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ABSTRACT 
Perceived obstruction of the Labour government's legislative programme in the 
mid-1970s sparked renewed interest in tackling the House of Lords. A Labour 
Party study group recommended outright abolition and this was adopted as policy, 
notwithstanding questions about the practicalities. The Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan, failed to prevent this; and his last minute attempt to block its inclusion 
in the 1979 manifesto, while successful, led to a major row which had significant 
repercussIons. The alternative policy was then to curtail drastically the Lords' 
powers, at least as a first step, but the arguments continued into the early 1980s. 
Labour's policy was a major influence in leading the Conservatives to set up a 
committee under Lord Home, which in ] 978 came forward with radical proposals, 
involving a partly or wholly elected chamber. However, these were never formally 
adopted as Conservative policy and, in office, particularly after the emphatic 
election victory of 1983, ministers became increasingly complacent and content to 
maintain the status quo. The Lords meanwhile showed themselves willing to 
defeat the government on occasion; but while this may have been an irritant, on 
crucial issues it could usually rely on 'backwoodsmen' to get its way and the 
Thatcher government seems never seriously to have contemplated legislation. 
The expenence of opposition in the 1980s led Labour, with the Parliamentary 
leadership more to the fore in its Policy Review, to change its approach. Now 
seeing the second chamber as a potential ally in safeguarding future reforms to 
constitutional and human rights, it supported a fully elected chamber; and the 
position of the Liberal Democrats was broadly similar. 
The question of Lords' reform had a significant influence on the politics of the 
time. illustrating the potential uses and limitations of prime ministerial power and 
changing perspectives between government and opposition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"We believe the present House of Lords is an outdated institution, 
completely inappropriate to a modem democratic system of government. 
It should not, therefore, continue in its present form". 
(Labour's Programme 1976, p 104) 
" ..... .in our view maintenance of the status quo is not a prudent policy. 
Indeed, we are doubtful if it is a policy at all." 
(The House of Lords: The Report of the ConselVative Review Committee. 
Conservative Central Office, 1978, p 35) 
As these statements contained in documents issued by the two mam political 
parties might suggest, there was considerable interest in and speculation about the 
future of the House of Lords in the late 1970s. Yet, in the event, it was not until 
1999 that any changes were implemented, when the Labour government removed 
the rights of most hereditary peers to sit in the House of Lords. 
Before that, the last major instance of government legislation aimed at reforming 
the second chamber had been the abortive attempt of Harold Wilson's Labour 
government through the Parliament (No.2) Bill of 1969. That episode, the events 
leading up to it and the immediate aftermath were examined in detail by Janet 
Morgan in her study covering the period. l No significant legislation in this area 
was brought before Parliament in the following two decades (other than what were 
essentially no more than gestures by backbenchers, which stood no realistic chance 
of reaching the statute book). Nevertheless, there were important developments 
in the way the I-louse of Lords handled the business that came before it and in its 
relations with the governments of the day; and the main political parties came 
forward with proposals for major refoml and even outright abolition of the second 
chamber. To date. there has been no detaikd study of these, of how and why 
they came about or of their particular impact. This thesis seeks to fill that gap. 
------------------ - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------------- - - - - - - --- ------- .. _---------------------- ------
Jant't Morgan The House of Lords and Il1t' J abour (iollcrnment /964-/970 (Oxford at 
th(' ('larend')11 Press, 1975). 
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Documentation is available on the actual composition and the workings (If the 
House of Lords over much of the period - for instance. in Donald SheWs 
definitive book; in a PhD thesis by Nicholas Baldwin; in the detailed study in the 
1988-89 Parliamentary Session, edited by Shell and Beamish; and in a wider study 
of the workings of Parliament by John Griffith and others.2 There are also various 
contemporary pamphlets by individuals and organisations: and, more recently, 
material produced in the run up to the 1999 legislation, such as the report by the 
Constitution Unit and the book of which the former Leader of the Lords, Ivor 
Richard, was joint author; also the government's White Paper itself, plus the 
subsequent report of the Royal Commission under Lord Wakeham) The House 
of Lords itself has also issued various infonnation and briefing papers. 
However, while many of these are extremely useful in providing a contemporary 
snapshot of the House of Lords, in showing how it dealt with particular issues or 
legislation, in outlining earlier reforms or proposals, or in discussing particular 
alternatives for reform, including their respective merits and demerits, none of 
them covers, to any substantial degree, the policy developments involving the main 
political parties of the 1970s and the 1980s, the events surrounding them and their 
consequences. Shell's book does mention these briefly, but, while making some 
pertinent observations, it, like the others, does not set out to provide an in-depth 
study and analysis of them (as, for instance. Morgan was able to do for the 
preceding period). 
') Donald Shell: The /louse of Lords (2nd edition. Harvester Wheatsbeaf, J992): Nicholas 
Baldwin Tht' Contempomry Houst' of Lords (unpublished PhD thesis, Universih of 
Exeter. 1985): Donald Shell and David Beamish: The House of Lords at Work 
(Clarendon Press. 1993). 
3 JAG Griffith and Michael RyJe with M A J Wlwl'icl Booth: Parliament - Functiol1.'. 
Pr.1cticc and ProCt'dllrc (Sweet and Maxwell. 19~9): (\mstiitution Unit: Reform of tht' 
HOUSt' of J ords (1996): lvor Richard and Damit'n Welfare: l in finished Busincs, 
Rcfof7JJ//I/:! tbe /JOUSt' 01 Lords (Vinta~e. 19(4): .'\10(it'misinl! Parliament: R('J(lmlllJp. tbe 
IIClIl."(' of i on/..... em 41K3 (IIMSO. January 14')9). R(llrd Commissiol1 on the Rc/of7l1 oj 
tht' /lOUSt' 01 J Old, !\ House for the Futuft' ( 'm 4.'34. IIMSO, January 2(00) 
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Moreover, few of the published diaries, autobiographies or biographies of the 
period have much, if anything, to say on this. There are a few exceptions from the 
Conservative side, such as the memoirs by two prominent peers, Lords Carrington 
and Hailsham.4 In addition, another former Cabinet minister, Ian Gilmour, has 
some interesting observations about the relationship between the Thatcher 
government and the Lords, as, albeit In brief references, do his colleagues 
Nicholas Ridley and William Whitelaw.5 
Similarly, despite the considerable interest aroused by policy developments at the 
time, they are hardly mentioned by Labour politicians, beyond, in some cases, 
noting the difficulties the Labour government ran into with its legislation in the 
Lords. This applies even to Tony Benn in his diaries, notwithstanding his close 
involvement as a member of Labour's National Executive. Benn does, 
nevertheless, give an interesting account of the arguments surrounding the drafting 
of Labour's 1979 manifesto, in which policy on the Lords featured prominently, 
which supplements that contained in the contemporary account, What Went 
Wrong, although both are from similar standpoints.6 The Prime Minister at the 
time, James Callaghan, perhaps surprisingly, does not deal with the episode in his 
memoirs, although he does make a couple of interesting observations about the 
Lords generally.? Overall, however, there is relatively little material to to be 
obtained from these and similar sources. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
·t Lord Carrington: Reflect on Things Past (Collins, 1988); Lord Hailsham: The Door 
Wherein J Went (Collins, 1975) and A Sparrow's Flight (Collins, 1990). 
<; Ian Gilmour: Dancing with Dogma - Britain under Thatcherism (Simon and Shuster, 
1992); Nicholas Ridley: My Style of Government: The Thatcher Yea~ (Hutchinson, 
1991); William Whitelaw: The Whitelaw Memoirs (Aurum Press, 1989). 
6 Tony Benn: Conflict of Interest: Diaries 1977-80 (Hutchinson. 1990); 
Kcn Coates (ed): What Went Wrong (Spokesman, 1979) 
7 James Callaghan: Time <1nd Chance (Collins 1987). It is however, brietly mentioned by his 
biographer. Kenneth 0 Morgan. in C-aJJaghall." A LtIt' (OlJP, 1997). 
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Yet, arguably, the developments in this area, particularly in the second half of the 
1970s and the early 1980s, were at least as interesting as those that went before. 
This period saw a number of proposals for reform. By far the most significant 
were those which emerged from committees established by the main political 
parties, which, in the case of the Labour Party, involved abolition of the second 
chamber, leading to a unicameral Parliament; and, in that of the Conservative 
Party, slightly less drastic, but nevertheless sweeping reforms, involving at least 
partial election of the second chamber. If either had been implemented, the 
constitutional ramifications would have been considerable; and the abolition 
proposals did actually become, for a period, the formal policy of the Labour Party. 
As Lord Crowther Hunt, a member of the Study Group which came forward with 
the policy (although not, himself, a supporter of it) was to observe: 
"As a constitutional historian, I'm glad the Labour Party has committed 
itself to total abolition of the Lords ... because it raises such a list of 
fascinating questions".8 
Such questions did indeed anse, including some concemmg the rights of 
Parliament, the powers of the Crown and constitutional propriety. Any attempt to 
implement the policy could have precipitated the biggest constitutional wrangle 
since the Parliament Act of 1911. 
As it was, both proposals were ~re the subject of political debate and some 
controversy both within and between the parties; and they had a significant impact 
more widely on the politics of the time, particularly in the Labour Party in the run 
up to the 1979 election and the ensuing arguments and divisions. After something 
of a lull in the] 980s, there was a renewal of interest in the Labour Party, although 
not in the Conservative Party, particularly in the reform of the second chamber in 
the context of wider constitutional reform. Although, in the event, the structure 
of the Iiousc of Lords remained suhstantially unchanged until the very end of the 
century, the developments over the preceding period should contribute an 
understanding of why this was so and how the main political parties reached their 
respl'Ctive positions on this important constitutional issue. This thesis aims to 
l'xilIllinc those developments in depth. 
--------
- -- - --------------
X "Who :\ccds thl' Lords·~·. file l.istt'nCl. ·Hh December 19XO (\'01 104. P 74~). 
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It will start by looking briefly (in Chapter 1) at the historical background, including 
the main legislative developments earlier in the 20th century, such as the 1911 
Parliament Act which first restricted the powers of the House of Lords, the 1949 
Parliament Act which limited them further, the 1958 Life Peerages Act and the 
1963 Peerage Act which made changes to the composition and the abortive 
attempt at comprehensive reform in ] 968/69. All these are outlined in Shetrs 
book. The earlier developments were also covered, for instance, by P t\ 
Bromhead's study covering the years between 1911 and 1957; while the 
circumstances surrounding the passage of the 1911 Act were dealt with by Roy 
Jenkins in Mr. Balfour's PoodJe. 9 As already noted, the 1968/69 reforms and the 
events leading up to them have been covered by Janet Morgan. It is not proposed 
to re-examine these in detail, but, particularly in respect of the 1960s, some new 
information has subsequently become available, for instance, from the Public 
Record Office and other archives;lO also from some diaries and memoirs. Where 
this contributes to a better understanding of this historical background, it will be 
referred to. 
The thesis will then look in detail (in Chapters 2-6) at the important policy 
initiatives in the Labour Party in the late 1970s and the 1980s, including the policy 
of outright abolition which excited much interest at the time, the controversy 
which surrounded this and the questions which continued to be posed about its 
practicality and constitutional propriety. It will show that this was an important 
factor in a major political row concerning the content of the Party's ] 979 
manifesto, which demonstrated the fraught relationship between the Parliamentary 
leadership and the National Executive at the time; and it will provide new 
background information, which throws additional light on this and on the ensuing 
arguments about the Party's constitutional arrangements, which were one factor 
leading to a split in the Party and the creation of a breakaway. It will also show 
------------------------------------_._------------------------ ._----------------------------------------------
9 P .\ Bromhead: IDe /lOUSt' 01 Lords mId COll/t'mp<)/an Politics NJ/-N57 (Routledge.." 
Kc..'l'gan and Paul. ll)'i~); Roy Jenkins: Afr Iblfl11Jf:" Poodle (Hein('mann, 19'i-t. IH'\\ 
edition. Papt'mlac. 1999). 
10 Publi{' Record Office recently incorporated in lIlt' '\iational Archivc~ DOCUIl1l'lltalhHl \\ill. 
howeVl'l. bc..' crted as from the Puhlic Record ()ffice 
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how, after further heated discussions, the policy was slightly modified. It will then 
demonstrate how, after a lull following the heavy election defeat of 1983, Labour's 
Policy Review of the late] 980s saw the development of a radically different policy, 
with the Parliamentary leadership taking much more of a leading role, so that, by 
the time of the 1992 general election, far from contemplating abolition, it was 
advocating an elected second chamber with significant new powers. 
Similarly (in Chapters 7 and ~), it will look at developments in the Conservative 
Party and, in particular, at how, at least partly in response to those in the Labour 
Party, it set up an important committee in the late 1970s, which came forward with 
proposals for radical changes, involving a partially or even a wholly elected 
chamber. It will also show how and possibly why these were never implemented, 
or indeed formally adopted as Party policy; and how, despite subsequent 
occasional flickers of interest, by the time of the 1992 election, the Partv had 
become complacent to the extent that it seemed content to support the status quo. 
The thesis will also look at policy developments in the Liberal Party, in the newly 
formed Social Democratic Party and from the merged Liberal Democrats (Chapter 
9). This will necessarily be more concise, not only for reasons of space but 
because, as minority parties, they were less likely to be in a position to implement 
their policies. However, there was always the potential for them to exercise 
influence, particularly in a hung Parliament, so they should not be ignored. 
Finally, although strictly speaking outside the parameters of the thesis, it will be 
necessary to note brietly in a Postscript (Chapter 10) the subsequent 
developments. in which the main political parties again changed their policies in 
government and opposition, and which have seen the actual implementation of an 
important, if limited, reform of the second chamber. 
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While it is not intended to be a definitive history or record of the work of the 
House of Lords itself over this period, the thesis will look at some of the most 
important developments, in particular where the actions of the Lords may have 
influenced the attitudes of the parties and key political figures. This applies, for 
instance, to the episodes in the 1970s when the Lords blocked or amended major 
items of the Labour government's legislation, to its frustration and that of the 
Party more widely. Similarly, it applies to episodes in the 1980s, when the Lords 
sometimes proved themselves a nuisance to the Conservative government, but also 
when, particularly on some crucial issues such as the poll tax, the government was 
able to rely on its supporters in the Lords, and where this, too, may have 
influenced the way the second chamber was viewed. Although such instances were 
often significant for the approaches of both major political parties, they will be 
dealt with principally in the Chapters referring to the governments of the 
respective periods. 
Although reference will be made, where appropriate, to specialist books, wider 
studies of the period and to individual memoirs and diaries, the material which 
these provide is, as has been noted, limited. The thesis will therefore draw, to a 
considerable extent, on contemporary reports in newspapers and periodicals and 
on relevant Parliamentary Debates. It will also look extensively at the appropriate 
documents of the political parties. These will, of course, include published 
statements and reports. ll However, most importantly, it will also include the 
documents of the relevant internal party committees, especially those of the 
Labour Party's Machinery of Government Study Group, ] 976-82, and the 
Conservative Party's Review Committee, 1977-78. It will also refer to reports and 
records of Party Conference debates and decisions and, where availahle, 
documents rdating to higher level committees. in particular, the Labour Party's 
I lome Policv and National Executive Committees, hut also to documents, where 
accessihle, from the Conservative and Liberal archives. 
II l'.g. Ille \tachwen' of' (JO\cmment ,IDa the I/OIN' ut loros (Ihc Labour Part\', 1(77). 
Inc House 011 ord. ... (Conservative Central Office, 1(78); \1eet the (na/lcnf!c.\/akc rh(' 
(11<1I1f!e ( Ihl' L1bour Party. 1989). 
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This material will be supplemented by interviews with a number of the key 
participants from all the political parties, who have been able to provide important 
additional insight and infonnation. In addition, the author was, himself, directly 
involved in much of what happened in the Labour Party in this area, as a party 
official, in drafting documents and acting as secretary to various committees and 
groups, including the Party's Machinery of Government Study Group 1976-tS2. 
This offers a unique perspective and experience which can help inform this study, 
although the intention is to examine all developments objectively and, wherever 
necessary and possible, to support this evidence from other sources. 
All this is intended to help throw new light on the developments on this issue 
during the period covered and on why, despite a good deal of interest and activity, 
no major refonns were implemented then. It also aims to shows how and why 
these nevertheless had a significant influence on the politics of the time and to 
contribute to an understanding of how the House of Lords ended the 20th century 
in the form that it did. 
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1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The House of Lords, as one of two chambers of Parliament, has its origins in the 
councils summoned by medieval kings. Those attending such councils included 
archbishops and bishops, abbots and priors, earls, barons and the king's ministers. 
From the late 13th century, representatives from shires, cities and boroughs were 
also summoned and, by the end of the following century, the latter had formed a 
separate House of Commons. Henceforth, Parliament comprised two distinctive 
chambers. By the time of the 16th century, the Upper House, comprising Lords 
Spiritual and Lords Temporal, had become known as the House of Lords. 
There were various changes affecting the make up of the Upper House over the 
centuries - including the creation of new peerages (increasingly, towards the 
modern era, on the advice of ministers), the creation of new ranks of peerages in 
the late medieval period, the disappearance of abbots and priors following the 
dissolution of the monasteries in the 16th century, and the hiatus during the 
period of the Commonwealth in the 17th century, when the House temporarily 
ceased to exist. The Acts of Union of 1707 and 1800 provided for peers from 
Scotland and Ireland respectively to elect a limited number from amongst 
themselves to sit in the House of Lords at Westminster (arrangements which 
continued for Irish peers until they ceased to be eligible, as such, in 1922; and for 
Scottish peers until 1963, when all became eligible). With the creation of new 
sees in the 19th century, there was from 1847 a limitation on the number of 
bishops entitled to sit (and disestablishment subsequently removed Irish and 
Wdsh bishops from the House in 1869 and 1920 respectively). The first law lords 
were created in 1876, initially sitting only during their individual terms of office 
(like bishops), but as from 1887 for their lifetime. Nevertheless, at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, membership of the House was almost exclusively 
hereditary in nature (with the exception of the hishops and law lords) and would 
remain so for decades to come.) 
-------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec Shell: Iht' HOLJse oIl ords. pp 7-10; I be (,uide to tbe House 01 Lords (Carlton 
Publishm!?. 20(3) pp -lO--l); ) louse of Lords I nfomlation Sheets '\;0 <) (House of fords 
Rclc)JJll 1,""50-1970) and :\~) 11 (WhM ,-' the Hou .... e' of I OId.,'J) 
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Although Water Bagehot, writing in the 1860s~ had felt able to describe the House 
of Lords as one of the "dignified" parts of the Constitution, the Upper House 
actually enjoyed, in most respects, equal powers with the House of Commons. By 
tradition, the Commons exercised the dominant role in financial matters, which 
was rarely challenged by the Lords. However, with an unwritten constitution, as 
commentator Donald Shell has observed, "no authoritative document ever defined 
its role"; and the House of Lords could attempt to exercise its powers in this field 
(as it did in 1909, precipitating a constitutional crisis). Moreover, at the beginning 
of the 20th century, the Prime Minister, himself, the third Marquess of Salisbury, 
sat in the House of Lords (although he would be the last to do so ).2 
Up to the period covered by this thesis, there were four legislative changes during 
the 20th century affecting the House of Lords. The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 
1949 limited the powers of the House and provided the basis for its operation 
throughout the period in question. The] 958 Life Peerages Act introduced major 
changes to the composition of the House of Lords. The 1963 Peerage Act, in 
addition to its provisions for renouncmg peerages, made some other modest 
changes affecting composition. Other measures were brought in at various times, 
without the need for separate legislation - for instance, the introduction of 
travelling expenses in 1946, subsistence allowances in 1957 and provision for Leave 
of Absence in 1958. There were also other significant official proposals for 
reform brought forward which did not reach the statute book - in 1918; in 1948, 
before the implementation of the 1949 Act; and in ] 968/69, when legislation was 
introduced but never passed. All of these are outlined below. The] 999 House of 
Lords Act, removing the rights of most hereditary peers to sit, came after the 
period covered by this thesis.3 
2 Ibid. Set' also Walter Bagehot: The En!!1ish Constitution (Fontana. 1963 edition p 18: first 
publIshed 1867). Note that in 1963 the Larl of Home actually disclaimed his pt'nage 
aftt'r b('cmning Prime Minister. 
3 Suhseqm'nt developments are noted bridly 111 ('hapter 10. 
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Parliament Act 1911 
This Act was passed by Parliament, under Asquith's Liberal government, following 
the rejection in 1909 by the House of Lords of the Finance Bill to implement the 
Budget proposals. As things then stood, the House of Lords could have blocked 
the legislation; and the Parliament Act 1911 was only passed when backed by a 
threat to create sufficient peers to ensure its passage. Its main provisions were 
that: 
(i) Bills certified as Money Bills would receive the Royal Assent one month 
after being sent to the House of Lords, with or without its consent; 
(ii) Other Public Bills (except a measure to extend the life of a Parliament) 
passed by the Commons in three successive sessions and rejected by the 
Lords would nevertheless receive the Royal Assent, provided that there 
was a minimum period of two years between the Commons' Second 
Reading in the first session and Third Reading in the third session. 
The preamble to the Act stated that it was intended to substitute for the existing 
hereditary chamber one constructed on a popular basis, and that it was thus a 
transitional measure. However, these further changes did not, in the event, 
materialise.4 
4 See Shell (op cit) pp 10-11; House of Lords Information Sheet No 9.Previous to this, in 
1908, a House of Lords Select Committee, chaired by the 5th Earl of Rosebery, had 
concluded that "it was undesirable that the possession of a peerage should of itself give the 
right to sit and vote in the House of Lords". It recommended a chamber comprising 
around 400 members, mostly hereditary peers elected by themselves for the lifetime of a 
Parliament, plus some other hereditary peers by virtue of particular qualifications and a 
limited number of life peers (Report of the Select Committee on the House of Lords, 
HL 234, 1908). No action was taken on this. 
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Bryce Commission 1918 
A Commission was established by the wartime coalition government to consider 
the composition and powers of a reformed second chamber. it was chaired by 
Viscount Bryce and comprised equal numbers of MPs and peers. It 
recommended that the House of Lords be made up of 246 members indirectly 
elected by members of the House of Commons on a regional basis, together with 
81 existing members elected by a committee of both Houses. (Election should be 
for 12 years, with one-third retiring every four years.) It also proposed new 
arrangements for joint consultation between the two Houses to resolve 
differences.s 
In 1922, in place of the Bryce proposals, the coalition government proposed a 
House of 350 members, comprising mainly members elected directly or indirectly 
from outside, plus some hereditary peers elected from among themselves and 
some nominated by the Crown. The coalition government fell soon afterwards; 
and although similar proposals were mooted when the Conservatives wert' in office 
in 1924 and 1927, nothing came of any of these.6 
Post 1945: The Salisbury Doctrine 
Following its landslide victory In 1945, the Labour government enjoyed a large 
majority in the elected House of Commons, but the Conservative Party was sti;1 
the dominant party in the unelected (and then almost completely hereJita~) 
I louse of Lords. It thus had the potential ability to disrupt the government s 
legislative programme. It was in this context that what was to become known GS 
the 'Salisbury Doctrine', which was to influence the approach of the ConscrvativlS 
in the post-war years, was enunciated. According to this, the Conservativc:-- WQuJj 
not use their majority in the Lords to block kg.islation which had been in Lahnur') 
----------------_._-----------------------------------------------. --------------------------------- -- .--
6 
RCp0l1 "I tile Conlercnn.' 011 the Reform <>1 the .\·(,(·ond Chamber. 1918 (Cd 9018. 
H\1S<) )tJIX). Tht' Commission wa~ 1101 unaIllmous - eight of the 32 Jl1l'mber:-. dl ........ l'ntl'd 
from thf> ~chcme t(H election. 
. )61 ') Sec BlOl11hcad (OP CIt) rr -. -_. 
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manifesto. It was put forward by the Conservative Leader in the House of Lords, 
Viscount Cranborne (who would later become the 5th Marquess of Salisbury), at 
the beginning of the new Parliamentary session. Referring particularly to the 
nationalisation of the coal industry, he said: 
"With regard to this and similar proposals ... whatever our personal views we 
should fom1ally recognise that these proposals were put before the country 
at the recent general election, and that the people of this country, with the 
full knowledge of these proposals, returned the Labour government to 
power. The government may therefore, I think, fairly claim that they have 
a mandate to introduce these proposals. I believe it would be wrong, when 
the country has so recently expressed its view, for this House to oppose 
proposals which have been definitely put before the electorate."7 
It is worth noting precisely what was said, since this was still considered relevant 
decades later.8 However Salisbury (as he had by then become) did refine this 
position somewhat in retrospect, when interviewed in 1970: 
"The Conservative peers came to the conclusion that where something was 
in the Labour Party manifesto we would regard it as approved by the 
country and we'd have second reading and amend it in committee stage. 
I f they produced something that was not in the manifesto, we reserved the 
right to do what we thought best... we passed on second reading nearly all 
the nationalisation bills - in the one case of the Iron and Steel Bill we wen t 
rather further as we didn't think they'd a justified demand. So we put in an 
amendment not to put it into force until after the election."9 
This would seem to suggest that the 'doctrine', as applied in practice, did not 
necessarily mean withholding opposition to the measures in question; rather that 
they would not oppose them on second reading, and that there might be 
exceptions even to that. 
-------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- --
7 House of Lords Debates, 16th August 1945 (Vol 131. Col 47). 
8 See, for Instance, Chapter 2. 
9 Ouoted hy Janet Morgan (op cit) P ·l 
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Although the 'Salisbury Doctrine' concerning the mandate may thus seem to have 
contained a degree of ambiguity, it was nevertheless - with the possible exception 
of steel nationalisation - broadly adhered to during the period of the Attlee 
government)O However, one important measure was blocked by the House of 
Lords, namely the Parliament Bill to reform its own powers. 
Parliament Act 1949 
This Act reduced the period of delay required by the 1911 Act for the passage of 
Public Bills without the agreement of the Lords to two successive sessions and one 
year between Commons' Second Reading in the first session and Third Reading in 
the second session. However, before it reached the statute book, there had been 
significant discussions between the political parties, in an attempt to reach 
agreement on more wide-ranging reform. 
Labour's election manifesto had gIVen "clear notice that we will not tolerate 
obstruction of the people's will by the House of Lords";l1 and the Prime Minister, 
Clement Attlee, thought it "good tactics to make the necessary reform before 
trouble between the Houses has arisen")2 It might be argued that subsequent 
Labour governments would have been wise to take a similar view. On the other 
hand, some might argue that attempting Lords' reform could itself precipitate such 
trouble. 
The Parliament Bill was introduced in the Commons in November 1947, passing 
through all its stages there one month later. It then went to the Lords, where the 
('onservatives moved an amendment declining to give a Second Reading, but the 
debate was adjourned in February 1948 to allow all-party talks to take place. 
These were convened later the same month and concluded in April. 
----------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
to According to a later ConseIVative Leader in the Lords. Lord ('-arrington. this was "the only 
cOIlCt.'ivable way you could operate" after 1945. given the small Ilumber of Labour pel'r~ at 
that time (Interview. April 1999). 
II I.et\ Face the Future. Labour Party Manifesto 1945 (see L1ix>ur Party (iencraJ Flection 
Manifc ... t(ls 19(}()- 1997. ed lain Dale. RoutkdgcIPoliticos 2000. P 51) 
12 Publir Rt:cord ()ffin'. PREM 8/1059. House of Lords Reform: Mt'morandum from f\ttit't' 
to I ()Hj Addison (I.OId Pnv)' Seal). 15th {)(·tober 1947 
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A measure of tentative agreement was reached on the question of composition, 
including that the second chamber should be "complementary to and not a rival to 
the Lower lIouse"; that any revised constitution should ensure, as far as 
practicable, that a permanent majority was not assured for any political party: that 
heredity should not by itself constitute a qualification for admission; that 'Lords of 
Parliament' could be drawn from hereditary peers, or commoners created life 
peers, and that women would be eligible for appointment; there should be 
provIsIon for some descendants for the sovereign and also law lords and lords 
spiritual. Some remuneration could be payable; and some provision made for the 
disqualification of a member of the second chamber "who neglects or become~ no 
longer able or fitted to perform his duties as such". Peers not made 'Lords of 
Parliament' should be able to vote and stand for the Commons. However, on the 
question of powers, the participants failed to reach agreement. Although, at one 
point, the difference appeared to be a matter of only three months, both 
government and opposition concluded that the differences were fundamental and 
that there was insufficient basis for further discussions.13 
Following this breakdown, the Lords declined to give the Bill a Second Reading. 
The provisions of the 1911 Act (which the Bill itself sought to amend) were then 
called into play; and the Bill eventually went through to receive the Royal Assent 
in December 1949.14 
13 Parliament Bill - Agreed Statement on Conclusions of Conference by Party LeadeIS, 
Feb-April 1948 (Cmnd 7380, HMSO 1948). 
14 House of Lords Debates, 16th December 1949 (Vol 165, Col 1668). An account of the 
timetable of events concerning the passage of the Bill was given by the Home Secretary, 
Chuter Ede, in the Commons on 31st October 1949 (House of Commons Debates, Vol 
469, Co]s 45-47). 
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Meanwhile the Labour Party Conference had debated a motion expressing alarm 
at the government's apparent intention to support plans which would make 
subsequent abolition virtually impossible, and calling for an elected assembly. For 
the National Executive Commitee (NEC), Herbert Morrison (Lord President of 
the Council and Leader of the House of Commons) spoke of the dangers of any 
elected chamber which would have more moral authority than the existing House 
or that arising from the all-party talks; and seeking (successfully) to ensure that 
motion was withdrawn, he told the Conference that any agreement by party 
leaders would have been subject to approval by the NEC and the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, adding that any proposals which re-emerged would be discussed 
with the NEC)5 It might be thought surprising that Labour ministers were 
prepared ostensibly to give the National Executive what amounted to a veto on an 
important government policy in this way.16 Certainly it makes an interesting 
contrast to James Callaghan's later attitude towards the NEC and Party 
Conference on the same issue)7 
It was perhaps fortunate for the leadership that it was not put to the test. Had it 
proceeded on the basis of the all-party discussions rather than with its own 
measure, then, according to Tony Benn, "it is far from certain that M r Attlee 
would have been able to get a scheme of this kind accepted by the Labour 
Party."18 If so, the Attlee government might have found itself in difficulties with 
its own party and backbenchers, as the Wilson government did twenty years later. 
15 Lahour Party Conference Report 1948 (pp 210-12). Morrison's argument would seem to 
lend strength to the view later put forward, for instance by Ronald Butt, that, when in 
power. "Labour likes to have a weak chamher with no moral authority and no effective 
powers" (The Lords in Modem Dress', The Times, 5th November 1970). Lord (arrington 
bas suggested that the House of Lords as then constituted was "absolutely admirable for 
the Labour Party", in that if it challenged a (Labour) government, people would not 
discuss the actual issue in question. but whether the unelected House had the right to 
chaHen!!.e the elected House (Interview). 
16 It may not have been mere conference rhetoric. The White Paper itself. referrin!!. to the 
government's position on powers. states that It was prepared, as part of a !!.eneral 
a!!.reement. to "suggest to the Labour Party" an alternative longer delayin!!. period 
(('mnd 7380, Para 8). 
17 See Chapters -' and -t. 
18 Anthuny Wed!!,Wood Belm: The PrilY CounCIl as a Second Chamber: Fabian '1 J act 
30" (1957). P 5, 
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In opposing the legislation the Conservative leadership clearly took the view that 
the 'Salisbury doctrine' should not apply in this instance. Indeed, in the Lords, 
the Marquess of Salisbury (as he had by then become) argued that "th e 
government have no mandate for constitutional reform".19 Nevertheless, while 
unwilling to go along with the government in respect of powers, the Conservative s 
had been prepared to contemplate some quite significant changes to the I louse 0 f 
Lords - including a move away from its hereditary basis. 
Following the 1949 Parliament Act, the Conservative Party leadership appears to 
have been persuaded of the desirability of reforming the composition of the 
House of Lords. It went into the 1950 election stating the aim "to reach a refornl 
and final statement of the constitution and powers of the House of Lords by 
means of an all-party Conference called at an appropriate date", which would have 
before it proposals that "the present right to attend and vote based solely on 
heredity should not by itself constitute a qualification for admission to a reformed 
House". It should have powers appropriate to its constitution, but not exceeding 
those conferred by the 1911 Act.20 Although less specific at the 1951 election, the 
Conservatives re-iterated the intention to call an all-party conference.Ll 
The Conservatives in Office 1951-64: The Coming of Life Peerages 
This period saw two significant legislative reforms affecting the House of Lords, 
both of which were passed during Harold Macmillan's term of office. Both were 
government Bills, although the second was to some extent forced on the 
government by circumstances. 
19 House of'Lords Debates, 21st October 1947 (Vol 152. Cols 28-31). 
20 This is the Road, ConseIVative Party Manifesto 1950 (see Conservative Party (.ieneral 
Ejection Manifestos 1900-1997, ed lain Dale, RoutledgelPoliticos 2000, p 90). 
21 The Manifesto of the Conservative and Unionist Party 1951 (Ibid, P 99). 
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The first measure was the Life Peerages Act 1958, which provided for th,-' 
creation of life peerages for the first time (other than for law 10rds).21 It alsQ 
allowed for women to be appointed life peers, and thus to sit in the House for th~ 
first time. Although hereditary creations continued until 1964, after that time they 
virtually ceased. Nevertheless, life peers continued to be outnumbered by 
hereditary peers throughout the period covered by this thesis. 
The second measure was the Peerage Act 1963, which introduced prOVIsions 
allowing hereditary peerages to be disclaimed. It laid down that henceforth all 
peers by succession would be able to renounce their peerages for their lifetime ~ 
and that they would be given twelve months from inheriting in which to decide 
whether to so, unless they were sitting MPs, in which case the period would only 
be one month. Existing peers by succession were given twelve months in which to 
decide. The legislation also included two other changes: to allow hereditary 
peeresses in their own right to receive a Writ of Summons, and thus sit and vote 
in the House of Lords; and to allow all holders of Scottish peerages to participate 
in the House. (Previously they had elected a limited number from among 
themselves. ) 
Churchill's government had entered office committed at least to further steps 
towards reform; and when the Liberal peer, Viscount Simon, introduced a Life 
Peers Bill in the House of Lords at the end of 1952, its response was to seek to 
convene an all-party conference, as envisaged in the manifesto.23 To some extent 
this was a ploy. Salisbury, who was now Lord President of the Council, told the 
Cabinet that: " .... he had no expectation that the three parties would find any 
common ground of agreement. An attempt must nevertheless be made as a result 
of the pledge given at the time of the election. If the Conference failed, the 
government would be free to make its own proposals."24 
22 Law lords received life peerages under the 1876 Appellate JUlisdiction Act. as amended. 
23 Simon (a former Lord Chancellor) formally introduced his Bill on 10th December 1952. 
The Second Reading debate was adjourned without a vote, to allow for the proposed 
all-party talks, on 3rd February 1953 (House of Lords Debates. Vol IRO. Cols 133-176). 
2,1 PRO: CAB J2Krn. CC (52) 108, jOth Dect'mber 1952. 
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Nevertheless, Salisbury's conversion to the cause of reform of the House of Lords 
would seem to have been genuine. In criticising Simon's Bill on the grounds that 
it would not remedy "those main weaknesses of the existing composition of the 
House of Lords which make it so vulnerable", he pointed out to his colleagues: 
"The hereditary right to legislate will continue untramelled, even for those 
peers who never attend the House at alL The backwoodsmen will still, if 
they wish to be that (sic) ... [This] will be deplored by all those who really 
do the work of their Lordships' House, and it will make the task of those 
who wish to buttress the powers and influence of the second chamber 
quite impossible."25 
This would seem to be a significant acknowledgement by a semor ConselVative 
that the participation of backwoodsmen was a problem. The government 
proceeded to establish a cabinet committee, chaired by Salisbury, but nothing 
came of this in that Parliament.26 The Labour Party had made it clear it had no 
wish to join any discussions, but Salisbury told the House: "If we cannot get the 
co-operation of the Labour Party, we shall have to go on without them, just as 
they did without us in 1948."27 
In the 1955 general election, the ConselVatives, now led by Sir Anthony Eden, 
were the only party to refer to the Lords in their manifesto, declaring that it had 
"long been the ConselVative wish to reach a settlement regarding the reform of 
the House of Lords" and that "Labour's refusal to take part in the conversations 
must not be assumed to have delayed reform indefinitely." They would "continue 
to seek the co-operation of others in reaching a solution", but any changes should 
be concerned solely with composition.28 
25 PRO: CAB 129/57, C (52) 454, Life Peers: Memorandum from the Lord President of the 
Council, 29th December 1952. 
2b PRO: CAB 130/86, (,EN -l32/l-3, House of Lord~ Refonn Commitee (1953-1955). 
Discussions there show that Salisbury was not aloue in his concern to deal with 
backwoodsmcn. 
27 JlOUS(' of Lords Debates, 9th March 1955 (\'ul 191. Cols 8-l2~(6). 
28 l if)iled for Pt'acc and Pro!!rc.~. Conservative \1anifesto 1955 (Dale. op cit, p 125). 
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Whether or not the Conservatives had long wished to reach a settlement they had 
been unhappy at the reduction in powers following the failure to reach agreement 
in 1948. No doubt it was partly for that reason that they had subsequently shown 
the greater interest in looking for further reforms, particularly involving 
composition. Bromhead, in his study of the House of Lords, published just a little 
later, suggested that the Conservatives, having wanted to restore the House of 
Lords' formal powers to obstruct socialist legislation, had now abandoned this as 
unrealistic and were pursuing more limited objectives, hoping to improve its 
effectiveness and prestige, for which they would in return accept a reduction in 
their numerical supremacy.29 
Conversely, the Labour Party, in opposition, showed little interest in any further 
reform. Having successfully enacted legislation restricting the powers of the Lords, 
there would have been a reluctance to restore credibility to the House; indeed 
throughout the 1950s the issue was not mentioned in any of the Party's manifestos, 
neither was it debated at the Party Conference. There seems to have been no 
great pressure for action from within the Party. A 1954 Fabian pamphlet, 
although itself putting forward proposals for reform, nevertheless acknowledged a 
"widely held view" among "working socialists" that it would be "unwise" even to 
attempt limited reforms~30 and in another Fabian pamphlet, published in 1957, 
Anthony Wedgwood Benn described the Party's policy then as one "of leaving it 
alone to die quietly". He said Labour had come to realise the value of a second 
chamber - "by maintaining it as it is, with aU its absurdities and anomalies, it has 
left it powerless to do more than minor damage to Commons legislation"}! 
29 Bromhead (op cit) p vii. 
30 Reform olebe Lords: fabian Research Series No 169 (19)4) by Lord Chorley.lkmard 
Crick and Donald Chapman. The authors' proposals involved a mixture of appointt.:d 
members and indirect election by the Bouse of C-Ommons. 
31 Benn (op cit) p 1. Nevertheless, he warned that the party "cannot go on saying that 
nothin,. can be done and must think out its attitude afresh": othetwise the long tern1 
conseqlll'nCe~ would be that the Conservatives v.ould rdorm it There was a ''strong case" 
tor a second chamber t'xercisin? an ad\isorv rok "to help Ihl' (louse of Commons which 
would othtT\VISl' be (')\'t'rburdl'ned" ApJx)intment \~as pll'krablc to any torm nl electIon. 
and he sll~ested a chamber with Iin1Jtl'd delay",,!? pOV.CfS. comprising Prin OlllDClllors 
not III tht, ('ommons (This mi~ht St.'COl surpns1l1gl\ con~t'J'\'atl\·('. in view of his latn 
;Hh-()Cal~' of abolitinn) 
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Such observations notwithstanding, Viscount Alexander (then Labour leader in the 
Lords) pointed out in a Lords' debate that the Party policy was still officially for 
abolition, even though the last Conference resolution to that effect had been in 
1934. Until Conference decided differently, "there can be no actual recessIon 
from that", and he could not commit the Party with regard to reform.32 
Importance was apparently attached even to distant Conference decisions. 
Two procedural changes were introduced in the mid-1950s. One was the 
introduction of an attendance allowance, which meant that peers could claim 
expenses for attending the House. The other was provision for peers to apply for 
leave of absence for the duration of a Parliament)3 This did not fully address the 
problem of backwoodsmen, as is illustrated by later instances of complaints.34 
According to Donald Shell, the arrangements "seem somewhat pointless" .'<; 
A much more significant change was the introduction of life peerages by the 1958 
Life Peerages Act. Even so, the legislation did not go so far as suggested by the 
Conservatives in their 1950 manifesto, in that it did not place any restrictions on 
hereditary peers, who would continue vastly to out number life peers. Bromhead~ 
writing shortly afterwards, thought that the legislation came as "something of an 
anti-climax". On the other hand, Shell, more than thirty years later, concluded 
that "growing atrophy was averted by the Life Peerages Act".36 
32 House of Lords Debates, 30th October 1957 (Vol 205, Cols 593-9). 
33 Morgan (op cit) pp 12-15. The arrangements for leave of absence, incorporated in 
Standing Orders in 1958, followed the recommendations of a Select Committee on the 
Powers of the House (HL 66, HMSO, 24th January 1956). 
34 See, for instance, Chapter 8. The Select Committee had rejected an earlier proposal by 
the 5th Marquess of Exeter that no peer should vote unless he attended a given numbt'r 
of times (Ibid, Cols 24-25). 
35 The House of Lords (op cit) p 105. 
36 Bromhead (op cit) p viii; Shell and Beamish: The House of Lords at Work, p 9. 
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In the Commons, Labour put a reasoned amendment, declining to give a Second 
Reading to "a Bill which leaves the House of Lords overwhelmingly hereditary in 
character and with unimpaired powers to frustrate and obstruct the will of the 
elected representatives of the people". According to the Labour leader. Hugh 
Gaitskell, it gave the Lords "a slightly more respectable appearance" but left the 
overwhelming Conservative majority and existing powers untouched.37 The view 
that the Bill was essentially cosmetic was apparently shared by the Liberals. Their 
spokesman, the former leader, Clement Davies, agreed with Gaitskell that the real 
purpose was to make the House of Lords look "a bit more respectable", while 
bolstering the hereditary principle)8 However, the Labour amendment was 
defeated and the Bill was enacted in April 1958)9 
The 1963 Peerage Act followed the controversy which arose in 1960 when the then 
MP for Bristol South East, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, inherited a peerage (the 
Viscountcy of Stansgate) and was thus disqualified from membership of the House 
of Commons. Benn stood and won the subsequent by-election, but his election 
was declared void. A Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament, established 
to consider the constitutional implications, recommended introducing a right to 
disclaim an hereditary peerage (and also the admission of hereditary peeresses in 
their own right).40 
37 HOIiSc of (trfo,,,,,c"'J' Cebc.frS. 1'2."''''bNO~ 1"5<6 (to'S'lB,CDI, if"-+3G) 
38 Ibid (Col 430). The Liberals had only six seats in the Commons. 
39 Voting on the amendment was 305 to 251 (Ibid, 13th February 1958, Col 704). 
40 Report of the Joint Committee on House of Lords Refonn (HL23, HC38 Session 1962-3). 
(The Benn/Stansgate case and the subsequent development are summarised by Shell 
(op cit) pp 18-20. See also Tony Benn: Yea~ of Hope, Diaries 1940-1962 
(pp 356-421) and Out of the Wilderness, Diaries 1963-67 (pp 2-52); Hutchinson, 1987 and 
1994.) At one point, Macmillan had apparently expressed an interest in widening the 
scope of the Select Committee "to do something to settle the composition of the House of 
Lords and perhaps settle it for years to come, saying that they could then "claim to be the 
true refonners of the House of Lords' composition", first by "the Life Peers Act" (sic) and 
then by this (quoted by DR Thorpe in Alec Douglas-Home, Sinclair Stephenson 1996, 
p 259). 
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The legislation proved to be important to the future of the Conservative Party. 
because the period of grace allowed for existing peers to renounce happened tu 
coincide with Macmillan's resignation as Prime Minister and party leader In 
October 1963. Two of the leading contenders, the Earl of Home and Viscoun t 
Hailsham, were thus able to renounce their peerages and then successfully seek 
Commons seats. The former, who became Sir Alec Douglas-Home, succeeded as 
Prime Minister.41 Ironically, if the government had got its way with this 
legislation, this would probably not have been possible. Its original intention had 
been that it should not come into effect until after the following general election; 
but an opposition amendment to give it immediate effect, which the governmen t 
had resisted, was carried in the Lords; and the Act came into force on 31st July 
1963.42 
Although Donald Shell has observed that the desire to renounce peerages was a 
"confirmation of the junior status of the House of Lords,43 there was no mad rush 
to leave the Lords. Indeed, initially only four individuals renounced their 
peerages; and a further eleven did so between 1964 and 1977.44 These did, 
however, include Benn, who was then able to return to the House of Commons.45 
The other changes brought about by the 1963 Act also had a limited overall 
impact - there were only 18 women hereditary peers affected; and 31 holders of 
Scottish peerages were entitled to sit, compared with 16 previously.46 
41 Home only disclaimed his peerage after he had been appointed Prime Minister and then 
stood for election to the Commons. For a detailed account, see Thorpe (op cit), in 
particular, Chapter 12. Both Home and Hailsham subsequently returned to the Lords as 
newly created life peers. 
~2 For Cabinet discussions, see PRO: CAB 128/137, CC (63) 42 and CC (63) 43, 25th and 
27th June 1963. The amendment was carried at Committee Stage in the Lords by 105 
votes to 25 (House of Lords Debates, 16th July 1963, Vol 252. Cols 117-152). 
43 Shell & Beamish (op cit) p 9. 
44 Information supplied by House of Lords Information Office. (No further peerages were 
disclaimed between 1977 and 1992.) Of the 15 peerages disclaimed, five were 
subsequently reclaimed by successors. 
·t5 His Conservative replacement at Bristol South East resigned. creating a further 
by-election, which Benn won. 
46 Shell: The House of Lords (pp 19-20). 
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The Labour Government 1964-70: Reform Aborted 
Labour's 1964 manifesto stated that it would not permit frustration of its 
programme by the Conservative majority in the hereditary and non-elected 
Lords.47 This was its first manifesto reference since 1945. However, with a 
narrow majority, it was never likely that the new government would enact majo r 
constitutional reforms in advance of a second general election and the issue was 
put to one side. There was a hint of possible difficulties with the Lords early on, 
when the fifth Marquess of Salisbury suggested that the doctrine he had 
expounded in the 1940s might not necessarily apply, as the Labour majority in the 
Commons then had been "far larger than it is today" and it would be more 
difficult to decide which items in Labour's programme had been approved by the 
electorate.48 However, the Earl of Longford, who was Leader of the House of 
Lords from 1964 to 1968, observed that the Conservatives there were "willing to 
wound but afraid to strike".49 
There would be no major showdown until 1968, although the Conservatives forced 
"many more divisions" than they had done when last in opposition, inflicting 
"numerous defeats" on the government, some of which resulted in compromise, 
others of which were subsequently reversed.50 Meanwhile, in its manifesto for the 
1966 general election, the Labour Party promised legislation to safeguard 
measures approved by the Commons from delay or defeat in the Lords.51 
47 Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain, Labour Party Manifesto 1964 
(Dale, op cit, P 124). 
48 House of Lords Debates, 4th Nov 1964 (Vol 261, Col 166). Labour's overall majority in 
1945 had been 146, whereas in 1964 it was just fOUT. It would increase to 99, following the 
1966 general election. 
49 Lord Longford: A History of the House of Lords (Collins 1981) p 168. Morgan (op cit, 
p 5) quotes Lord Carrington, then leader of the Conservative peers, as saying: "If the 
Labour leadership are reasonable, we let them get away with it. They know how far they 
can push us. Once we start using our veto, we're damaging the object of a second 
chamber. If the House of Lords is to work we must show forbearance and common 
sense" 
50 Shell (op cit) p 21. 
51 Time for Decision, Labour Party Manifesto 1966 (Dale, op cit, p }.n). 
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The Labour government, returned with a large majority, would eventually produce 
legislation which went considerably further than this. The proposals, which would 
be outlined first in its 1968 White Paper52 and then embodied in the abortive 
Parliament (No.2) Bill, would actually propose wholesale reform of the 
composition as well as the powers of the House of Lords. This legislation, the 
events leading up to it and the circumstances of its failure have been analysed in 
detail by Janet Morgan and it is not proposed to repeat that exercise here.53 
However, this episode and the experiences of those involved would undoubtedly 
have influenced subsequent approaches to the issue; and it is therefore worth 
looking further at the events of this period, noting particularly information which 
may not have been available earlier. 
Although the legislation was not actually brought before Parliament till the third 
session of that 1966/70 Parliament, the issue, including the possible form and 
timing of any legislation, was discussed by the Cabinet quite soon after the 1966 
general election. A memorandum from Longford and the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Gardiner, observed that the situation provided the House of Lords with 
opportunity for tactical manoevring which could embarass the government and 
limit its freedom to manage public business; and they suggested that a Bill to curb 
its powers should be introduced in the following session (1967/68), when there 
would be time to ensure its passage, using the Parliament Act, if necessary. They 
added: 
"We do not believe that the Labour movement would easily forgive a 
Labour government with a majority in the nineties which, after two 
successive Labour governments, left the powers of the House of 
Lords intact."54 
52 !louse of Lords Refonn (Cmnd 3799, lIMSO 1968). 
53 Morgan (op cit). 
54 PRO: CAB 129/125, C(66) 87. Refoml of the House of Lords: Memorandum by I.ord 
Chancellor and Lord Privy Seal, 24th June 1966 
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In the event, that was exactly what did happen. However. at this point. Gardiner 
and Longford went on to propose legislation on powers, to provide essentially for 
a three month delaying period, and also that, in effect, delegated legislation should 
only be subject to affirmative/negative procedures m the Commons.55 
Significantly, they observed that, if the Lords' powers were dealt with. there would 
be less of a problem in respect of composition~ but they also suggested that there 
was a great deal to be said for a two-writ plan, whereby all peers would be able to 
attend and speak, but not to vote, unless given a voting writ, which might be 
contined to first creation and life peers only.56 
The Labour government would, in due course, attempt to implement reforms to 
composition, including a 'two-writ' scheme; but at this stage, in 1966, the Cabinet 
decided only to introduce legislation to curtail the powers of the House of Lords.57 
With hindsight, it may be felt that, if the government had stuck to its original 
decision, then it might have run into fewer difficulties. 
When the Cabinet returned to the matter in September 1967, the position had 
changed. A Ministerial Committee now recommended amending the delaying 
powers, so that a Bill rejected by the Lords could be passed immediately in a fresh 
Parliamentary session, as well as ending the Lords' powers to reject subordinate 
55 Ibid. The House of Lords then, as now, had the power to reject delegated legislation, 
albeit rarely exercised. 
56 Ibid. The 'two-writ' plan had been put forward by Commander Henry Burrows, former 
Oerk Assistant of the Parliaments, House of lords. (See 'How the House of Lords might 
reform itself, The Times, 26th May 1966.) 
)7 PRO: CAB 128/41 C(,(66)32, 28th June 1966 (Confidential Annex 128/46). Richard 
Crossman. at that time Minister of Housing, recorded that Wilson thought attempting to 
change the composition was "bound to cause trouble in the Party". and that he (Crossman) 
agreed. ('rossman then added that he favoured unicaml'ral government, and that the best 
way of achlt>ving thIS was to have a second chamber "so discredited by its composition that 
it was no threat at all" (The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol 1: Hamish Hamilton & 
Jonathan Cape 1973. p 553. entry for 28th June 1966). 
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legislation. Gardiner also reported the Committee's VIew that there was "no 
satisfactory way of dealing in isolation with Lords' powers". To attempt to do so 
with the existing composition, could lead to disturbance of good relations and to 
greater delay to the legislative programme. If powers only were to be dealt with, 
it advised that no change be introduced in that Parliament. but that further 
consideration should be given to wider reform, including composition and 
function. In this Gardiner was backed up by the Leader of the Commons, 
Richard Crossman.58 
The following month, the Cabinet decided to proceed with proposals for a two-tier 
scheme, the general objectives of which were: the elimination of the hereditary 
basis of representation; the removal of the inbuilt Conservative majority; the 
government to secure a reasonable working majority over both opposition parties; 
delaying powers to be restricted and powers to block statutory instruments 
abolished. A two-tier system of voting and non-voting peers, was proposed, with 
all existing peers having speaking rights. Gardiner told the Cabinet that it would 
be necessary to give life peerages to some hereditary peers in order to allow them 
voting rights, but emphasised that it was essential to avoid the concession to the 
hereditary principle which would result from allowing existing peers the right to 
elect voting members.59 He emphasised the need to introduce legislation 
promptly, to avoid possible obstruction in the last session of the Parliament, and 
warned that, if they failed to take the initiative, one of the opposition parties 
58 (i) PRO: CAB 128/42 CC(67) 54, 7th September 1967. The conclusions of the Ministerial 
Committee had been set out in a memorandum (PRO: PREM 13/1686; Report of 
Ministerial Committee C(67)145, 5th September 1967). It concluded (perhaps 
complacently) that there would be little appreciable gain for the government from a 
limited measure, since the Lords had shown little inclination to reject c,ontroversial Bills. 
(ii) Crossman had become Leader of the House in August 1966. His diaries record that by 
October he had changed his previously held views and had started to see Lords' refonn 
as part of wider Parliamentary reform and wanted to deal with composition. By April 
19b7, he was claiming to have converted Wilson to his new position (The Diaries of a 
Cabinet Minister. Vol II, Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape 1977: p 298, entry for 
3rd April 1967). 
59 "his is an intl'resting observation. in view of what would be enacted in 1999 (see 
Chapter 10). 
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might do so; but the Ministerial Committee had nonetheless recommended 
consultation with the opposition, to avoid disruption and the use of the Parliament 
Act procedure. Notwithstanding doubts expressed at Cabinet by some ministers, 
the majority supported the proposals and it was agreed to proceed.60 The ensuing 
Queen's Speech stated that "legislation would be introduced to reduce the prescnt 
powers of the House of Lords and to eliminate its present hereditary basis, 
thereby enabling it to develop within the framework of a modem Parliamentary 
system", but also that the government was prepared to enter into consultations.61 
The background document circulated for the first meeting with the opposition 
parties stated that composition and powers were indissolubly linked; and that this 
was an "integral part of the government's thinking".62 That which the government 
had previously rejected had now apparently become central to its approach. The 
Inter-Party Conference first met in November 1967~ and, by early the following 
year, a measure of agreement had been reached on a two-tier scheme, with a 
nucleus of 200 peers with voting rights, conditional on attendance. Although there 
had been some disagreement on delaying powers, the Conservatives had then 
proposed a period of six months delay. While doubts were again expressed in 
Cabinet, including that the proposals would be open to criticism on grounds of 
patronage involved, there was majority support. A draft White Paper, as agreed in 
the Inler -Party Conference, was presented to the Parliamentary Committee 
(Wilson's Inner Cabinet) at the end of May 1968. However, there had been no 
agreement over the date of implementation, with the Conservatives arguing that 
this should be after the next general election.63 
60 PRO: CAB 128/142, CC(67)59, 12th October 1967. The Cabinet papers show that this 
Ministerial Committee itself was not unanimous in supporting the two-tier scheme, a 
minority favouring a single-tier House of first creation peers (PRO: PREM 13/1686, 
C(67) 1~7: Note on Composition and Powers of the House of Lords - Cabinet Secretary 
to Prime Minister. 10th October 1967). 
61 /louse olLords Debates, 31st October 1967 (Vol 286, Col 5). 
62 PRO: PREM 13/1687. House of Lords Refonn Background Papt'l (undatl'd) 
63 Ihld Sec PRO: CAB 128/43. CC(68) 1 I. 1st February 1968: PREM 13/2294. Pari «(,cn) HI 
Rdoml Pt 5, 30th May 196X: and Morgan (op cit), particularly Chapter 7. 
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The approach of the Conservatives in the Lords had been set out in 1967 by the 
Leader of the Opposition there, Lord Carrington. He argued that restraint was 
necessary because "an unelected chamber should not, except in the last resort and 
in quite exceptional circumstances, override the opinion of the House ot 
Commons". Othetwise it would be impossible for any Labour government to 
govern. However, in the event of "a matter of great constitutional and national 
importance on which there was known to be a deep division in the country or 
perhaps on which the peoples' opinion was not known ... the House of Lords has a 
right and perhaps a duty to use its powers, not to make a decision but to accord 
the people of this country and members of the House of Commons a period for 
reflection and time for views to be expressed". It could be appropriate for the 
Lords to ask the Commons to have another look at legislation and a clash would 
arise only if the Lords insisted on amendments. However he cautioned that the 
House of Lords would only be able to use its delaying powers once. "Members 
of the Party opposite in another place will, I am sure, make certain either that this 
House is abolished or that its remaining powers are removed, if there is direct 
confrontation of this kind".64 In the case of "Statutory Orders" (sic), there was 
"more difficulty", since they were not covered by the Parliament Act: "Though I 
can visualise occasions when your lordships would wish to vote against an order, I 
should have thought they would be rare indeed".65 In fact, that very circumstance 
would precipitate a major row between the political parties the following year.66 
Also, as we shall see, when the Lords did insist on some amendments to 
legislation in the 1970s, the Labour Party (if not the government) then came out 
in support of abolition.67 
64 House oj Lords Debates, 16th February 1967 (Yol 250, Cols 419-421). 
65 Ibid. Plt'sumably by "Statutory Orders", Carrington meant Statutory Instruments or Orders 
ill Council 35 
66 On the Sonthern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968 (see p ~). Back in 
1966. Canington had warned the Shadow Cabinet that this very situation might arisl'. "It 
may he that Orders will he necessary to implement the government's policy on Rhodesia. 
If;o this will raise great difficulties" (CA)nscrvativc Party Archives: LCC (66) 114. 25th 
Novemher 1966: House of Lords - paper by Lord C..arrington). 
67 St'C Chapters 2 and 3 
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With regard to actual reform, the ConselVative Deputy Leader in the Lords, Lord 
Harlech, acknowledged: "the ConselVative Party has made no attempt to arrive at 
any agreed policy on this issue at the present time";68 and when it came to the 
all-party talks, the Shadow Cabinet was initially reluctant to become involved.69 
Although Crossman records Carrington as telling him that neither Edward Heath, 
nor lain Macleod nor Reginald Maudling showed the slightest interest in Lords 
refonn,7° both Maudling and Macleod were nominated to participate. According 
to Morgan, the ConselVative peers involved in the talks were anxious for a 
"sensible refonn" and "ready to compromise", but their colleagues from the 
Commons were less detennined to reach an agreed solution and more 
preoccupied by tactical considerations.71 Carrington told his colleagues in March 
1968 that he considered the scheme emerging from the talks to be a "good 
compromise solution", and that obstructing it could result in "a far less acceptable 
solution". The Shadow Cabinet eventually agreed to approve the scheme, but 
added the rider that it opposed implementation before the next general election.72 
68 House of Lords Debates, 12th April 1967 (Vol 281, Col 1295-1302). 
69 ConseIVative Party Archives (CPA): LCe 67 (189) and 67(191), 23rd and 30th October 
1967. 
70 Diaries Vol 2, p 589, 23rd November 1967. They were Leader, Shadow Chancellor and 
Deputy Leader respectively. There is little evidence to show that Heath took an interest at 
any stage. The House of Lords scarely rates a mention in John Campbell's biography 
(Edward Heath: A Biography; Pimlico 1994) and the events of 1968/69 are not mentioned 
at all. He created few new peerages as Prime Minister and never accepted one himself on 
retirement. In 1999, he did, however, indicate his support for an elected Upper House 
(House of Commons Debates, 2nd February 1999, Vol 323, Cols 761-2). 
71 Morgan (op cit) p 186. 
72 Previously, in December 1967, the Shadow Cabinet had thought "it would not be possible 
to object to the agreed changes coming into force at once, rather than waiting till the end 
of the Parliament", but (despite Carrington arguing to the contrary) this position changed. 
(See CPA: Lee 67(205) 18th December 1967 and 68 (235) 1st May 1968'> 
- 35 -
Although, this aspect notwithstanding, a measure of agreement had been reached, 
this was overtaken by the action of the Conservative peers in defeating the 
Southern Rhodesia (United Nations) Sanctions Order in June 1968.73 Following 
this, the Labour government broke off the all-party talks and announced its 
intention to proceed with comprehensive and radical legislation of its own.74 
Initially Wilson thought that Labour MPs would be pressing for "drastic retaliatory 
action" against the Lords; and ministers considered introducing "a short sharp Bill 
dealing with powers only".75 Indeed, according to Crossman, such a Bill had 
actually been prepared, but nothing came of this;76 and, less than a month after 
Wilson's statement, the Cabinet decided, at least provisionally, to prepare a Bill on 
the basis of the broadly agreed proposals in the draft White Paper.?7 Thus, for a 
second time, the Cabinet stepped back from a decision to go ahead with a Bill on 
powers and instead decided, fatefully, to go for the more comprehensive reform. 
There was stilI a degree of vacillation, the Cabinet deciding to review the position 
in the autumn "in the light of the feeling amongst the governmenfs supporters 
and in the country generally".78 However, there seems to have been no great 
interest in the issue in the Labour Party as a whole; and the Party Conference was, 
73 The Order, implementing United Nations sanctions aginst the rebel regime in Rhodesia, 
was defeated by 193 votes to 184 on 18th June 1968 (House of Lords Debates, Vol 293, 
('...01 394). This was an affirmative Order, requiring the agreement of both Houses, and 
had been passed the previous day by the Commons. Carrington would have preferred to 
avoid this situation, but. his advice was rejected by his backbenchers (Morgan. op cit. 
p 192; Carrington: Reflect on Things Past, p 20). The Order was subsequently relaid and 
then was passed by the Lords on 18th July 1968. 
74 Prime Ministerial Statement, 20th June 1968 (House of Gmunons Debates, Vol 760. 
CAlls 1314-16). 
7':. PRO: PREM 0/2295: Note of ministerial meeting. 19th June 1968: Wilson: The lAbour 
Government: A Personal Record (Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 1971) P 535. 
70 Crossman records Freddie Warren, then Private Secretarv to the Government Chid Whip 
(House of Commons) as saying: "One alternative is a Bill to end the powers of the Lords 
.. .It's all fIxed. We've prepared the Bill already" (Tht' Ikmc ... of a Cabinet f'vlinistcr 
Vol. III. Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape, 1977. ent" for June 18th 1968. P (9). 
77 PRO: CAR 128/43. C('(oM) 36. 18th Jllly 1968. 
7'<1 Ibid. 
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perhaps surprisingly, acquiescent.79 It is interesting to speculate as to what might 
have happened had it, for instance, shown strong support for a short Bill reducing 
the Lords' powers. Might not the government, apparently uncertain in its own 
mind, then have responded? 
The White Paper was eventually published on 1st November 1968 and "followed 
very closely the line provisionally agreed in the all-party talks".80 Nevertheless, it 
was decided it should take the form of a statement of government proposals, 
rather than an agreed statement, as it was felt this would enable the government 
to present the "radical" proposals in a way more attractive to its supporters".81 It 
proposed in effect a two-tier chamber, comprising a first tier of around 230 
nominated voting peers and a second tier of non-voting peers, who could 
participate in the House but not vote. Voting members would all be peers by 
creation, but some peers by succession could also be created life peers. There 
would be a place for bishops and law lords. Although all existing hereditary peers 
would be able to continue as non-voting peers, their successors would have no 
such rights. y oting peers would be paid, but would be required to attend at least 
one-third of sittings and be subject to a retirement age. The composition of the 
voting House would be such as to give the government a small majority over 
opposition parties, but not an overall majority, taking account of those with no 
allegiance. The delaying powers of the House in respect of Public Bills would be 
reduced to six months (with this period being capable of being carried over from 
one session to the next); and its powers over delegated legislation would be 
limited, so that it could require the Commons to reconsider, but could no longer 
finally reject it.82 
79 A resolution caHing for immediate abolition was remitted. For the NEe, James Callaghan 
askt'd Conference to await the outcome of the government's deliberations and to give it 
"a completely free hand in whatever proposals it decides to put forward" (Labour Party 
Conference Report, 1968. pp 172-186). 
~o Wilson (op cit) p 608. Carrington confirmed that the government's proposals were based 
nn the position reached III the talks and this was accepted hy the Shadow Olbinet 
(CPA: I.CC (68) 261. 29th Octoher; (68) 263, 4th NO\l'll1her 1968). 
HI PRO: CAB 12H/43. (,C(6H) .. L:!. 17th October 1968. 
~2 ('mnd 3799 (op CIt). 
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There were already signs of possible trouble ahead when the White Paper was 
debated in the Commons. According to Morgan, the whips made little attempt to 
encourage backbench attendance or participation on either side; and of those who 
did, a succession of them were overwhelmingly critical, attacking, in particular, the 
notion of a paid and nominated House opening the way to an extension of 
patronage. "It soon became clear that the reforms would have a rough passage in 
the Commons." Only the front bench speakers really supported the scheme, 
although Crossman, speaking for the government, "on his own admission, needled 
backbenchers", whereas Callaghan, although "known not to be a diehard refonner", 
made a more convincing case that Labour needed the scheme to overcome Lords' 
obstruction.83 
A motion to reject the White Paper was defeated by 270 votes to 159, but a 
significant minority of Labour MPs voted for rejection or abstained; and amongst 
Conservatives, twice as many MPs voted against as voted for. 84 By contrast, in the 
I louse of Lords, which debated the White Paper at the same time, most speakers 
supported the proposals and peers overwhelmingly approved the White Paper by 
251 votes to 56. All political groupings there voted by a large majority in favour, 
including the Conservative peers, unlike their colleagues in the Commons.85 
The government proceeded with publication of a Bill, very much along the lines of 
the White Paper, in December 1968.86 Following the Commons debate, ministers 
had been aware that they were facing potential difficulties and considered 
"whether the government should persevere with the Bill in the face of 
83 Morgan (op cit) pp 204-5; see also House of (AJmmons Debates, 19th, 20th November 
1968 (Vol 773, Cols 1125-1434). CaJIaghan was Home Secretary; Crossman was now 
Secretary of State for Social Services, but, given his previous involvement. continued to 
assist with this legislation. Prominent amongst critical Labour backbenchers was the future 
Party Leader, Michael Foot. 
84 Ibid. 
85 House off ords Debates 19th-21st November (Vol 297, Cols 642-1096); Morgan (op CIt) 
pp 206-8. 
86 Parliamcnt (No.2) Bill. 19th December 1968. 
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determined opposition of a number of their supporters". Some argued that it was 
unwise to proceed with a Bill "for which there was no enthusiasm on either wing 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party", and on which the Conservative frontbench was 
in no position to control its backbenchers, even if it was so minded. The Bill 
offered "unlimited opportunities for opposition", which would be exploited to the 
full. Other ministers argued that to tum back "would be a confession of 
weakness" and might embolden Conservative peers to make "freer use of their 
powers".87 The Cabinet decided to proceed, although with a few minor changes, 
such as continuing with allowances rather than payment for peers.88 
The Bill passed its Second Reading in the Commons at the beginning of February 
1969 comfortably, with a majority of 150 - larger than that for the White Paper -
with only 25 Labour backbenchers voting against, but many more Conservatives 
doing SO.89 However the real trouble was to come during the Committee Stage, 
which, as this was a constitutional measure, was by convention taken on the floor 
of the House. The government had optimistically allowed five days for this, but, 
after two months and eleven sitting days, only the preamble and five clauses (out 
of a total of 20) had been debated. A cross-party alliance "exploited every 
procedural device" and "filibustered energetically". Some Labour backbenchers 
actively opposed the proposals and others were insufficiently enthusiastic to 
sustain the Bill through its Committee Stage.90 Attempts to try to secure 
co-operation from the Opposition, including a possible concession that the reforms 
to powers and composition could be implemented at different times, came to 
nothing.91 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 PRO: CAB 128/43,CC(68)49, 5th December 1968. It was suggested complacently that 
"Labour abolitionists and Conservatives dissidents were unlikely to make common cause, 
since they opposed different parts of the Bill". 
88 Ibid. 
1-19 House of Commons Debates, 3rd February 1969 (Vol 777, Cols 43-172); Morgan (op cit) 
pp 210-11. 
90 Morgan (op cit) pp 212-8. The hostility in the Labour Party was not confined to thl' left. 
For instance, as Michael Foot has observed, "Robert Sheldon, who led the wav. was no 
great ra~ling left winger" (Inlt.'rview, 17th M;nch 1999). 
91 Callaghan Il'ported this to Cabint't on 20th Fdnuary 1969 (PRO:CAB 12~/44 C( '(69)Y). 
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Given the slow progress in Committee, the Cabinet agonised for weeks about what 
to do. After only a fortnight, it was discussing whether to abandon the Bill~ but, 
for the time being, it decided to continue, since withdrawal "could give dangerous 
encouragement .to the opponents of major Bills in the remainder of the 
government's programme."92 However, by mid-April, the Cabinet eventually came 
to the conc1usion that it could not proceed. The possibility of proceeding with a 
truncated Bill was briefly considered but rejected. There was general agreement 
that the difficulties resulted from "general malaise" and a problem of authority in 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. While feeling they needed to make a stand, they 
were apparently uncertain whether to make it on this or on the Industrial 
Relations Bill (which, with its provisions to curb unofficial strikes, was also 
unpopular with sections of the Labour Party and would also eventually be 
withdrawn). They decided that Lords' reform "was not the right issue on which to 
base the attempt to restore the government's authority in the Party and that, 
without doing so, they could not force the Bill through". Nevertheless, even at 
this stage, the Prime Minister thought they should leave open the possibility that 
legislation on powers alone might be introduced in this session.93 Thus legislation 
on powers, which had been considered at earlier stages, was still not ruled out, 
although in the end nothing came of it. 
As it was, Wilson was forced to announce that the government had decided "not 
to proceed with the Parliament (No.2) Bill in order to ensure that necessary 
Parliamentary time is available for priority legislation". He observed that the Bill 
had started as a consensus measure, which meant that it was regarded "in a spirit 
92 PRO: CAB 128/44 CC(69)1O, 27th February 1969; CC(69)12, 13th March 1969. At the 
first of these meetings, the Chief Whip. John Silkin. had estimated that a timetable 
("guillotine") motion would be lost. (See also Morgan, op cit, pp 212-6.) 
93 PRO: CAB 128/44 CC(69) 18, 16th April 1969. See also Morgan (op cit) pp 216-8. 
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falling far short of enthusiasm" by a considerable number of Labour MPs, as well 
as some ConselVatives. He suggested that this would not have been the case had 
the government gone for a "one party" measure; and that "the idea of a consensus 
measure fell through when it became clear that we had no support whatsoever 
from rt han gentlemen opposite in making reasonable progress on this Bill".94 
Thus, Labour ministers were blaming the ConselVative opposition for not 
delivering the support they expected.95 The Shadow Cabinet had considered 
tabling a reasoned amendment on Second Reading, but in the event decided to 
have a free vote, while making clear the Party's objections on timing - which had 
become something of a sticking point for them; and then, if these were not dealt 
with at Committee Stage, to vote against on Third Reading. Thus at Second 
Reading, both Maudling and Douglas-Home supported the Bill. Nevertheless, on a 
free vote, ConselVative MPs divided almost two-to-one against.96 
At Committee Stage, despite the ConselVatives' nominal support, they had given 
no undertakings on the handling of the Bill; and there was no agreement between 
government and opposition on a timetable. Members of the opposition front 
bench were "not all wholeheartedly eager to see it through"; and significantly, the 
94 House of Commons Debates, 17th April 1969 (Vol 781, Cols 1338-44). He specifically 
referred to the Industrial Relations Bill as one of the items of "priority legislation". 
95 Wilson later suggested that they enjoyed seeing the government's legislative programme 
get into difficulties. He noted that Heath had voted in only one of 59 divisions held after 
Second Reading (Wilson, op cit, p 609). However, since Wilson acknowledged that he 
himself "made no effort to suggest there was enthusiasm about the Bill one way or the 
other" at Second Reading (p 608), it seems somewhat invidious to have singled out Heath 
for subsequent lack of enthusiasm. 
96 CPA: Lee (69) 278, 29th January 1969; House of Commons Debates, 3rd February 1969 
(Vol 777, Cols 43-172); Morgan (op cit) pp 210-11. 
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ConseIVative Whips were not instructed to discipline their backbenchers at the 
Committee Stage.97 Whitelaw later recorded in his memoirs that Carrington 
accused him as Chief Whip of having considerable responsibility for the Bill's 
failure, arguing that he should have done more to get the troops into the lobby 
and prevent filibustering. Whitelaw acknowledged that ~certainly I could have 
tried harder", although he did not think he would have succeeded, adding: 
"Not for the first time in my life, I concluded then that masterly inactivity 
can have considerable advantages. Certainly it proved so in this case. "98 
Carrington himself, with hindsight, doubted whether "our proposals would have 
lasted a great many years", but he felt "they would have begun a movement". 
However, he concluded that "we did not go far enough", since in due course "our 
scheme" would have led to "fresh dissatisfactions and renewed efforts at reform".99 
These references suggest that the then leader of the Opposition in the House of 
Lords identified closely with the Labour government's proposals (which had, of 
course, arisen from the earlier all-party talks), although this was not necessarily 
true of all his colleagues.lOO 
97 Morgan (op cit) p 212. The Conservatives would have opposed any guillotine motion on a 
three-line whip (CPA: LCC (69) 288, 8th March 1969). Crossman thought that the troubles 
on the Bill stemmed from the breakdown of "normal channels between the parties" 
(Hetherington Archive, BLPES: Note by Alistair Hetherington, then editor of The 
Guardian, of meeting with Crossman, 18th March 1969; File 16/25). AJthough Morgan 
suggested that Macleod, in particular, was supportive, evidence now suggests otherwise. 
Macleod's biographer indicates that he was less than enthusiastic in his support and 
strongly advocated making a stand on postponement of implementation (Robert Shepherd: 
lain Macleod Hutchinson 1994, pp 512-513); and Shadow Cabinet records show that, for 
instance, he told his colleagues that "the Party was overwhelmingly against this BilJ" 
(CPA: LCC(69)277. 27th Janaury 1969). 
98 Whitelaw (op cit) pp 66-68. He had warned the Shadow Cabinet before Second Reading 
that "there were known to be a lot of people in the party who were critical of the 
proposals" (CPA: Lee (69) 277, 27th January 1969). Whitelaw later recalled that 
Carrington had accused him of being 'very wet indeed", because ''you haven't the coura~e 
to whip our party properly and make sure the proposals that I believe to be right get 
through" (Houst' of Lords Debates. 3rd November 1983, Vol 444, Col 656). 
99 Carrington (op cit) pp 208, 213. 
100 Carrington bad opposed the moves in the Shadow Cabinet to forc,c a delay in 
implementation. (CPA:LCC(68)235, 1st May 1968; (69)277, 27th January 1969). 
Crossman. for h. is pal1, had des~:i~how "~die IShackietonj and}. P~ter IC...arringtonl 
and George (Jellicoe j have re~ be~ome qUIte a band of brothers (DJanes Vol III. p 87. 
28th March 1968). (Shackleton was Leader of the House of Lords; Jellicoe was Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition: all were involved in the all-party talks.) 
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Another supporter of reform was Sir Alec Douglas-Home (who had spent a large 
part of his political life in the House of Lords). In his speech at Second Reading, 
he addressed those who were dismayed at the prospect of change, arguing that 
"the composition of Parliament cannot be widely divorced from the social structure 
of the community", and referred to the constraint that peers were reluctant to 
oppose measures whatever their judgement, because of their status and for fear of 
raising a new 'peers vs. people' argument. WI These factors would probably have 
influenced Home, when he came to chair a Party committee in the 1970s. 102 That 
committee would be set up by Margaret Thatcher, who would, as Prime Minister, 
have the opportunity to implement further reforms, had she been so minded. It is 
therefore interesting to note that in 1969 she voted (on a free vote) in favour of 
the Second Reading of the Labour government's Bill.103 
The inter-party talks had also involved the Liberals. However, although that 
Party's 1968 Annual Report expressed the hope that "the ill-considered action of 
the Tory peers in throwing out the Rhodesia Sanctions Order will not have put in 
jeopardy the large measure of agreement that had previously been reached", when 
it came to the Commons debate on the White Paper, all eight Liberal MPs who 
voted did so in favour of the motion to reject the government's proposals. On the 
other hand, in the parallel debate in the Lords, the Liberal peers divided thirteen 
to three in favour.1 04 
JOI House of OJmmons Debates, 3rd February 1969 (Vol. 777, Cols 149-150). He also told 
his colleagues (in private) that some Conservative MPs hoped that the Labour 
government would be forced to drop its Bill and that a subsequent Conservatjve 
government would introduce one of its own, but he warned that the consequence would 
be that I.abour would then commit itself to abolition "at the first opportunity" 
(CPA:lCC (69) 284, 19th February 1969). Notwithstanding his general support, Home 
had favoured the postponement of implementation of the refonns (CPA: LCC (68) 2Yi. 
1st May 1968). 
J02 See Chapter 7. 
103 House of Commons Debates, 3rd February 1969 (Vol 777, Cols 168-171). 
104 Liberal Party Annual Report J968 (p 17): /louse of Common::, Debates, 19th, 20th 
November 1968 (Vol 773, C.ols 1125-1434); HOllse of Lords Debatt·s. 19th-21st Novt.'mbcr 
1968 (Vol ~<)i, Cob 642-1096): also Morgan (op cit) pp 20~7, The Liberals only had 
twl'lvl' MPs in total. 
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The following month, the Liberal Party Council passed a resolution strongly 
critical both of the process in which its own leaders had been involved and of the 
proposals which had been subsequently put fOlWard, in particular that the 
proposed system of patronage would be "undemocratic, unrepresentative, and a 
sinister extension of the over large personal power of the Prime Minister")05 
Thus first Liberal MPs and then the official Liberal decision-making body had 
formally aligned themselves with the critics of the government's proposals. Yet, 
when it came to the vote on Second Reading on the actual legislation in February 
1969, Liberal MPs divided three in favour and three against, with the Party Leader 
himself voting in favour;106 and the following year, the Party's Annual Report still 
felt able to record the "genuine feeling of regret that the reform of the House of 
Lords was never accepted")07 
The Liberals' approach over this period may have lacked consistency; but this was, 
to some extent, true also of the two main parties on this issue, which were 
characterised by uncertainty and division. The end result was that, for all the time 
and effort expended, the position of the second chamber remained much the same 
at the end of Labour's period in office as it was at the start and as it would be for 
the next three decades - that is mainly hereditary, with the Conservatives far 
outnumbering their political opponents, and with its powers unchanged. !Os 
Arguably, if anything, having survived a major attempt at reform, the position of 
the House of Lords had been strengthened.109 
105 Liberal Party Council, 16th December 1968; Liberal Party Archive (BLPES) -
Liberal Party Po1icies 16/145. 
106 House of Commons Debates, 3rd February 1969 (Vol 777, Cols 43-172); also Morgan 
(op cit) p 210. 
107 Liberal Party Annual Report 1970 (p 10). 
108 For statistics, see Appendix 1 (Tables 1-3). Although Wilson had discontinued the creation 
of hereditary peerages, that was merely a matter of custom and practice. A future Prime 
Minister could create further hereditary peerages (as Margaret Thatcher was to do). 
109 Following this episode, the House of Lords did exert itself - late in 1969 on the House of 
Commons (Redistribution of Seats Bill), by which the government sought to delay 
implementation of recommended changes to constituency boundaries. Peers amended it at 
Committee Stage and then rejected an alternative compromise passed by the C..ommons. 
with the result that govemment found itself obliged to lay the necessary orders beforc 
Palliamt'nt, but then adopted the somewhat unedifying tactics of using its Commons 
majority to \ote them down (Morgan. op cit. pp 1:"2-168). Thus the Lords showed their 
continuing potential to cause problems and embarrassment for a Labour government 
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Concluding Note 
Both main political parties had, at various times since 1945, shown an interest in 
reforming the House of Lords. Indeed both of them carried out some measure of 
reform during their time in office. 
The Labour Party twice achieved a large Commons majority, sufficient to secure 
passage for such legislation, albeit after delay. Yet, in both cases - aware of the 
potential of constitutional legislation to block its timetable and possibly also to 
encourage disruption by the Lords in other matters - it became involved In 
all-party talks in an attempt to proceed by consensus to wide-ranging reforms. In 
neither case was it ultimately successful. Although initially reluctant to become 
involved, the AttIee government came close to reaching agreement, but having 
failed to do so, it found itself forced to use the provisions of an earlier Parliament 
Act in order to carry through its own measure limiting further the powers of the 
Lords, in the face of opposition from that same quarter. Having done so, Labour 
then showed little interest in further reform when in opposition in the 1950s, 
either when the Conservatives sought to initiate further discussions or when they 
brought in legislation to introduce life peerages. In the case of the latter, Labour 
(and for that matter the Liberals) saw the move as essentially cosmetic, to make a 
still Conservative-dominated chamber appear more acceptable. It did however, 
support a more limited reform, essentially to redress an anomaly, by allowing 
peers by succession to renounce their peerages, since the case in question directly 
affected one of its own prominent members. Yet ironically, by a coincidence of 
timing, a leading Conservative was a major beneficiary. 
Returning to office, Labour recognised the potential for the Lords to create 
difficulties In its legislative programme and, once it had a substantial majority, 
sought to address the issue. However, it was slow in dealing with this. Having 
decided on an all-party approach, things were allowed to drag on, with the White 
Paper and legislation not presented until the third session of Parliament, hy which 
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time it was getting into difficulties in other areas. Initially intending to introduce 
legislation dealing only with the powers of the Lords, it allowed itself to be 
persuaded to go for a more wide-ranging reform, providing much more scope for 
opposition; and even when, at various stages, it actively considered going back to 
its original plan as an expedient, it did not pursue this. Clearly such a move would 
not have had the support of the ConselVatives. However, it would almost 
certainly have been supported by Labour MPs who were not sufficiently persuaded 
of the case for wider reform and, given that support, would have stood a 
reasonably good prospect of reaching the statute book, using the Parliament Act if 
necessary. 
Instead Ministers pressed ahead with a measure for which even they, for the most 
part, had no great enthusiasm. James Callaghan, who was principally responsible 
for handling the legislation, recalled that, personally, he did not put it at the top 
of his agenda. Moreover, he told Wilson that, if he wanted to get it through, he 
would have to put his personal authority behind it, but "Harold was never willing 
to do that...if Harold had put his authority behind it, he'd have probably got it 
through without enthusiasm". Although Crossman was keen, "Harold really didn't 
take a lot of interest in it".110 Indeed, there is little evidence that Wilson had 
much to say on the issue itself, as opposed to the tactics. 
As it was, the Labour government ended up pleasing nobody, conveymg an 
impression of weakness, and still having to deal with an unreformed House 0 f 
Lords. This unhappy outcome undoubtedly left a strong impression on those 
involved, and so would be likely to influence their reactions when the issue arose 
again in the ]970s.111 
110 Callaghan: Interview (May 1998). 
III See. for instance, p 100. 
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As for the ConselVatives, despite their large majority in the House of Lords, for 
much of this period - in both government and opposition - they showed a 
willingness at least to consider reform and, at varying times, they showed positive 
support for reform of one sort or another. Although they opposed the 1949 
Parliament Act, they had previously come to a partial agreement with the Labour 
government on reform. Following this, they sought to resume discussions with 
other parties; and then they implemented legislation to reform the House, 
including the most significant reforms to its composition at least until the end of 
the century. The ConselVative leadership was also supportive, up to a point, of 
the Labour government's proposed reforms in the late 1960s - as might have been 
expected, since they reflected discussions in which they had themselves been 
involved. However, the leadership - as opposed to certain individuals - showed 
no particular enthusiasm. Not surprisingly, as an opposition party, they also 
welcomed the discomfiture of a government running into trouble with its own 
legislative programme, and thus were unlikely to strive zealously to pull their 
opponents' chestnuts out of the fire, particularly on a measure which many of 
their backbenchers did not support.112 
This attempt at legislation having failed, interest in Lords' reform would wane for 
a few years, but, as will be seen, it would soon return to the agenda when Labour 
returned to office in 1974. 
112 Carrington was an exception. A supporter of reform, he seems to have been keen to see 
Labour carry it through, and feared that if the Conservatives attempted their own reform, 
"they might be faced with the "same sort of difficulties as the present government". 
(CPA: LCC (69) 292, 19th March 1969). There is no evidence to suggest that he pushed 
strongly for subsequent Conservative governments, of which he was a member, to act -
possibly for this reason. 
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2. LABOUR AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS 1970-76 
As this Chapter will show, the House of Lords would again become a thorn in the 
f1~sll of a Labour government. However, for some years following the failure to 
reform the House of Lords in the late 1960s, the Labour Party showed 
comparatively little interest in the issue.1 Its 1970 general election manifesto said 
that it would not accept the House of Lords nullifying important decisions of the 
Commons or, by its power of delay, vetoing measures in the last year of a 
Parliament and that "proposals to secure reform" would be brought forward;2 but 
Labour lost the election and no proposals were forthcoming in opposition. 
During the course of Edward Heath's Conservative government of 1970-74, the 
Lords allowed important and controversial legislation - notably the Industrial 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the European Communities Act 1972, both of 
which had been guillotined in the Commons - to pass virtually unamended.3 
Ilowever, although Labour would point to these later,4 it does not seem to have 
taken up such cases in opposition as an argument for constitutional reform, or for 
action with regard to the House of Lords. 
The issue was not debated at Conference; and the Party's comprehensive policy 
statement Labour's Programme 19Z1 had little to say on the issue of constitutional 
reform, other than on regional and local government. It rather blandly noted over 
300 years of stability, enabling "reforms to be implemented without upheavals 
apparent elsewhere", but added that "this had also helped maintain the innate 
conservatism of many institutions which have a hostility to change", observing that 
"many reforms have a long and difficult battle before reaching the statute book".5 
A 1968 Conference resolution to set up a committee looking at machinery of government 
was not followed up (Conservative and Labour Party Conference Decisions 1945-81, 
ed F W S Craig, Parliamentary Research Services 1982. pp 128-9.) 
") Now Britain's Stron!!. Let's Make it Great to Live In. Labour Party Manifesto 1970 (Dale, 
op cit. p 171). 
-' See Chapter 7. 
4 See, for instance, Michael Foot (House of Commons Debates. Vol 899, Col 1536, 12th 
November 1975)~ and The Machinery of Government and the House of Lords - An 
Interim Statement (The Labour Party, 1977) p 2. 
5 l..abour., Propramme 1973, pp 81-82. (See also Labours Propramme for Bn'tain 1972. 
p 61.) 
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There was no suggestion of specific action~ and neither of the 1974 general 
election manifestos had anything to say on the subject. According to Barbara 
Castle, this absence was pointed out at an NEC / Cabinet meeting, but although 
Harold Wilson responded by saying "let's have a sentence about it", this did not 
materialise.6 It would seem that, when Labour entered office in 1974, it had no 
real plans to resolve a problem which had confronted previous governmentsJ 
The Labour governments of 1974 to 1979 were, however, to prove even more 
vulnerable, having little or no majority in the Commons.8 In the Lords, where 
Labour was, of course, very much in a minority: 
"The Conservatives in Opposition pressed divisions on large numbers of 
amendments to government bills, defeating the government over 350 times 
in the division lobby (or in over 80 per cent of all divisions which took 
place)."9 
With its fragile Commons majority, the government sometimes found itself unable 
to reverse Lords' amendments. For instance, in the space of three days in 
November 1976, it carried two divisions on Lords' amendments to the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Industries Bill by just one vote, while it was narrowly defeated in two 
key votes on Lords' amendments to the Dock Work Regulation Bill - which 
reportedly "knocked the heart out of the Bill" - and won a third only with the 
casting vote of the Speaker. to The statistics would, on the face of it, seem to 
suggest determined action by the Lords to block or delay government measures. 
6 Barbara Castle: The Castle Diaries 1974-76 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1980) p 182; entry 
for 16th September 1974. 
7 No Labour politicians or officials interviewed could recall any discussion on this. 
8 Between March and October 1974, it was a minority government. After the October 
election, the overall majority was three, but Labour lost this majority just as James 
Callaghan replaced Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in April 1976. Callaghan "never 
experienced anything other than minority government from that moment on" 
(K 0 Morgan: Callaghan: A Life, OUP 1997 P 412). However, the Labour government 
reached an agreement with the Liberals in 1977 (the Lib-Lab Pact), which helped 
safeguard its position (See Callaghan: Time and Chance, pp 449, 456-7). Most of the 
governmenfs problems with legislation in the House of Lords pre-dated this. 
9 Shell: Ine House of Lords, p 25. 
10 Reported in Ine Times, 9th-12th November 1976. The government had by then lost its 
overall majority: and the Opposition were aided by a small number of Labour abstentions. 
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The contrast with a mere 26 defeats during the period of Conservative 
government of 1970-74 is particularly stark. ll It seems hardly surprising that there 
should have been concern in the Labour Party and that interest in tackling the 
House of Lords should have been revived. Certainly, the somewhat complacent 
view about what the Lords could do, noted by Tony Benn in the 1950s, would no 
longer have been widely held. 12 
Even during the minority Labour government, between March and October 1974. 
the Employment Secretary, Michael Foot, had felt it necessary to warn that the 
Lords would have to be dealt with after Labour secured a majority. to ensure "the 
built in reactionary majority there" was never allowed to repeat its "monkey 
tricks")3 However, that period was largely one of shadow boxing. The bulk of 
Labour's legislative programme was to follow the second election. As the 
government sought to carry this through, it suffered numerous defeats In the 
Lords in the 1974/75 session. The Government Chief Whip in the Lords, 
Baroness Llewellyn Davies, reportedly complained of the "capacity of the House, 
full of hereditary or appointed peers, to stop us implementing our policy" .14 
One of the most significant clashes between the Labour government and the Lords 
was on the Trade Union and Labour Relations Bill, particularly on the issue of 
journalists and the closed shop. This had first come before Parliament in 
November 1974. After a prolonged tussle, the Lords insisted on pressing on their 
amendments, so the Bill fell at the end of the 1974/75 session. The government 
then re-introduced the legislation and it was finally passed in a slightly amended 
form, as the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act in March 1976. 
II Shell: The House of Lords, p 24. 
12 See p 24 above. 
13 Address to Labour Party rally in Peterborough (reported in The Times, 27th July 1974). 
14 Noted by Tony Benn in Against the Tide: Diaries 1973-76 (Hutchinson. 1989) p 372 (entry 
for 5th May 1975). Labour's 1977 Interim Statement (op cit, p 2) complained of more than 
100 defeats in the 197.f-75 session. (Official figures are unavailable.) 
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Thus the 1949 Parliament Act procedure was not invoked. A degree of 
compromise may have suited both sides, since the government (fearing possible 
by-election defeats) could not be sure of maintaining its majority till the end of 
the parliamentary session, while its opponents risked losing compromise 
amendments. 15 
The struggle with the Lords over this legislation had, however, antagonised 
Labour's front and back benches. In October 1975 Labour backbench MPs tabled 
two Early Day Motions. The first said that it viewed with alarm the threat to the 
democratic will of the Commons, noted the success of the western democracies 
which had established single chamber government and called on the British 
government "during the lifetime of the present Parliament, to introduce legislation 
to abolish the House of Lords". The second, mindful of the treatment of recent 
legislation, called on the government "to abolish the remaining legislative powers 
of the House of Lords".16 At this time, the government was still struggling to get 
its business through before the end of the 1974/75 session; and the Leader of the 
House, Edward Short warned: 
"Certainly at the end of this session, we shall have to sit down and take 
stock of the changing way in which the other place is behaving".17 
This was taken by some as an oblique threat of government action to curb the 
Lords. 18 
15 See, for instance, reports in The Times, 7th and 24th February 1976. Also Shell (op cit) 
p 25. The Lords had been pressing particularly for a press charter, but the government 
eventually offered the compromise of a tribunal. 
16 See The Times, 23rd October 1975; and House of Commons Debates, 23rd October 1975 
(Vol 898, Col 723). The first was tabled by Bruce Grocott who, as Lord Grocott would, in 
2002, become Government Chief Whip in the Lords. Note that New Zealand and Sweden 
had both abolished their second chambers (in 1950 and 1973 respectively). 
17 House of Commons Debates (Ibid). 
18 For instance, The Times (24th October 1975) headlined its report: 'Mr Short hints that the 
future of the Lords may depend on their actions in coming weeks.' 
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When announcmg the government's intention to re-introduce the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations (Amendment) Bill in the following session, Michael Foot 
told the Commons that it was "the first time for many years ... when the House of 
Lords has gone to such lengths to frustrate the will of the Commons" and argued 
that everyone should join in condemning this "challenge to democratic authority".t9 
On the occasion of the Second Reading of the re-introduced Bill, he was a little 
more specific: 
"My main reason for finding the conduct of the House of Lords offensive 
to proper democratic procedures in this instance, as in many others, is that 
the House of Lords invokes the final powers only when Labour or Liberal 
governments are in power. It never does when Conservative governments 
are in power and that gives a stronger list to the whole constitution" (sic). 
Foot then referred back to 1711, when he said the Whig majority in the House of 
Lords had obstructed the Tory majority in the Commons and Queen Anne had 
responded by appointing twelve peers directly to overturn the Whig majority. He 
described this as a "very good precedent", adding: 
"If that kind of conduct were to be repeated by the House of Lords on 
frequent occasions ... there is a prompt remedy open to us and a remedy that 
can be invoked".20 
This particular comment may have owed something to Parliamentary rhetoric. 
Nonetheless, before the start of the 1975/76 Session, the Labour Party General 
Secretary, Ron Hayward, had proposed that the government "enact legislation to 
cut drastically the length of time the House of Lords can hold up legislation and 
ensure that only life peers are allowed to vote on all the issues before the Ilouse 
of Lords". lie envisaged that the Prime Minister would recommend sufficient 
supporters to maintain a majority; and added, perhaps less than subtly, "life peers 
would be expected to carry out the duties for which they had been appointed."2t 
19 House of Commons Debates, 12th November 1975 (Vol 899. Col 1536). 
20 Ibid, 9th December 1975 (Vol 902, Cols 242-243). The issue in 1711 concerned support 
for the Treaty of Utrecht (see Vernon Bogdanor: The Monarchy and the Constitution, 
Clarcndon Press 1995, p 114). But note that it was a Tory government in office at that 
timc. 
21 Speech at l.ancaster. reported in The Times, 13th Novemht.'T 1975. 
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The Times' political editor David Wood, recalling the "ill-fated plan of 1968", 
observed that Labour ministers would be "less ready than ~1r Hayward and 
left-wing backbenchers to rush into impetuous schemes for abolition or reform of 
the House of Lords";22 and indeed they did not act on either of these suggestions, 
or to give effect to Foot's warning. The lack of action was criticised by some 
backbenchers. Following the Queens' Speech for the 1975/76 session, six Labour 
MPs (all members of the left-wing 'Tribune' Group) tabled amendments regretting 
that the government had not included proposals to abolish the Lords)3 
The Labour government was to suffer at least as much difficulty with the Lords in 
this new session as in the last, suffering 126 defeats out of a total of 146 
divisions.24 The subsequent Labour Party statement on the House of Lords 
accused it of being a "wrecking chamber rather than a revising chamber", noting 
that: 
"most of the major pieces of legislation of the 1975/76 session - the Aircraft 
and Shipbuilding Industries Bill, the Rent (Agriculture) Bill, the Education 
Bill, the Dockwork Regulation Bill and the Health Services Bill - were 
emasculated in the Lords so that they emerged virtually unrecognisable".25 
Again the government found itself at the end of a Parliamentary session with 
major disagreements still outstanding with the Lords. The Dockwork Regulation 
Rill eventually went through:26 but the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industric~ Bill 
went right up to the wire. The Lords were insisting on the deletion of 
shiprepairing from the public ownership provisions of the Bill. As Lord 
Carrington, then leader of the Conservative peers, later acknowledged, this Bill 
was one on which "we let ourselves go".27 
T) Ibid. 
23 Reported in the The Times, 20th November 1975. 
2-1 Divisions in the House of Lords since 1970-71 (House of Lords Infonnation Office, 1996). 
25 Interim Statement 1977 (op cit) P l. 
26 A motion that the Lords do not insist on their amendments was agreed to and Third 
Reading given on 15th November 1976 (House of Lords Debates, Vol 377, Cols 
1030-1056), with Royal Assent a week later. 
27 Carrington: Reflect on Thin!!s Past, p 279. (See also Chapter 7 below.) 
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Speaking some twenty years later, a future Conservative Leader of the House of 
Lords, Viscount Cranborne, would claim that the Lords had never blocked the will 
of the Commons under a Labour government. Referring back to 1976, he argued 
that "we stood on a principle of hybridity over the Aircraft and Shipbuilding 
Bill."28 It was not, in fact, so clear cut. 
The question of hybridity was actually raised in the Commons in May 1976, at a 
fairly late stage in the Bill's proceedings.29 The Speaker then ruled that the Bill 
was prima facie hybrid, but the government successfully moved that Standing 
Orders be dispensed with, to avoid reference to a Select Committec.30 
Subsequently the government had to resort to the guillotine procedure for this Bill 
(and for four other items of legislation) on two separate occasions.]l As the ent! 
of the Parliamentary session approached, the legislation went to and fro, in what is 
sometimes referred to as "ping pong" - a vote in the Lords on 16th November was 
re-affirmed on 23rd November, only for the Commons to vote five hours later to 
re-instate the key provision. Eventually the Bill fell, to be re-introduced the 
following session. However, the issue of hybridity was not mentioned by either of 
the speakers from the Conservative frontbench in the preceding Lords debate; nor 
was it included in the official statement of Lords' reasons for insisting on their 
amendment.32 
28 House of Lords Debates, 4th July 1996 (Vol 573, Cols 1581-9). A hybrid Bill contains 
elements of both Public and Private Bills, being both public and general in nature, but also 
affecting particular local or private interests. It may be subject to special procedures, 
which give interested parties the right to petition Parliament (see, for instance, Shell, 
op cit, p 215). 
29 As Francis Pym, speaking from the Conservative frontbench, later acknowledged (House 
of Commons Debates, 1st December 1976, Vol 921, Cols 939-40). The Bill had actually 
received its Commons' Second Reading back on 2nd December 1975 (Vol 901, 
Cols 1446-8). 
30 See House of Commons Debates: 25th- 27th May 1976 (Vol 912). The vote was initially 
tied; but, in a further division, the government won by just one vote. (This was the 
occasion on which Michael Heseltine famously picked up the Commons mace.) 
31 Ibid. 20th July 1976 and 8th November 1976 (Vol 915, Cols 1527-1605; Vol. 916, C..ols 
31-124). The other Bills were the Health Service, Dockwork Regulation. Rent 
(Agriculture) and Education Bills. 
32 See House of Commons Debates, Vol 919; House of Lords Debates, Vol. 377. 
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Nevertheless, in the following 1976/77 session. the issue of hybridity came into 
play again and, although the Bill passed through its Commons stages speedily. 
further lengthy proceedings were anticipated in the Lords. The government 
eventually agreed to drop shiprepairing from the legislation, which finally received 
Royal Assent in March 1977.33 
One of the most significant aspects of the actions of the Lords on the aircraft and 
shipbuilding legislation was that they would seem to have been acting in breach of 
the Salisbury doctrine, whereby the Upper House would not seek to block 
legislation for which the government of the day had an electoral mandate. The 
political commentator, Simon Hoggart, noted at the time: 
"It was this doctrine which, became a firm unwritten convention over the 
years, which was broken this week".34 
Eric Varley, the responsible minister as Secretary of State for Industry, pointed 
out in the Commons that public ownership of shiprepairing had been "stated in 
clear and explicit terms" in the 1974 election manifestos and "was not included as 
an afterthought".·~5 Hoggart observed that "it is surprising that there seems to have 
been such an obvious breach of the conventions this time - a break which the 
Labour leaders, Lords Peart and Shepherd, have already warned will change for 
ever the relationship between the two Ilouses",36 
33 With Standing Orders having again been set aside. Third Reading was given on 7th 
December 1976 and the Speaker then rejected opposition claims that it did not comply 
with the Parliament Act provisions. However. in the Lords, it was ruled that the Bill was. 
in effect, hybrid in respect of shiprepairing; and the procedures envisaged could have 
involved prolonged hearings of petitions, and a lengthy Committee Stage. It could 
eventually have been passed using the Parliament Act procedures at the end of the 
session. hut rather than risk "terrible" consequences for the industry. the government 
decided to compromise and drop shiprepairing, thus allowing the Bill to go through. 
(See House of Commons Debates. Vol 922: House of Lords Debates. Vol 380.) 
.14 'How the Lords broke the unwritten rules'. The Guardian. 26th November 1976. Lord 
Denham. then Opposition Deputy Chief Whip. later argued that it had not been a breach 
of the Salisbury doctrine. because of the hybridity ruling and because the Lords had only 
amended the legislation rather than rejecting it outright (Interview. January 2000. and 
subsequent conversation with the author). As noted above. the hybridity ruling was not 
rited as the reason at the time. 
35 House of Commons Debates. 22nd November 1976 (\'01 919. Col 1890). 
36 lht> Guardian. op cit. 
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Shepherd (who had recently been replaced by Peart as Leader of the House of 
Lords) had indeed warned, in the last debate on the Bill of 1975/76 session, that 
the relationships between the two chambers could be shattered. He said he 
shared with Carrington a desire for reform, but "a reform as a consequence of the 
act contemplated today would be a reform of the very worst order", which could 
be brought in "in a spirit of vindictiveness towards the House". He concluded: 
"I personally believe in the need for a second chamber, but a second 
chamber that would not be in conflict with but in support of another 
place")7 
In the same debate, the veteran Labour peer Lord Shinwell (who had, III this 
instance, supported the Conservative-led action) was much more sanguine: 
"What can they do? They will go on attacking the House of Lords, 
threatening to abolish it. I do not think we should worry ourselves unduly 
about it".38 
It should be noted that - Cranborne's later observations notwithstanding - in the 
same 1975/6 session, the Lords also blocked the British Transport Docks Bill. to 
bring Felixstowe Docks into public ownership. Although supported by the 
government, it was in the form of a Private Bill, which the Lords had the power to 
reject, and which they exercised in this instance. Even though it had received 
majority support in the Commons, the government could not invoke the 
Parliament Act to override the Lords.39 
The wider political context was that, by the autumn of 1976, the government had 
lost its majority in the Commons and was facing major problems. including severe 
economic pressures. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, had 
famously turned back at the last minute from a flight to Hong Kong, and dashed 
to the Labour Party Conference where, he later recalled, "the mood was ugly"; and 
37 House of Lords Debates. 22nd November 1976 (Vol 377, Cols 1668/9). 
38 Ibid (Col 1677). 
39 Shell (op cit), pp 2..')-26. Private Bills originate outside Parliament and are usually 
promoted to by bodies seeking authorisation not available to them under general 
legislation. The Lords and Commons possess equal powers in respect of these. See, 
for instance. Shell, pp 211-5. 
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"the rest of the year was dominated by a senes of negotiations around our 
application to the IMF."40 At such a time, the Opposition was keen to press its 
advantage in the House of Lords.41 Although Lord Denham later argued that the 
Lords had reacted more to being put under pressure by the Labour government 
than to the government's vulnerability in the Commons, he conceded that "we 
were being begged constantly to send back more and more amendments by our 
friends in the Commons - I think because the majority was so small".42 
Harold Wilson appears in retrospect to have considered that the Lords' actions 
between 1974 and 1976 were not unreasonable. "Too much" was asked of them, 
he wrote in his memoirs. He went on to say that in August 1975 ministers entered 
a "concordat" - which he claimed, at the time of writing in 1979, was "still effective 
and now virtually an unwritten rule of the constitution" - that the Lords should not 
be asked to accept in any session any major Bill after Easter, except in 
cmergency.43 His recollection may have been confused, since although his 
memoirs linked this to the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill, that legislation had made 
no progress in the Commons in the 1974/75 session and was withdrawn, to be 
re-introduced the following session. In an earlier book, he had suggested that the 
key piece of legislation was the Remuneration Charges and Grants Bill, related to 
the government's counter-intlation policy, which had to be rushed through before 
the summer recess, when "business in the Lords was already more congested than 
at any time in living memory". Agreement, he said, was reached "with great good 
.f0 The Time of My Life (Penguin Books 1989) p 429. The crucial Cabinet decisions on the 
IMF action were actually taken in early December 1976. (See also, for instance, 
Callaghan, op cit, Chapter 14.) 
.f I See Chapter 7. 
42 Interview (January 2(00). 
-U Wilson: Final Tenn (Weidenfeld & Nicholson and Michael Joseph, 1979) p 144. 
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will" on the legislative programme, but "as the price of this co-operation. the 
Opposition exacted a not unreasonable promise that, in the new seSSion, no 
seriously 'controversial' legislation would be introduced after Easter".44 This 
parliamentary business deal (which apparently does not rate a mention elsewhere) 
hardly seems to merit Wilson's somewhat grandiose description of it.45 
Whatever Wilson may have thought, other ministers were certainly far from happy 
with the situation. Barbara Castle had noted in her diary back in October 1975 
that: 
"Their Lordships are keeping us tied to the House day and night with their 
amendments to this and that and are beginning to get under our skins".46 
Tony Benn relates that in Cabinet, in October 1976, Eric Varley accused the 
Lords of being "enormously irresponsible in blocking legislation". However Lord 
Elwyn-Jones, the Lord Chancellor, and Lord Peart apparently objected that it 
would be tactically unwise to attack the Lords then; and, perhaps surprisingly, 
Benn records that, while he himself disagreed, he said no more.47 The following 
month, however, Benn (who was Secretary of State for Energy) stated publicly 
that he personally supported the "outright, complete abolition of a chamber based 
either on inheritance or appointment";48 and at the very end of the session, when 
presumably it was clear that the Lords were determined to block the legislation, 
44 Wilson: The Governance of Britain (Weidenfeld & Nicholson and Michael Joseph, 1976) 
pp 144-5. 
45 Sir John Sainty, a former Clerk of the Parliaments, thought Wilson's description was 
"absolute rubbish" and said that any such agreement would have been ''window dressing" 
(Interview, January 2(01). Indeed Bills have subsequently been introduced in the Lords 
after the Easter recess. A study of the 1988/89 session, for instance, lists eight Bills leaving 
the Commons for the Lords after Easter (Shell & Beamish, op cit, pp 70-71). The Lords 
did accept a Select Committee recommendation for minimum intervals between various 
stages of legislation, in 1977, but these were not always observed (Ibid pp 64-66). Sainty 
also suggested that there was nothing unusual about the alleged overload of legislation in 
the Lords. Indeed Labour, in opposition, would make similar complaints against a future 
Conservative government (see Chapter 8). 
46 Diaries (op cit) p 531 (entry for 22nd October 1975). 
47 Diaries (op cit) p 632 (entry for 29th October 1976). 
48 Interview on Independent Radio News, reported in The Times, 13th November 1976. 
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Varley publicly attacked the Tory peers "responsible to no-one and elected by 
no-one" who had "the arrogance and effrontery to tell this elected House of 
Commons what policies they will allow us to pursue".49 
The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, also joined the criticism, telling MPs In 
early November 1976 that: 
"time after time there has been a conspiracy between the Conservative 
front bench in this House and the in-built Conservative majority in the 
House of Lords to defeat legislation which has been passed through the 
House of Commons .. J warn the House of Lords of the consequences".50 
Also, the Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, a close ally of Callaghan, was reported to 
have said: "Whatever happens now, the House of Lords in its present form will 
not endure".51 
This feeling that something should be done about the House of Lords was 
undoubtedly shared by many of the Labour backbenchers. It was reported in 
November 1976 that more than 60 had signed a motion criticising the "wilful and 
politically motivated" attempts of the Lords to mutilate and wreck legislation.52 
Back in June 1976, the left-wing MP, Dennis Skinner, had sought leave to bring in 
a Ten Minute Rule Bill to abolish the House of Lords. In colourful language, he 
argued that "when the lady in red chiffon has difficulty in stopping legislation in 
this House, she instructs her bower boys in ermine to put the boot in". He also 
showed how, for some at least on the Labour benches, their objection was not 
confined simply to hereditary Conservative peers. In a reference to Harold 
Wilson, he said: 
"Our ex-prime minister has made more life peerages than any other prime 
minister in history - close on 200 - we still have a job to find a 100 who will 
go through the lobbies and vote Labour".53 
49 House of Commons Debates, 22nd November 1976 (Vol 919, Cols 1890-93). 
50 Ibid (Vol 919, Col 211), 9th November 1976. 
51 Reported in The Guardian, 20th November 1976. In Time and Chance (p 387), 
Callaghan described Rees as "my closest friend" . 
52 Reported in The Times, 13th November 1976. 
53 House of C.ommons Debates, 16th June 1976 (Vol 913, C-<lls 545-552). During Wilson's 
two terms, 215 life peerages (excluding law lords) were created (House of Lords Library: 
Peera!!e Creations /958-/998; figures include some resignation/dissolution honours 
attributable to previous Prime Ministers, but exclude Wilson's own resignation honours). 
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Wilson's resignation honours earlier in 1976, which included nme peerages, had 
been controversial, since some recipients were said to be unsuitable and not all 
were known supporters of the Labour Party. (One - his raincoat manufacturer, 
Lord Kagan - was subsequently to go to prison.) This certainly would have done 
little to enhance the honours system or the House of Lords in the eyes of Labour 
supporters, as Skinner's speech showed.54 The episode would no doubt have 
reinforced objections to a nominated chamber, which had previously been raised 
by opponents to the 1968 proposals. Although it would not have had official 
government support, Skinner's motion was supported by 153 votes and was 
defeated by only 15 votes.55 Thus nearly half of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
was at that time prepared to support abolition of the House of Lords. 
The situation had changed considerably since the general elections of 1974, when 
neither manifesto had even mentioned the Lords. After two years in which, in the 
eyes of Labour members, they had wilfully obstructed the governmenfs legislative 
programme, there appeared to be a mood for action to be taken to deal with the 
problem, which had been articulated from the government frontbench, as well as 
from the backbenches. 
As far as the government was concerned, it may be that this amounted to little 
more than rhetoric. If ministers were, perhaps understandably, unwilling to revisit 
large scale reforms of the type abandoned in 1969, then presumably the short 
54 In his diaries, Tony Benn described Wilson's list as a 'scandal". "It is unsavoury, 
disreputable ... that he should push inadequate, buccanecring sharp hysters for his honours 
was disgusting" (Diaries op cit pp 570/1; entries for 23 and 27 May 1976). 
Wilson's biographer, Phillip Ziegler, says that Benn's reaction was "by no means untypical" 
and that the Political Honours Scrutiny Committee and reportedly Buckingham Palace had 
taken exception to the list (Wilson: The Authorised Life; Harper Collins, 1995, 
pp 494-498). Callaghan's biographer concluded that "it undoubtedly did much damage to 
the Labour Party", as well as to Wilson's own "shop soiled" reputation (K Morgan, op cit, 
pp 703-4). 
55 House of Commons Debates, 16th June 1976 (Vol 913, Col 552). 
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Bill dealing with powers, apparently prepared at the same time, would still have 
been available, to be dusted down for future use.56 Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence to suggest that this or any other measure to deal with the Lords were 
even discussed by ministers at this time.57 Of course, the passage of any such 
measure then would have been fraught with difficulty, given the government's lack 
of a majority, unless it could secure wider support for it. Callaghan later reflected 
that, in such circumstances, it would have been "a sheer waste of the Cabinet's 
time"; and Lord McNally (then his political adviser) recalled that the actions of 
the Lords "may have annoyed ministers, but certainly there was nothing they could 
do about it".58 
However, this would not necessarily inhibit discussion of the development of 
longer term policy on this issue. It was against this background that an official 
Labour party committee had begun work on proposals for constitutional reform, 
including the House of Lords. This will be examined in detail in the following 
Chapters. 
56 See p 35. 
57 Michael Foot, then Leader of the Commons, could not recall any discussions in Cabinet 
on this, although he thought, in retrospect, they ought to have taken place (Interview, 
March 1999). Neither could Elizabeth Thomas (his special adviser) or John Stevens 
(his principal Private Secretary 1977-79) recall discussion of any action (correspondence 
with the author, May/ July 1999). Sir John Sainty recalled that, at some point, Llewellyn 
Davies asked him to look unofficially into what steps might be required to create a very 
large number of peers (Interview). This would have presumably been in response to the 
Labour Party NEC's proposals (for which see Chapter 3), since there was never any 
suggestion that the government seriously contemplated such action. 
58 Interviews (May 1998, June 1999). 
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR'S POLICY 1976-78 
Establishment of Study Group 
The Machinery of Government Study Group had been set up by the Party's National 
Executive Committee (NEC) in March 1976, in advance of the drafting of Labour's 
Programme, a comprehensive policy statement due to be put to the Party Conference that 
autumn. 
1 The preceding 1973 Programme had said little on the subject of the 
constitution;2 but this gap had been noted by the party officials who presented a paper 
setting out "issues the Home Policy Committee might like to consider in drawing up 
Labour's Programme 1976". The House of Lords was one item in a list ranging from the 
civil service to honours and the role of the monarchy. 3 
The NEC's Home Policy Committee resolved "that a Working Party be set up to consider 
a general statement for inclusion in Labour's Programme 1976 and that further detailed 
work be undertaken subsequently". The proposed membership would comprise Eric 
Heffer, Shirley Williams, John Forrester and Bryan Stanley (two MPs and two trade union 
representatives on the NEC respectively), plus "a small number of co-opted members".4 In 
addition, Tony Benn, as Chainnan of the Home Policy Committee, had the right to attend 
ex-officio. He was subsequently listed as a member and would play an active part in its 
work. The number of co-optees would not, as it turned out, be confined to "a small 
number", as the group grew considerably in size. At the first meeting of the Machinery of 
Government Study Group (as it came to be called) on 1st April 1976, the three NEC 
members present - Stanley was absent - elected Heffer chainnan.5 
The Party Conference was the supreme policy making body of the Labour Party, but the NEC was 
otherwise responsible for policy and for preparing and issuing statements which would, where 
appropriate, be put to Conference. Domestic policy issues were dealt with by its Home Policy 
Committee, to which a range of sub-committees, working parties and study groups reported 
(including the Machinery of Government Study Group). 
2 See Chapter 2. 
3 RE 515 (March 1976): The Machinery of Government. 
4 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 8th March 1976 
5 Machinery of Govemment Study Group Minutes (1) lSI April 1976. 
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The paper drafted by the officials included many points which were to recur during 
subsequent discussions. It observed that since the previous Labour government's abortiye 
reforms, "very little attention has been given to this problem". However the problems 
remained - the frustration of Labour government legislation; the delaying powers' 
growing importance towards the end of a Parliament; and objections to both hereditary and 
appointed peers, enjoying no popular mandate. It suggested that the objection to appointed 
peers was "almost as great as with hereditary peers". It argued that, while the "simplest 
remedy" might be a pledge to outright abolition and a single chamber, "this would lead to 
considerable problems", including overwork for the Commons, and added: 
"The overwhelming majority of parliamentary democracies are bicameral, and 
it is suggested that there is a continuing role for a second chamber in the United 
Kingdom. What is crucial, however, is that this should no longer take the form of 
an unrepresentative body which is able to frustrate the will of the democratically 
elected House of Commons.,,6 
Thus, the initial paper put to the Home Policy Committee and then to the Study Group did 
not suggest support for the policy of abolition which was subsequently to be adopted. The 
wording may seem to have been tentative, but that would have been in the nature of such a 
paper, which, in advance of discussion, could go no further than consider options and 
suggest a preferred course of action, which was that: 
"The simplest way of dealing with the powers of the House of Lords would be to 
pass an amendment to the Parliament Act 1911 to provide that all Bills passed by 
the Commons would be enacted with or without the consent of the House of Lords 
at the end of each session. This simple provision would shut off any possibility 
that the House of Lords would frustrate a majority in the House of Commons for 
even a single session." 
It added that there would also need to be provision to remove the Lords' powers to block 
secondary legislation. The paper concluded that the Lords could still playa useful role, 
initiating legislation and acting as a revising chamber, but allowing the Commons, if it so 
wished, to override them, "after due consideration, but without inordinate delay and a 
lengthy process which can also block other vitallegislation.,,7 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 RE 515 op cit. 
7 Ibid. 
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Thus, the possible introduction of a short Bill dealing with the powers of the House of 
Lords was again being mooted. As previously noted, this possibly had been considered 
when Labour was last in office, and a Bill had apparently been prepared by Parliamentary 
draftsmen. It could presumably have been drawn on again, if necessary; but if anyone 
involved in Labour's discussions in the 1970s was aware of its existence, no mention was 
made ofit.8 
A paper of this nature necessarily also discussed possible changes in composition "to 
ensure that it is a forum which has some weight, although not having the right to hold up 
legislation", ranging from an elected chamber, to simply ending the rights of hereditary 
peers to take their seats on inheritance. A House with life peers and others there by virtue 
of holding specified positions or being nominated by particular "representative 
organisations" was also mooted;9 and Benn's earlier proposal for a chamber of Privy 
Counsellors was noted. 1O After initial discussion in the Study Group, "the general view 
was that any second chamber should be more representative of the community that the 
present House of Lords. However, at this stage we should leave the options open as to 
exactly how it would be composed. "II 
The Group then proceeded to consider a draft for Labour's Programme. This was agreed 
at a meeting attended by only two NEC members (Williams and Stanley) and the 
Secretary (the present author); 12 but the passage on the House of Lords, which was to be 
much quoted in future documents, went through unchanged into the published version. It 
stated: 
"We believe that the present House of Lords is an outdated institution, completely 
inappropriate to a modem democratic system of government. It should not, 
therefore, continue in its present form. Any second chamber which replaces it 
must be much more representative of the community as a whole, and we shall 
examine ways of bringing this about".13 
8 See p 35. Michael Foot has said that he was not aware of the draft short Bill referred to (Interview, 
March 1999). Nor, at the time, were the present author or the Party's then Research Secretary, 
Geoff Bish, who later confIrmed that the NEC was unaware of it, adding, "I wish I'd known about 
the Bill" (Interview, March 1999). 
9 RE 515 op cit 
10 See p 24. 
1 1 Study Group Minutes ( 1) 1 st April 1976. 
12 Study Group Minutes (2) 26th April 1976. 
13 RF 594: Draft Section of tab our's Programme. 
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The Programme, approved by Conference in October 1976, did, however, note that work 
on machinery of government issues was at an early stage and that "at this point we are 
seeking only to present some interim conclusions on a few of the issues involved".14 
Although there was to be no debate specifically on the Lords, in presenting the Programme 
to the Conference, Tony Benn drew particular attention to the section on machinery of 
government, saying the party did not want the impetus of policy bogged down in 
Parliamentary obstruction - "certainly not in the House of Lords"; and he added, speaking 
for himself, that abolition of the Lords would add nothing to the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement. 15 
Meanwhile, the full membership of the Study Group had been established. A total of 16 
co-options had been agreed by the NEC members of the Group at its second meeting (in 
the absence of the Chairman) but, following a request from the Home Policy Committee, a 
further 13 co-options were made, most of whom would have been thought of as broadly on 
the "left" of the Party.16 Although political labelling should be treated with caution, one 
active member, John Garrett, said in retrospect that the Group was clearly not balanced 
and that it should have had more Lords on it. Another, John Griffith, recalled wondering 
whether Labour MPs ''would regard us as a bunch of left wing eccentrics. 17 The co-options 
meant that the membership was extremely large - a total of 36, including Chairman, 
Secretary and five other NEC members. It should, perhaps, be noted that three of the NEC 
members were also Cabinet ministers (although Michael Foot played no active role, 
despite receiving the papers). There were at this stage, only two members of the House of 
---------------_ ... ------------------------------------------------------------------_ ... -------------------------------------------------... ------
14 Labour's Programme 1976, p 104. 
15 Labour Party Conference Report 1976, p 157. As noted in Chapter 2, the government was facing 
severe economic pressures at this time. 
16 Study Group Minutes (2) 26th April 1976, (3) 29th June 1979; Home Policy Committee Minutes 7th 
June 1976, 1 t h July 1976 and Study Group papers refer. One of the further co-options included the 
future Party Leader, Neil Kinnock, then a backbench MP, but he would play little part in the 
proceedings. 
17 Interviews, July and October 1998. 
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Lords on the Group - Lords Shepherd (who played no active role) and Crowther Hunt 
(who did). The size and diversity of membership meant that, although there was usually a 
core of about a dozen or so regular attenders, it could not really be an homogeneous 
group. IS 
The issue of the second chamber was not initially given priority, but, by October, the 
Group decided to aim for an interim report for 1977, which would include the House of 
Lords. 19 The next few meetings concentrated on that issue. 
The paper then submitted by the Secretary included much which was to form the basis of 
the statement issued by the Party the following year. After observing that the simplest 
course "in theory" would be outright abolition, it suggested that "this could lead to 
considerable problems" and that "there should be a continuing role for a second chamber 
in the United Kingdom", although this should not take the form of an unrepresentative 
body able to frustrate the Commons. Having discussed various possibilities, "A Proposed 
Course of Action" was put forward. This involved amending the Parliament Act so that, 
firstly, amendments to legislation made in the Lords could be removed by a vote of the 
Commons, with no requirement to send them back again; and secondly, that rejection of 
legislation by the Lords at any stage could be negated by an overriding vote of the 
Commons in the same session. The paper also suggested a time limit on Lords' 
discussion, removal of powers to block subordinate legislation, but retention of powers 
over the extension of the life of a Parliament. Like the earlier paper, it examined various 
options for composition, but now argued that limiting voting to life peers and ending of 
hereditary peerages, while an improvement on the present, would still mean an appointed 
House which would "probably not be appropriate as long term solution".2o 
18 There would be further changes to the membership over time. For full membership list, see 
Appendix 2. Note that neither Foor nor Shepherd are recorded as having attended any meetings of 
the Group. 
19 Study Group Minutes (3) 29th June 1976; (5) 19th October 1976 
20 RE842: The House of Lords and a Reformed Second Chamber (November 1976). This paper was 
broadly in line with the approach suggested in the initial paper (RE 515). In discussion with the 
author, Geoff Bish later recalled, with regard to unicameralism: "You and I were a bit uneasy about 
it, weren't we'? ... we felt a revising chamber of some kind or something, was necessary" 
(Interview, March 1999). 
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Given the battle that was taking place at the same time between the Labour government 
and the House of Lords,21 it is perhaps not surprising that the contents of the paper leaked. 
In the Financial Times, Richard Evans reported that a "far reaching plan for refonn" had 
been drawn up "as pressure mounts for action"; and that the proposals on powers would 
mean that "the 'ping-pong' between the two Houses" which had killed the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Bill the previous day could no longer happen; 22 while in The Times, 
Michael Hatfield suggested that the proposals would "strike a chord with Labour voters".23 
At this stage, in November 1976, it was by no means clear that the Labour Party would go 
for abolition. Even Tony Benn, later to be a foremost advocate of the policy, was keeping 
options open. While calling for abolition of a chamber based on heredity and patronage, 
he acknowledged in a radio interview that for a second chamber ''we could manage quite 
well with a number of altematives.,,24 
The Study Group, when it met in November 1976, agreed that "an upper chamber based 
on either the hereditary principle or on a patronage basis was unacceptable" and that it 
should not have the existing powers to frustrate the Commons. There were differing views 
on what sort of chamber, if any, should replace the present one. Some felt a second 
chamber with limited revising powers, was necessary; but there was little enthusiasm for a 
chamber of interest groups and "the general view" was that an elected chamber would be 
able to claim a mandate and be a threat to the House of Commons. Accordingly the 
minutes go on to record: 
"Thus while some members felt that there should be a second chamber, the 
majority of those present thought such a body would not be necessary.,,25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 See Chapter 2. rd 
22 'Transport House draws up scheme for House of Lords', Financial Times, 23 November 1976. 
23 The Times, 23rd November 1976. 
24 Interview with IRN, reported in The Times, 13 th November 1976. 
25 Study Group Minutes (6) 23rd November 1976. 
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They add that, if the Commons were overburdened, then it was argued this was a case for 
the reform of the Commons itself. The Group decided that the paper should be revised in 
the light of this (by the Secretary, in consultation with Nonnan Buchan MP and John 
Griffith, Professor of Public Law at the London School of Economics, both of whom 
supported the abolition recommendation). It would "make it clear the House of Lords 
should be abolished", but nevertheless set out the cases "for and against having any second 
chamber" and also the merits and demerits of alternative forms. 26 
No members of the House of Lords were present at this meeting. Lord Crowther Hunt 
afterwards doubted that his presence would have made much difference, but expressed the 
hope that something on the lines of the Secretary's paper could be put to the National 
Executive as one of the alternatives.27 Lord Peart, the Leader of the House of Lords, had 
been invited to the meeting, but did not attend. He had also been sent an advance copy of 
the paper but, perhaps surprisingly, no comments were received.28 
Reflecting the previous discussion, the revised paper for the December meeting of the 
Group no longer suggested a continuing role for a second chamber. It acknowledged that 
outright abolition "would entail certain problems," but also that "there is a strong case for 
arguing that the House of Lords has shown itself not to be especially valuable as a revising 
chamber", citing in support evidence supplied by Griffith. While acknowledging that the 
majority of Parliamentary democracies are bicameral, it observed that, for instance, 
Sweden and New Zealand had abolished their second chambers, and concluded that "it 
might well be that, given the necessary changes in Commons procedure and governmental 
processes, abolition of the second chamber would be the most appropriate course for the 
United Kingdom. ,,29 
26 Ibid. 
27 Letter to the Secretary, 30th November 1976. 
28 Personal recollection. 
29 RE 876: Statement on the House of Lords (Revised Draft), December 1976. Griffith's evidence 
(included in an appendix) was based on his own study of the Lords in 1968/69 and 1970171, 
published in Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (Allen & Unwin 1974); and evidence III 
Janet Morgan's study: The House of Lords and the Labour Government J 964-70. 
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Nevertheless, it noted that refonns would take some time to implement, with the danger of 
the Lords meanwhile frustrating the Commons. It suggested, in the first instance, 
legislation to restrict the power of the Lords, adding that, if changes were not effected 
during the existing Parliament, "the NEC should aim to ensure that our next manifesto 
contains a commitment to introduce legislation to curb, refonn or abolish the Upper House 
in the next session of the new Parliament.,,3o (The failure to mention the issue in the 1974 
manifestos had been noted, and this would have been intended as advice to the NEC on the 
necessity for such a commitment next time.) 
However, the Group thought that any suggestion of restricting powers as a first step 
"would distract from a clear commitment to abolition". It effectively confirmed the 
previous conclusion, agreeing that the paper to be put to the Home Policy Committee 
"should make clear the Study Group's conclusions in favour of abolishing the House of 
Lords and having a single chamber legislature." It would also make clear the need to 
consider reforms to the Commons.3) The paper was then further revised accordingly. 
Several of the individuals present at this meeting, which agreed the draft statement 
supporting abolition, were different from those at the previous one. Although most of 
those who were at the November meeting might have been regarded as on the "left", this 
was not the case with those at the December meeting.32 (The latter included Crowther 
Hunt, who went along with the statement, despite his personal disagreement with the 
conclusion.) In any case, it would be much too simple to draw an automatic correlation 
between the "left" and support for abolition. The Chairman, Eric Heffer, told the press 
later that "he had originally been in favour of a reformed second chamber, but had been 
convinced during the group's studies that a unicameral system was the only answer".33 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------
30 Ibid. 
31 Study Group Minutes (7) 16th December 1976. 
32 The November and December meetings were attended by ten and eleven members respectively 
(excluding officials), of whom only five (including the Chairman) were present at both. 
33 The Times: 'Labour Executive aims at Lords abolition', 11th February 1977. 
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Another active member of the Group, Robert Sheldon (then Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury) was reported as saying that "he had always been a unicameralist, but had been 
prepared to accept a second chamber on practical grounds. However his work on the 
Study Group had taken him back to square one. ,,34 
Nevertheless, the academic, Bernard Crick, had resigned from the Group after the 
November meeting. He expressed the fear that the Party was in danger of digging itself 
"even further into the trough of unpopularity into which we are sinking", arguing that "it is 
perfectly plain that people are not convinced of the value of unicameral government and 
we are fooling ourselves if we think so". He regretted the demise of the 1968/69 
proposals, "the old joint compromise, which would have been workable.,,35 
It was at the December 1976 meeting of the Group that another aspect was raised, which 
was to prove significant in later debate, as it pointed to a possible stumbling block. 
Ironically it was at the request of Tony Benn, by no means an opponent of abolition, that a 
paper by Geoffrey Bing was circulated. Bing was a lawyer, who had previously been a 
Labour MP and then Attorney-General of Ghana. He raised a number of questions, but the 
crucial one was as follows: 
"it is necessary to consider how to achieve within the present law the abolition 
of the House of Lords without its agreement. The danger is that the House of 
Lords will be only too anxious to be reformed in order for it to continue in 
some shape or another, and the Parliament Act does not appear capable of 
being used for the purpose of abolishing the Lords altogether. ,,36 
This and related points were to be looked at further on several occasions; and, as will be 
seen, the potential difficulties were never fully resolved. For the moment, however, the 
Group noted that "this might mean that additional peers would need to be created to ensure 
the passage of such a measure"; and that it should seek clarification on the points raised.37 
34 Reported in The Times, 31 51 December 1976. 
35 Letter to the Secretary, 25th November 1976. 
36 RE 879: Points for Discussion in Regard to the House of Lords - Geoffrey Bing (December 1976). 
37 Study Group Minutes (7) 16th December 1976. 
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The Party's Home Policy Committee agreed in January 1977 that the Study Group's paper 
should be published with only minor amendments, and resolved that: 
"the NEC be recommended to accept the Study Group recommendations that 
the House of Lords be abolished and to ask the Study Group to continue its 
work on the implications of that decision.,,38 
A newspaper report the following day suggested a degree of dissent, implying that Shirley 
Williams had argued for support for abolition of the existing chamber but not for 
unicameralism?9 There is no official record of any disagreement, but Tony Benn's private 
record suggests that Williams did raise the matter. He noted that, while he had suggested 
opting for the end of the Lords and "to see where that leads us", she expressed concern 
about unicameralism and asked about the possibility of an elected second chamber. Benn 
himself said this could be looked at later. He recorded that a motion (by Judith Hart) to 
print the report as circulated, but to say that further work would be done, was agreed 
without a vote, "Shirley having tried to get the vote, but 10st.'.40 
The decision then went through the NEC later that month with no record of dissent from 
any of those present - who included Williams and James Callaghan - even though Benn 
had drawn attention to the relevant minute of the Home Policy Committee.41 This is worth 
noting, in view of Callaghan's subsequent opposition to the policy. Williams did, 
however, resign from the Study Group shortly afterwards, but cited poor attendance rather 
than any policy issues as the reason.42 
38 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 10th January 1977. 
39 'Labour take aim at Second Chamber'; Martin Adeney, The Guardian, 11 January 1977. 
40 Unpublished text of Diaries (entry for 10th January 1977). Williams herself could not recall having 
raised the matter (Letter, March 2000). 
41 NEe Minutes, 26th January 1977. 
42 Letter to the Secretary, 4th February 1977. Two other members of the Group, Bill Kendall and 
Norn1an Ellis, also resigned, giving the same reasons (letters to the Secretary, 2nd February 1977). 
Both were senior figures in the Civil Service Unions. It would be unsurprising if they had preferred 
not to be associated with a controversial political decision; and one was apparently concerned about 
leaks from the Group (private infom1ation). Shirley Williams subsequently confirmed that, for her, 
lack of time was the reason, but that she wanted to keep tabs on the work of the Group and her 
political adviser, John Lyttle, continued to attend. As far as she could recall, there was no 
connection with the other resignations (Letter, March 2000). 
- 71 -
Callaghan and other ministers may, of course, have been pre-occupied with other matters. 
Interestingly, he makes no specific mention of the House of Lords issue at this time in his 
memoirs, and neither does his senior policy adviser Bernard Donoughue in his book 
covering the period.43 Yet it would be surprising if the Prime Minister and his colleagues 
were not alerted to its significance. Even before the matter reached the Home Policy 
Committee, leaks had appeared in the press; and that Committee's endorsement was also 
reported. Readers of The Guardian were told "it is bound to be Party political dynamite, 
with the Conservatives using it as an argument to frighten voters into viewing Labour as 
'd . ,,44 antI- emocratIc. Moreover ministers (including Callaghan) had themselves been 
warning of action against the Lords only a few weeks previously, and so would have been 
unlikely to ignore proposals for such action emerging from the Party's official 
h· 45 mac mery. 
Callaghan clearly felt frustrated by the NEC and later suggested that he may have given up 
on the NEC by then.46 Tom McNally, then his chief political adviser, has suggested that 
the NEC was then seen by Downing Street as an open enemy and that Callaghan "simply 
bided his time, as far as issues that he didn't want to see", relying on the joint manifesto 
committee (which would meet prior to an election) as the final arbiter. 47 However, this 
was surely storing up trouble for the future. 
43 Callaghan: Time and Chance; Donoughue: Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy under Harold 
Wilson and James Callaghan (Jonathan Cape; 1987). Likewise Denis Healey ignored the issue in 
his memoirs, The Time of My Life. Even Benn's published diaries covering this particular period 
made no reference to this significant policy development (Against the Tide, Diaries 1973-76,· 
Conflicts of Interest, Diaries 1977-80, Hutchinson 1989/90). However, as noted above, there was 
some reference in his unpublished diaries. 
44 Martin Adeney, The Guardian. 11th January 1977. 
45 See Chapter 2. 
46 Interview, May 1998. In his autobiography Callaghan noted, although not specifically in this 
context, how he felt that "a small majority of the NEC were actually opposed to the Cabinet and 
some of the MPs on the NEC appeared to want to set themselves up as an alternative government." 
(op cit, p 459). Geoff Bish thought it was probably true that ministers had given up on the NEC by 
then; and recalled that "until we got nearer the election .... they treated NEC statements as just 
another statement from the opposition (sic)" (Interview, March 1999). 
47 Interview, June 1999. 
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Publication of the Study Group's Report 
The Study Group's report was published in February 1977 as a 'Labour Party Discussion 
Paper' and took the unusual form of a special supplement to the Party's newspaper Labour 
Weekly.48 Despite the label, it did not invite responses to any specific questions, although 
it did rehearse the arguments for and against various options. However, as we have seen, 
the NEC had already agreed to accept the principal recommendations contained in the 
report; and, in the event, the revised statement, which was to be published later in the year 
and presented to the Party Conference, would not differ from it greatly in substance.49 
The 'discussion' paper began by pointing to the disruption caused to the Labour 
government's legislative programme and argued that the Lords' subsequent action had 
shown that the description of it in Labour IS Programme 1976 to be "more than 
justified,,;5o and "quite clearly that action to deal with unrepresentative second chamber 
can no longer be delayed." Noting previous attempts at reform, it made particular 
reference to the Labour government's 1968 White Paper and to criticisms of it, including 
that it would have "opened the way for excessive use ofpatronage.,,51 
It suggested that "in theory, the simplest course of action would be the outright abolition 
of the House of Lords, leaving the House of Commons as a single chamber legislature", 
but that, "if this course of action is advocated, it must be recognised that it would entail 
certain problems". It noted arguments concerning lack of parliamentary time and also that 
it would put more power into the hands of the executive, an argument which would be 
"widely expressed in the press and elsewhere" and to which "the public might be 
receptive". On the other hand, it reiterated the argument that the House of Lords was not 
essential as a revising chamber, noting that if the Commons was overburdened, this might 
be better dealt with by reforms to the Commons itself and greater scrutiny achieved by 
more open government and pre-legislative consultation. 
48 House of Lords: A Labour Part)' Discussion Paper; Labour Weekly, 11 th February 1977. The 
following paras on pp 72-75 all refer to this. 
49 See pp 81-82. 
50 See p 64. . 
51 Cmnd 3799 (See Chapter 1). Amongst other criticisms noted were that the delaying powers would stIll 
have been too great and thJt too much of a decisive role would have been given to crossbenchers. 
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Although suggesting a single chamber Parliament, the report nevertheless went on to 
consider what form a second chamber could take, arguing that "if we are to have a second 
chamber, it is crucial that it should no longer take, the form of an unrepresentative body 
able to frustrate the role of the democratically elected House of Commons. The most 
immediate way of ensuring this was to deal with the power of the Upper House, refonned 
or otherwise." The paper outlined possible changes in powers, along the line of previous 
drafts.52 The second chamber could then, "if so required ... continue to playa useful role in 
the Parliamentary process", able to initiate legislation, and act as a revising and 
scrutinising chamber. 
Even with such changes, the question of composition would still be extremely important. 
The Commons would "undoubtedly" attach more weight to a representative chamber; and 
there was the danger of a Conservative majority, "smarting from a reduction in their 
powers", which "would be inclined to be even more awkward than now". Swamping by 
means of new creations was considered, but to ensure a Labour majority this "would 
require the creation of several hundred new peers (up to nearly 1,000)". This "would 
clearly involve the use of patronage on an unprecedented and unacceptable scale and 
might also involve difficulties with the Crown". It would be "adding to the existing 
unacceptable system rather than replacing it with a more acceptable one". The paper 
considered means of curbing the hereditary element, but noted that "it would still be an 
appointed House, whose members owe their existence to patronage and would in that 
respect be unacceptable. At best, ending the hereditary voting might serve as an interim 
measure, but would not provide a satisfactory solution". 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52 See, for instance, p 65. 
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The possibility of an elected second chamber was raised, but noting the various existing 
and proposed elections, it concluded "a further set of elections on top of these would not 
t b . t ,,53 Th'" b seem 0 e appropna e. e major pro lem" was that an elected assembly "could then 
appear to have a much greater right to challenge the elected House of Commons, and very 
probably would do so". The possible dangers, it was said, were illustrated by the recent 
constitutional crisis in Australia. 54 
Indirect elections were not supported; nor was the suggestion that "members of the 
proposed new directly elected European Parliament" or of the proposed devolved 
assemblies should become members of a second chamber. Amongst other objections, both 
would confuse what the elections were really for. The possibility of a chamber comprising 
individuals from "representative institutions" was discussed, but "it would appear to be the 
very kind of corporatist body which many people - especially Labour people - would find 
unacceptable" and there would be the objection of a "substantial element of patronage". It 
also questioned whether the most able and suitable people would want to serve "in what 
they would see as a 'talking shop' . 
The conclusion previously reached by the Study Group was then reiterated - that ''there is 
no suggestion for reformed composition which does not have important drawbacks"; and 
thus, ''the most straightforward and practical course would seem to be to abolish the 
second chamber altogether". It added that "there is any case a clear need for refonning the 
practices of the House of Commons", which should be done "in such a way as to' 
incorporate those functions which have hitherto been thought necessary to a second 
chamber"; and that the Study Group was looking at this. 
53 At that time, the government was proposing to establish assemblies in Scotland and Wales; and it 
was also proposed that members of the European Parliament, who then were nominated from 
among existing Westminster MPs, would in future be directly elected. In the event, the legislation 
for devolution to Scotland and Wales fell, but direct elections to the European Parliament went 
ahead in 1979. 
54 In 1975, a constitutional crisis bad been precipitated in Australia by a clash between the Upper and 
Lower Houses of Parliament, where the elected Senate, which bad much greater powers than the 
House of Lords in the UK, refused supply to the government The outcome was that the Labour 
government of Gough Whitlam was dismissed by the Governor-General. While not directly 
comparable with the situation at Westminster, memories of this were then fresh. 
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One caveat was added, however, to the conclusion in favour of abolition. While only in 
brackets here, suggesting an afterthought, it was to prove of some significance in future 
discussions. It stated: 
''There is some doubt as to whether the Parliament Act can be used to get 
through legislation abolishing the House of Lords. The Study Group is seeking 
clarification on this point." 
The published paper also included a separate section by John Griffith, under the heading 
'We should abolish, not reform the Lords'. This reiterated the argument and some of the 
evidence he had presented to the Study Group to show that ''the case for a second chamber 
has been much overstated and that a single chamber could adequately do the necessary 
legislative job.,,55 
Around the same time, Griffith had also published a more polemical article in the New 
Statesman, entitled 'One House of Parliament', which did not confine its criticism to 
Conservative peers. 
"Facing them across the Upper House are, with very few exceptions, the rag tag 
and bobtail of the Labour Party, a collection of superannuated widows, defeated 
and discredited politicians, political hangers-on to the coat tails of our most recent 
Prime Minister, rich men and poor academics, not one of them able to achieve his 
or her membership of that House, except through inheritance or the operation of a 
system of patronage. ,,56 
This seemingly harsh attack by a prominent member of Labour's Study Group was in 
marked contrast to the official paper, which avoided any direct criticism of existing 
Labour peers, who had been fighting an uphill battle against superior Conservative 
numbers in the Lords. 
--------------------------------------------------------_._-----
55 Labour Party Discussion Paper (op cit). Griffith was then a leading advocate of single chamber 
government, but this view was not reflected in a more recent book of which he was joint author, 
which argued that, "as the weight of legislation increased, neither government nor the House of 
Commons have been able to prevent the onus of revision shifting increasingly over to the Lords" 
(J A G Griffith and Michael Ryle, with M A J Wheeler Booth: Parliament - Functions, Practice 
and Procedure, Sweet and Maxwell 1989, p 455). Asked later whether he had modified his view on 
the efficacy of the second chamber, Griffith said that it was useful to have a revising chamber, and 
that this could be either a second chamber or the House of Commons itself, but reform of the House 
of Commons would have to be "pretty radical" to allow for this (Interview, October 1998). 
56 New Statesman, 14* January 1977 (Vol 93, pp 39-40). 
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As it was, the Labour peers had been stung into action by the Study Group's report and the 
NEC's support for it. On receiving a copy prior to publication, the Government Chief 
Whip in the Lords told the Party's General Secretary that representation on the Study 
Group and that representation had not been "as we would have wished. ,,57 Then Lord 
Champion informed him that the Labour peers had formed a "Working Group to consider 
House of Lords reform", under his chairmanship, and asked that the NEC consider their 
deliberations before arriving at any conclusions on what he described as "submissions" of 
the Home Policy Committee.58 He was, of course, too late, since the decision to endorse 
the Study Group's conclusions and publish the report had already been taken. 
The NEC's support for abolition should not have come as a complete surprise to Labour 
peers, two of whom were members of the Study Group.59 Their leader, Lord Peart, had 
been sent an early draft of the report which had discussed the various courses of action, 
including abolition;60 and the Group's deliberations had been reported in the press. 
Moreover, it would seem that some discussions had already been held by Labour peers. 
The Times reported on 28th January that: 
"Labour peers decided yesterday that, in spite of strong feeling in the Labour Party 
in favour of abolishing the House of Lords;! they will go ahead with their own 
discussions on the reform of the House of Lords and preservation of the bicameral 
system.,,61 
As the Party launched its actual statement, Simon Hoggart observed in The Guardian that 
Labour peers had just set up their own group, "partly as a rival to the official one".62 At 
the same time, the Conservative Party, too, had been prompted to act, setting up its own 
Review Committee, chaired by Lord Home, at least partly in response.63 
57 Letter from Baroness Llewellyn Davies to Ron Hayward, 27 rh January 1977. 
58 Letter from Champion to Hayward, 9rh February 1977. Champion was a Labour peer (and fonner 
MP), who had been Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, 1964-67. 
59 Only one, Crowther Hunt (also appointed a member of the Labour peers' group), was active, but 
both would have received the papers. 
60 RE 842 November 1976 (op cit). 
61 'Labour Peers to continue talks on refonn', 28 rh January 1977 (emphasis added). 
62 The Guardian, 11 rh February 1977. 
63 See Chapter 7. 
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Questions about Implementation 
Labour's Study Group now turned its attention to the means of implementing abolition. 
The question which concerned it was whether the Parliament Act of 1911 (as amended by 
the 1949 Act) could actually be used to abolish the House of Lords. The Secretary had 
written to the Attorney General, Sam Silkin, seeking advice as to "whether the Parliament 
Act could be invoked to get through legislation abolishing the House of Lords, if the Lords 
themselves were to refuse to pass such a measure". In his reply, Silkin indicated that he 
had discussed this with the Solicitor General, Peter Archer, and supplied a note 
representing their joint view. He also suggested consulting the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Elwyn Jones,"on a matter of such urgent constitutional importance". He stressed they 
were acting in a non-ministerial capacity; and, indeed, both the letter and note of advice 
were personally handwritten. 64 
The Law Officers' note observed that the 1949 Act had been carried through using the 
provisions of the 1911 Act, establishing the principle that the Parliament Act could be 
used to carry through amendments to itself. Also, a literal interpretation of Section 2 of 
the 1911 Act suggested it covered all Bills not specifically excepted "and hence would 
cover a Bill to abolish the House of Lords"; and moreover, despite initial appearances, the 
Long Title of the Act did not rule this out. They took up the argument concerning the 
preamble to the Act, indicating its transitional nature, and they concluded that, after 65 
years, arguments about constitutional propriety had lost much of their force. The return at 
a general election of a government openly committed to abolition and to using the 
Parliament Act for that purpose would outweigh arguments based on the preamble to the 
1911 Act. 65 Accordingly: 
"It follows that in our view, the Parliament Act 1911, as amended, can be used to 
carry through legislation abolishing the House of Lords, at least if the electorate 
had given the government of the day a mandate to use the 1911 Act for that 
purpose". 
-- - --- ---- -- ----------------------------- ----- --- -- --- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- -----
64 Study Group papers: correspondence, 14th January and 4th February 1977. 
65 The preamble to the 1911 Parliament Act indicated that its purpose was to make transitional 
provision, stating that "it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it presently exists a 
second chamber constItuted on a popular instead of hereditary basis, but such a substitution cannot 
immediately be brought 1I1to effect." 
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Although this might, on the face of it, seem a fairly clear conclusion, Silkin and Archer 
noted two caveats. The first was that the requisite Speaker's certificate might be refused.66 
While this was unlikely, such a refusal "could cause obvious problems." Secondly, Royal 
Assent might be refused on grounds of constitutional propriety. Again this was "highly 
unlikely," but the possibility "cannot be completely ruled OUt',(j7 
This paper was never formally circulated, since Silkin, concerned at the sensitivity of the 
subject, preferred to report verbally. 68 When he did so, he told the Study Group: 
''Their view was that the House of Lords could be abolished by making use of the 
Parliament Act as amended by the 1949 Act. If the Speakers' Certificate and 
Royal Assent had been received, the courts probably could not challenge it". 
Silkin added, however, that he had consulted Lord Elwyn Jones, again in a personal 
capacity, and "his view was that the preamble was still relevant, and that it would be a 
constitutional impropriety to use the Parliament Act to abolish the House of Lords 
altogether.,,69 Thus the most senior lawyers in the government disagreed on this important 
question of whether the Parliament Act could be used to abolish the Lords. Furthermore, 
Silkin had said only that the courts "probably" could not challenge it. Clearly there was 
some doubt on this point. 
For the same meeting of the Study Group, a paper from Geoffrey Bing had been 
circulated, which argued that "there are five reasons, each of which might in itself be 
sufficient to prevent the Parliament Act being used to abolish the House of Lords", and 
which taken together would seem likely to make it "constitutionally impossible". He 
further argued that this could probably "lead to a conflict with the judges and with the 
Crown as to whether future Acts of Parliament were invalid, as not being enacted as 
required by law, once the House of Lords was abolished.,,7o 
66 Under the terms of the Parliament Act, the Speaker must issue a certificate confirming that the 
relevant provisions have been complied with, before legislation can receive Royal Assent and be 
enacted under this procedure. 
67 Study Group papers (op cit). 
68 Ibid: letter 19th March 1977. 
69 Study Group Minutes (11) 30th March 1977. . 
70 REI037: Reasons likely why it is suggested that the Parliament Act cannot be used to abolish the 
House of Lords - Geoffrey Bing (March 1977). Bing had been invited to the Study Group meeting, 
but did not attend. Note that Crowther Hunt would bring up the point about the Coronation Oath 
again in later discussions (See Chapter 5). 
- 79-
The reasons cited were: firstly, the preamble to the Parliament Act 1911, which was not 
intended to permit abolition; secondly, the 'Long Title' which presumed a House of Lords 
in some form until both Houses agreed on a Bill for a new Chamber; thirdly, that it must 
exist in order for an extension of Parliament to be agreed by both Houses, as provided for; 
fourthly, the Aim, the Scope and Object of the Act, which did nothing to justify complete 
abolition; fifthly, possible embarrassment for the Crown, since the monarch promises in 
the Coronation Oath to govern "according to statutes in Parliament agreed on," raising the 
question of what would constitute such a statute. Bing's conclusion was: 
"It would be legally and constitutionally more simple to retain the House of Lords 
deprived of all real power than attempt to abolish it by the use of the Parliament 
Act. ,,71 
This argument could have taken the Study Group back to the case for a Bill dealing with 
the powers of the House of Lords, at least as a first step, which had been suggested earlier, 
but not adopted. However, Silkin was not enthusiastic for a House deprived of its powers, 
telling the Group he "felt there would be greater propriety in straightforward abolition". 
As far as the other possible alternative means were concerned, he felt that asking the 
Queen to create a large number of new peers "would hardly seem to be more proper."n 
The differing views expressed by eminent lawyers clearly suggested a potential problem in 
implementing the policy. Moreover, if Bing was correct, a Labour government's whole 
subsequent programme might be called into question. 
When it was suggested that safeguards against Parliament prolonging its life were needed, 
some members of the Group argued that, in the absence of a written constitution, such 
provisions could ultimately be got round; but the minutes go on to record: 
"it was generally felt that it would be desirable for some apparent form of 
safeguard to be written in on this point. It was also suggested that, as there was 
still some doubt about the use of the Parliament Act, we should, in our manifesto, 
cover both points, making it clear it would be done either by the Parliament Act or 
h . f " 73 t e creatIOn 0 peers . 
71 Ibid. 
72 Minutes (11) op cit. 
73 Ibid. 
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The use of the word "apparent" points to the continuing uncertainty as to whether any 
absolute safeguard could be provided. 
The argument about the use of the Parliament Act and how or whether the House of Lords 
could be abolished would be returned to in the Study Group after the 1979 general 
election.74 Meanwhile, it would also be taken up by two academics in the learned pages of 
the Law Quarterly Review. Peter Mirfield (Lecturer in Law, University of Leeds) 
questioned whether the House of Lords could be abolished, even with the Royal Assent, 
and further whether even then it would have the force of law. He also doubted that the 
Parliament Act itself could be used to carry it through. He argued what would seem to be 
a sort of 'Catch 22' position, that "the Parliament Act of 1911 provides for legislation 
without the consent of the House of Lords only on the basis that the second chamber 
continues to exist", and that: 
"The conclusion must be that if a Bill to abolish the legislative power of the House 
of Lords were to pass through Parliament under the Parliament Act procedure, the 
result would be an invalid Act or something perhaps better not described as an Act 
at all." 
Speculating about the reactions of the courts, he concluded that "the judiciary ... would 
face a minefield of decisions". 75 
A contrary argument was then put by George Winterton (Senior Lecturer in Law, 
University of New South Wales), who concluded that, whatever the political force of 
Mirfield's argument, "it has no legal significance"; and that "there are, in fact, no legal 
obstacles to the abolition of the House of Lords". He suggested that, in any case, there 
could be means of achieving de facto abolition, but that these should not be necessary.,,76 
74 See Chapter 5. 
75 'Can the House of Lords be Lawfully Abolished?' Law Quarterly Journal. January 1979 (Vol 95, 
pp 36-58). 
76 'Is the House of Lords Immortal?', Law Quarterly Journal, July 1979 (Vol 95, pp 383-392). 
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Since both lawyers and academics were divided on the issue, it seems hardly surprising 
that the Labour Party was, in the event, unable to arrive at a wholly conclusive view. 77 
1977 Party Conference 
The statement issued by the NEC to be put to the 1977 Conference was based very much 
on the earlier 'Discussion Paper' - indeed, apart from necessary presentational changes, 
much of it was identical. Some amendments were designed to make a more positive, less 
conditional statement in support of abolition; and it omitted the separate section by 
Griffith, instead incorporating some of his supporting arguments in the main text. Having 
stated the intention to come forward with a statement on reform of procedures and 
practices of the House of Commons, it added an initial proposal to take account of the 
abolition of the Lords: 
"in relation to the tidying up and revising functions at present carried out by 
the House of Lords, it is proposed that a special form of select committee 
should be set up to consider legislation after it has received its third reading. ,,78 
Also the all-important conclusion was amended to take account of the debate on whether 
and how the abolition of the House of Lords would be carried through. Having stated that 
77 By contrast, the Conservative Party's Review Committee apparently accepted that the House of 
Lords could be abolished (see Chapter 7). The question has not subsequently been resolved. The 
Labour Party's further deliberations in the 1980s were inconclusive (see Chapter 5). In current 
reference texts, A W Bradley and K D Ewing contend that the Parliament Act could be used to 
abolish the Lords (Constitutional and Administrative Law, 13th edition, Longman 2003, p 71), 
whereas 0 H Phillips, P Jackson and P Leopold question whether the 1911 Act could be used to 
amend itself and thus whether the 1949 Act is itself valid (Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
8th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2001, pp 79-81). However, the Royal Commission on the Reform of 
the House of Lords stated that the Parliament Acts could be amended under their own procedures 
(Cm 4534, A House/or the Future, HMSO 2001, P 52). 
78 The Machinery o/Government and the House o/Lords (1977). 
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"clearly there are immense difficulties with any attempt to provide a reformed second 
chamber", it re-iterated that "we certainly cannot allow a second chamber to continue on 
the basis of heredity and patronage, and that "the most straightforward and practical 
course would be to abolish the second chamber altogether." It then added the following: 
"We believe that Labour's next Manifesto should contain a commitment to 
introduce legislation at any early stage in the new Parliament and should include a 
passage along the following lines: 
"Should we become the Government after the next General Election, we intend to 
abolish the House of Lords. No doubt, given such an electoral mandate, the Lords 
would agree to this, but should they not, we would be prepared to use the 
Parliament Act or advise the Queen to use her prerogative powers to ensure this. 
Unless something else was done, this would remove the Lords' complete veto on 
an extension of the life of the House of Commons beyond five years. To safeguard 
electors' rights, therefore, we propose that such extensions should be subject to 
approval by a Referendum or, in time of war, by a two-thirds majority of the House 
of Commons." 79 
This passage was clearly intended to get round the potential difficulties that had been 
identified. How far it succeeded is open to question. Despite saying "no doubt" the Lords 
would agree, it immediately cast doubt on this by saying "should they not. .... ". This 
whole question was to be re-opened after the 1979 general election, but for the time being, 
at least, it would seem to have been laid to rest. 
Although labelled an 'interim statement' (because other issues relating to machinery of 
government remained to be dealt with), this was, in fact, the definitive statement of Party 
policy on the Lords. It was accepted by the NEC's Home Policy Committee as it emerged 
from the Study Group, without any dissent being noted. 8o This could have provided a 
further opportunity for any opponents of the policy on the NEC to intervene, although a 
reversal of the earlier decision would have been unlikely at this stage. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 19th July 1977. 
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The Labour peers had meanwhile put forward some proposals of their own. Their 
Working Party, under Lord Champion, had concluded that they agreed with Bagehot that 
"the difficulty of reforming an old institution like the House of Lords is necessarily 
great.,,81 The NEC's Study Group had, of course, come to a similar conclusion and 
recommended abolition. Unsurprisingly, the Labour peers did not so recommend. Instead 
they proposed that membership be confined to life peers and hereditary peers of first 
creation; other hereditary peers would lose the right to sit, although they could be eligible 
for nomination to life peerages. There would also be a place for law lords and for ten 
bishops, with consideration given to other religious bodies in future creations. From this 
body, about 250 "voting peers" would be selected, so as to reflect party balance in the 
Commons, with the parliamentary parties in the Lords determining composition of their 
groupings. Other peers would be able to participate in the work of the House, but not 
vote. Nominees for future creations would be made by a Commons' Select Committee, 
chaired by the Prime Minister, who would then select from them. Delaying powers would 
be reduced to six months (other than for legislation to extend a Parliament) and the 
Commons would be able to override the Lords on delegated legislation.82 
These proposals were in many respects similar to those which had been put forward 
unsuccessfully in 1968/9. In particular, they provided for a two-tier House of voting and 
non-voting peers; and, on the face of it, prime ministerial patronage would have only been 
slightly circumscribed. It might be considered surprising that such proposals should have 
been thought to stand any greater chance of success this time round. As David Wood 
noted in The Times, they could help keep the Lords in being much as it is, for a long time 
to come, but "for internal party reasons, the proposals cannot be practical politics.,,83 
81 Report circulated to the NEe Study Group as RE 1232: House of Lords Reform. (Reference is to 
Bagehot: The English Constitution, op cit.) 
82 Ibid. 
83 'A House not to defeat or destroy', 4th July 1977. 
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No changes to the NEC's proposals resulted. The Machinery of Government Study Group 
simply noted the paper, regretting it had only been received after the Study Group had 
h d . I· 84 Th reac e Its conc USIOns. e Study Group's proposals, accepted by the NEC, would be 
going forward to the Party Conference later in October. Meanwhile support for its position 
was expressed by the executive bodies of both arms of the Labour movement in a joint 
policy statement issued by the Labour Party and the TUC, which included the following: 
"The past year has shown the imperative need for early action to reform the House 
of Lords and we look forward to its abolition".85 
The debate on the House of Lords was one of the highlights of the 1977 Labour Party 
Conference in Brighton. The Times reported that the Conference "erupted into a lather of 
emotion" as it voted for abolition.86 Alongside the NEC statement was a resolution 
supporting abolition: 
"This Conference declares that the House of Lords is a negation of democracy and 
calls upon the Government, the Parliamentary Party and the National Executive 
Committee to take every possible step open to them to secure the total abolition of 
the House of Lords and the reform of Parliament into an efficient, single chamber, 
legislating body, without delay. 
"Conference calls for this measure to be included in the next manifesto as set out in 
the National Executive Committee paper. Conference instructs the National 
Executive Committee to organise a great campaign throughout the movement on 
h·, ,,87 t IS Issue. 
It was moved by the Transport and General Workers Union, the largest affiliated trade 
union, which had strongly supported some of the legislation which had been held up in the 
House of Lords. Curiously, Tony Benn noted in his diary that, over lunch shortly before, 
the TGWU General Secretary, Jack Jones, had said to him: 
"I hope you're not going to come out in favour of a second chamber. We want 
total abolition of the House of Lords". 
Benn noted caustically: "Of course, ifhe'd read the House of Lords statement, he'd know 
h .. ,,88 t at was our pOSItIOn. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
84 Study Group Minutes (15) 7th July 1977. 
85 The Next Three Years and Into the Eighties, July 1977 (Para 40). 
86 The Times, 6th October 1977. 
~7 I abour Party Conference Report 1977, p 270. th . . . 
SS Conflicts o/lntercst- Diaries /977-80, P 213: entry for 12 S.eptember 1.977 .. Surpns,1Ogly, ~Iven 
his interest and involvement, this is the only rderence to the Issue contamed 10 Benn s published 
diaries for this year. 
- 85-
In the debate, Jones argued fiercely for abolition, pointing out that legislation had been 
"bruised and delayed by a vindictive and unrepresentative second chamber" and 
concluding that "the case for abolition is overwhelming." He asserted further that "this 
commitment must be included in the next manifesto at the next general election. \Vith one 
stroke, a firm decision today at this Conference would give greater encouragement to 
those who believe in a democratic society. ,,89 
Government ministers kept a low profile. Perhaps this was because, as political 
commentator, Ian Aitken, had observed on the NEC statement: 
"The document seems certain to be regarded as an embarrassment to Mr 
Callaghan. Yet even the most sceptical ministers are bound to endorse the political 
case made against the present House. ,,90 
Yet, not withstanding any potential embarrassment, as already noted, ministers on the 
NEC had not opposed it there; and at the Conference it was left to Baroness Llewellyn 
Davies, to argue against abolition of "the poor old deeply unpopular House of Lords". 
Even she felt the need to acknowledge: 
"Of course the House of Lords is indefensible, based as it is on hereditary 
peerages, and I do not pretend to defend that. I believe that all titles should be 
abolished, and I believe that every Labour member of the House of Lords thinks 
the same thing.,,91 
However, she appealed to the Party to think the matter through, referring to valuable work 
done by the Lords in amending legislation - without it Bills would go through imperfectly 
and then be interpreted in courts. "I do not believe the people will respect us if we divert 
all our too few resources from the real things that matter to a constitutional side issue like 
th o ,,92 IS . 
. -------- - ------- ------- -.- ---------------------_ ...... -------------------------------------_ ... ---- ------------------------------------------------------
89 Conference Report, p 270. 
90 The Guardian, 5th September 1977. 
91 Conference Report, pp 272-3. Despite this assertion, the Labour peers' own proposals would not 
have eliminated titles. 
92 Ibid. 
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It was reported that Joan Lestor, in the chair, looked about vainly in an attempt to get a 
balanced debate.93 However, the veteran fonner Minister, Lord Shinwell, then in his 
nineties, also spoke against abolition, arguing again that the Party should concentrate on 
other issues, but although he won sentimental applause, the outcome of the debate was 
never in doubt.94 John Forrester wound up for the NEC, saying "what we cannot mend we 
must now detennine to end"; and the resolution was carried on a card vote by 6,248,000 to 
91,000. The NEC statement was then carried on a show ofhands.95 
Given the overwhelming support for abolition, a card vote might have seemed 
superfluous. However, The Times' report suggested it was taken to make the position 
clear beyond doubt to the government, which implies doubts about the government 
position in the minds of those asking for it. Significantly, a fonnal two-thirds vote would 
ensure it was included in the Party's programme from which, under the terms of the 
constitution, the election manifesto would be drawn.96 Jack Jones had, of course, made a 
point of emphasising the need for its inclusion in the next manifesto in his Conference 
speech. This, as will be seen, became a matter of major controversy at the time of the 
general election in 1979.97 Supporters of the policy had certainly not forgotten it, even 
though nothing became of the "great campaign" called for on the issue.98 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
93 Report in The Times (op cit). 
94 Although Shinwell had supported the Conservatives in blocking the Labour government's Aircraft 
and Shipbuilding Bill, this was not mentioned. (It seems likely that most delegates were unaware 
of this.) 
95 Conference Report, p 275. 
96 Provided for in Labour Party Constitution, Clause V. 
97 See Chapter 4. 
98 Relevant NEC Reports make no reference to any ongoing campaign; and the author, who would 
have been involved, has no recollection of any such campaign. Conference resolutions were often 
the result of a complicated drafting and negotiating process and would sometimes include aspects 
which were not followed up. However, if the NEC and the policy's supporters had been 
sufficiently motivated, this one probably would have been. 
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However, there was at the same time an upsurge of interest elsewhere in the issue of 
Lords' reform. The work of the Conservative Party's Committee was well under way; 
and that autumn also saw plans from a former Attorney General and papers from two 
Conservative pressure groups. The Liberals, too, had begun work on plans for Lords 
refonn.99 
Implications for the Commons 
Labour had never planned simply to look at the House of Lords in isolation. Indeed, the 
NEC statement had specifically stated the intention to bring forward proposals on reform 
of the House of Commons. 100 There had already been some preliminary discussions in the 
Machinery of Government Study Group on specific changes to Commons procedure to 
take account of the abolition of the House of Lords. In particular, the Group had 
recognised the need for some fonn of procedure to take a second look at legislation. One 
of its members, John Griffith, had suggested a period between the Commons Committee 
and Report Stages, for which three months might be necessary. He acknowledged that this 
would mean that most complex measures would have to conclude their Committee Stage 
by April and that their Report Stage would be longer; but he argued that, since the quantity 
of positive revision by the Lords was not great, "it could be absorbed by the Commons 
without great difficulty".lol However the Group was concerned at the effect of an April 
deadline on the legislative timetable. Instead, a special form of Select Committee was 
suggested to consider legislation after Third Reading, although it was envisaged that not 
all legislation need necessarily go through this, if agreement was reached through the 
"usual channels". 102 
Subsequently, it was decided to include a less detailed reference in the 1977 Statement. 103 
Further work was clearly necessary. No doubt, had the plan been pursued in the form 
suggested, critics would have asked how a procedure intended to tidy up and revise 
legislation would work, if some legislation were to be excluded. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
99 See Chapters 7 and 9. 
100 The MachinelY of Government and the House of Lords, p 9. 
10 1 RE 1150: One House of Parliament by Jo1m Griffith (May 1977). 
102 Study Group Minutes ( 13) 11 th May 1977. 
103 Study Group Minutes ( 15) 7th July 1977. 
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Following the 1977 Conference, the Study Group was able to look in greater detail at 
refonn of the House of Commons, establishing a small drafting committee, from which a 
range of proposals, including a new Revision Committee after Report Stage, emerged. A 
statement agreed by the Study Group in March 1978 was then subject to minor 
amendments by the NEC's Home Policy Committee and consultation with the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, before approval by the NEC and publication in July 1978. 104 
It proposed new procedures up to and after Second Reading, with a Committee Stage 
involving new and more powerful committees (which would be able to take evidence), and 
then an extra stage. 
"After the Report Stage, the Bill would go to a Revision Committee of the House 
of Commons which would be set up to enable a second look to be taken to see if 
any obvious flaws or drafting mistakes had been made in the legislation and to see 
if any changes were necessary. It is at this stage that "second thoughts" on the 
precise drafting of legislation could be considered. The Revision Committee 
would report with recommendations to the House, which would approve or reject 
them. Effectively this would be perfonning the only useful role which the House 
of Lords now perfonns.,,105 
The statement also included, in a "miscellaneous section", a couple of additional points 
which seemed to follow on from the 1977 Statement. These were that hereditary peers 
should revert to the nonnal rights and privileges of ordinary citizens, with no special 
status, and that: 
"The House of Lords as Court of Appeal should be given accommodation outside 
Westminster and a Royal Commission should be set up to decide the future of the 
Law Lords". 106 
104 Study Group Minutes (20) 220d March 1978, (21) 19th April 1978, (22) 26th April 1978,. . 
(25) 14th June 1978. (NB An earlier version, before final amendment, had been publIshed WIth 
'green paper' status in April 1978). 
105 NEC Statement: Reform of the House of Commons (1978) para 8. By inference, the proposed 
Revision Committee would, like other Committees, reflect the political balance in the Commons, 
although this was not spelt out. Other proposals included provision for carrying over legislation 
from one Parliamentary session to the next. 
106 Ibid (Para 18). 
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This suggests some uncertainty about how to deal with law lords - an aspect which the 
Group had not considered in detail and which had barely rated a mention in the 1977 
statement. In addition, this wording could be interpreted as envisaging that the House of 
Lords might continue to exist, at least in a nominal fonn, for some time to come. This was 
despite the overwhelming Conference decision on abolition, which had excited so much 
interest at the time, and which would prove to be significant to the development of the 
Party's forthcoming election manifesto, as will be seen in the next Chapter. 
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4. LABOUR'S POLICY AND THE 1979 MANIFESTO 
During the cou rse of 1978, attention became increasingly focused on the like Iy 
imminence of a general election. Although the Parliament could in theory run 
until the autumn of 1979, the Labour government had no overall majority; and the 
Liberals announced in the summer that they would withdraw from the Lib-Lab 
pact when the new Parliamentary session began in November.! An autumn 
election was widely expected. Some MPs had cleared their filing cabinets in 
anticipation and the party machine had materials printed ready for the campaign;2 
while in Downing Street, according to his senior policy adviser. the Prime 
Minister's staff "had mentally adjusted for an electoral battle"} 
In preparation for the forthcoming election. advance thought was glVen to the 
contents of Labour's manifesto. In the summer of 1978 a number of joint working 
parties were set up, with representation from the National Executive and the 
Cabinet, "in order to reach preliminary agreement on items for inclusion in the 
manifesto on the basis of the Party programme."4 Amongst these was a Working 
Party on Government Machinery, which met twice in July 1978.5 
A paper prepared for this Working Party noted that abolition of the House of 
I .. ords would require legislation. "This would be a major constitutional measure, 
debated through all stages on the floor of the House. It would almost certainly 
extend over two sessions, since the Parliament Acts would have to be used against 
the Lords' opposition to their own abolition". It suggested the most complicated 
sections of the Bill would be those dealing with judicial and allied functions 
3 
5 
Callaghan: Time and Cl1ance, p 513. 
Ibid; also personal reconection. 
Donoughue: Prime Minister - The Conduct of Policy under Harold WJ1son and James 
Calla/!han. p 167. 
NEe Report 1978, p 44. Abolition of the Lords would now be considered part of the 
programme. 
Thi~ comprised Frank AlJaun, Tony Benn, John Cartwright, Barbara Castle and Eric 
Ildfcr (on behalf of the NEe): Michael Foot. John Morris, Lord Peart and Merlyn Rees 
(on lwhalf of the CAlbinet); plus secretariat (Hizabeth Thomas and Tim Lamport: Geoff 
Bish also attended). C.astle and Cartwright did not attend either meeting. (Of these only 
Benn. Iidfer and - nominally - Foot. plll~ the author as Secretary. had been involved in 
lhl' NFC"s Study Group). 
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(which, as previously noted, had not been addressed in detail). It was also 
suggested that further further legislation would be required, if the proposal to 
hold a referendum on the extension of the life of a Parliament was adopted, but 
that consequent reforms of the Commons to deal with the revising functions of the 
Lords could probably be done without legislation.6 
At its second meeting, a clear decision was reached on the abolition of the House 
of Lords: 
"Michael Foot proposed and it was agreed with one exception that the 
Working Group should recommend that this commitment should be 
included in the Manifesto. Fred Peart wished to have it recorded that he 
was implacably opposed to the abolition of the House of Lords and 
believed that it would be a liability electorally."7 
In view of the controversy that was to ensue, it is worth noting that the proposal 
to include abolition of the Lords in the manifesto was made by Michael Foot, the 
Party's Deputy Leader; and that it was agreed at a meeting with five Cabinet 
Ministers present, of whom only one - the Leader of the House of Lords -
dissented.s Indeed, at one point in this particular meeting, when Lord Peart had 
temporarily left the room, Foot (who was in the chair) jocularly suggested: "Let's 
all agree to abolish the House of Lords before Fred gets back." Peart did, of 
course, get the chance to make his position clear, but he was in a minority of one.9 
On the detail, the Working Party thought that reference to a referendum in case 
of extension of the life of a Parliament should be omitted - "the safeguard 
required could be guaranteed by specifying a two-thirds or other majority in the 
Commons". There was some discussion on how the abolition would be carried 
6 Internal Working Party documentation. 
7 NEe/Cabinet Working Party on Government Machinery: Minutes (2) 26th July 1978. 
8 The five ministers concerned were Foot, Rees, Peart, Morris and Benn (although Benn 
was there as a representative of the NEe). 
9 Personal recollection. 
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through - with Tony Benn arguing for reference not only to use of the Parliament 
Acts but also to prerogative powers to create peers; and Michael Foot disagreeing, 
arguing that the former would be sufficient. Eventually it was decided that 
compromise wording, along the lines that "we would, if necessary, secure the 
creation of the required majority in the House of Lords", would be included in 
brackets in the manifesto draft, with the decision on inclusion to be taken at the 
appropriate NEC/Cabinet meeting. lO 
Thus, while agreement had been reached on the commitment to abolition itself, 
differing views remained on what would be necessary to carry this through. These 
had not been resolved by the Party's Study Group or by the NEC/Cabinet 
Working Party; and it was to re-surface after the election, with Benn and Foot 
again taking different positions. ll 
Such disagreements on detail notwithstanding, there would seem to have been 
good reason to expect that, when the election came, the manfesto would include a 
commitment to abolish the House of Lords. The day before the NEC / Cabinet 
Working Party agreed to this, the Prime Minister had reportedly conceded as 
much at a meeting of the TUC / Labour Party Liaison Committee.12 Then, on 3rd 
August 1978, when asked in the Commons by Dennis Skinner whether he would 
get rid of the House of Lords, he made the following reply: 
"As for the abolition of the House of Lords, this has been an aspiration of 
many of us for many years. I am glad to say that it has been the policy of 
my party for many years. Because of the constitutional difficulties which I 
have seen in getting certain Bills through it has not been possible yet to 
achieve it, but we must always strive to move onwards and upwards."l3 
10 Working Party Minutes, op cit. 
11 See Chapter 5. 
12 The Times, 25th July 1978. 
13 /louse of C-ammons Debates (Yol 955, Col 932), 3rd August 1978. 
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Perhaps significantly, Callaghan did not respond directly when challenged by the 
Leader of the Opposition, Margaret Thatcher, as to whether he supported the 
aspiration of his party to do without a second chamber altogether. Instead he 
emphasised that he had "never found any legitimate authority whatever for an 
undemocratic unelected chamber in this country" and that: 
"I know of no-one, save the reactionary Conservative Party who 
would seek to defend an unelected House of Lords."14 
Nevertheless, this led Francis Pym, the Opposition spokesman on Commons 
affairs, to claim that, "in his guise as a moderate, Mr Callaghan is in reality driving 
onwards and upwards towards the socialist goal of an unicameral state")5 
The Commons exchanges took place on the last day before the recess and what 
was widely expected to be an autumn general election. In the event, the Prime 
Minister decided after all not to call an election;16 so some six months were to 
elapse before the actual manifesto came to be drafted. 
Meanwhile, the drafts from the NEC/Cabinet Working Parties had been sent to 
the NEC's Home Policy Committee in September 1978, which then asked party 
officials to prepare a 'Campaign Document' "as the basis for future manifesto 
consultations". The Home Policy Committee considered the document 'NEC 
Proposals for the Manifesto' at two meetings in early December, following which a 
meeting of key members of the NEC and the Cabinet was held on 20th December. 
This group then became, in effect, a manifesto working group which held eleven 
meetings between January and March 1979. According to the Party's Research 
Secretary, Geoff Bish, "considerable progress" was made at these and through 
informal contacts, but "substantial differences" remained to be resolved."17 
14 Ibid, Cols 932-33 
15 Reported in The Times, 5th August 1978. 
16 He announced this in a broadcast on 7th September 1978 (see Callaghan, op cit. 
pp 517/18). 
17 What Went Wronl? (ed Ken Coates), Lnapter 10, which is extracted from a paper by 
Geoff Bish presented to the NECs Home Policy Committee following the election. The 
account in the British lTCneral r.1ection o{ 1979 by David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh 
(Macmillan 1980) tells a broadly similar story. (Butler would aJmost certainly have 
spoken to Bish whl'n compiling it.) 
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Leaks of the draft presented to the Home Policy Committee in December had 
appeared in the press. The Daily Telegraph noted the commitment to abolish the 
Lords and if necessary secure a majority to bring it about, and also the reference 
to the proposed safeguard of a two-thirds majority with regard to the life of the 
Parliament. The newspaper then went on mischievously to infer from the 
proposed safeguard that Labour actually planned to extend the life of 
Parliament. 18 
Although the draft reflected the position agreed in the Working Party earlier in 
the year, party officials had harboured doubts about this point, as shown in a 
comment accompanying the draft, which said that it "detracts from a clear crisp 
commitment - and draws attention to a possible drawback which it is not possible 
to answer clearly in the text:19 The Home Policy Committee then sought to 
clarify the position by agreeing a passage stating that "the Bill to abolish the 
House of Lords will entrench the automatic dissolution at the end of each five 
year period".20 The Daily Telegraph noted that members of the committee had 
claimed deliberate misrepresentation by the press. Nevertheless, its report was 
headed 'Labour Drops Long Life Commons. '21 This episode would have helped 
show the potential for a hostile press to raise scares, whether well founded or 
not.22 
18 'Longer Parliament Move by Labour', The Daily Telegraph. 11th December 1978. 
19 RE 1898: NEC Proposals for the Manifesto: First Rough Draft (December 1978). 
20 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 12th December 1978. 
21 The Daily Telegraph, 13th December 1978 
22 This possibility had been anticipated earlier, for instance in the 1977 NEC statement (see 
p 72). The matter was discussed further in subsequent meetings between members of the 
NEe and the Cabinet, IOcluding the possibility of a reduction in the limit on the duration 
of a Parliament, but no new policy decisions were taken (Private papers). 
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Having decided against a general election the prevIous autumn, Callaghan was 
forced to hold one at a time not of his choosing when, having failed to secure 
sufficient support in the devolution referenda in Scotland and Wales, his 
government was defeated in a vote of confidence in the House of Commons on 
28th March 1979.23 Just two days earlier, Michael Foot had publicly reaffirmed 
Labour's policy on the House of Lords. In response to a question by the Shadow 
Leader of the House, Norman St John-Stevas, suggesting a referendum on the 
House of Lords, he said: 
"I am in favour of its abolition and I believe the proper body to carry out 
the abolition of the House of Lords is the House of Commons".24 
As noted above, some differences remained on the NEC / Cabinet manifesto 
working group at the time the government was defeated. The NEC had not yet 
had a chance to consider these. A special meeting was arranged for 2nd April, 
but 10 Downing Street had prepared its own draft manifesto, said to be based "to 
some extent" on drafts agreed in the NEC/Cabinet Working Party. Bish said that 
he had first sight of this on 30th March: 
"It was, in his view, appalling. Not only did it ignore entire chapters of 
Party policy; it overturned and ignored many of the agreements which had 
been laboriously hammered out within the NEC/Cabinet Group.25 
Butler and Kavanagh suggest that the existence of this draft (prepared by Tom 
McNally and David Lipsey) should have come as no surprise. "It was widely 
known that there was such a draft", although virtually no member of the 
Parliamentary Party had seen it.26 
23 See Callaghan (op cit) pp 558-563. 
24 26th March 1979, House of Commons Debates (Vol 965, Col 25). 
25 What Went Wrong. pp 196-197. 
26 The British General Election of 1979, P 147. 
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A revised draft was then prepared by the Research Department for the NEe 
meeting on 2nd April, but, according to Bish's account, this was never discussed.27 
However, the meeting agreed to establish a drafting committee comprising the 
Prime Minister (Callaghan), the Party Chairman (Frank Allaun), the General 
Secretary (Ron Hayward), plus Michael Foot, Tony Benn, Denis Healey, Eric 
Heffer and Lena Jeger.28 Bish noted that it was given no remit on policy issues, 
but was instructed to work on the basis of the Research Department draft ("which 
it did not do") and to make it shorter ("which it certainly did").29 
The drafting commmittee met the same evemng and continued till 3.30 the 
following morning. It was apparently the first time NEC members had seen the 
No. 10 draft (which was less specific and omitted reference to certain non-agreed 
policies), but this became the basis for discussion. Callaghan insisted the number 
of commitments be strictly limited and suggested instead the NEC should 
approach ministers after the election, when he would ensure progress, saymg: 
"You have to trust us to do things that you want us to do without putting it in the 
manifesto." It would seem that the trust was not there, but, according to Bish, 
"NEC members became fully aware only at this meeting about the degree of 
hostility within the the Cabinet to certain commitments."30 
27 What Went Wrong, p 197. 
28 NEe Minutes 2nd April 1979. It was original1y proposed to remit the draft to just the first 
three, but an amendment moved by Heffer was carried, remitting it to the larger group. 
(NB These minutes were erroneously dated 2nd May.) 
29 What Went Wrong, p 197. 
30 Ibid, pp 198, 199; also Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) pp 147, 148. 
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One issue on which no agreement was reached was the I-louse of Lords. Tony 
Benn recorded in his diary a colourful account of this marathon meeting, which 
quotes Callaghan as saying "I won't have it, I won't have it", by implication in 
response to a proposal to include abolition of the Lords. Then, he says, Heffer 
banged the table and challenged Callaghan's right to dictate, to which Callaghan 
responded by saying that, if they wanted it, they would have to change the leader: 
"I am the Leader of the Party and I have to decide what is right. I have 
responsibilities that I have to take and I won't do it")1 
Butler and Kavanagh confirm that Callaghan twice threated to resign if this was 
included and record that "at one point Mr Heffer reminded Mr Callaghan he was 
neither God nor the Labour Party."32 Considerable acrimony certainly seems to 
have been generated on this particular issue)3 
A formal decision on outstanding contentious Issues was deferred to the full 
Clause V meeting of the NEC and Cabinet on Friday 6th April,34 with a press 
conference planned for that evening and the official campaign launch the 
following Monday. According to Benn, a Cabinet meeting was held in the interim, 
at which the question of Lords' abolition was raised; and, when asked how such a 
question would be settled, "Jim said: 'I will decide if")5 
31 Benn: Conflicts of Interest - Diaries 1977-80; entry for 2nd April 1979 (pp 480-482). 
32 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 149. Benn's account phrases this slightly differently, 
quoting Heffer saying to Callaghan: "Who are you to dictate? Who do you think you are? 
You are just a member of the Party". The gist is the same; but interestingly, Benn recaUs 
Heffer actually using the phrase "You're not God, you're just a member of the Labour 
Party" to Callaghan a year earlier at a meeting of the TUC/Labour Party Liaison 
Committee on 24th July 1978, on the issue of public ownership of the building industry 
(Diaries. op cit. p 327). This was clearly not the first argument about the rights of the 
NEe and the Party leadership in determining policy, but it came at a crucial time. 
33 McNally dissented from this view, saying that "there may have been an exchange, but 
there was certainly not anything approaching a row on it" (Interview, June 1999). 
However Callaghan. himself, broadly confirmed the other accounts and stated explicitly 
that he had had "a terrible row" in the NEC and with Eric Heffer in particular (Interview. 
May 1998). lleffer may have felt particularly incensed, since he had chaired the relevant 
committee which drew up the policy, and thus felt slighted - in the recollection of the 
author, this would have been in character. 
.14 So called after Clause V of the Labour Party constitution, which provides for such a joint 
meeting to determine the manifesto. 
J5 Diary (unpublished version); entry for 5th April 1979. 
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When it came to the Clause V meeting, "there was precious little success for the 
NEC" on the issue.36 According to Benn's published account, he attempted 
another draft and "may have compromised too early", but he had in mind 
Callaghan's threat to resign the leadership. He noted that those on his side 
included Michael Foot, Neil Kinnock and John Smith (who, of course, were to be 
the next three leaders of the Party), "but the reality was that Jim wouldn't have it": 
and in the end a compromise put forward by Foot was agreed.3? Thus the 
manifesto, as published, stated: 
"No-one can defend on any democratic grounds the House of Lords and 
the power it exercises in our constitution. We propose therefore, in the 
next parliament, to abolish the delaying powers and the legislative veto of 
the House of Lords."38 
This position was, in fact, similar to that suggested to the NEC's Home Policy 
Committee and Machinery of Government Study Group at the outset of the 
deliberations on the issue.39 
This ill-tempered episode was scarcely the happiest way to start a difficult election 
campaign. Ironically, it occurred despite the considerable advance planning there 
had been for the manifesto. According to Bish, "the NEC had been set up to 
agree the very kind of manifesto in the very circumstances it had always hoped to 
avoid". Arguing for joint determination of policy and strategy, he suggested: 
''It is surely quite wrong for the Party to be encouraged to adopt, almost 
without dissent, major planks of policy (as it did on the House of Lords) 
and then, at the very last fence, to be faced with a complete veto on its 
inclusion in the manifesto. "40 
36 Bish, in What Went Wrong, p 200. 
37 Diaries (op cit), entry for 6th April 1979 (pp 486-7). Foot's recollection was that, although 
after the initial drafting meeting, he may have asked Callaghan to reconsider, by inference 
he had not pushed the matter further. He emphasised the importance he attached to 
Callaghan's leadership - "I was in favour of helping Callaghan" (Interview, March 1999). 
38 The Labour Way is the Better Way, Labour Party Manifesto 1979 (Dale, op cit, p 231). 
39 See Chapter 3. In retrospect, two of the leading advocates of the abolition policy 
recognised the case for the pragmatic alternative. Tony Benn acknowledged that there 
might havl' been a case for a Bill to tackle the powers: and John Griffith agreed that this 
could have been "a politically much more viable exercise" (Interviews June 2000. October 
1998) . 
.to What Went Wronj? pp 200. 203. 
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He said later that the NEC / Cabinet Working Party on Government Machinery 
had been "an example of a Group that worked", where ministers and NEC 
members had agreed drafts. He had pointed out at the controversial No. 10 
meeting on 2nd April that the policy on the Lords was something which had been 
discussed and agreed, rather than simply stuck in a draft; but he recalled that 
Benn "didn't make a big thing of this."41 
Writing five years after the event, Michael Foot claimed it was "one chief modem 
myth" that Callaghan and Wilson invented a leader's veto on the manifesto 
commitments, and that Callaghan wielded this with a special relish and ferocity. 
notably on the House of Lords at the meetings in 1979 - "it was never quite like 
that". lIe acknowledged that there had been discussions in NEC and PLP 
committees, but argued the timetable was forced by the Commons defeat and that 
correct procedures had been followed.42 
Whether or not correct procedures were followed, the leader could still have 
exercised what in practice amounted to a veto, even if he formally possessed no 
such power. In such a situation, decisions on content could not be deferred, as 
they had been on earlier occasions. The insistence of the leader, particularly if 
backed by the threat of resignation on the eve of an election, must carry 
considerable force, as Benn himself has acknowledged. Recalling the episode 
later, he observed, with understatement, that "to lose a Prime Minister then would 
have been a bit of a handicap."43 Butler and Kavanagh incline to the view that 
there was effectively a veto at the Clause V meeting: 
"Mr Callaghan correctly observed that, according to this clause, the 
manifesto had to be agreed between the NEC and the Parliamentary 
leadership. lie interpreted this to mean that if he did not agree with a 
proposal it could not be included and that, of course, was the political 
reality, though no leader had been so blunt in the past".44 
41 Interview. March 1999. Bish said he was annoyed about this. When also interviewed. 
Benn recalled Bish berating him over it; while McNally said he thought Benn had been 
"going through the motions" at the meeting .. 
42 Another Heart and Other Pulses (Collins. 1984) p 31. 
H Speaking at Queen Mary and Westfield College. University of London. 1st March 1995. 
44 Butkr & Kavanagh (op cit) p 148. 
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Moreover Callaghan thought so himself, saying later quite plainly: "well, I've 
always had a veto, obviously."45 
It is clear that Callaghan was implacably opposed to including abolition of the 
Lords in the manifesto. Why should this have been the case? In his memoirs, he 
noted: 
"I had been vaccinated against enthusiasm for legislation on constitutional 
reform by a salutary experience as Home Secretary in 1968."44 
He was referring here to his close involvement in Labour's abortive attempt to 
reform the Lords in 1968/9. With hindsight, he observed that "a large majority is 
not enough by itself to carry a constitutional Bill, for the opportunities for delay 
by a handful of determined members are infinite". Thus he concluded: 
"Even when finnly convinced that the proposed constitutional changes rank 
with the wisdom of Solomon, do not leave harbour until all legislative 
cargoes have arrived safely at their destination, for there is no limit to the 
uncharted rocks that can wreck this particular freighter during its voyage". 
He added, perhaps significantly, that "this was graphically illustrated by his own 
governmenfs difficulties over devolution legislation".47 
It may seem surpnsmg that Callaghan did not attempt to block or oppose the 
policy on abolition of the Lords at an earlier stage. However, at the time of the 
manifesto meeting, his government's recent defeat, partly as a result of problems 
with its devolution policy, may have weighed particularly heavily. As Butler and 
Kavanagh observed: 
"His own government had just failed after another fruitless attempt at 
constitutional refonn, which had consumed a vast amount of Parliamentary 
time. He was not keen, in his own words, to offer 'another gift to the 
backbench barrack room lawyers'."48 
·tS Interview, May 1998 . 
.t6 Calla~han (op cit) pp 502-4. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Butler and Kavanagh (op cit) P 148. 
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Callaghan, himself, recalled that his opposition was tactical, rather than because of 
opposition to reform as such: 
"We'd got plenty of problems on our plate, without taking on this extra 
thing of abolishing the Lords, which doesn't arouse a flicker of interest in 
the country, and would merely be used again by the opposition as another 
weapon - they'd got plenty in their hands already. I wouldn't have minded 
if we had been, say, on a winning streak. .. going ahead with it, if we'd got 
nothing else to do; but we weren't in that position ... We were in a position 
where we were fighting with our backs to the wall anyway, and I regarded 
this not as an advantage, as a handicap ".49 
This view was supported by Michael Foot, who had personally been in favour of 
the abolition policy: 
"I think it was just a question of thinking it wasn't going to assist us to win 
the election and I dare say he was right about that."50 
Nevertheless, this fails wholly to answer the question of why Callaghan does not 
seem to have attempted to avert the likely clash at an earlier stage. According to 
Tony Benn, he had told him as far back as May 1978, that he did not want 
abolition of the Lords in the manifesto.51 That, of course, was before the meeting 
of the NEC / Cabinet Working Party, designed to reach agreement in advance of 
the manifesto, when there would clearly have been the opportunity to intervene.52 
Benn has also suggested another reason for Prime Ministerial opposition to 
abolition of the Lords. Asked later why Labour had never done so, he said: "The 
explanation, ] think, is quite simple. A Labour Prime Minister would lose his 
patronage. "53 
49 Interview, May 1998, and correspondence with the author. May/June 2004. 
50 Interview, March 1999. 
) I Bcnn: Diaries (op cit) p 305. 
52 When asked by the author about this specificalJy, Callaghan replied that he ''wouldn't have 
tried to interfere with Michael I Foot]", (Interview May 1998); but this seems rather to 
miss the point. 
'i., QMW, 1995. 
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Notwithstanding such arguments, the actual manifesto commitment - "to abolish 
the delaying powers and legislative veto of the House of Lords" - could, taken 
literally, stiJl be regarded as radical, leaving the House of Lords in existence but 
still with relatively little power.54 Moreover, it could still have meant 
time-consuming constitutional reforms for "backbench barrack room lawyers" to 
get their teeth into. However, it was perceived by many as a climb-down from 
official policy, forced on the Party by the leader, and this was to have 
repercussions in some of the bitter arguments which followed Labour's defeat in 
1979.55 
It is interesting to note that, despite the controversy, the issue does not seem to 
have been especially important in the 1979 election campaign itself. It does not 
feature significantly in Butler and Kavanagh's account of that campaign, which 
records that only four per cent of Conservative and six per cent of Labour election 
addresses (in England and Wales) referred to it.56 Thus the Conservatives 
apparently did not see the policy as a major weapon to use against Labour, but 
nor did Labour see it as an especially important plank in its campaign. After a 
good deal of excitement, the party manifesto had proposed a more pragmatic 
approach than that so enthusiastically embraced by the Party Conference. Had it 
been implemented, it might nevertheless have dealt with the perceived problem of 
obstruction by the House of Lords. However, the way in which it had been arrived 
at had provoked resentment in some quarters, the ramifications which would 
continue to be felt after the general election, following Labour's defeat, as will be 
shown in the following Chapter. 
54 Bish recalled that, subsequent to the initial argument, No. 10 had been "surprisingly willing 
to accept fairly strong language in the manifesto", which 'which was not all that unradical" 
(Interview, March 1999). Benn also accepted that the manifesto commitment was fairly 
radical (Interview, June 2000). His unpublished diaries record that, subsequent to the 
Clause V meeting he disagreed with Frances Morrell, his politcial adviser, who had argued 
that the manifesto was 'worse than nothing". Moreover, Eric Heffer had even told him 
that he was "quite pleased with the whole thing" (entry for 6th April 1979). 
55 See Chapter 5. 
56 Op cit, P 298. 
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5. LABOUR'S POLICY IN THE AFfERMATH OF DEFEAT 1979-83 
Reaction to Defeat 
With Labour now back in opposition, the Party's National Executive Committee, some of 
whose members had felt thwarted in the drafting of the manifesto, took an early 
opportunity to assert itself over the outgoing Prime Minister's Dissolution Honours. It 
took the view that to nominate new peerages would be inconsistent with its policy of 
abolition and passed a resolution which: 
"Taking account of the fact that the Labour Party Conference had voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of abolition of the House of Lords, requests the Leader 
of the Party not to nominate any members of the Labour Party for peerages in the 
Dissolution or any future Honours List and similarly requests members of the 
Labour Party not to accept peerages if they are offered to them.") . 
By the time the motion came before the full Executive, in June 1979, Callaghan's honours 
had already been announced.2 However, the motion had originally been moved by Tony 
Benn at the preceding Home Policy Committee, held the night before the expected 
announcement.3 Two recipients of honours were actually present at that meeting - namely 
the retiring National Agent, Reg Underhill, who received a peerage, and the former 
minister, Judith Hart, who was made a Dame. Although the eventual resolution referred 
specifically to peerages, there was a discussion about relating it to honours more widely. 
Benn recalls Hart arguing that "we should exempt Jim's resignation honours.'''' Although, 
unsurprisingly, Callaghan's honours list went ahead, the resolution could be seen as an 
embarrassment for the party leader; and it could be used to discourage future creations. 
Furthermore, by implication it raised the question of how far a party committed to 
abolition of a body such as the House of Lords should nevertheless seek to playa role in 
it, so long as it continued to exist. 
Labour Party NEC Report 1979, p 72. 
2 Callaghan's biographer observes that he was anxious to avoid anything similar to the "sleazy 
impact" made by Wilson's resignation honours and that Callaghan's honours were overwhelmingly 
to political associates and Labour Party colleagues (K 0 Morgan: Callaghan - A Life, p 203). 
3 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 11th June 1979. 
4 Benn: Conflicts of Interest: Diaries 1977-80, entry for 11th June 1979 (p 511); also personal 
recollection. Both the author and the then Research Secretary, Geoff Bish (Interview, March 1999), 
recall Hart arguing that being made a Dame was different from accepting a peerage. This surprised 
some at the meeting, who were unaware of her personal position. 
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After a two year hiatus, Callaghan's successor as leader, Michael Foot, felt bound to put 
forward some nominations to strengthen the Labour peers.5 Tony Benn and Eric Heffer 
had apparently attempted to dissuade him from doing so, pointing out that this would be 
out of line with the NEC's decision, but Foot responded that the NEC had not consulted 
with the leadership on that and told them that the new Lords would be there to do a job.6 
When a list of fifteen new peers, six of them Labour, was duly announced in April 1981, 
Foot explained that his nominees had all agreed to be "full-time active working peers", 
adding: 
"I recommended their appointment because it would have been unfair to the few 
who have been carrying the burden so far not to have responded to their requests to 
supplement their number. This in no way changes my conviction and that of the 
Labour Party that the House of Lords ought to be abolished. However, I also 
believe that so long as it exists and is part of the legislative process, the Labour 
Party cannot leave our opponents to operate the place to suit themselves without 
even the surveillance which Labour peers can supply.,,7 
Back in 1979, the row over the manifesto, in which policy on the Lords featured so 
prominently, was to have repercussions at that year's Party Conference, where a resolution 
proposed a constitutional change to give the National Executive the final say in 
determining the contents of the manifesto, rather than providing for it to be determined by 
ajoint meeting of the NEC and the Cabinet / Shadow Cabinet, as hitherto.s This was to be 
one of several serious and acrimonious internal constitutional wrangles which afflicted the 
5 In the first year of the new Parliament, Baroness Llewellyn Davies, Labour's Chief Whip in the Lords, had 
expressed concern about the ''weight of expectation which is being piled on us," while Lord Peart, the 
Opposition leader there, suggested that three-line whips were almost a daily occurrence (reported in The 
Times, 5th March 1980). In the 1979-80 session, there were 303 divisions in the House of Lords - more than in 
any of the previous ten years, although it was an extra-long session. (Source - House of Lords Information 
Office). 
6 Benn: End of an Era - Diaries 1980-90 (Hutchinson 1991), entry for 17th February 1981 (pp 89-90). 
7 Reported in The Times, 14th April 1981. Foot later recalled that "every opportunity to put some names 
forward, I did," but added that he made it clear to nominees that the Party's policy was for abolition and that 
they would be expected to vote for it, if necessary. "I'm not in favour of the system, but as long as it lasts, the 
Leader of the Opposition should have the right to nominate" (Interview, March 1999). 
8 For details of existing constitution, see note 13. 
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Labour Party in its first years of opposition (the others being the reselection of MPs and 
the election of leader and deputy leader). The resolution in question referred to the 
"failure of successive Labour governments to advance the realisation of the Party's long 
term objectives" and continued: 
"It regrets that policies approved by the Labour Party Annual Conference and 
recommended by the NEC for inclusion in the Party's general election manifestos 
are often omitted from the manifestos because some members of the Shadow 
Cabinet object to them, such as the abolition of the House of Lords. Conference 
therefore instructs the NEC to submit to the 1980 Labour Party Annual 
Conference, constitutional proposals which would lay down that the NEC alone, 
after the widest possible consultation with all sections of the movement, would 
take the final decision as to the contents of the Labour Party General Election 
Manifesto.,,9 
The mover, Stuart Weir, claimed that, at the Clause V meeting, Callaghan had himself 
suddenly produced a constitutional amendment, the leader's "personal veto." He referred 
specifically to the House of Lords, "as it was perhaps the most blatant example of the 
leadership's disregard for Conference decisions.,,1o 
Significantly, this resolution was supported by the NEC itself - indicative of the poor state 
of relations which now existed between that body and the Parliamentary leadership. Eric 
Heffer, on behalf of the NEC, gave an account of the preparation of the manifesto. He 
recalled that agreements reached with Cabinet members had been included in "our draft 
manifesto"; and although he acknowledged that it was long and needed to be cut "purely 
from the point of view of readability," he argued that the essence of agreed decisions 
should have been included. His description of the late night meeting of NEC and Cabinet 
members after the election announcement contained an amusing slip of the tongue: 
"It was a traumatic meeting for me, comrades, and the veto at that meeting was 
exercised not just on one particular issue - although it was used on one issue in 
particular, the question of the abolition of the House of Commons (Laughter and 
applause). All right comrades, the House of Lords. ,,11 
9 Labour Party Conference Report 1979, pp 275-81. 
10 Ibid. Weir was later to become editor fIrst of New Socialist (published by the Labour Party) and 
then of New Statesman and Society. Amongst other speakers supporting the resolution were two 
future Cabinet Ministers, Robin Cook and Gavin Strang. 
1 1 Ibid. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed account of this meeting. 
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The resolution itself was carried on a card vote by 3,936,000 votes to 3,088,000. 12 
Accordingly at the 1980 Conference, the NEC proposed an amendment to the Party 
Constitution, which, in line with the previous year's decision, would have given it the final 
decision on the contents of any future election manifesto. I3 On this occasion, none of the 
speakers from the floor specifically mentioned what had happened with the House of 
Lords. This was perhaps less fresh in the memory now, although it had clearly helped 
galvanise supporters of the move. However, Tony Benn, speaking for the NEe, did refer 
to it, alleging that a leaders' veto had crept in, and adding: 
"If you have a veto, those who oppose policies do not bother to argue with 
Conference, because they wait till the Clause V meeting and kill it secretly, 
privately, without debate. My resentment about the House of Lords - and you 
must not think I have any particular interest in the place - was not just that it was 
vetoed but that, when Conference discussed it and decided against it by an 
overwhelming majority, no voice was raised from the platform to persuade us to 
drop it. They let the Conference pass it and it was vetoed secretly, quietly, before 
the Party could discuss what happened. This is wrong and it is out of that that the 
mistrust in our Party groWS."I4 
Benn himself was highly pleased with the speech. He noted in his diary: 
"I must say it was the best speech I have made at Conference, probably the best 
speech I have ever made at a public meeting.,,15 
12 Ibid 
l3 The existing Clause V, Section 2 of the Constitution on the Party Programme read: 
"The National Executive Committee and Parliamentary Committee of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party shall decide which items from the Party Programme shall be included in the Manifesto which 
shall be issued by the National Executive Committee prior to every General Election. The Joint 
Meeting of the two committees shall also define the attitude of the Party to the principal issues 
raised by the election which are not covered by the manifesto." 
The amendment proposed by the NEC would have changed it to read as follows: 
'The National Executive Committee, after consultation with the Leader of the Labour Party and the 
Parliamentary Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party, shall decide which items from the 
Party Programme shall be included in the Manifesto which shall be issued by the National 
Executive Committee prior to every General Election, and shall also define the attitude of the Party 
to the principal issues raised by the election which are not covered by the manifesto." (Conference 
Report 1980, pp 143-148). 
14 Ibid. (Interestingly, the speakers for the amendment included Patricia Hewitt, subsequently a 
member of Tony Blair's Cabinet, and Dave Nellist, later to be expelled by the leadership because of 
alleged Trotskyist connections.) 
15 Diaries (op cit), entry for 1 sl October 1980 (p 32). 
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The amendment was, however, lost narrowly on a card vote by just 117,000 votes (for the 
amendment: 3,508,000; against: 3,625,000). It would seem that sufficient opposition had 
been mustered from the union block vote to defeat it. However, two other resolutions 
relating to the Party constitution - on the reselection of MPs and the principle of an 
electoral college for election of leader and deputy leader - were carried, leading to changes 
which were to prove highly controversial. A third such change had only just been 
averted. 16 It was at the same Conference that Benn made a controversial reference to the 
creation of 1,000 peers, which will be examined later. 17 
Policy Re-examined 
As for the policy itself, the Party's Machinery of Government Study Group, which was 
continuing its work, had decided at the end of 1979 to give "early priority" to 
consideration of "the means by which to bring about the abolition of the House ofLords. 18 
(This aspect had, of course, not been resolved to everyone's satisfaction, prior to the 
election.) A paper by John Griffith and Joe Jacob suggested either legislation "to provide 
that the House of Lords should, on a specified date, cease to exist" (which could, but need 
not, also provide for abolition of all existing peerages); or that the House could be 
retained, but with its powers curbed by legislation to provide that "every Bill approved by 
the Commons could forthwith be presented for Royal Assent without the concurrence of 
the House of Lords." The latter course would mean that the non-legislative role had not 
been dealt with; but it would "not be easy to see how this could be done", unless 
legislation was passed preventing the issue of writs of summons. The authors concluded 
that, whatever means were used, "those who oppose are certain to do so with utmost 
vigour and all devices." Therefore it was best to "take the most dramatic means" and 
introduce legislation providing for the abolition of both of the House of Lords and all 
peerages. 19 
16 See 1980 Conference Report. 
17 See p 112. 
18 Study Group Minutes (33) 6th December 1979. 
19 RD 329: Abolition of the House of Lords (April 1980). Jacob (who had joined the Group after its 
initial work on the Lords) was, like Griffith, an academic in the Law Department of the London 
School of Economics. 
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As will be seen, the notion of a House of Lords deprived of most or all of its legislative 
powers was to feature in future discussions and, indeed, would be included in the 1983 
manifesto. However, at this time in 1980, the majority of the Study Group supported 
Griffith and Jacob's more "dramatic" conclusion. There was, nevertheless, a wide ranging 
discussion, which included the suggestion that ''we should say that we would anyway 
create sufficient peers to ensure the will of the Commons was carried out until the Lords 
was abolished"; but, significantly, it is recorded that there was no agreement on this. The 
contentious question of whether Labour should seek the large scale creation of peers was, 
for the moment, glossed over. The minutes of the meeting go on to note: 
"Generally it was felt there should be a clear commitment in the manifesto so that 
people would know that in voting for Labour they would be voting for abolition of 
the Lords, and that we should also make it clear that we would take the necessary 
means to secure such abolition. ,,20 
Although the existing Parliament had up to four years to run, the NEC had decided to 
publish a Draft Manifesto in 1980. This included a passage on the House of Lords which 
had been recommended by the Study Group, stating: 
"The next Labour Government will proceed immediately to abolish the House of 
Lords. It will secure the passage of the necessary legislation and secure a majority 
for that purpose. In the legislation to enact this we will make provisions to ensure 
that the life of a Parliament cannot be extended except by referendum and to 
safeguard the independence of the jUdiciary. We shall abolish peerages.,,21 
Argument on this issue had been predicted. For instance, The Times had prematurely 
reported that the draft manifesto would include "a proposal to achieve the necessary 
majority to abolish the House of Lords by packing it with Labour Party supporters", which 
''would undoubtedly produce a political and constitutional outcry" and would be "bound to 
meet resistance from the Labour leadership.,,22 In the event, the document was carefully 
worded so as not to specify the means by which the passage of legislation would be 
20 Study Group Minutes (36) 16th April 1980. 
21 Draft Manifesto 1980. (Inclusion of this passage was specifically agreed at a special meeting of the 
Home Policy Committee, 281h April 1980.) The commitment to proceed "immediately" might be 
thought to have been somewhat 
optimistic, given the potential difficulties involved. 
22 Michael Hatfield: 'Labour's left in ploy to abolish the Lords'; The Times, IIIh April 1980. 
- 109-
achieved. Thus argument was averted, at least for the moment. However, another 
contentious proposal, that of a referendum as a safeguard against the extension of the life 
of a Parliament - which had been included in the 1977 statement, but which the NEC / 
Cabinet Working Party had subsequently concluded was inappropriate - was revived at 
this stage. It would not, though, find a place in the next relevant major policy statement, 
Labour IS Programme 1982.23 
Abolition of the Lords was given a brief airing in the House of Commons in May 1980, 
when Labour MP Jeff Rooker moved, under the Ten Minute Rule, that "leave be given to 
bring in a Bill to abolish the House of Lords." Substantive legislation would not be 
expected, but this provided an opportunity to air the issue and allow a vote. In this 
instance, the motion was defeated by 240 votes to 142. In his speech, Rooker referred 
back to Labour's 1977 Conference decision, acknowledged that "in 1979 we in the Labour 
Party had a hiccup on the issue" (clearly a reference to the manifesto), but claimed the 
leadership was now unanimous and looked forward to a forthcoming special Party 
Conference.24 This was held on 31 st May 1980, to discuss an overall statement of 
Labour's policies, which included a commitment to "the abolition of the House of Lords" 
amongst "a whole range of measures ... to strengthen democracy against privilege and 
patronage," and which was carried overwhelmingly.25 
There were, meanwhile, indications that Labour's policy was encouraging further reaction 
in the upper echelons of the Conservative Party. Newspaper reports suggested that a new 
second chamber was being considered in response, since "ministers now take the prospect 
of a future Labour government introducing a powerful single chamber parliament as a 
serious one;" but Mrs Thatcher, it seems, was not persuaded of the need for action at this 
time.26 
23 See pp 126-7. 
24 House o/Commons Debates. 6th May 1980 (Vol 984, Cols 46-56). Rooker would later become a 
minister in Blair's government. 
25 NEC Statement: Peace. Jobs and Freedom (May 19.80), approved by 5,164,OO~ votes t~ 6,000. 
26 See Chapter 8 for more on this. (Quotation from MIchael Jones, The Sunday TImes, 11 May 
1980.) 
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The policy of abolition was also perceived as a threat by Labour peers.27 It was reported 
that they were "fighting a rearguard action to retain the House, but with its composition 
reformed.,,28 A committee chaired by Lord Lee of Newton had produced a report which 
proposed a body of 250 voting peers to be drawn from life peers and peers of first 
creation. This was similar, in many respects, to that put forward by the Labour peers in 
1977, although there was now no mention of salaries, and the delaying powers envisaged 
would mean that (except in relation to the life of a Parliament) if a measure was sent back 
to the Commons a second time, "it will become law on a simple resolution of the 
Commons.,,29 (In this respect, the proposal was not dissimilar from proposals put early on 
to the Study Group.)30 The Labour peers acknowledged that an unelected chamber should 
not seek equality of power with one that was elected, but argued that it could reinforce 
democracy through the effective performance of functions, including revising and 
initiating legislation, providing a forum for debates and scrutiny of the executive.3) 
Their report noted two proposals "recently put forward". The first was Labour's policy of 
abolition (which, of course, had been adopted in 1977). This was objected to on the 
grounds it would make it harder for the overworked Commons to cope, there would be no 
opportunity for tidying up/second thoughts and "most important, there would be no 
safeguard against the House of Commons prolonging the life of a Parliament or dismissing 
judges.,,32 Clearly the NEC's attempts to arrive at a formula to safeguard the life of a 
Parliament had not satisfied them. 
27 In view of this, it is perhaps surprising that some peers who were also members of the NEC's Study 
Group had not shown a more active involvement in its work. Early in 1980, it was decided to 
contact inactive members, who included three peers, all fairly recently ennobled. Two of these 
dropped out, including Lord Cledwyn, a fonner Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party and 
future leader of the Labour peers (Study Group Papers). 
28 The Times, 220d May 1980. 
29 'A Refonned Second Chamber' (23 rd April 1980). When it was presented to a meeting of Labour 
peers, it was noted that the report had taken the 1977 report as its basis (Minutes of meeting of 
Labour Peers, 24th April 1980). Lord Lee, a fonner minister, was now the Labour peers' 
representative on the Parliamentary Committee. 
30 See Chapter 3. 
31 A Refonned Second Chamber (op cit). 
32 Ibid. 
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Secondly, the report observed that "leading members of the present Conservative 
government" had suggested replacing the Lords with a chamber elected by proportional 
representation and with more powers. This was opposed on the grounds that no 
government would have a majority and it would be a "check on effective government." 
Frustration would then produce a demand for "drastic constitutional change", including 
possible abolition.33 Although no specific proposal was identified, the reference suggests 
that Labour peers thought that a Conservative attempt to pre-empt Labour was under 
active consideration. 
There is no record of the Labour peers' report having been submitted to the NEC, which 
had anyway reaffirmed its support for abolition.34 There seems to have been a reluctance 
on the part of Labour peers to accept this, or even to acknowledge it as party policy. In a 
House of Lords debate later in 1980, one of them, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, 
actually questioned whether abolition was an official Party commitment, although he then 
added, a touch inconsistently, "we shall fight as hard as we can to alter it.,,35 Moreover, in 
the same debate, Lord Peart would hark back to the abortive 1968/69 proposals, saying 
that ''what happened then was a tragedy," and adding: 
"One day there will be a reformed House of Lords. I do not believe that there will 
be an abolition of the House of Lords. ,,36 
It is interesting that Labour's official leader in the Lords felt able to state publicly that he 
did not believe his own party's policy would be carried through. 37 
33 Ibid 
34 The Times (22nd May 1980) suggested that it was not intended to submit it either to the NEC or to 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. The peers did not, in any case, have any formal role in the policy 
making process. However, the Chief Whip did later send a copy to the General Secretary, in 
advance of preparations for the manifesto in 1983 (Internal Party correspondence). 
35 House o/Lords Debates, 8th December 1980 (Vol 415, Col 610). 
36 Ibid (Cols 625-7). 
37 Another front bench spokesman, David Owen, also provided a dissenting voice, in a speech calling 
for an elected second chamber, with representatives from Scotland, Wales and the English regions, 
elected by proportional representation, plus possibly members of the European Parliament and 
some non-voting peers from the existing House (reported in The Times, 18th September 1980). 
Owen was then Labour's Energy spokesman, but would early the following year, break away to 
fonn tlle new Social Democratic Party (for which, see Chapter 9). 
- 112 -
Labour peers were not necessarily influential figures in detennining Labour's policy, but 
the Chainnan of the Home Policy Committee certainly was. Tony Benn was to cause 
much greater controversy on the same subject, in the full glare of publicity at the Party's 
1980 Conference in Blackpool. Replying for the NEC in a debate on economic and 
industrial policy, he said three major pieces of legislation would be required within the 
first month of a Labour government - an Industry Bill; a Bill returning powers from the 
European Commission to the House of Commons; and, since neither of these would get 
through the Lords: 
"our third immediate Bill is to do what the movement has wanted us to do for 100 
years, to get rid of the House of Lords and, if I may say so, we shall to do it by 
creating 1,000 peers and then abolishing the peerages as well, at the same time that 
the Bill goes through. It is not possible for a Labour government to continue if it 
has control of only half a Parliament.,,38 
In saying this, Benn was going beyond his brief, since this had not been agreed even by 
the Study Group, let alone the NEC on whose behalf he was speaking.39 As Baroness 
Jeger, who was Chainnan of the Party at the time of the Conference, later told her 
colleagues in the House of Lords: 
"The suggestion about 1,000 peers was made entirely out of the top of the head of 
a member of another place, with no authority from the National Executive.,,40 
The Times reported "appalled reactions in private amongst Party leaders, including some 
left wingers", to Benn's Conference speech.41 Nevertheless, Benn, for whom this was 
clearly an important issue, would return to the notion he put forward here, as will be seen 
later in this Chapter. His speech also prompted further interest at the Conservative Party 
Conference the following week, which responded by passing a resolution to strengthen the 
composition and status of the House of Lords.42 
38 Conference Report 1980 (pp 31-32). 
39 Although the possibility of using prerogative powers had been alluded to in the 1977 Conference 
Statement, crude numbers had not been mentioned. Indeed, in a slightly different context, it had 
said creations on this scale would be "unacceptable" (see Chapter 3). 
40 House of Lords Debates, 8th December 1980 (Vol 415, Col 610). 
41 Fred Emery, The Times, 30th September 1980. 
42 See Chapter 8. 
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Following this attention, the question of whether abolition could legally be carried through 
was once again raised. Giving the BBC Dimbleby Lecture, the Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Denning, said: 
"I do not doubt that Parliament would have the power to reform the Lords 
.... but I doubt whether Parliament could lawfully abolish the second 
chamber altogether. I would expect any such legislation to be challenged 
in a Court of Law and for the judges to give a ruling on it. ,,43 
He quoted the preamble to the 1911 Parliament Act. Differing views on the significance 
of this have already been noted;44 and it would seem the matter might only be resolved ifit 
were ever to be tested in the courts. However, it was raised, along with other related 
issues by Lord Crowther Hunt, shortly after Denning's lecture, in a talk given Radio 3, in 
which he looked forward to "the exciting prospect of a real Pandora's box of constitutional 
issues and crises if the Labour Party perseveres with its abolition proposals." These 
included whether the Lords could be abolished without its consent and whether the Queen 
might veto such a measure or insist on a referendum. His view was that Labour could not 
count on her acquiescence. There would be arguments about whether she would be 
justified in withholding consent, since it might not constitute 'a statute Parliament agreed 
on', or in insisting first on a constitutional conference. In a reference to Benn's suggestion 
that 1,000 peers might be created, Crowther Hunt noted this would require the Queen's 
consent; and that in a similar situation, King George V had insisted on a general election 
first. 45 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
43 Reported in The Listener, 27th November 1980 (Vol 104, p 722). 
44 See Chapter 3. Those disagreeing with Denning's interpretation included Roy Jenkins who, in 
Mr. Balfour'S Poodle, said "it was an expression of the wishes of the government [which would] 
have no legal force" (op cit, p 135). 
45 'Who needs the Lords?', The Listener, 4th December 1980 (Vol 104, p 742). 
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The latter reference concerned events surrounding the passage of the 1911 Parliament Act. 
It is not proposed to detail these here, but essentially, it proved necessary to hold two 
elections beforehand in 1910; and at the second, the King had given "contingent 
guarantees" that if the Liberal government was returned, he would agree to the necessary 
creation of peers to secure passage of the legislation. In the event, the threat of mass 
creation proved sufficient. However, the episode did illustrate the potential for differences 
to rise between Crown and government. 46 
Crowther Hunt concluded that there could be no certainty of abolishing the House of 
Lords against its will in the first three years of a government. His personal view was that a 
second chamber should supplement the Commons' representation of the people by 
"representation of interests", scrutinising from the point of view of affected interests and 
provide a forum for experts.47 He had, of course, been a member of the Study Group 
which drew up the original statement supporting abolition, although he had indicated he 
was not in agreement. He continued to serve on the Group and, indeed, several of the 
points from this radio talk featured in future discussions. 
The issue of the House of Lords was re-opened within the Party's official machinery, 
following a brief look at the wider Honours system by the Machinery of Government 
Study Group early in 1981. A poorly attended meeting in March agreed the basis of a 
statement, but the Home Policy Committee, chaired by Benn, referred it back, together 
with alternative proposals from himself, including that no further nominations be made for 
46 For more detailed accounts, see Jenkins (op cit); Vernon Bogdanor: The Monarchy and the 
Constitution (pp 113-119); and Harold Nicholson: King George V (Constable & Constable, 1952, 
Chapters VII-X). The latter shows particularly how fraught relationships between government and 
sovereign could become in such a situation. 
Bogdanor refers to the proposal for 1,000 peers put forward in 1980, but may have misunderstood 
the reasoning behind it. He states (p 120) that opposition to abolition could be overcome by use of 
the Parliament Act with a year's delay, but that some Labour Party members, including Benn, 
argued that it should not have to wait. In fact, it was the perceived uncertainty as to whether the 
Parliament Act could actually be used which led some to see this as an alternative. 
47 The Listener, 4th December 1980 (op cit). Crowther Hunt subsequently ftnned up his prediction, 
arguing that a future Labour government would find it "almost impossible" to abolish the House of 
Lords without its consent, because "Her Majesty the Queen would almost certainly spring to their 
defence"; and that, in his view, the monarch would be 'justified in insisting on either a second 
general election or a referendum, before acquiescing in creating the peers demanded by a 
government elected on a minority vote." ('How the Queen might finally save the Lords', The 
Guardian, 11 th January 1982). 
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any peerages, baronetcies or knighthoods in the United Kingdom.48 The Study Group 
noted that this "carried the implication" that no further peerages should be created and, 
while agreeing to consider some points further, it decided to resubmit its paper largely as it 
stood, and this was subsequently endorsed by the Home Policy Committee.49 
The statement then published in July observed that "once the House of Lords is abolished, 
presumably no more peerages would be created", but "the question remains as to what 
happens to the titles". Life peerages would cease on the death of the holder, but 
hereditary peerages could continue in existence for generations. 
"It might be argued that their continuance would perpetuate class divisions in our 
society, in which case it would be necessary to consider whether we should or 
could legislate to abolish the rights of existing and/or future holders to use their 
titles. However, it is our view that, given the abolition of the peers' formal 
political powers, the continued use of the title would be irrelevant, and that it 
would be a matter for the individual concerned what he wished to call himself.,,5o 
The Study Group was also informed that the April meeting of the Home Policy Committee 
had suggested that the Group look again at the means of abolishing the House of Lords.51 
In response to this, it was decided to re-circulate the paper by Griffith and Jacob;52 and 
also the text of Crowther Hunt's radio talk, together with some ensuing correspondence 
between him and Griffith, some of which was rather personalised. For instance, Griffith 
accused Hunt of being "terrified of democracy"; and, after Hunt had asked about 
guarantees to protect the basic rights of minorities, Griffith referred to various guarantees, 
but added pointedly: "I doubt, however, whether greater protection for the minority of 
ennobled Oxford dons is likely to figure prominently in anyone's list.,,53 
48 Study Group Minutes (37) 11 th March 1981; Home Policy Committee Minutes, 6th April 1981; 
RD762: The Honours System (March 1981); RD 829 Amendments proposed by Tony Benn (April 
1981). If taken literally, Benn's proposal here would not have permitted his 1,000 peers notion. 
49 Study Group Minutes (38) 12th May 1981; Home Policy Committee Minutes, 5th June 1981. (Benn, 
who was in hospital around this time, was not present at these later meetings, both of which were 
chaired by Heffer.) Note that the Honours list announced in April 1981, which included six Labour 
peers, would have been fresh in people's minds (see p 104). 
50 NEC Statement: The Honours System (1981). Overall it argued that "if we are to continue with 
honours, they should only be in recognition of outstanding acts of service and without distinction 
on the basis of class and rank", but it made no specific proposals, other than establishing a Select 
Committee to consider reforms. 
51 RD 828: Future Work of the Study Group - A Note from the Secretary (April 1981). There was, 
however, no Home Policy Committee minute to this effect. 
52 RD329 (op cit). 
53 RD 905: Who needs the House of Lords? (June 1981). Crowther Hunt was, of course, an 
"ennobled Oxford don." 
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Such remarks might have been expected to presage an acrimonious debate in the Study 
Group, but at this stage it was reasonably good natured. 54 The minutes of the ensuing 
meeting in June 1981 record that: 
"it was generally acknowledged that a Labour government would have to face 
significant political, constitutional and legal problems when it came to carry out 
the abolition of the House of Lords, and that it would not be possible to achieve 
this within just a few weeks.,,55 
"No conclusion was reached," but the Secretary was asked to draft a paper "setting out the 
options and noting the problems each might involve.,,56 The result was the first of several 
drafts, which were to form the core of extensive discussion in the Group and beyond over 
several months. It noted that neither the 1977 statement nor the 1980 draft manifesto had 
spelt out how it was intended to proceed to abolition; and it posed two options, involving 
the Parliament Act or creation of peers, to secure the passage of legislation, either of 
which would involve difficulties. 57 
In the case of the former, assuming Lords' opposition, there would be a minimum of 13 
months delay, but a contested measure taken on the floor of the House could take longer; 
and there was a danger of disruption to other legislation. Referring to previous 
discussions concerning the life of a Parliament, it suggested the proposed safeguards of a 
referendum or two-thirds majority would not constitute "a formal safeguard". It noted 
previous discussions and the conclusion that the Parliament Act "probably" could be used 
to abolish the Lords, "but we cannot, of course, be certain what the courts might decide 
until it happens." The validity of such legislation might be challenged and that the final 
court of appeal would be the Law Lords. Legislation would need Royal Assent, which 
might be refused on grounds that the legislation was unconstitutional, although it noted the 
suggestion that refusal would be less likely if there was a clear manifesto commitment, 
particularly if this made clear it would require consent of Queen and Commons only. 58 
54 Personal recollection. 
55 Study Group Minutes (39) 16th June 1981. 
56 Ibid. 
57 RD 992: Abolishing the House of Lords - The Possibilities and the Problems (July 1981). 
58 Ibid. 
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On the creation of peers, the paper noted that the arguments about patronage and possible 
difficulties with the Crown, but also the suggestion that a clear manifesto commitment, 
including references to the creation of peers if necessary, would make resistance by the 
Queen less likely. Nevertheless creations would be on an "unprecedented" scale and, 
given the Lords' procedures for introduction new peers - two days a week, two at a time -
which they were unlikely to change in the circumstances, it could take more than the 
lifetime of a Parliament. There was also the possibility that newly ennobled peers might 
then change their minds on abolition, which could cause "great embarrassment. ,,59 
It argued that a referendum would make it less likely that legislation would be blocked, 
but it would be "contested vigorously". If the referendum result went against, the Lords, 
with their existence endorsed, might then be more obstructive. Also, a separate 
referendum Bill might itself delay things further. The alternative of a second general 
election was not recommended, since it could not be fought on a single issue and it would 
not be worth risking the party's whole programme.60 
The paper concluded that it was apparent that there were potential problems involved in 
whatever means was adopted and that it would not be possible to implement the policy 
overnight, but added that there was general agreement on the need for a clear manifesto 
commitment.61 
The main discussion in the Study Group then (July 1981) centred on the use of a 
referendum, on which "conflicting views were expressed." The case against was that that 
many potential obstacles to legislation could still apply and that the result could go the 
wrong way. In its favour, despite the uncertainty of outcome, "there was a prospect of 
carrying the policy through, given a clear endorsement;" the alternative would be "several 
years of constitutional wrangling and an election at a time not of our choosing." 62 
59 Ibid. Tony Berm, a principal advocate of mass creation, subsequently acknowledged that there may 
have been something in the latter argument (Interview, June 2000). Note also that mass creation 
had been threatened to secure passage of Parliament Act 1911, but there appears to have been no 
suggestion then that Lords' procedures might prevent this. 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
62 Study Group Minutes (40) 22nd June 1981. 
- 118-
When the matter was discussed agam in November 1981, many of the now familiar 
arguments were rehearsed again, without agreement being reached. However, the minutes 
state that "it was agreed that with either alternative procedure - the Parliament Act or the 
creation of peers - Parliamentary business would be disrupted for at least a couple of 
years, with no certainty of getting an abolition measure through at the end of the day." 
They then record: 
"It was pointed out that there was considerable danger that the potential difficulties 
and delays arising from any measures to abolish the Lords could jeopardise the 
ability of a Labour government to implement the key measures in its programme, 
and there was general agreement on this. We should therefore conclude that the 
technical difficulties were so considerable that we could not give a firm 
commitment to carry out the early abolition of the Lords.,,63 
Significantly, this would mean that there was no longer a presumption that the potential 
obstacles could be overcome. It may be recalled that, from the outset, party officials had 
warned that a pledge to outright abolition and a single chamber ''would lead to 
considerable problems.,,64 Had this been accepted at the time, the development of policy 
might have proceeded on different lines, and some of the ensuing consequences (including 
at the time of the 1979 election) might have avoided. However, in November 1981, a 
complete reversal of the policy would almost certainly have been unacceptable, both to the 
NEC and the Party Conference. Instead, the Group, having noted the difficulties involved 
in effecting early abolition, considered an alternative proposition: 
"However, we could aim to introduce new Labour peers into the House of Lords as 
quickly as possible. In the longer term this could help in securing the abolition of 
the Lords, but in the meantime it would have the effect of reducing the Party 
political imbalance in the House of Lords and this would be something it would be 
difficult to argue against. The House of Lords meanwhile would be asked to 
improve the procedures for the introduction of new peers.,,65 
This was a different approach to the issue, which carried with it the implication that it 
could be expected that the present House would continue for some time. Also, it would 
represent a clear departure from the 1979 NEC resolution opposing new peerages 
(although the Leader had since recommended some new creations).66 
63 Study Group Minutes (41) 4th November 1981. 
64 See Chapter 3. 
65 Minutes (41) op cit. This took account of the point that the Lords could not be forced to change 
their procedures. 
66 See p 104. 
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There is nothing to suggest that this November meeting was particularly unrepresentative 
or one-sided. As it happened, John Griffith (who had been a leading supporter of 
abolition) was present on this occasion, whereas Lord Crowther Hunt (an opponent) was 
not; and the Group's Chainnan, Eric Heffer, it should be remembered, had himself 
previously been a forceful advocate of the Party's policy of abolition. The minutes 
certainly suggest the various arguments were again heard.67 However Tony Benn was not 
present; and the following meeting of the Home Policy Committee (which he chaired, but 
from which Heffer in tum was absent) decided to infonn the Study Group that it "would 
not accept proposals which sought to change Conference policy on the basic issue of 
abolition.,,68 
In response, Study Group members argued that their new proposal was intended to help a 
Labour government get its legislation through and also, it was hoped, "help facilitate the 
eventual abolition of the House of Lords." The minutes note that "in conclusion, it was 
pointed out that all those present wanted to abolish the House of Lords. The question at 
issue was over how quickly and easily it could be achieved. ,,69 Benn, in his diary, 
commented on a "lack of potential will." He also noted that Heffer did not like being told 
he had changed policy and got "very shirty.,,7o 
Another option suggested was the creation of peers by means of a Parliamentary 
resolution, whereby the Commons could present a "Humble Address" to the Queen which 
would not have to go through the Lords. A possible precedent from Canada was cited. 
The Study Group accepted that a "Humble Address" from a newly elected House of 
Commons would "almost certainly" not be resisted by the Sovereign; given a clear 
manifesto commitment, there should be no question of another election being needed. 
However, it was also argued that it would "not effectively change very much", beyond 
67 Minutes (41) op cit. (Although Heffer left the chair later in the meeting, the House of Lords was 
the first substantive item on the agenda; and there is no indication that he dissented from the 
Group's conclusion.) 
68 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 7th December 1981. 
69 Study Gro~ Minutes (42) 9th December 1981. 
70 Entry for 9 December 1981 (unpublished). 
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clarifying the position of the House of Commons and that the outstanding problems would 
remain. It would not necessarily avoid a constitutional crisis and the legislation would 
still need to be passed.71 
A paper by Party officials, presented to the Group in February 1982, noted the recent 
conclusions, the acknowledgement that some of the practical obstacles to abolition could 
also apply to the new alternative proposition for the creation of peers and that, moreover, 
achieving an eventual Labour majority in the Lords might not necessarily ensure a 
majority for abolition. It suggested that the Group consider another course of action, 
namely legislation to curtail the powers of the House of Lords so that, in effect, it would 
no longer be able to obstruct the wishes of the House of Commons. The paper pointed out 
that there was little doubt that the Parliament Act could be used to get such a measure 
through; and added that "many of those Labour peers who might baulk at abolition" would 
be more likely to support a measure of this nature. It noted that steps could also be taken 
to reduce the anti-Labour majority in the Lords, as had been suggested, implying that the 
two courses of action might be taken together, if so desired.72 
Of course, the notion, at least in the first instance, of restricting further the powers of the 
Lords was not new. Similar proposals had been put forward by officials when the 
question was first discussed, and clearly they were thought worth resurrecting. It was put 
to this meeting that measures could be brought forward ''which would severely restrict or 
remove most of the existing powers of the House of Lords. Although these might fall 
short of complete abolition, they could represent an important step towards it and make it 
easier to bring about abolition in the long run.,,73It was agreed to consider these further 
and, as will be seen, this was to become the Party's official policy, at least for the short 
term. 
71 Study Group Minutes (42) op cit and (43) 2nd February 1982. The author's recollection is that this 
idea was put forward by Benn, who still wanted to pursue the mass creation of peers option. This is 
borne out by Benn' s diary entry. 
A paper for the second meeting (RD 1075) described how the Canadian House of Commons had 
passed motions to present Addresses to King George V, asking him to refrain from conferring 
firstly hereditary titles and then any titles to subjects resident in Canada, in 1918 and 1919 
respectively. Although one Canadian Prime Minister had not felt constrained by this, it was 
thought that no such titles had been conferred since 1935. 
72 RD 1162: Restricting the Powers of the House of Lords - An Office Note. The paper proposed 
amending the Parliament Act in a way similar to that suggested in an earlier paper (RE 842) in 
November 1976 (see Chapter 3). 
73 Minutes (43) op cit. 
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These deliberations were acquiring a new urgency, as the position on the Lords required 
clarification in time for the new Party Programme, due to be published in summer 1982. 
Various alternative means of amending the powers of the Lords had been mooted; and 
three papers were put to the Study Group's April meeting. The first, by Michael English, 
proposed a manifesto commitment to abolition, stating that the Lords would be asked to 
agree to this "as the expressed will of the people", but that, should they resist, ''we will 
immediately use the powers of the Commons alone under the Parliament Act to deprive 
the House of Lords of all its powers", save the right to veto legislation extending the life 
of the Commons.74 
The second was from John Silkin, who had joined the Group and, as Shadow Leader of the 
Commons, was playing an active part in its deliberations. He argued that, while abolition 
of the Lords was desirable and a Bill should be introduced, it was "not a matter which 
should put in jeopardy the rest of Labour's programme". His main point was that ''the 
urgent need is to stop the House of Lords interfering with Labour's legislation". He 
agreed that it should be deprived of almost all of its powers (with one or two exceptions); 
and concluded that "if we follow this reasonable course of action, the abolition of the 
Lords will occur quite naturally and without any fuSS.,,75 Some of this may have been said 
tongue-in-cheek, but the main suggestion was serious. 
The third paper, from Tony Benn, did not concern curbing of powers, but argued again 
that abolition was an essential prerequisite to other measures and advocated a manifesto 
pledge "to create enough peers to carry the Lords Abolition Bill at the very outset." This, 
he claimed (without any hint of irony), "would satisfy the Crown that the electorate knew 
precisely what it was doing when it voted Labour" and so avert the possibility of the 
Crown seeking a second general election. The same Abolition Bill would "entrench" the 
five year life of a Parliament, (although it was not made clear precisely how). He set out a 
procedure, involving a Humble Address, with the Prime Minister advising the Crown to 
74 RD 2194: House of Lords - Draft by Michael English. 
75 RD 2195: Labour and the House of Lords - A note from John Silkin. Apart from the life of a 
Parliament, his proposed exceptions were unclearly worded, but apparently concerned Private 
Members Bills and non-contentious legislation "suitable for introduction in the House of Lords", 
plus allowing the Lords to propose amendments "without them having legislative effect". 
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act on this; and added that, if the Lords delayed the introduction of peers by procedural 
means, the Commons could pass another Humble Address, "asking the Crown to send a 
message to the House of Lords commanding them to seat the new peers forthwith." He 
acknowledged that "a massive creation - possibly over a thousand" peers could be 
involved, but the names should be approved by the Commons.76 
Following the April meeting, a further draft report was prepared, still very much on the 
lines of that put to the Group in July 1981, but including some additional points covering 
the Parliament Act procedures, the Law Lords, the creation of peers and a referendum. 
The most significant addition, however, was a new section entitled 'Curbing the Lords 
Powers - An Interim Measure', which noted "considerable legal, procedural and other 
difficulties in whichever course was to be adopted" and the danger of disrupting the wider 
programme of a Labour government; therefore, it said, "we are bound to acknowledge that 
it may not be possible to give a firm commitment to effect the complete abolition of the 
House of Lords at an early stage." However, noting that the Lords would still have 
considerable powers to disrupt Labour's legislative programme, the draft report suggested 
introducing, early in the new Parliament, "legislation to remove most of the powers of the 
House of Lords at present possesses," but excluding those relating to the life of a 
Parliament. It argued that there was "little doubt that the Parliament Act procedure could 
be used to ensure the passage of this legislation if necessary," and proposed a clause based 
on Section 1(1) of the 1911 Act, which restricted the Lords' powers over Money Bills. 
Further provisions were suggested relating to delegated legislation, so that the Lords' 
conclusions would be reported but the Commons would have sole power to pass 
resolutions. Given an adequate majority, ''we can be reasonably sure the legislation will 
reach the statute book;" the House of Lords would be seen increasingly as an irrelevance 
and the logic of eventual abolition as unavoidable. Meanwhile, it would have been 
prevented from blocking legislation. This would achieve "the major immediate objective 
of ending the effective political power of the House of Lords," while also taking a "major 
step towards our ultimate objective".77 
76 RD 2196: The Abolition of the Lords: A Note by Tony Benn. 
77 RD 2332: Abolishing the House of Lords - The Possibilities and the Problems - A Report from the 
Study Group (Third Draft, April 1982). 
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The paper was intended to reflect the various discussions and viewpoints expressed over 
several meetings. Thus, notwithstanding the above conclusions, it also noted two further 
propositions. The first involved legislation to end all the powers and functions of the 
Lords, save that relating to the life of a Parliament. It observed that such an emasculated 
body would soon appear absurd, but also noted the danger that this would be more 
contentious and that the passage of the necessary legislation and ensuing changes in 
Commons procedures could prove more difficult. The second suggested, as well as 
curbing powers, taking steps to secure the creation of new Labour peers to end the anti-
Labour majority and to obtain a majority favourable to abolition.78 The first of these 
alternatives was soon to be accepted as part of Labour's policy; the second was not. 
The meeting which discussed this draft in May 1982 was the last chance to agree a report 
to the Home Policy Committee before the content of Labour's Programme was 
determined. As Chairman of the Study Group, Eric Heffer had generally taken a 
pragmatic approach, supporting the abolition policy, but willing to acknowledge the force 
of argument about the potential difficulties involved and to take account of these. Tony 
Benn had, however, taken a committed position, attempting repeatedly to persuade the 
Group to adopt his proposal for a large scale creation of peers to carry through abolition.79 
Heffer was absent from this particular meeting (as also, incidentally, was Silkin) and the 
chair was instead by taken by Benn who, from that position, strongly criticised the paper 
which was before the Committee, although other members defended it as a reflection of 
the Group's previously expressed views, which they had asked to be prepared. so 
78 Ibid. 
79 Personal recollection. Benn's observations of an earlier meeting have already been noted (see 
p 119). Two members of the Study Group, John Garrett and John Griffith, when interviewed later, 
also recalled that Heffer had taken a more open minded approach on the issue. Benn himself said 
the reason why he pursued this particular approach so strongly was that he was determined to show 
that abolition could be achieved and did not accept the argument that it would take ten years to 
carry through (sic). (Interviews, July 1998, October 1998, June 2000.) 
80 Personal recollection. The Study Group Minutes (47) lih May 1982, record more blandly: "some 
questioned the conclusion that it may not be possible to give a fIrm conunitrnent to effect complete 
abolition at an early stage, but others confirmed that this view had been taken at earlier meetings." 
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Various arguments were again put - on the one hand that it was "primarily a question of 
political will"; on the other that the Party could not ignore difficulties or risk making 
promises which it might not be possible fulfil and jeopardise other parts of the 
programme. It was recorded that, if the course of curbing Lords' powers were followed, 
"most favoured abolition of all their legislative powers;" and, it was noted, "we could 
proceed at the same time with the creation ofpeers.,,81 
As in previous discussions, arriving at a consensus proved impossible. The Times later 
suggested that the Group "failed to reach agreement because of Mr. Benn's detennination 
to enforce abolition within the lifetime of a Parliament." It had clearly obtained a copy of 
the minutes, which, it said, "give a picturesque insight into Labour's left-right impasse." 82 
These record that Benn had suggested a conclusion which would re-affinn "our 
determination to abolish the House of Lords in the lifetime of the next Parliament; that the 
best means would be to "create sufficient peers to 'swamp' the Lords with a mandate for 
this"; and stating the intention also to abolish all legislative powers except those relating to 
the life of a Parliament. They go on to note that "there was, however, some disagreement 
in particular over whether we could give a commitment to abolition in the lifetime of the 
next Parliament," and that "in view of the fact that the Study Group was unable to reach an 
agreed conclusion," the paper be submitted to the Home Policy Committee unamended, 
but accompanied by the minutes. 83 
It may be worth noting here that the Parliamentary Affairs Group of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party had taken a view similar to that put forward in the draft report - that 
legislation should be passed to prevent the Lords frustrating the will of the Commons and 
steps taken towards ultimate abolition. Backbench groups of the PLP such as this had no 
formal role in the policy process (and did not necessarily carry great weight), but their 
position was noted by the Study Group. 84 
81 Ibid. 
82 Anthony Bevins: 'Labour tries to break deadlock over Lords', The Times, lOth June 1982. 
83 Minutes (47) op cit. 
84 Ibid. The views of the PLP Group are recorded as follows: 
"a Labour government should pass legislation to abolish the powers of the House of Lords to 
frustrate the will of the elected House of Commons (except the power to extend the life of a 
Parliament) and initiate steps ultimately leading to abolition of the House of Lords, while of course 
providing a control over a future House of Commons extending its own life unilaterally." The PLP 
Group Meeting on 21 51 April 1982 was chaired by Michael English, with just seven MPs present. 
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The Study Group having failed to reach agreement, it fell to the Home Policy Committee, 
which Benn chaired, in effect to adjudicate. This Committee (on which, like the NEe 
itself, the left was predominant) decided to delete some significant points, namely 
reference to a possible legal challenge to ensuing legislation, a whole section dealing with 
a referendum and crucially, the statement that it may not be possible to give a finn 
commitment to abolition at an early stage. It further decided to incorporate, without 
caveats, the proposal that all powers save one be abolished. The new conclusion, similar 
to that previously put forward by Benn, was to read: 
"We re-affirm our determination to abolish the House of Lords in the lifetime of 
the next Parliament. We recognise that there will be some obstacles and serious 
opposition. We believe that to secure the abolition of the Lords it would be 
necessary to seek a clear mandate in the Manifesto to create sufficient peers for 
this purpose. We would as a first step bring in a Bill to abolish all the legislative 
powers of the House of Lords, except those in relation to the life of a Parliament." 
The draft as amended was to be published and the draft of Labour's Programme 1982 was 
to reflect this. 85 
Thus the proposition to swamp the Lords - which was favoured by Benn but which the 
Study Group had not accepted - was agreed by the Party's senior policy committee. As 
has been seen, on previous occasions (such as following the 1980 Party Conference) 
radical proposals had prompted a Conservative reaction. This time, however, The Times 
reported there was no nervous reaction from Conservative ministers, "who believe it will 
prove a vote loser at the next general election." 86 They were also, perhaps, more 
confident about their election prospects at this time - this was less than a week before the 
end of the Falklands War - than they had been two years previously. 
85 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 10th June 1982. 
86 George Clark: 'Benn's plans seen as vote loser', The Times, 12th June 1982. 
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The Home Policy Committee had not, however, been unanimous. There was in fact, 
strong disagreement between Benn and Foot who, despite his long standing support for 
abolition, took the view that the Party had to take proper note of the potential difficulties.87 
He was to have a further opportunity of retrieving the position, at least to some extent, the 
following week, when the final text for Labour's Programme was to be considered by the 
full National Executive Committee. The relevant section had been amended, following 
the Home Policy Committee, and included the following sentence: 
"To secure the abolition of the Lords, we will seek a clear mandate to create 
sufficient peers for this purpose and for them to be introduced as quickly as 
possible." 
Foot succeeded in securing deletion of this sentence, but by the narrowest possible margin, 
9 votes to 8. Almost all those voting to retain the sentence were on the left (and they 
included Heffer), while those voting to exclude it (who included the future leader, Neil 
Kinnock, as well as Foot) were from a broader spectrum.88 Foot's failure to carry the day 
at the Home Policy Committee and his narrow victory at the NEC perhaps illustrate the 
weakness of the Leader's position on the NEC at this time. 
Meanwhile, the Report on the Abolition of the House of Lords was further amended but, 
although its publication as an NEC statement was agreed, this seems never to have 
happened. 89 The Programme was, however, duly published and endorsed at the Party 
Conference later in the year. It stated in line with the decisions noted above: 
"We believe that there can be no place for such an outdated and unrepresentative 
body in a democratic legislature; and it is therefore our intention to abolish the 
House of Lords in the lifetime of the next Parliament. We recognise that there will 
be obstacles and opposition to this. We shall therefore, as a first step, carry 
through legislation, using the provisions of the Parliament Act if necessary, to 
abolish all the remaining legislative powers, with the exception of those which 
relate to the extension of the life of a Parliament.,,9o 
87 Personal recollection. 
88 NEC Minutes, 16th June 1982. The Times (17 th June 1982) reported that the deletion was on the 
strong reconunendation of Foot. It should be noted, however, that in 1975 Foot had apparently 
supported the creation of peers to secure the passage of legislation, although possibly not on such a 
large scale (see p 51). 
89 Home Policy Committee Minutes, 12th July 1982, and personal recollection. 
90 Labour's Programllle 1982, pp 206-7. 
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It referred back to the 1977 statement, to show that "we have carefully considered the 
alternative possibilities and found them all to be seriously defective. Either they would 
not be truly democratic or they would have the makings of a built in constitutional 
deadlock." It expressed confidence that "the limited revising function currently 
undertaken by the House of Lords could be adequately - and indeed better - carried out by 
a reformed House of Commons," adding that: 
"We are not proposing the abolition of the House of Lords in isolation. It forms 
part of our much wider-ranging commitment to democratise and modernise the 
various institutions of parliament and govemment.,,91 
There was to be no further detailed discussion on this area of policy before the 1983 
general election.92 The position agreed in 1982 was, for the most part, reflected in the 
election manifesto, afterwards to be described by a member of the Shadow Cabinet as "the 
longest suicide note in history.,,93 This was originally issued in the form of a Campaign 
Document entitled The New Hope for Britain, which was agreed at a special NEC on 21 st 
March 1983. As well as indicating the Party's plans for a full parliament, it set out an 
Emergency Programme of Action, which included legislation to abolish the legislative 
powers of the Lords. However, the commitment to abolition in the lifetime of the next 
Parliament was no longer included in the document. 94 
Despite this omission, members of the Shadow Cabinet and the Parliamentary Party were 
reported to be "dismayed" by the commitment on the legislative powers of the Lords. 
Under the headline 'Wipe out Lords policy may scuttle Labour, MPs fear,' The Times said 
MPs and peers had not been consulted, and that it was being argued that it could torpedo 
the rest of the legislative programme.,,95 Of course, there had been prolonged discussion 
on the issue in the Party's policy-making committees and a clear commitment in the 1982 
Programme. Some may have wrongly assumed that such commitments could be omitted, 
91 Ibid. 
92 The Machinery of Government Study Group, along with several other committees, was in abeyance 
during the year 1982/83, following the conclusion of work on Labour's Programme 1982 .. 
93 Gerald Kaufman, as quoted by Denis Healey (The Time of My Life, p 500). 
94 Commenting on a draft, Anthony Bevins suggested in The Times (lOth March) that this would be 
seen as a retreat by Benn and the left. 
95 The Times, 2nd April 1983. 
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as they had been in 1979, but circumstances were now quite different. Butler and 
Kavanagh observed that, in 1983, the context was a large Conference vote for left-wing 
policies, charges of betrayal of the last Labour government and a push to make the PLP 
more responsive to Conference decisions, and loss of office and diminution of the 
Parliamentary Party's influence.96 Foot's weak position on the NEC has already been 
noted (although in the autumn of 1982, the left had slightly lost its grip there and a right 
winger, John Golding, had become Chairman of the Home Policy Committee).97 
The Campaign Document was adopted as the general election manifesto, a suggested 
shortened version having been rejected.98 According to Butler and Kavanagh, "it was 
forced through in an hour or so virtually undiscussed .... .it was the shortest Clause V 
meeting ever." Foot had apparently suggested to the Shadow Cabinet the previous day that 
the Campaign Document be accepted; and although some Shadow Cabinet members 
wanted further discussion at the Clause V meeting, the authors note that: 
"The memory of Mr Callaghan's behaviour in 1979 - or the myths about it - seem 
to have served as a negative symbol. Mr Foot did not want to inflict on the Party 
rows like those that had gone on after 1979 or to risk the Party's new found unity 
by selecting or omitting proposals from the Campaign document. ,,99 
This suggests that the consequences of the argument in 1979, in which the House of Lords 
featured so prominently, were still being felt, with the memories still raw. In the event, as 
part of its 'Emergency Programme of Action', the manifesto stated that Labour would 
"introduce an early Bill to abolish the legislative powers of the House of Lords."I00 In the 
substantive part of the manifesto, on 'A Wider Democracy' it referred to Labour's 
Programme 1982 and stated a commitment to: 
" .... Take action to abolish the undemocratic House of Lords as quickly as possible 
and, as an interim measure, introduce a Bill in the first session of Parliament to 
remove its legislative powers -with the exception of those relating to the life of a 
Parliament. "jOl 
96 The British General Election of 1983 (Macmillan 1984) pp 60-61. 
97 Ibid, P 53. 
98 NEe Minutes, 13 th May 1983. 
99 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 62. 
100 The New Hope for Britain: Labour Party Manifesto 1983 (Dale, op cit, p 246). 
101 Ibid, p 275. 
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Labour never got the chance to implement this, suffering a heavy election defeat, although 
there has been no suggestion that its policy on the House of Lords played a significant part 
in this. It does not feature in Butler and Kavanagh's study of the campaign itself; and their 
analysis of election addresses shows that only five per cent of Conservative and four per 
cent of Labour ones even mentioned it.102 
Essentially, since the general election defeat of 1979, the Labour Party had been looking 
backwards. There had been lengthy and acrimonious recriminations over what had 
happened prior to the election. Bound up with these were the internal constitutional 
wrangles, which dominated Party debates in the early 1980s and which were followed by 
the defection of a significant number of Labour MPs to the newly-formed Social 
Democratic Party. The episode involving policy on the House of Lords in the 1979 
manifesto, when the Leader was perceived to have exercised a veto over established Party 
policy, was an important factor in the debate over control of the manifesto, although this 
was one issue on which the "left" narrowly failed to secure a change. 
The actual policy towards the House of Lords also essentially looked back to the earlier 
debate on abolition. The practicalities of achieving this had again been discussed in detail, 
but outstanding questions were never satisfactorily resolved. The prospect of a 1910 style 
constitutional crisis was raised, with the suggested creation of 1,000 peers, prompting 
further temporary flirtation with reform in the Conservative Party. However, unlike 
Callaghan in 1977, Foot intervened before a policy he opposed became official Party 
policy and was successful in stopping it, albeit narrowly. As things turned out, the 1983 
manifesto policy was not so dissimilar from that of 1979. While aspiring to abolition, it 
promised early action only to remove the Lords' legislative powers, leaving actual 
abolition as a more distant prospect. The policy at this time was, however, still geared 
mainly toward removing a potential obstacle to the programme of a Labour government. 
Following further heavy election defeats and a lengthy period in opposition, this would 
change, as will be seen in the next Chapter. 
------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
102 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 258. 
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6. DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR'S POLICY IN OPPOSITION 1983-92 
Policy Development in Abeyance 
In the years immediately following its heavy defeat in the general election of 1983, the 
Labour Party showed little interest in the House of Lords. Indeed no further policy 
statement would be issued referring to it until 1989. Of course, circumstances had 
changed. The previous concern that the House of Lords might obstruct the programme of 
a Labour government was unlikely to be foremost in people's minds, since it was clear 
that the Labour Party was not going to form a government for several years. It had just 
209 MPs, the smallest number since the Second World War, having received its lowest 
share of the vote since 1918. Also there was a new leader, Neil Kinnock, whose principal 
concern was to ensure the Labour Party was in a position to fight the next general election 
effectively and who, over this period, concentrated mainly on reforming party 
organisation, dealing with groups such as the 'Militant Tendency' and on improving 
presentation.) Although some statements on various policy issues did appear, it was only 
after the 1987 election that the Party would embark on a fundamental review ofpolicy.2 
Labour's official policy at this time was still for abolition. However, some eight years had 
elapsed since the confrontation between the previous Labour government and the Lords. 
Lord Cledwyn, who had become Labour's leader in the Lords, now observed that, in his 
experience, the House had not exceeded its powers.3 Opposition could bring a different 
perspective and, instead of being seen as a potential obstacle to a Labour government, the 
House of Lords could be seen as providing a means of limiting at least some of the actions 
See for instance, Butler and Kavanagh: The British General Election of 1987 (Macmillan, 1988), 
pp 47-64. 
2 Geoff Bish, then the Party's Head of Research, recalled that, between 1983 and 1987, "we were 
marking time, policy wise" (Interview, March 1999). 
3 House of Lords Debates, 19th December 1984 (Vol 458, Col 680). He argued for a new enquiry or 
Royal Conurussion on Lords reform. In the same debate, the veteran Labour peer, Lord Houghton 
of Sowerby, observed that Lords' reform had become a "non subject" and that studies had "gone 
into limbo" (Col 656). 
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of the Thatcher government. There was greater potential to do so there than in the 
Commons, with its massive Conservative majority. According to Donald Shell, during the 
1980s local authorities - many of which were Labour controlled - came to look to the 
House of Lords for support in moderating the impact of government legislation; and the 
Lords had at least some success in the mid-1980s in obliging the government to adjust 
policies or slow down their implementation.4 As will be seen, Labour thinking was later 
to develop so that it saw the second chamber (if not necessarily the existing House of 
Lords) as a means of preventing future encroachments on individual and constitutional 
rights. 
The role of the House of Lords and the extent to which it had an effect on the policies and 
legislation of the Conservative government in the 1980s will be looked at more fully later.5 
However, it should be noted here that between 1979 and 1990 the Conservative 
government suffered 155 defeats in the House of Lords, 148 of which involved legislation. 
While this number may seem quite large, it should be contrasted with the 350 plus defeats 
suffered by the Labour government over a shorter period between 1974 and 1979.6 The 
bare figures do not necessarily tell the whole story, since some defeats may be relatively 
trivial, while others can be of great political importance. Although some defeats were 
significant, such as that in 1984 on a crucial amendment to the Bill paving the way for the 
abolition of the Greater London Council and the metropolitan county councils, the 
substantive abolition legislation was passed. In the next Parliament, in 1988, the 
government secured victory on a crucial amendment to the highly contentious "poll tax" 
legislation, thanks to heavy Whipping and a large turnout of hereditary peers; and it won a 
key vote on legislation, enabling it to go ahead with the abolition of the Inner London 
Education Authority. Usually it seemed, the Conservatives could rely on their majority in 
the Lords, when it really mattered. 7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Shell: The House of Lords, p 173. 
S See Chapter 8. 
6 Shell (op cit) pp 25, 157. 
7 Writing in 1988, the then Labour Chief Whip, Lord Ponsonby ofShulbrede, asserted that the House 
had "confounded its critics who have traditionally held that the House of Lords "was ineffective as a 
revising chamber when there was a Conservative government". However, in the same article, he 
conceded that "for all the publicity given to government defeats in the Lords, the government bas 
not lost a single important Bill as a result of Lords' activity" ('The House of Lords: An Effective 
Restraint on the Executive,' The Parliamentarian, Vol 69 No 2, April 1988). 
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Nevertheless, Margaret Thatcher actually increased the Conservative strength in the Lords 
with new creations. 8 On at least one occasion she blocked a number of proposed Labour 
creations. After the election defeat of 1983, the outgoing Party Leader, Michael Foot, put 
forward some 25 names. Some of them, he recalled, were former MPs, who "hadn't any 
income ... they were down and out after the election"; and also two or three were 
nominated by the Deputy Leader, Denis Healey "and I didn't think I could refuse them". 
However, Thatcher refused such a large number and was only prepared to accept six or 
seven. Foot objected very strongly, but Thatcher refused to concede, with the result that 
some ex-cabinet ministers were not inc1uded.9 This episode is interesting, not only for the 
way it illustrates Thatcher's determination not to make any concession to the opposition, 
but also in that it shows that providing compensation to former MPs was a motive for the 
Labour leader, in addition to that of ensuring numbers to carry out work in the Lords. 10 
Despite Labour's numerical disadvantage, there may have been an expectation - and 
perhaps a hope amongst some Labour peers - that limited success in the Lords would lead 
to a change in the way Labour viewed the House and ultimately a change in policy. II 
Following, the votes on the local government "paving" bill in 1984, the New Statesman 
warned that, although "the House of Lords has successfully resisted Mrs. Thatcher's 
elected dictatorship", this did not alter the case for abolition. It added, however, that there 
was no evidence Labour had done any work on what ending the Lords' legislative 
functions would involve, suggesting that ''until it does, the commitment to abolish will 
ring as hollow as last time". 12 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 See Chapter 8. 
9 Interview with Michael Foot (March 1999). Lord Denham, then Conservative Chief Whip, recalled 
that "Margaret was always very reluctant to allow enough members of the Labour Party or indeed 
the Liberal Party to come here" and that, when it was necessary, she insisted on matching them with 
Conservatives ''because she didn't want to threaten the balance" (Interview, January 2000). 
10 See p 104 for Foot's publicly stated objectives in 1981. 
11 Lord Cledwyn, speaking in 1987, argued that the years since 1979 had demonstrated that the Lords 
had done a necessary job and this was accepted by the Labour Party. He thought it was one reason 
why abolition was not included in the 1987 manifesto (Analysis: The Other Opposition: BBC 
Radio 4, Sth November 1987). Note also that, by 1989, a supporter of abolition like John Griffith 
could nevertheless acknowledge the potential usefulness of the Lords as a revising chamber 
(see p 7S). 
12 Leading article, 6th July 1984 (Vol 108, p 3). 
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Labour had not looked at the issue in any depth since the Machinery of Government Study 
Group had failed to reach agreement during the run up to Labour IS Programme in 1982. 13 
Neil Kinnock wanted to distance the Party from memories of the 1979-83 period; 14 and, 
shortly after his election as leader, it was decided in December 1983 to wind up the 
existing network of advisory sub-committees, study groups and working parties and 
replace them with a comparatively small number of new Joint Policy Committees. These 
were to report to both the National Executive Committee and the Shadow Cabinet and 
would be made up of equal numbers from both bodies, with only a limited number of co-
optees and, so "it was hoped, avoid the problem of over-large fluctuating memberships". 
They would be set up "only where there was a clear priority for policy development" and 
"a link to the Party's campaign strategy.,,15 None of these new Joint Policy Committees 
had specific responsibility for policies relating to the House of Lords or for wider 
parliamentary reform. The second chamber, it would seem, was no longer seen as a 
priority for policy development or as featuring in the campaign strategy. In the absence of 
any decision on this by the NEC or the Party Conference, policy remained formally 
unchanged, but it was now very much on the back-burner. 16 
The Labour frontbench's lack of enthusiasm on the issue was demonstrated when 
Kinnock, in an interview the same year, said that while he was still in favour of abolition, 
he did not want this to ''pre-occupy the time of a Parliament that's got to get on with the 
business of helping to rebuild our society". Given other claims on time and energy, it 
could not be in the "top slot" of the first five years of a Labour government; and the House 
of Lords was still likely to be there at the time of the following election. I7 Unsurprisingly, 
13 See Chapter 5. 
14 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 54. 
15 Labour Party NEC Report 1984, p 70. The work of the Machinery of Govemment Study Group 
(which had enjoyed a large and fluctuating membership) had, in practice, ended in 1982. 
16 Tony Benn and another Labour backbencher, John Marek, made nominal attempts at legislation in 
1985, involving respectively abolition of the Lords (as part ofa wider Reform Bill) and a chamber 
elected by proportional representation, but neither stood any realistic chance of success (House of 
Commons Debates, 24th May 1985, Vol 79, Col 1253; 5th July 1985, Vol 82, Cols 686-9). 
17 Interview with David Frost, TV AM, 31st March 1985. 
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therefore, Labour's 1987 manifesto made no reference whatsoever to the House of Lords. 
In marked contrast to 1979, "little fuss" was made about the manifesto, which was agreed 
at an amicable Clause V meeting of the NEC and Shadow Cabinet. The general mood, 
according to one participant was "if Neil didn't want it, then we won't have it. "18 
Labour's Policy Review 
Although Labour's performance in the general election of June 1987 showed improvement 
on that in 1983, the Party still lost heavily and was again faced with the prospect of a 
Conservative government with a comfortable majority for a full Parliamentary tenn. 19 
Shortly after the election, it was decided to undertake a wide ranging and fundamental 
policy review. The aim was said to be to close the perceived gap between the Party and 
the electorate on policy issues and to help overcome internal disunity.20 According to 
Butler and Kavanagh: 
"Awareness of how much electoral ground Labour had to make up as well 
as sullen resignation amongst much of the left and grass roots activists 
strengthened the hands of the reformers. The widespread recognition that 
something radical had to be done led to acceptance of a far reaching review 
f 1· ,,21 o party po ICy. 
The policy review was discussed by the National Executive in July and the decision to 
establish the review was endorsed at the 1987 Party Conference, without much debate. 
The Conference was said to have been indifferent, with the left holding fire, not wanting to 
rock the boat, while the trade unions were supportive.22 
18 Butler and Kavanagh (op cit) P 71. This study of the 1987 campaign makes no mention at all of the 
Issue. 
19 The Conservatives this time had an overall majority of 102, with Labour winning 229 seats. 
20 Gerald R Taylor: Labour's Renewal: The Policy Review and Beyond (Macmillan, 1997) p 43. 
21 The British General Election of 1992 (Macmillan, 1992) p 45. 
22 Ibid. 
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Seven Policy Review Groups (PRGs) were established, with joint membership taken from 
both the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet and with joint convenors. Each was to look at 
policies within fairly broad themes, and the remit of the Group covering 'Democracy for 
the Individual and the Community' comprised: 
"Civil liberties and equal rights, freedom of information and expression, policies to 
combat crime, involvement in the democratic process at local, regional and 
national level, the media and democracy, and the issues of centralisation and 
decentralisation. ,,23 
The joint convenors were the Party's Deputy Leader, Roy Hattersley, and Jo Richardson, 
who had frontbench responsibility for women's issues, both of whom were members of 
the Shadow Cabinet and the NEC. 24 
This PRG made no reference to the issue of the second chamber or to Parliamentary 
reform of any sort in its first stage report. Although it discussed "a framework for more 
effective and open democratic process" (centred round a Freedom of Information Act), the 
emphasis at this time was more on individual rights. The notion of an elected second 
chamber with a special role was only to emerge later. Indeed, the report acknowledged 
that so far only brief consideration had been given to aspects of its work relating to 
government and the electoral and decision making process, but the Group would be 
looking at "how we can improve the quality of our democracy.,,25 
23 Social Justice and Economic Efficiency: Democracy for the Individual and the Community (The 
Labour Party, 1988). 
24 Ibid. The other initial members were Eric Clarke, Joan Lestor MP, Jack Rogers, Paul Boateng MP, 
Ann Taylor MP, Danny Sargent and Lord Irvine of Lairg. Irvine (later to become Lord Chancellor) 
was then a fronbench spokesmen in the Lords on legal and home affairs. The other non-MPs were 
all trade union members of the NEC. There would be some changes to membership subsequently. 
The Secretariat was provided by staff from the Shadow Cabinet and Party HQ, with staff from the 
Party Leader's office also involved. 
25 Ibid. 
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At the NEC meeting which agreed to publication of the report in May 1988, Tony Benn 
moved an amendment that "a Labour government will abolish the House of Lords," but his 
influence and the strength of the left had diminished and it was defeated by 18 votes to 4,26 
However, later in the year, Hattersley told a meeting in Dartford that the NEe had agreed 
in May that the PRG (of which he was joint convenor) should "examine alternative wa,Ys 
of implementing abolition of the Lords.,,27 Newspaper comment noted that this "dispels 
left wing suggestions that the party had been backtracking on reform of the Lords~"28 and 
Hattersley himself took the trouble to deny that the Party had abandoned its commitment 
to abolition. However, this did not necessarily mean that he (or indeed the Party) still felt 
committed to doing without a second chamber at all, as the rest of the speech showed. 
This was an important speech, since Hattersley was to have a pivotal role in the 
development of policy in this area, and it indicated the direction of his thinking. Nothing 
had yet been put to the PRG, although he claimed in his speech that he had considered the 
alternatives shortly after the aforementioned NEC meeting, but had refrained from 
speaking publicly, lest it become linked with the deputy leadership election. The speech 
was, nevertheless, made before that election at the Party Conference in October.29 
Hattersley, in offering thoughts as "no more than a contribution to the debate", said he had 
always believed a second chamber of hereditary peers and nominees to be an anachronism. 
While acknowledging the work of Labour peers and the fact of some defeats for the 
Conservative government, he stressed that "when the government is determined to win, it 
can always win", and attacked the "naked use of the Conservative Party's inbuilt 
majority". Performing a role as "revising chamber of a technical sort" did not in itself 
justify its existence. He suggested the best solution would be an all-party solution; "if the 
Tories were prepared to concede hegemony could not last for ever", there was much to be 
said for a Royal Commission examining how democracy could be restored to both Houses 
of Parliament. 30 
26 NEC Minutes, 25 th May 1988. 
27 Speech to Dartford Constituency Labour Party, 20th September 1988. The NEC Minutes do not 
record such a decision. 
28 Patrick Wintour: 'Hattersley commits Labour to abolition of the Lords', The Guardian, 
21 sl September 1988. 
29 Both the leadership and deputy leadership were contested in 1988, with Kinnock defeating Tony 
Benn for the former and Hattersley defeating John Prescott and Eric Heffer for the latter, both by 
large margins (Labour Party Conference Report 1988, p 11). 
30 Dartford speech (op cit), 
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He went on to pose five questions. Was a second chamber necessary at all? Was there a 
case for maintaining the hereditary principle? In what other fonns might a second 
chamber be constituted? Should it be elected on some other fonn of suffrage or from 
different constituencies? Was there a case for maintenance in its present fonn, but with 
powers attenuated and membership augmented? Hattersley told his audience the Party 
would now address these, but himself made some interesting preliminary observations. 
He refuted the arguments that the Lords deterred the Commons from excesses, citing the 
evidence of the past eight years; and he described as "nonsense" the notion that, without 
the Lords, the Commons might delay an election - it was public opinion rather than "some 
frail constitutional principle" which obliged politicians to respond to democratic 
obligations. He was cool towards the idea of a nominated House reflecting the 
composition of the Commons - "they will be likely to respond to the demands of their 
patrons and do no more than reinforce both errors and successes of the other chamber". 
He noted the "classical argument" that an elected chamber would have greater influence 
than at present, but saw "no reason why an elected second chamber should not have its 
powers circumscribed in law", adding: 
"it is difficult to imagine how a representative House can be created by any other 
means than election. ,,31 
At this stage, Hattersley purported only to be floating ideas. Support for an elected second 
chamber was strongly hinted at, but no more; and there was as yet no suggestion of using 
the second chamber to provide special powers to safeguard fundamental and constitutional 
rights, which was to become an important feature of the plans. The comments on a 
nominated chamber are also worth noting (not least in view of developments since 
Hattersley left the front bench in 1992). It is also interesting that he should have expressed 
a preference for an all-party solution, even if he did not expect it to be forthcoming.32 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 Ibid. 
32 Hattersley later confirmed that this was his preference, as consensus was the best way of making 
progress on constitutional reform, without having to sacrifice the Parliamentary timetable 
(Interview, May 1999). 
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At the Party Conference itself, Hattersley reiterated the intention of looking at policy on 
the House of Lords, although the report on which he was speaking made no specific 
reference to it; and it did not feature in the debate, except for a reference by Eric Heffer, 
who had just unsuccessfully challenged him for the deputy leadership, and who suggested 
that it was that campaign which had let Hattersley to say he was in favour of getting rid of 
the House of Lords: 
"I did not hear much of that from Roy beforehand, but I am sure he held that point 
ofview.,,33 
Hattersley told the Conference that, to build a new society, there had to be changes at the 
top and "that requires the abolition of the House of Lords", adding in a riposte to Heffer 
that this was "a view - you know very well Eric - that I have had throughout my political 
life". He pointed to the way the Lords had recently "saved the Conservative 
administration by wheeling in the backwoodsmen", and added: 
"I think we ought to make it clear today that these noble ancients, brought in from 
great houses and country estates, signed the death warrant of the House of Lords 
b h · b h' h' ,,34 Y t elr e aVlOur t IS year. 
Then - perhaps because he was addressing the Party Conference - he took a somewhat 
different tack from that in his Dartford speech, saying: 
"The House of Lords in its present form must go, but we must not assume that it 
needs to be replaced by another second chamber. There are many in this Party -
me amongst them - who think that a single elected chamber is the best of all 
safeguards for democracy." 
Moreover, he asked the Conference not to support any resolution committing it to a second 
chamber, promising to return the following year with a firm plan, which "may involve a 
second chamber or it may not. ,,35 
33 Conference Report 1988, p 121. 
34 Ibid, P 124. Hattersley referred particularly to their record on the poll tax and the abolition of the 
ILEA (see Chapter 8). 
35 Ibid. The Conference Report does not record any resolution debated which would have committed 
the Party to a second chamber. Neither does it show any vote being taken on the specific Policy 
Review Report. 
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Even allowing for Conference rhetoric, it seems surprising that the Deputy Leader of the 
Party should have played down so much the potential role of a second chamber, when less 
than three months later, he would himself put forward proposals which envisaged an 
important role for the second chamber in safeguarding democratic reforms - and this at a 
time when the work of the policy review on this had scarcely begun. 
Clearly though, there was now recognition within the Party that, together with other 
aspects of constitutional reform, this area of policy would need to be looked at.36 There 
were also other influences pushing in the same direction. In December 1988, the pressure 
group Charter 88 launched its Charter, which advocated a range of democratic reforms. 
Included in its list was a proposal to: 
"Reform the Upper House to establish a democratic, non-hereditary second 
chamber.,,3? 
Hattersley himself is said to have been dismissive of Charter 88 - more so than Kinnock38 
- but clearly there was a degree of common ground. Such pressure groups sought and had 
the potential to influence politicians, particularly those in opposition.39 
Earlier the same year, Lord Scarman (a prominent, recently retired law lord) had set out 
proposals for a reformed second chamber. He asserted that the checks and balances, such 
as they were, of the constitution were of no avail and, echoing Lord Hailsham, argued that 
"the path to an 'elective dictatorship' is open and must be blocked".4o One of Scarman's 
specific proposals was for a reformed second chamber, partly elected from regional and 
institutional constituencies by proportional representation and also with a nominated 
element. A new Parliament Act, he went on to suggest, should schedule legislation of 
constitutional importance which would require the assent of both Houses for amendment 
36 In a leading article, The Times had suggested that this fresh look at Lords' reform would be "an 
important test not only of the genuineness of Labour's revisionism, but of its claim to democratic 
credentials" (22nd September 1988). 
37 New Statesman and Society, 2nd December 1988 (Vol 1, P 11). 
38 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 52. 
39 For instance, in the 1992 general election campaign, both Labour and Liberal Democrats arranged 
press conferences on constitutional reform to coincide with Charter 88's designated 'Democracy 
Day'. 
40 Hailsham used the phrase in his 1976 Dimbleby Lecture. Hattersley himself would also use it (see 
pp 141 and 173. 
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or repeal. For immediate action he proposed incorporation in domestic legislation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, a new Parliament Act (to give effect to the 
proposed new powers of the second chamber) and a joint Parliamentary Committee to 
review membership of the Lords and propose further refonn, although the first 1\\'0 of 
these need not wait on the third.41 
The notion of a second chamber with special powers to safeguard legislation of 
constitutional importance - unlike Scannan's other proposals - would, in due course, be 
adopted by the Labour Party. Indeed, when questioned later about when he became 
attracted to this notion, Hattersley acknowledged that he may have got it from Scannan.42 
Labour's Policy Review Group took its first detailed look at policy towards the second 
chamber on 30th November 1988. Hattersley had already made it clear the subject would 
be back on the agenda; and the way which, that year, the government had secured 
majorities in the Lords on such contentious matters as the poll tax, the abolition of the 
ILEA and most recently, eye test and dental charges, may have helped ensure this was the 
case.
43 In the case of the poll tax, The Guardian had observed shortly before the Party 
Conference: 
"Lord Denham won the vote; but at the cost of putting the unrefonned state of the 
Lords back on the party agenda. ,,44 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_ ... 
41 'Power House' The Guardian, 6th June 1988 (based on his Radcliffe Lecture at Warwick 
University). Scarman saw the role of the new chamber as restraining the abuse of power by the 
Commons, without blocking the ultimate right of the Commons to get its way. Greater powers 
should mean a more representative chamber. His proposal was for a reformed second chamber, 
based not just on regional constituencies, but also representing other groups in society (professions, 
churches, business, industry, trade unions, ethnic groups etc). It was not clear exactly how these 
groups would be identified or would exercise their vote. 
42 Interview, May 1999. 
43 See Chapter 8. 
44 Leading article, 22nd September 1988. (NB Denham was then Government Chief Whip.) 
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The PRG had on its agenda Hattersley's Dartford speech and a paper from Party officials 
summarising developments in the Party's policy towards the House of Lords since 1976. 
Noting that there had been no mention of this issue since the 1983 manifesto, the latter 
observed that there had been "suggestions in some quarters, that the Lords, unsatisfactory 
as it might be, could prove useful in blocking some of the excesses of the Thatcher 
government", but argued that, despite the "useful contribution made by individuals," 
recent events, with Tory backwoodsmen whipped in on key votes, had shown this not to 
be the case. The PRG would be bound to consider the Party's position on the Lords, but in 
so doing, it was suggested that: 
"it should bear in mind the fact that various alternative reforms of the second 
chamber have been rejected in the past and also the very real difficulties involved 
in carrying through actual abolition:.45 
The PRG then set up a small Working Party to examine 'Constitutional Questions', which 
included on its agenda 'Modernising Parliament'. Before its first meeting, however, the 
Party's Deputy Leader had developed his thinking further on the role of the second 
chamber, which might safeguard constitutional reform and possibly also certain legislation 
on individual rights. 
Hattersley floated his ideas in an article in The Independent at the end of the 1988, in 
which he observed that "there are no judicial checks or legislative balances to hold back 
the sovereignty of Parliament", and that "we need formal protection against elective 
dictatorship". He dismissed both a Bill of Rights and electoral reform, but argued for 
devolution; and then went on to suggest that the "powers of the regional assemblies could 
in effect be entrenched by reform of the House of Lords". He thought there were dangers 
in an Upper House replicating the Commons or in having an unelected chamber which 
could frustrate the Commons, but "a second chamber, elected directly by the regions or 
indirectly from the assemblies, would avoid both dangers". It would be highly unlikely to 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
45 PD 1804 (November 1988) Party Policy on the House of Lords - A Background Note. The paper noted the 
problems which had emerged from earlier discussions. 
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endorse legislation removing their powers. He suggested that this second chamber "could 
come to represent those institutions which conflict with the instincts of central 
government". It would defend not only devolved powers, but freedom of information and 
citizens' privacy; it would prevent erosion of civil liberties, insist on "close supervision" 
of security services and on the rights of broadcasters to operate without interference. It 
would be "a realistic check on the powers of central government and a counterbalance to 
the authority of the Prime Minister.46 
This went further than his Dartford speech; and the notion of a second chamber with a 
particular role along these lines was to feature in the 1989 Policy Review Statement. 
However that statement would be much more vague on any direct link between the 
regional assemblies and the second chamber. It was not explained clearly, at this time or 
subsequently, why the new second chamber should necessarily share Hattersley's 
particular concerns and so safeguard them. 
It did indicate a significant change in the way the second chamber was perceived, at least 
by this senior Labour politician. In the discussions of the 1970s and early 80s, even those 
opposed to abolition were taking an essentially defensive position, rather than advocating 
a positive role for the second chamber. Now the Party's Deputy Leader was doing just 
that. The long years in opposition and the consequent inability to prevent controversial 
changes had clearly had some effect. As Hattersley, himself, acknowledged: 
"Margaret Thatcher's contempt for compromise ... has changed the constitutional 
perception. We need formal protection against elective dictatorship.,,47 
Hattersley was opposed to a formal Bill of Rights, as he made clear in the article, and the 
new second chamber could be seen to some extent, as an alternative proposition.48 An 
article and speech by the Deputy Leader did not necessarily determine official Party 
policy, but clearly they would be influential. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
46 'Devolution to defend the nation against elective dictatorship,' The Independent, 30th December 
1988. 
47 Ibid. 
48 In a subsequent paper to the Policy Review Group in February, Hattersley would set out objections 
to the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, and put 
forward the new second chamber as part of an alternative approach (PO 2060: Constitutional 
Reform:- Note from Roy Hattersley and Jo Richardson). 
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Although Hattersley was not directly involved in the aforementioned Working Party, it 
was chaired by one of the members of his Home Affairs team, Alistair Darling.49 The 
second chamber was one of many issues - albeit an important one - to be dealt with in 
time for the main report, so there could be no lengthy examination. Nevertheless, its first 
two meetings in January 1989 concentrated on this issue, following which a note was 
drawn up setting out its conclusions, which were for a new second chamber, "whose 
composition would be determined democratically, not on a basis of heredity or patronage". 
It should have "strong representation from the regions of the UK". Direct and indirect 
representation of regional assemblies had been considered, but dual membership could 
involve practical difficulties, while the latter could mean a lack of direct accountability. 
Moreover, either would have to await establishment of the assemblies. "On balance, the 
advantage would seem to lie with the establishment of a directly elected second chamber, 
elected at the same time as the House of Commons, but by an alternative system of 
election. ,,50 
It recognised that an elected chamber "would have a stronger claim to democratic 
legitimacy" than the present House and that there could be no guarantee of a government 
majority there; but an additional nominated element would be "undemocratic" and involve 
"an unacceptable degree of patronage". Bills should not be introduced there and delaying 
powers over most legislation should be restricted, "perhaps allowing for one opportunity at 
revision". However, extension of the life of a Parliament should require the consent of 
both Houses, and "there might be a similar requirement in other constitutional areas" - for 
instance, "changes to the status of regional assemblies." Ministers could sit there "if it 
was so desired". Titles need not be affected. A number of points would need to be 
considered further, including the system of election; clarification of specific powers and 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 Darling had also joined the main Policy Review Group. The other members of the Working Group 
were Lord Irvine of Lairg, Paul Boateng MP, James Comford (Director of the Institute for Public 
Policy Research), David Hill (assistant to Roy Hattersley), Kay Andrews (Party Leader's office) 
and Tim Lamport (Labour Party HQ). Note that Darling, Irvine and Boateng were all lawyers. 
50 PD 1993A: The Second Chamber - Summary of Conclusions so far (Feburary 1989). 
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functions, including entrenching powers; the fonn of links with the regions; timing and 
mechanism for carrying refonns through and possible interim measures; and consequent 
changes to Commons procedure. 51 Although not all would be dealt with in the published 
report, the Working Party was aware that they ought to be addressed. 
These proposals would fonn the basis of the eventual Policy Review statement, but with 
some significant differences. They were worked into a draft section of the report then put 
to the full PRG in March. In this, the position on ministers in the second chamber was 
changed, stating that "ministers will no longer sit there".52 This would seem to haye been 
in response to Hattersley who, in a separate paper to the PRG in February, had said there 
was no reason why there should be a fonnal government presence in the second 
chamber.53 Hattersley was certainly a major influence. For instance in the same paper, 
while saying that he would himself favour a second chamber with special blocking 
powers, he acknowledged that his co-convenor, Jo Richardson, even then, remained 
"highly sceptical about the need for a second chamber,,;54 but Hattersley's views would 
prevail. 
In the Working Group's deliberations, the notion of special powers over constitutional 
matters had been put forward only tentatively, probably taking account of Hattersley's 
recent advocacy of this, but making no reference at all to individual rights and personal 
freedom. The March draft, however, was much more specific as to this special role in 
respect of constitutional and individual rights. It proposed "extended delaying powers of 
up to two years" and mentioned specific areas, including regional and local government, 
freedom of infonnation, data protection and other rights, for instance in connection with 
race relations and equality. By the time the final draft was sent to the NEC in May, this 
51 Ibid. Although no decision had been taken on the electoral system, it was tentatively suggested that 
a list system involving party patronage would be unacceptable. (A list system would, however be 
supported by Party Conference four years later; see Chapter 10.) 
52 PO 2120: A Second Chamber - Draft Section ofPRG Report (March 1989). 
53 PD 2060 (op cit). Reflecting later, Hattersley reasoned that he wanted a second chamber which was 
as "un-party political as possible" and that, without the prospect of ministerial office, members 
would be likely to behave more freely. He thought he probably had been responsible for changing 
this aspect of policy (Interview). 
54 Ibid. 
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would have changed again, reference being made there to "powers to delay repeal of 
legislation for the whole of the life of a Parliament" and specifying only "legislation 
establishing the national and regional assemblies" and "covering fundamental rights". 
Similarly, although the March draft suggested that "it would make sense" for elections to 
be held "at the same time and with the same boundaries as those for the regions" and had 
re-iterated that there could be no guarantees of a government majority in the new chamber, 
neither of these points would be included in the final version. 55 
The final draft was presented to the NEC in May 1989. At this meeting, a proposal by 
Tony Benn for "the creation of a sufficient number of peers to secure the abolition of the 
House of Lords" was defeated by 26 votes to 4.56 Although now in a small minority on 
the NEC, Benn was still pursuing this proposition tenaciously. The thorny question of 
entrenchment (in other words, of how to safeguard particular legislation from repeal) came 
up, and in particular, in this context, the special powers to be given to the second chamber. 
The final draft, in its introductory section on protection for rights and democratic reforms, 
had asserted that it was intended to "make the only constitutional reform which can protect 
the legislation from repeal in further Parliaments.,,57 However, an amendment moved by 
Hattersley was passed, so it was amended to read, as it would in the final text: 
"We intend to make constitutional reform which can protect that legislation by 
ensuring any government which seeks its repeal must obtain the consent of both 
Houses or else fight, and win, a further general election. ,,58 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
55 PD 2120 (op cit); PD 2194: Democracy, the Individual and the Community (May 1989). 
56 NEC Minutes, 9th May 1989. (The Home Policy Committee did not meet during this period, the 
Policy Review being dealt with at special meetings of the full NEe.) 
57 PD2194 (op cit). 
58 Meet the Challenge. Make the Change: A New Agenda/or Britain - Final Report of Labour's 
Policy Review for the 1990s (The Labour Party, 1989) p 55; NEC Minutes, 9th May 1989 record 
that the amendment was carried by 20 votes to 4. (An amendment on similar lines had been 
suggested by the present author.) The chapter as a whole was approved by 22 votes to 4. 
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The draft section concerning the proposed Scottish Assembly, had made an even more 
ambitious assertion, that "we are detennined to entrench the powers of the Assembly and 
thus to give a guarantee of pennanence to the new settlement". 59 This was also modi tied 
in the published version, which stated instead: 
"We are detennined to entrench the power of the Assembly and it may be that this 
is best done through the powers that we will give to our proposed new second 
chamber, which will replace the House of Lords.,,6o 
There seems to have been a degree of confusion about the extent to which entrenchment 
was possible. Alternatively, there may have been a wish in some quarters, for political 
reasons, to claim more for the proposals than would actually be the case. It could certainly 
have been seen as advantageous to be able to claim a degree of pennanence for the new 
settlement. The Policy Review statement would indeed state that "we are detennined that 
the new Scottish settlement will be finnly established in our system".61 However it is by 
no means clear that the PRG had actually accepted it was possible to give any "guarantee 
of pennanence"; and in the event, such a claim was not directly made, even if it was 
implied.62 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 PD 2194 (op cit). 
60 Meet the Challenge, Make the Change; p 57. 
61 Ibid 
62 The author's contemporaneous notes suggest it had been agreed at the PRG that it was not possible 
to guarantee pennanence, but that apparently Donald Dewar, then Shadow Scottish Secretary, had 
wanted the contentious wording. 
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Policy Review Report 
The PRG's report was incorporated as a chapter entitled 'A Modem Democracy' in the 
comprehensive policy statement, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change. In vie\\' of its 
importance as a new statement of policy, and the significance of particular wording, it is 
necessary to quote from it here in some detail. The sub-section on a second chamber re-
iterated that: "a second chamber of Parliament based on inheritance and patronage is 
unacceptable in a modem democracy". It noted that for many years the Labour Party had 
been committed to the abolition of the House of Lords and the time had come "to give 
precise and practical effect to that intention". It then identified a clear departure from the 
Party's previously held position: 
"We have considered whether democracy would be best served by the creation of a 
single chamber Parliament or by replacing the House of Lords with a new second 
chamber. We propose the abolition of the House of Lords and its replacement with 
an elected second chamber with a specific and precisely defined constitutional 
role".63 
The document argued the need to extend democracy by "passing out new powers to the 
nations and regions of Britain" and "establishing fundamental rights which cannot easily 
be overthrown by authoritarian government". Parliament must scrutinise legislation "with 
greater care than is now possible", ways must be found to ensure the proper examination 
of the increasing European laws and regulations, and the new second chamber would 
"playa substantial part in achieving all these essential objectives". 
On the composition of this chamber, it stated: 
"The form of election to the new second chamber will be a matter for further 
consideration, but, because of its nature, it may be appropriate to adopt a scheme 
different from that by which Members of Parliament are elected. We intend that 
members of the new second chamber should particularly reflect the interests and 
aspirations of the regions and nations of Britain. We do not, however, propose 
direct links between members of the national and regional assemblies and 
members of the upper house". 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
, .• "'-'1 
63 Meet the Challenge, Make the Change; pp 55-56. (NB All the extracts on pp 6:+#15 are taken from 
this.) 
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The report emphasised that the new chamber would not be "a replica of the House of 
Commons". Ministers would not sit there and Bills would not be introduced there. It 
would retain powers to delay legislation, but for most Bills its power of delay would be 
restricted "to only one opportunity for revision before final consideration by the House of 
Commons". To "improve its efficiency as a revising chamber", it should develop a 
standing committee system for the detailed scrutiny of Bills and special select committees 
for general examination of government policy. 
It asserted that "the new second chamber will be an essential element in the protection of 
fundamental rights", it would "in effect entrench our fundamental rights legislation". In 
the British system there was "only one way of preventing a government with a substantial 
majority and supine backbenchers from transforming Parliament into an elective 
dictatorship", and that was "the creation of at least one House of Parliament which 
because of its composition and construction, will not automatically accept cabinet 
directions." It continued: 
"We propose that the second chamber should be the instrument which prevents the 
swift repeal of legislation on fundamental rights by any authoritarian government 
which might, in future, be elected. We propose therefore that the new second 
chamber should have new delaying over measures affecting fundamental rights. It 
will possess the power to delay repeal of legislation affecting fundamental rights 
for the whole life of a Parliament - thus providing an opportunity for the electorate 
to determine whether or not the government which proposes such measures 
should remain in office. The extra delaying power will apply to items of 
legislation specifically designated as concerning fundamental rights and all 
legislation establishing the national and regional assemblies. The second chamber 
will also possess the absolute right of veto on any proposal to extend the life of 
Parliament beyond the constitutional maximum of five years". 
It added that "the judicial committee of the present House of Lords will continue to 
function as the supreme court", but would comprise senior judges appointed by "an 
independent committee responsible to the Minister for Legal Administration.,,64 
64 A new ministry responsible for the administration of justice was proposed. 
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To set all this in context, the report had stated it was preparing specific legislation to 
"provide a massive extension of individual rights and to extend democracy". It added: 
"We intend to make constitutional reform which can protect that legislation by 
ensuring that any government which seeks its repeal must obtain the consent of 
both Houses or else fight and win, a further general election. Since, within our 
system there is no way which as Act of Parliament can be 'entrenched', legislation 
remains on statute books for so long, but only so long as Parliament resists its 
repeal. We intend to create an upper House of Parliament (to replace the present 
House of Lords) which will- because of its composition and constitutional 
functions - protect and preserve the rights which we incorporate in law". 
While not explicitly rejecting a Bill of Rights, it made clear that it would not regard this as 
providing necessary protection, whereas "by creating the new second chamber. .. we will 
make it infinitely more difficult for some future authoritarian government to repeal our 
rights legislation". 
The same chapter of the report also put forward a range of other proposals, including 
reform of the House of Commons, state funding of political parties, devolution and 
decentralisation, extending the right to know, changes to the administration of justice and 
other reforms relating to individual rights. 
As far as the second chamber was concerned, this was the most comprehensive statement 
on the issue for more than a decade. It completely reversed the Party's position, from one 
which had argued that a second chamber was unnecessary, to one which, to some extent, 
made it central to its programme for democratic reform. Although it acknowledged that 
"our programme for the extension and protection of individual rights is not dependent on 
our plans for constitutional reform", they nevertheless came across as pivotal. It is 
perhaps significant that the new second chamber was placed first in the order in which 
items on democracy were dealt with in the document. 
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Despite this, there were still important questions concerning aspects of the policy which 
remained to be answered, and of which officials dealing with the policy had been aware, 
even before the report had been finalised. 65 The question of whether it was proposing 
actual entrenchment was still unclear since, despite in two places asserting a 
"determination to entrench" or "in effect entrench", it elsewhere stated that "there is no 
way in which an Act of Parliament can be entrenched". If the latter was in fact the case, 
then it would seem that the new second chamber was seen at least as the next best thing, 
since it would make it "infinitely more difficult" for a future government to repeal 
Labour's reforms. However, it had not been made clear exactly how this would work, or 
how and precisely what legislation would be designated for this special protection. 
Also, it had not been made clear why the second chamber should necessarily be less 
inclined to accept cabinet directives than the Commons.66 Nor had it been explained how 
legislation would be handled there if it had no ministers. Although an explicit link was 
being proposed with regional government and representation, it had not been established 
precisely how this would operate. It is clear, however, that a different electoral system 
from that used for the Commons was being contemplated, even at this stage.67 The 
following year Labour would set up a Working Party on Electoral Systems, whose remit 
would include the second chamber. 
65 The author's contemporaneous notes indicate that these were raised and clarification suggested. 
66 If members of the second chamber were to have no prospect of holding ministerial office, this 
might have been a factor (see note 53), but it was not explicitly stated. Moreover, in his note to 
PRG in February 1989, Hattersley had acknowledged that "it may not be possible to avoid its 
examination of legislation being carried out in the confrontational way which both chambers of 
Parliament now employ" (Ibid). 
67 Despite his known hostility to electoral reform generally, Hattersley had indicated that he would be 
prepared to consider the Upper House being elected "on a different form of franchise" (Ibid). 
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Some Critical Reactions 
Some of the problematic aspects of the policy were to provide grounds for criticism by 
observers from various political standpoints. For instance, soon after its publication. a 
former senior Labour Party official expressed concern that the Policy Review was 
"recommending the establishment of a respectable alternative power base to the 
Commons" and that "an elected second chamber charged with protecting vague 
'fundamental rights' could well develop a feeling of self-importance and look for things to 
do. Then the Commons might find it had created a Frankenstein's monster.,,68 Later the 
political columnist in New Statesman and Society pointed to an inconsistency in haying a 
more democratic second chamber and simultaneously reducing its powers;69 while his 
counterpart at The Spectator observed sarcastically that it would have enough power 
apparently to block important legislation, but not enough to block unimportant 
legislation.7o 
The academic, Donald Shell, subsequently pointed to the fact that no ministers would sit 
there and that its powers would be limited for the great bulk of legislation, prompting him 
to ask "what kind of people would compete for election to this new second chamber?" He 
also asked how a list of measures affecting fundamental rights would be drawn up and 
who would have the responsibility of deciding when and how draft legislation infringed 
such rights. He suggested that "it does not appear that the Labour Party has given much 
consideration to these matters. ,,71 Some in the Party were certainly aware that some such 
questions remained unresolved and would, in due course, seek to clarify the position.72 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
68 Ann Carlton, Tribune. 16th June 1989. (She had previously been the Party's Local Government 
Officer and then adviser to John Silkin, a Cabinet minister in the 1974-79 government.) 
69 R W Johnson, The New Statesman and Society, 25 th May 1990 (Vol 3, P 23). 
70 Noel Malcolm, The Spectator, 9th June 1990 (Vol 264, p 6). 
71 The House of Lords. p 257 
72 See p 159 .. 
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Even before the Report had been put to the Party Conference, Tony Benn, who still argued 
that "the only way you can deal with the Lords ... is by threatening to swamp them", had 
questioned the likelihood of the proposals ever being implemented. "I would be surprised 
if it ever got off the ground", he said;73 and similar doubts were expressed two years later 
by the political columnist of Tribune, who questioned Labour's commitment to carry the 
policy through: 
"I would bet a few baubles that, no matter what brave words are uttered, the House 
of Lords will be as safe in Labour's grasp as the People's Party is in the aristocratic 
embrace.,,74 
This might have proved reassuring to the Labour peers, whose existence would still be 
threatened and many of whom clearly remained to be convinced of the merits of the new 
policy. The plans were reported to have "provoked consternation amongst Labour peers" 
and their Chief Whip, Lord Ponsonby, was quoted as saying they would tum the House 
into "little more than a sub-committee of the Commons".75 In a highly relevant House of 
Lords debate in April 1990 (on a motion to call attention to appropriate powers and 
constitution of a second chamber), the speaker from the Labour front bench, Lord 
Mishcon, did not actually refer to his Party's policy proposals or respond to criticisms of 
them made in the debate. Indeed he argued that "we must ensure that the powers and 
duties of the second chamber are roughly consonant with those that we have".76 This was 
not in line with the Party's official position. 
There appears to be no record of any formal opposition from the Labour peers. However, 
around the time that the Policy Review proposals were being presented to the NEC in 
1989, their leader, Lord Cledwyn, was recorded as stating that the "collective view of 
Labour peers towards a second chamber was that the hereditary principle should be 
immediately abolished and a Royal Commission established to consider reform.,,77 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
73 Reported in The Independent, 9th August 1989. 
74 Hugh Macpherson, Tribune, 3rd May 1991. 
75 The Independent, 9th August 1989. 
76 House of Lords Debates, 25 th April 1990 (Vol 518, Col 630). 
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Later, when Neil Kinnock met the Labour peers, some of them expressed reservations 
about the Policy Review proposals, but the record does not indicate overwhelming 
hostility At this meeting, Kinnock stressed that the Party now favoured a bicameral 
Parliament, and observed that this represented an "historic shift". He himself "had 
changed his own personal view over the years and now firmly believed in the need for two 
chambers, distinct but complementary.,,78 He told the peers that their views would be 
taken into account, and is recorded as having agreed that Lords reform was "low on the 
agenda for action.,,79 Whether Hattersley would have concurred must be doubtful; but he 
did later acknowledge that the Labour peers were "frantically unhappy" with the 
proposals. He admitted that they had not been consulted beforehand and that, afterwards, 
they were "extremely hostile.,,8o 
New Statesman and Society reported in 1990 that the Labour peers were set to oppose the 
party's plans, arguing that, with less power and no hope of government office, it would be 
difficult to attract candidates for the new second chamber; and that they were seeking a 
Royal Commission. However, it then went on to note speculation that, possibly in 
response to the Labour peers, Kinnock had suggested the Lords might not actually be 
abolished in Labour's first term. 81 There might have been something in this, as Hattersley 
later recalled being told by Cledwyn that Kinnock had said he would stop it happening.82 
However, when asked about this, Kinnock said he could not imagine any circumstances in 
which he would have done so, although he had been aware of the peers' unhappiness and 
would probably have said that it was understood and that any change would obviously be 
complex and time consuming. 83 
77 Minutes of meeting of Labour peers, 11 th May 1989. 
78 Minutes of meeting of Labour peers, 18th July 1989. In a wide ranging discussion on the Policy 
Review, four peers are recorded as expressing varying degrees of reservation. 
79 As might be expected in the case of a Party Leader, Kinnock had not been directly involved in the 
detailed development of policy in this area (in which, as has been shown, Hattersley took the lead), 
although staff from his office had been. 
80 Interview, May 1999. 
81 R W Johnson, New Stateman and Society, 25 th May 1990 and 9th June 1990 (Vol 3, Nos 102, 
p 23 & 104, p 23). 
82 Interview with Hattersley. 
83 Letter from Kinnock to the author, 5th October 1999. 
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It seems possible that the Party Leader, recognising the strength of feeling of the Labour 
peers on something directly affecting them, may have emphasised potential difficulties in 
implementation, in order to try to placate them; and that this may then have been 
misinterpreted. If it had been the case that the policy was not to be implemented or would 
be postponed, then the question would have arisen as to how this would square with the 
party's commitment to give special protection through the second chamber to particular 
legislation. However, in the event, the policy would be re-affirmed, with no suggestion of 
any postponement. 
The following year the Labour peers made their continuing reservations known, when the 
author (in his capacity as Secretary to the Party's Working Party on Electoral Systems) 
met with the 'Labour Peers Working Group on Electoral Systems'. The discussion 
centred not on any electoral system but on questions concerning composition and 
functions of the House of Lords, which the peers felt needed to be addressed. Although 
presumably the Labour peers had their own channels of communications to the leadership, 
they were apparently seeking aid in their rearguard action from the Working Party, which 
they hoped would pass on (or even endorse) their reservations. 84 A paper presented by the 
peers posed a whole list of questions, including those already identified - how the new 
chamber would reflect regional interests and link with the assemblies, whether the 
presence of ministers was necessary, and why it should be disinclined to accept cabinet 
directives. It then added such questions as how differing regional views might be 
resolved, who would guide its work, the scope and form of committees and scrutiny 
procedures and whether legislation could be amended, the size of the chamber and term 
served, whether members would be paid and have a constituency role.85 
84 Based on personal recollection and note of meeting on 21 sl May 1991. (This note records Baroness 
Llewellyn Davies saying that meetings had been held with Hattersley and Kinnock, but they had 
focused on the need for a constitutional commission rather than on details of the Policy Review 
proposals. ) 
85 PD 2894: Final Report of Labour Peers' Working Party on Electoral Systems. It concluded that 
"We cannot usefully study competing electoral systems until more specific proposals have been 
made by the PRG about the kind of chamber that is required, the scope of its duties and powers and 
the size and quality of its membership." 
The remit of the Working Party on Electoral Systems was concerned specifically with how it should 
be elected and did not extend to the functions and powers of the second chamber. It could only 
note these points, although PD2894 \vas circulated and would have been seen by the PRG 
convenors and relevant front bench spokesmen. 
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Although the relevant part of the Policy Review Report had clearly left some questions 
unresolved, there had been a definite change in policy, placing the second chamber at the 
heart of the party's democratic reforms. Nevertheless, it excited little interest when it was 
debated at the Party Conference in 1989, at which it was formally approved. However, in 
his speech from the platform, Hattersley made a bold claim for the new policy. 
"The only way to protect our freedom is to provide a constitutional change that 
makes the destruction of our basic rights impossible. For that reason, we propose 
to replace the House of Lords with an elected second chamber with a precise and 
specific constitutional role .. .It will be charged with the protection of liberties and 
it will possess the power to delay for the full life of Parliament any legislation 
which reduces personal freedom.,,86 
The claim, which may have owed something to Conference rhetoric, that it would make 
the destruction of basic rights "impossible" was, to say the least, questionable. There 
could be no absolute certainty that this new second chamber would block such legislation; 
and even if it did, it might be passed after an ensuing general election, depending on the 
result. This claim went beyond what had been said in the Report and again implied there 
could be absolute entrenchment. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
86 Conference Report 1989, p 120. 
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Further Work on Constitutional Reform 
The PRG then went on to concentrate on drawing up a Charter of Rights to be established 
by a Labour government. This was trailed in a speech by Hattersley in January 1990, in 
which he linked it with the proposed new second chamber "elected and designed to 
exercise specific powers", amongst which would be "the power to delay legislation -
which it considers would result in a reduction of individual rights - for the lifetime of a 
full parliament".87 This might seem to suggest that the second chamber would itself 
determine the legislation over which it would exercise its special powers, but it would 
actually have to be designated somehow.88 Although Hattersley referred to individual 
rights - the subject of the speech - the example he gave would have been significant for 
both individual and constitutional rights. 
"A government which, for example, proposed the repeal of the Freedom of 
Information Act would only be able to do so after it had faced a general election. 
Within our system that is the only way to entrench civil rights legislation".89 
The actual Charter of Rights, which was published later in the year, made no direct 
reference to the special powers proposed for the second chamber, but from earlier 
statements it could be inferred that, where these rights involved legislation, they would be 
likely candidates for the application of the "entrenching" provisions. The document 
proposed measures to establish rights relating to freedom of information, privacy, the 
security services, immigration, citizenship and asylum, equal opportunities, children, the 
criminal justice system, employment and assembly.9o 
87 Speech to Fabian Society Conference, Ruskin Hall, Oxford, 6th January 1990. 
88 Hattersley later said he envisaged that the Act establishing the new second chamber would lay 
down the criteria for designating legislation. A Commons committee might also playa role in 
certifying such legislation (Interview, May 1999). This was not spelt out at the time. 
89 Oxford speech (op cit). Note the specific reference again to entrenchment. 
90 The Charter of Rights: Guaranteeing Individual Liberty in a Free Society (The Labour Party, 
1990). Some of the measures listed in this document were a re-iteration of more detailed proposals 
from other policy statements. 
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Meanwhile, a paper for the PRG had drawn attention to other areas where further work 
might be needed. As far the second chamber was concerned, these included "the 
relationship between the second chamber and the regions", the electoral system for the 
second chamber and regional assemblies, and "how to entrench legislation on individual 
and constitutional rights". It noted that "events in Scotland mean there is some pressure 
for these questions to be clarified and resolved".91 In the event, these matters relating to 
the second chamber were not fully resolved by the time of the 1992 general election.92 
Although further steps were taken to clarify the position with regard to entrenchment, 
these were not altogether successful. Advice on this was sought from John Griffith (now 
Emeritus Professor of Law, University of London), but he told Alistair Darling (the 
frontbench spokesman on constitutional affairs) that he thought the Policy Review had 
conceived a "monster in embryo" and, while acknowledging there were means by which 
amendment or repeal of legislation might be made politically more difficult, concluded 
that he knew of "no way short of a completely new written constitution in which Bills can 
be entrenched". The dialogue was not pursued further. 93 
It may be that the Labour Party was pursuing a chimera in seeking an answer to the 
question of entrenchment. More than ten years previously a House of Lords Select 
Committee, considering the possible entrenchment of a Bill of Rights, had concluded: 
"There is no way in which a Bill of Rights could protect itself from encroachment, 
whether express or implied by later Acts".94 
91 PD 2371: Policy Review: A Note on Future Work (January 1990). The reference to pressure from 
Scotland would have related to the forthcoming Scottish Labour Party Conference and discussions 
in the Scottish Constitutional Convention. 
92 The Working Party on Electoral Systems, established in 1990, made an interim recommendation for 
the Scottish Parliament before the 1992 election; but its recommendations for other bodies, 
including the second chamber, for which it proposed a regional list system, were contained in its 
main report, published in 1993. 
93 Private correspondence (March 1990). 
94 House of Lords: Report of Select Committee on a Bill of Rights; Session 1977-78 (HL Paper 176, 
Para 20). 
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Labour was now talking about a Charter of Rights rather than a Bill - and about several 
items of legislation rather than one - but this conclusion would still seem to have been 
valid in that context.95 Indeed, despite his statements at the time, Hattersley himself later 
acknowledged that "you can't entrench anything in our constitution, all you could do is 
make it more difficult to reverse it".96 This was really what the proposals would have 
amounted to; but there may have been a temptation, for political reasons, to suggest 
otherwise at that time.97 
Thus, notwithstanding these reservations, the Labour Party's last comprehensive overall 
policy statement before the general election, Opportunity Britain, issued in 1991, re-
affirmed the policy on a new second chamber, and claimed that it would "effectively 
entrench" legislation dealing with individual or constitutional rights. 
"Our proposals for protecting individual freedom will be underpinned by the 
reform of government institutions. Our aim is to create a modern constitution. We 
shall therefore create a new elected second chamber, in place of the anachronism 
of the House of Lords. It will have the power to delay, for the lifetime of a 
Parliament, change to designated legislation dealing with individual or 
constitutional rights. 
"In this way we will effectively entrench our Charter of Rights and strengthen the 
position of the new Scottish Parliament and the assemblies in Wales and in the 
English Regions. Any government that seeks to follow the Conservative example 
by eroding peoples' rights will therefore have to present the issue to the people at a 
subsequent general election. The new second chamber will also be able to prevent 
a government delay a general election beyond the five year limit (sic). ,,98 
This statement made a direct link with the Charter of Rights and the powers of the second 
chamber, but linked these with legislation on both individual and constitutional rights 
more explicitly than either the 1989 Report or some of Hattersley's speeches had done. 
As, to some extent, a forerunner of the manifesto, it was by its very nature much briefer 
than the Policy Review Report.99 The omission of certain details would not necessarily 
indicate a change in policy. However, it is interesting that it made no reference to the 
presence or otherwise of ministers in the second chamber; and neither did a subsequent 
comprehensive briefing document for Parliamentary candidates. 100 
95 These discussions pre-dated the Human Rights Act 1998. 
96 Interview, May 1999. 
97 For instance, in relation to devolution, see p 160. 
98 Opportunity Britain - Labour's Better Way/or the 1990s (Labour Party, 1991) p 50. 
99 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit p 93) described it as "effectively a draft manifesto". 
100 Policy Briefing Handbook (Labour Party Policy Directorate). 
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This latter document (produced following discussions between frontbench spokesmen and 
party officials) included "questions and answers" on difficult or unresolved aspects of 
policy.lol The relevant section on constitutional reform attempted to elucidate some of the 
outstanding questions already identified. On how the procedures for safeguarding rights 
would work, it stated: 
"The new second chamber will have the opportunity to revise all legislation 
coming from the House of Commons. However, unlike the present situation, it 
will not have the power to delay legislation beyond a minimal period, with the 
exception of certain constitutional measures and legislation relating to fundamental 
individual rights. This would include legislation under Labour's charter of rights, 
and also that relating to the structure of local and regional government, the Scottish 
Parliament and the Parliament Act itself. Any subsequent measure to amend these 
would, of course, also be included. 
"Such Bills would be designated as constitutional measures; and the second 
chamber would be entitled to amend or reject them. Without the approval of the 
second chamber, any such legislation could not be enacted during the lifetime of 
the existing Parliament; it would have to be reintroduced after a general 
election" I 02 
The document was specific about the inclusion of constitutional measures, including local 
government and the Parliament Act itself. It also had more to say on how reform of the 
second chamber would be implemented: 
"Through a new Parliament Act. Our intentions will be stated in our election 
manifesto, so there can be no doubt about the Labour government's democratic 
mandate. We would hope that the House of Lords would not seek to block a 
democratic reform in that light. However, in the event of it so doing, we would be 
prepared to use the provisions of the existing Parliament Act to get it through.,,103 
The use of the existing Parliament Act in order to ensure enactment was not now 
questioned, as it had been previously. However, rather than abolition, the new policy 
involved replacement with additional safeguards for constitutional rights, which was 
something quite different. l04 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 1 Geoff Bish, who had some involvement in these discussions, together with the author and Alistair 
Darling, later recalled that "we asked lots of questions, because [they] would never get into details" 
(Interview). Darling, himself, had at the time expressed "serious doubts about the whole exercise", 
which he thought would give "a negative view of our proposals" (Letter to the author, 28 th June 
1990). 
102 Policy Briefing Handbook, Section 21.2. 
103 Ibid. 
104 The PRO's Working Party noted (7 th February 1989) that Lord Irvine would look at earlier opinions 
on whether the Parliament Act could be used as an instrument of reform, but there is no record of 
any further discussion. 
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On how the second chamber might reflect the interests and aspirations of the regions. the 
possibility of a different electoral system on a regional basis was mooted, but this \\'ouIJ 
be "for further consideration". Asking why it should be less likely to accept cabinet 
discussions and more inclined to safeguard rights, the response was that, since 
governments would not be formed on the basis of its composition, it would be at "greater 
distance from day-to-day government business and from whips using the prospect of 
patronage to encourage conformity". Moreover, it claimed, members elected to a chamber 
with a special constitutional role, "knowing they have been elected for that purpose, are 
likely to take such a duty seriously". 105 This sounds more like an expression of hope than 
a finn statement, but there could be no certainty on such matters. 
Although there was no reference to "entrenchment" in this particular section of the 
document on 'regional government and constitutional reform', the section dealing with 
Scotland asserted that "Labour is committed to the principle of entrenchment to protect the 
constitutional powers of the Scottish Parliament".106 As has been shown, the question of 
how and whether it was possible to give a commitment to entrenchment had not been 
satisfactorily resolved; but the context in which it re-appeared suggests that a major 
consideration in moving the Party in this direction was the perceived need to give the 
firmest possible commitment to the Scottish Parliament, in order to suggest that its 
establishment could not easily be reversed. 107 Indeed Hattersley subsequently confirmed 
that wishing to be seen to appear to entrench devolution was then an important factor. 108 
Those involved were aware that certain questions still remained to be fully answered. 
However, beyond the clarifications noted above, there would be no attempt to develop the 
policy further before the general election. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
105 Policy Briefing Handbook, Section 21.2. 
106 Ibid, Section 32.1. 
107 The draft of the constitutional reform section would have been prepared in London and that of the 
Scottish section in Scotland. Butler and Kavanagh (op cit, pp 72-73) observed how "Scottish 
politics ... were different because of the constitutional question". 
108 Interview, May 1999. 
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Proposals from Other Sources 
While new Party policy was being developed through official channels, others in 
Parliament also put forward proposals of their own, although none progressed very far. For 
instance, in the Lords in December 1988, the then Labour peer, Lord Stoddart of Swindon 
put forward a proposal to restrict peers' voting rights there to those who met a minimum 
33 per cent attendance requirement. This proposal would seem to have been aimed at 
tackling the "backwoodsmen" who had affected the outcome of some important divisions, 
but would have left the House otherwise undisturbed. 109 In the Commons, meanwhi Ie, 
Graham Allen (subsequently a frontbench spokesman on constitutional matters) presented 
two Bills in successive sessions to abolish the House of Lords as presently composed and 
replace it with a directly elected membership.llo Later, Tony Benn presented a 
'Commonwealth of Britain Bill', containing a whole range of proposals for constitutional 
reform, including ending the constitutional role of the crown and abolition of the House of 
Lords. The latter would be replaced by a 'House of People', comprising equal numbers of 
men and women, elected for fixed four-year terms to represent England, Scotland and 
Wales in proportion to their populations, which would have a limited legislative role and 
could be overridden by the House of Commons. I II 
An outside organisation with strong, though informal links with the Labour Party was the 
Institute for Public Policy Research. This "think tank" published proposals for a new 
constitution in 1991, which included a new second chamber with equal powers with the 
Commons on constitutional and rights issues, whose members would be elected by Single 
Transferable Vote for four-year terms, half at a time. I 12 There were close connections 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
109 House of Lords Debates, 8th December 1988 (Vol 602, Cols 719-751). A similar proposal had been 
included in the Labour government's 1968 White Paper. 
110 House o/Commons Debates, 18th October 1989 (Vol 158, Col 144); 17th December 1990 (Vol 183, 
Col 20). 
111 Ibid, 28 th June 1991 (Vol 191, Col 665). Under Benn's proposals, legislation rejected by the 'House 
of People' could be enacted after one year, while amendments could be overturned by the 
Commons. Delegated legislation could be delayed for one month. Benn would introduce an 
identical Bill in the next Parliament, which again made no progress. 
112 IPPR: Constitution (1991). This covered a wide range of constitutional reforms including a House 
of Commons elected by the Additional Member System. The same organisation followed this up 
with a more detailed paper. Reforming the Lords by Jeremy Mitchell and Anne Davies (1993). with 
some slightly different f'''C:S.4 's. 
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between certain key figures at IPPR and those involved in policy work and presentation 
for the Labour Party. However, while there were certain similarities, the document only 
appeared after Labour's policy had been established. I 13 
In view of the nature of Labour's new policy, it should be noted here that the Liberal 
Democrats and their predecessors (the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) had 
at various times proposed a reformed chamber, partially or wholly elected, with 
representation linked with the regions, including in 1987 and again in 1990. 114 There was 
now a degree of common ground between the approach of the two parties. In the general 
election campaign, there would be some speculation about possible deals, particularly 
following an apparent suggestion by Kinnock that an invitation would be extended to the 
Liberal Democrats to become involved in the Working Party on Electoral Systems. I 15 
The 1992 Manifesto 
As was to be expected following the policy review, Labour's 1992 manifesto included a 
major section on constitutional reform. This included devolution, ending the misuse of the 
Royal Prerogative, improving procedures and facilities of the House of Commons, and 
reform of the second chamber. On the latter, it stated: 
"Further constitutional reforms will include those leading to replacement of the 
House of Lords with a new second chamber, which will have the power to delay 
for the lifetime of a Parliament, chan~e to designated legislation reducing 
individual or constitutional rightS.,,11 
However, unlike other aspects of constitutional reform, such as devolution itself and 
electoral reform, which proved a matter of controversy and contention, the proposals for 
the second chamber did not feature significantly in the campaign. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the Prime Minister, John Major, did not really pick up on this quite radical reform at the 
time, despite otherwise highlighting themes on preservation of the United Kingdom and 
the electoral sytem. 117 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
113 IPPR had been established in 1989. James Com ford, its director, was also involved in the working 
party on constitutional issues noted earlier, while its deputy director, Patricia Hewitt iwas involved 
in the Shadow Communications Agency, preparing for the election campaign. 
114 See Chapter 9. 
115 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 128. . 
116 II's Time to get Britain Working Again: Labour's election manifesto, 1992 (Dale, op CIt, p 339). 
117 Butler & Kavanagh (op cit) p 130. The issue hardly rates a mention in their study of the campaign. 
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By the beginning of the 1990s, the Labour Party had come to adopt a significantly 
different approach to the question of a second chamber from that of a decade earlier. The 
main driving force in this had been the Parliamentary leadership; and the changed policy 
had gone through with little dissent. The Party's earlier policy had grO\\TI out of 
frustration in government, which led it to support abolition or, at least a major reduction in 
the power of the second chamber; and this continued during its first period in opposition, 
with the principal concern being to prevent the second chamber from blocking the 
programme of a Labour government. However, after a decade of frustration in opposition, 
while still seeking the abolition of the House of Lords as such, the Party now saw the 
second chamber as having a central role in safeguarding some of the key reforms it wished 
to enact. Certain aspects had not been fully worked out; and the Party's enthusiasm to 
present its proposals for Scottish devolution, especially, in the strongest possible light, 
perhaps led some to succumb to the temptation to overstate the nature of the safeguards 
which this new second chamber would provide. It did, though, provide a clear instance in 
which Labour's Policy Review resulted in a fundamental change in policy. 
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7. THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE CONSERVATIVES 1970 79 
This Chapter turns its attention to the Conservatives, who, in the mid-1970s, 
established a Committee which responded to Labour's support for abolition with 
some quite radical proposals of its own. However, this did not necessarily mean 
that they would be implemented; and, as the following Chapter will show, the 
Conservatives' subsequent period in office would be marked by an increasing 
disinclination to act at all. 
The Heath Government 1970 - 74 
Although the Lords had occasionally flexed their muscles in the 1960s, the 
outcome of the 1970 general election meant that the potential for further conflict 
between Lords and Commons "was postponed as a result of the Conservative 
election victory". 1 The Labour government had recently failed in its efforts to 
legislate for reform of the Lords, suffering political embarrassment in the process; 
but differences had also emerged amongst Conservatives, who had made no 
mention of Lords reform in their election manifesto. It was, therefore, unlikely 
that Edward Heath's new government would wish to embark on further reform.2 
This was confirmed in a Commons reply by a Home Office minister who, when 
asked what plans the government had to modernise the Lords, replied bluntly 
"none"} 
Shell: The House of Lords, p 23. 
2 Lord Carrington, a member of Heath's Cabinet and both a fonner and future Conservative 
leader in the House of Lords, recalled that, after 1968, the Conservative Party decided 
that rcfonn was not worth the candle (Interview. April 1999). Heath's apparent lack of 
interest in the 1960s has already been noted (see p 34). 
3 Mark Carlisle (Parliamentary Under Secretary, Home Office), House of Commons 
Debates, 18th November 1970 (Vol 806, Col 442). 
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According to the Conservative-leaning political commentator, Ronald Butt, most 
Conservatives either thought it not an important problem to spend time on, or 
that it would undermine the constitution to do more than tinker. Having criticised 
Labour for inaction - a somewhat curious stance in view of the previous 
government's efforts - he argued that the Conservatives should act, preferably 
with, but if necessary, without all-party agreement.4 
As it was, the 1970-74 Parliament saw just a few mmor changes in procedures 
affecting the Lords, but no major attempt at reform. A modest and rather 
half-hearted proposal by Conservative backbencher Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams to 
limit the voting rights of hereditary peers came to nothing; and indeed the MP 
himself acknowledged that he was "not seeking to initiate a campaign".5 Another 
development was the publication of the Kilbrandon Report on the constitution; 
but this did not support a direct link between regional government and the second 
chamber (although a Memorandum of Dissent by two members did) and it would 
seem not to have affected the government's approach to the second chamber.6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 'Lords in Modern Dress' (The Times, 5th November 1970). He proposed a chamber 
comprising members elected regionally (either indirectly or directly, possibly by 
proportional representation) who might be supplemented by a nominated element. It 
should have delaying powers of six months or a year, but in respect of constitutional 
legislation, "more far reaching powers of delay, possibly covering the entire length of a 
Parliament". Both the report of the Committee chaired by Lord Home, as detailed later 
in this Chapter, and Labour's 'Policy Review' proposals some twenty years later (see 
Chapter 6) would echo some of these. 
S House of Commons Debates 27th April 1971 (Vol 816, Cols 259-6). 
6 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (Cmnd 5560) 1973. Principally 
concemed with regional government, the Commission concluded that it would be "neither 
practical nor desirable" for a change in the structure of Parliament to give effect to 
regional policy to take the form of a change in the House of Lords. It would be 
"irrational" to introduce "a novel geographic factor into the House of Lords" (Para 1073). 
It specifically rejected the notion of replacing the House of Lords with a chamber similar 
to the West German Bundsrat (Para 858). However, a Memorandum of Dissent by I . .ord 
Crowther Hunt and Professor Alan Peacock included proposals for linking devolution with 
changes to the House of Lords. This suggested adding ]50 members from the proposed 
Scottish, Welsh and several English Assemblies, reflecting the Party balance in each, but 
added this would be "by no means essential" to the suc-eessful operation of the devolution 
scheme" (Para 297-307). 
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However, it has been suggested that the failure of Labour's proposed reforms _ as 
a result of opposition in the Commons rather than Lords - did affect the 
behaviour of the Lords themselves; and that "throughout the 1970s, the House 
became noticeably more assertive".? An unnamed Labour peer has been quoted as 
saymg: 
"The failure of the [ 1968 reform] proposals had the effect of freeing us 
from the lethargy that had encumbered and inhibited us for so long. From 
this point we were determined not to pussy-foot about any longer but 
instead to get on with the job in hand".8 
According to Donald Shell, there was now a "markedly different" relationship 
between the Heath government and the Lords, who were "a great deal less 
submissive" than they had been to its Conservative predecessors.9 This government 
was, indeed, defeated on 26 occasions during its period of nearly four years in 
office. However this pales into insignificance when compared with the 350 defeats 
suffered by its Labour successor; and Shell himself acknowledges that, while 
Labour flexed its muscles, for instance forcing 138 divisions on the controversial 
Industrial Relations Bill during its passage in 1971, "the government won every 
one of these divisions and made few concessions".10 
It would seem that this new "assertiveness" had yet to manifest itself fully - an 
impression which is strengthened by the handling of another major piece of 
legislation - the 1972 European Communities Bill. As Janet Morgan noted, "the 
Bill was brief and incomplete" and reached the Lords "very late in the 1971-72 
session." Nevertheless, "in their anxiety to pass the Bill into law, the government 
7 Shell, in The House of Lords at Work (p 11). 
8 Quoted by Nicholas Baldwin in The Contemporary House of Lords' (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Exeter, 1985). 
9 The House of Lords, pp 23-24. Shell also observes that Labour peers were three times 
more numerous in the 1970s than in the early 1960s, that the numbers of crossbenchers 
had grown, and that the Conservatives did not have an overall majority there. (They were, 
nevertheless, much the largest party.) 
10 Ibid (p 24). Shell suggests that. when defeats occurred. the government usuallv but not 
always gave ground: and notes that, for instance, the Lords successfully insisted on 
amendments to the 1971 Immigration Bill. There was also some conflict between the 
two Houses on the 1972 National Health St'rvices Bill. when the Lords voted in favour 01 
flel' contraception ~l'rvices, but gave way when the t 'ommons asserted financial privilege. 
!\. ICltel Consen'ative Pal1y Research Department paper noted this as the only legislation 
Oil \\ hich there was "serious disagreement between Lords and Commons" (PG 400/77;10). 
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had allowed no time for amendments, even on a drafting point". She observed 
that even many of those supporting entry to the European Community were 
concerned at omissions covering critical areas such as Parliamentary scrutiny, but 
that the government was adamant, "as much towards its own supporters as towards 
the Opposition", since to yield a single Lords' amendment, however reasonable, 
would mean returning the Bill to the Commons and thus delaying enactment. 
Accordingly, Conservative peers were asked not to support or propose 
amendments and, although it may have caused some strain, the exercise was 
successful as far as the government was concerned.l1 The Bill, which was of major 
constitutional significance, and which had been passed only narrowly by the 
Commons, went through the Lords unamended.12 
An amendment had been moved at Third Reading by Lord Shackleton, from the 
Opposition front bench, which: 
"deplores the insistence of Her Majesty's Government that this Bill 
should pass unamended through all stages irrespective of the merits of 
the amendments proposed and deprecates the reliance of Her Majesty's 
Government upon their built in majority in this House to achieve their 
purpose". 
Unsurprisingly this was defeated.13 llowever, the Labour Party would be able to 
cite this episode later, in order to contrast it with the Lords' treatment of the 
Labour government's legislation.14 It certainly gave ammunition to critics of the 
House of Lords, by suggesting that it was not always effective as a revising 
chamber and thus weakening the case of those who might seek to defend it on 
that basis. 
11 IDe House of Lords and the Labour Government 1964-70 (Epilogue, pp 233-4). Lord 
Denham, then Deputy Chief Whip. subsequently recalled "the intense pressure put on 
Conservative peers to prevent any amendments being made", which he felt had "a 
devastating effect on the morale of peers" (Shell, op cit, p 95). 
12 Edward Heath's biographer observed that "passage through the Lords was a formality" 
(Campbell, op cit. p 441). 
U House of wrds Debates, 20th Septenber 1972 (Vol 335. Col 270). The amendment was 
ddeated by 100 votes. The Bill \\a~ then given a Third Reading by a majority of 140 
(Ibid. Col 1272). 
14 111(' Macbinen of Government and the /louse of Lords. p 2. 
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The Conservatives in Opposition 
While the greater assertiveness of the House of Lords referred to above may not 
have been fully apparent during the period of the Heath government. it certainly 
became so under the Labour government which followed. Between March and 
October 1974, this was, of course, a minority government and, following the 
second general election of that year, it had a majority only in single figures which 
was eventually eroded.15 The Conservative peer, Lord Bethell, shortly after the 
first general election, suggested that his colleagues were "unlikely to go looking for 
head-on conflict", warning that "uppity behaviour brings abolition a step nearer", 
although he added that nobody denied the Lords the right to suggest amendments 
and that "in the new situation, this weapon could prove extremely powerful".16 In 
the event, as has been noted earlier, the Conservatives pressed divisions on large 
numbers of amendments, defeating the government over 350 times between 1974 
and 1979, with the Lords most notably forcing delay and compromise over 
legislation on trade union and labour relations, dockwork regulation, and aircraft 
and shipbuilding, such that they were accused of breaching the Salisbury doctrine 
by their ac!ions.17 
Some individuals argued that the Lords were, even so, too willing to accept the 
notion that the Lords should acquiesce in measures that had been in the 
government's manifesto, and that the Salisbury convention should no longer 
apply. 18 On the whole, however, the Conservative leadership in the Lords, while 
clearly prepared to act against key parts of the Labour government's legislation, 
was nevertheless concerned to justify its actions and argue that it did not breach 
precedent and conventions. 
---------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------
15 See ('haptcr 2. 
16 'What if the Lords stand up to be counted?'. The Times, 12th March 1974. 
17 SCt.' Chapter 2. 
18 Sec David Wood, political cditor of The limes ('The Lords should stand and fIght". 21st 
Octoht.'f 1975), referring particularly to the Trade Union and Labour RelatIOns Bill. 
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At this point, it should be noted that, although there was a change in the 
leadership of the ConselVative Party, when Margaret Thatcher replaced Edward 
Heath in February 1975, its approach in the House of Lords does not seem to 
have been directly affected. The key participants there remained largely 
unchanged - for instance, Lord Carrington selVed as leader of the opposition 
peers throughout from 1974 to 1979.19 Reflecting later on this period, Carrington 
said the problem then was a familiar one: "when and whether to defeat the 
government and yet be regarded as acting responsibly". Although he admitted 
that on the aircraft and shipbuilding legislation, "we let ourselves go", he argued 
that: 
"We had a good cross section of peers with us, and could not he seen as 
pursuing a purely factional interest, but as seeking to stop government 
improperly railroading a Bill through Parliament, without proper process 
or discussion".20 
This was not how the Labour government saw things;21 and Shadow Cabinet 
minutes tend to support the contention that the ConselVatives were engaged in a 
partisan political tight in the Lords. At the height of the controversy in 1976, they 
record, in respect of Lords' business: 
"We should fight the present contentious legislation as long as possible and 
should endeavour to deny the government time in which to obtain all their 
Bills before 17th November. "22 
Michael Fallon, who was then an official in the Opposition Whips' office, recalled 
that "there was a bit of nelVousness in front bench meetings in the Lords" and 
19 Lord Denham took over as Chief Whip from Earl St Aldwyn in 1978 (having previously 
been his deputy), but this was after the main period of confrontation between the 
government and the Lords. 
20 Ret7ect on Things Past, p 279. 
21 The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, claimed that the legislation had been considered 
for no less than 256 hours (House of Commons Debates, 9th November 1976, Vol 919, 
Col 211). 
22 Conservative Party Archives: Lee 76/133 13th October 1976. (The date referred to was 
the anticipated end of the Parliamentary session.) 
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that, in particular, Carrington and Hailsham were nervous about the Salisbury 
doctrine, fearing that such actions might provoke Labour to support abolition~ but 
that some "younger bloods" were prepared to be rough.23 
Some memones of episodes such as this do, however, seem to be rather 
unreliable. Viscount Cranbome's subsequent claim that the Lords had "never 
blocked the will of the House of Commons under a Labour government" has 
already been noted;24 and Lord Hailsham even asserted - quite inaccurately - in 
his memoirs that "there have been more defeats of Conservative governments in 
the House of Lords than under any Labour administration".25 However, whether 
or not the Conservative peers may have regarded their actions over this period as 
reasonable, there is no doubt that, as shown earlier, they caused considerable 
resentment in the Labour Party and were an important factor in reviving interest 
there in policies to reform or abolish the House of Lords.26 
There were also signs of revived interest in Lords' reform in Conservative circles, 
as shown, for instance, in the pages of The Spectator. Not everyone shared the 
views of the right-wing political commentator, Patrick Cosgrave. that "we would be 
better advised to leave things exactly as they are and congratulate ourselves on 
getting so useful an institution on the cheap".27 One Conservative MP who did 
not then favour the status quo was the future Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Norman Lamont. Responding to suggestions that Mrs Thatcher should revive 
23 Interview, February 2000. FalJon (later to become a Conservative MP) also recalled Chris 
Patten, then head of the Conservative Research Department, suggesting to him: "You're 
not overdoing it there are you?", to which he observed: "I was stoking the fires at this end 
you know - that was my job". 
24 See p 53. 
25 1\ Sparrow:" Right (C-allins, 1990) p 250. Hailsham was attempting to support his 
contention that "contrary to the false legend sedulously promuJagated from the Labour 
leadership. the House of Lords has no built-in Conservative majority". See Appendix 1. 
Table 7 for further statistics on government defeats. 
26 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
27 'I he Peers in Practice', The Spectator. 22nd November 1975 (Vol 235, P 6.".t). CosgraVl' 
was an adviser to Margaret rhatcher 1975-79. 
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hereditary peerages, he argued "that would be a step into the 19th century .... which 
would achieve nothing, except for a considerable amount of ridicule"; and he 
continued: 
"Far from reviving ancient practices like hereditary peerages, the next Torv 
government should limit or abolish the hereditary element in the Lords -
with a view to radically reforming that institution (sic) and creating the 
effective second chamber we need so badly .... What is needed is an Upper 
House which can be an effective guardian of the citizens' liberties. The 
Upper House should also be able to slow down the speed with which the 
Commons churns manifestos into laws." 
The best way to do this, he asserted, would be through a second chamber "with 
real powers of veto, which was either wholly or partially elected". This should be 
hy a different system and at a different time than for the House of Commons; and 
he proposed proportional representation for electing the Upper House, plus a 
fixed term for the House of Commons.28 
It is interesting to note Lamont's views, since, although not necessarily influential 
at the time, he went on to serve in Conservative governments which would revive 
hereditary peerages (albeit on a limited scale) and support the status quo for the 
House of Lords.29 Paradoxically, several of his proposals would subsequently 
become Labour Party policy at one time or another - including ending the 
hereditary element, an elected second chamber using proportional representation 
(PR) and fIXed-term Parliaments.30 
Another Conservative commentator arguing for reform was one who had himself 
renounced his peerage, John Grigg. He found the House of Lords to be a second 
rate chamber, and clearly did not share the view noted earlier that life peerages 
had averted "growing atrophy", since he suggested that the Life Peerages Act had 
2H 'Reforming the Lords', The Spectator, 27th March 1976 (Vol 236, p17), 
29 See Chapter 8. 
30 See, for instance, Chapters 6 and 10. 
- 172 -
"done more than anything to give the House of Lords the character of a geriatric 
institution". He wanted to see what he regarded as a proper second chamber _ 
partly elected by PR and partly appointed.31 At the height of the controversy over 
the aircraft and shipbuilding legislation, Grigg argued that the Lords should allow 
the passage of controversial legislation and refrain from using its "power to 
override the popularly elected chamber, even though to do so might be popular."32 
Clearly some Conservatives, at least, were unhappy with the prospect of an 
unelected chamber blocking the wishes of the elected House, even if they agreed 
with it on the matter in question. This led them to consider the attraction of a 
more democratic second chamber, which would have a more legitimate basis on 
which to challenge the actions of the Commons. Significantly, these appeared to 
include Lord Carrington. Speaking at the Conservative Party Conference in 
October] 976, he described how "unpaid amateurs, rather old, we sit until one or 
two in the mornIng, trying to do our job .... yet we are hamstrung by our 
composition and lack of real power". Emphasising that he was speaking for 
himself, he added: 
"Has not the time come when there should be a reformed House of Lords 
given real power to curb the excesses of the executive abusing its position 
and with no safeguard for checking it? A hereditary and nominated 
chamber will not be given that power, for its unrepresentative composition 
enables the government to misrepresent its actions. The Labour 
government want a weak chamber; the present chamber suits them well". 
He went on to suggest that members of the European Parliament should serve in 
a reformed second chamber, along with members elected under whatever form of 
devolution arose.33 
31 The Spectator, 26th June 1976 (Vol 236, P 4). Fonnerly Lord AJtrincham, GriU had 
disclaimed his peerage in 1963. (Earlier quotation from She)] - see p 2). 
32 Ibid, 13th November 1976 (Vol. 237. P 4) . 
. 13 Reported in Ine Timc:'s. 8th October 1976. The suggested link with devolution is 
IIltercsting, since the Conservatives opposed the Labour government's proposals; indeed, 
Carnngton was speaking on a motion to reject them. Howevcr. the Liberal Party had 
stwWI1 an interest in Iinklll,!.? membership of thl' second chamber With that of dt'voht.'d 
asscmbht.'s and the Fuwpt>an Parliament (Sl>C Chapter 9). 
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Carrington seems to have been the first top-level Conservative to raIse seriouslv 
the question of Lords reform since the debacle of 1968/69. It was known at the 
time that the Labour Party would be looking at it, since its Conference had just 
endorsed the 1976 Programme saying the House of Lords should not continue in 
its present form.34 However, even though he was addressing the Party 
Conference, Carrington claimed to be speaking for himself, and has subsequently 
denied that he was flying any sort of authorised kite.35 
Shortly afteIWards, however, another semor Conservative peer, Lord Hailsham, 
raised the issue in the widely reported Richard Dimbleby Lecture. in which he 
complained about an "elective dictatorship". He argued that the powers of 
Parliament were unlimited: 
"in this we are almost alone .... we have an elective dictatorship, absolute in 
theory, if hitherto thought tolerable in practice". 
He complained that "government controls Parliament, not Parliament the 
government". Moreover, "power has centralised itself more and more in the 
Commons .... the sovereignty of Parliament has virtually become the sovereignty of 
the House of Commons". The Lords played a useful role, but "it is not an 
effective balancing factor and cannot in practice control the advancing power of 
the cxecutive".36 
34 See p 63. 
35 Interview, April 1999. He also denied acting in co-operation with Hailsham, who would 
also raise the issue. 
36 Published in The Listener, 21st October 1976 (Vol 94, pp 496-5(0). 
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Hailsham observed that the second chamber had been said to be either 
objectionable or unnecessary - objectionable if it endorsed the decision of the first 
and unnecessary if it did not; but he disagreed with this. A single chamber, by 
whatever means it was elected, could not be "wholly representative for all 
purposes". He continued: 
"What is obvious to me is that, useful and distinguished as the present 
House of Lords is, nothing can be done to modify its present composition 
in that direction. In the long run it will be a question of abolition or 
replacement. Until then it is better to leave it alone. But when the time 
comes I shall be for replacement".37 
Hailsham's long tenn solution was for a written constitution, which would include 
a second chamber representing the regions and elected by a form of PR: but he 
envisaged this in "a number of years rather than months".J8 A second chamber 
along these lines would subsequently become Labour Party policy, if not 
Conservative policy. By that time, however, Hailsham would have changed his 
mind, although Carrington would continue to favour reform.J9 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. His long term proposals also embraced a Commons elected by single member 
constituencies, a Bill of Rights and limitation of powers. He envisaged a constitutional 
convention before legislation and a referendum afterwards. 
39 See Chapters 6, 8 and to. 
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Conservative Review Committee 
Clearly, in the mid-1970s, reform of the House of Lords was on the agenda, at 
least as far as some senior ConselVatives were concerned; and in early 1977 an 
official committee was established by the Party. Yet, surprisingly, neither 
Hailsham nor Carrington were members. The Chairman of the Conservati\e 
Review Committee was the former Prime Minister, Lord Home of the Hirsel, who. 
having renounced his hereditary peerage was now back in the House of Lords as a 
life peer. The committee included five peers - apart from Home, there were two 
hereditary peers (Lord Mancroft, who was the committee's Vice-Chairman, and 
Lord O'Hagan) and two life peers (Lord Blake, the historian, and Baroness 
Young, a future Leader of the Lords) - and four MPs (Kenneth Baker, Jim Lester, 
Neil Marten and Sir Derek Walker-Smith) among its ten members.40 
Although the Committee was appointed by the Party Leader, the membership 
does not seem to have been especially Thatcherite. According to Michael Fallon, 
who was Secretary to the Committee, it was chosen "very carefully" to reflect 
strands of opinion both in the Lords and the Commons. He recalled that the 
hereditary peers were anxious to secure representation, because they suspected a 
"plot" by Carrington, who himself wanted to ensure representation of "the 
modernisers". Also, those for and against proportional representation wanted to 
ensure their voices were heard.41 Clearly a balancing act was involved. It was 
certainly considerably smaller than Labour's Study Group then looking at the 
issue, although it did have a much narrower remit.42 
40 The other member was Nevil Johnson (Nuffield College, Oxford). The Secretaries were 
James Douglas and Michael Fallon. (Membership listed in the Committee's report - The 
House of Lords: The Report of the ConselVative Review Committee, Conservative Central 
Office 1978.) 
41 Interview with Fallon (February 20(0). This suggests that, although not himself a member 
of the Commjttee. Carringt.on may have had some influence .over the composition . 
.t~ The Committee's report stated that it was appointed by Mrs Thatcher in January 1977 to 
consider the future of the House of Lords (op cit. p 2). Home observed at its first meetmg 
that it had no fonnal tenns .of refer('nce (Committee Minutes. 22nd February 1977). 
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The timing, In the same month as the report of Labour's Study Group was 
approved, may have been significant. As The Times reported: 
"ConseIVative thinking is that the Opposition must be prepared with an 
answer if the Labour Party commits itself at this year's Conference to the 
abolition of the Upper Chamber on the basis of the National Executive 
Committee's report".43 
This would later be acknowledged by Home In his introduction to the Report 
itself: 
"The issue was to some extent forced by the apparent intention of the 
Labour Party to commit itself to government through a single House of 
Parliament.. . .in such a situation, we do not believe that the Conservative 
Party can do nothing".44 
As might have been expected, the first meeting of the Committee in February 
1977 ranged over various options, including election, nomination and group 
representation. Home appeared to be cautious about radical reform, saying that 
he felt the argument against two elected chambers to be a powerful one and 
pointing to difficulties in abolishing hereditary peers in one gO.45 On the other 
hand, the future Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, showed much greater 
enthusiasm for radical reform. He argued that a House based on the hereditary 
principle was fragile, pointed to the arguments against appointment involving 
patronage (which had been used against the 1968/69 proposals) and questioned 
who would decide on groups which might be represented. He did, however, think 
a part-ejected / part- appointed chamber might be possible.46 
43 The Times, 2nd February 1977. 
44 Committee Report, p 4. Baroness Young confirmed that it was established at least in part 
in response to Labour's report (Interview, July 1997). 
45 Committee Minutes. 22nd February 1977. Back in 1969, Home had argued the case for 
reform in supporting the Labour government's Bil1 (see p 42). 
46 Ibid. Interestingly, Baker observed that "it was a mistake to think that unicameralism was 
linked to the Labour Party"; and that "some of his colleagues were quite attracted to the 
idea of a unicameral legislature". He wanted to see the case put for bicameralism. 
There would, however. seem to be little evidence of support for unicameralism in the 
C.-anservarive Party at that time: and Fallon did not know who such supporters might have 
been (Interview). Baker also appears to have been under a misapprehension that the 
Labour government would seek to reduce the Lords' powers, but leave composition 
unchanged. Fallon, tm). had thought it was planning a Bill to that effect. However. 
although this was disnJssed in Labour's Study Group, th~rl' is no evidence that the 
governncnt had an\' finn plans (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
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The Committee's second meeting indicated broad agreement on the role of the 
second chamber, which should be: to revise Public Bills; to act as a debating 
chamber to complement the Commons; to initiate Bills for which there was no 
time in the Commons; to scrutinise subordinate legislation; and to act as a 
constitutional safeguard against abuse of power by the Commons - "this was, of 
course, the most important of the powers of the Upper House". (Mancroft put it 
more colourfully that the Lords' primary role was "to stop the House of Commons 
going mad".) It was said that people were beginning to hanker after some form of 
constitutional protection, particularly with governments elected by a minority of 
the electorate pursuing radical proposals that had little support. Possible forms 
such protection or entrenchment might take were discussed, including a special 
Commons procedure for constitutional Bills, requirements for a special Commons 
majority or powers to require a referendum in certain cases, or a constitutional 
court.47 
No doubt, at this time, members of the Committee had a Labour government in 
mind when looking to possible constitutional safeguards. I t is interesting to note 
that, in the following decade, the Labour Party would consider reforming the 
second chamber to provide a similar form of constitutional safeguard - at least 
partly in response to a Conservative government pursuing radical and controversial 
polices.48 The perspective when in opposition can, of course, be different from 
that when in office. 
A position paper from Home in April said it was agreed that the Committee 
should consider composition before powers; and that the proposed pattern of the 
reformed House had hegun to gell on the following lines: 100 hereditaries elected 
from their own number; 100 appointed (by the Prime Minister or party leaders, 
assisted by a committee of Privy Counsellors); 200 elected from the regJOns 
(probably by PR); plus Privy Counsellors from the existing House retained ex 
officio.49 
·n Committee Minutc~. 3rd March 1977. 
·tS Set' Chapter o. 
49 PC 400/77/6. April 1977. 
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However, Home was not present when the Committee considered his paper. In 
that discussion "it transpired that the idea of hereditary peers electing from 
amongst themselves a number of representatives did not commend itself to the 
Committee", which thought it would be difficult to justify any system in which 
heredity was a sufficient qualification. It was assumed, however, that the 
appointed element would include a number of hereditary peers, as well as 
appointed members, bishops (and possibly other church leaders), law lords and 
"non political men and women of distinction" in other walks of life. There was no 
agreement on exactly how the appointments should be made, although there was 
"relatively little support for appointment by a Committee of the Privy Council", but 
a limit on numbers was thought desirable. There was also general agreement that 
the elected element should be seen to account for at least 50 per cent of the total 
(although Baker suggested two-thirds); and further, that PR would be likely to 
prevent one-party domination and that a proportion should be elected at a time.50 
Thus, comparatively early in its deliberations, in April ] 977, the Committee was 
supporting the notion of a reformed chamber with a substantial elected element. 
The following month, after further discussion on the pros and cons of various 
options, it was affirmed that most of the Committee seemed to favour the 
part-elected / part-nominated option, although it was acknowledged that this might 
lead to a wholly elected chamber.51 
Having already reached a measure of agreement on the role of the second 
chamher, the Committee went on to consider in some detail concerned the ways 
by which possible disagreements between Lords and Commons might be resolved. 
A paper by one of its members, Nevil Johnson, suggested provision should he 
made for the establishment of a Mediation Committee at the request of either 
50 Committl'c Minutes, 21st April 1977. It is interesting that this Committee came down 
against the proposition that hereditary peers elect 100 members from amongst themselws. 
since an arrangement along these lines would fonn part of the Labour govemment's 
\'ompromise interim arrangement in 1999 (see Chapter 10) 
.5] ('onnnlttl'c Minutes, 17th May ]977. (Neither Home nor Baker \"'ne present at this 
mCl,ting.) Tht' elected chamber option was rdared to in the paper before the Committl'l' 
from hl11l'~ Douglas as thc "Carrington Scheme" (PG·WO/77 I !3) Carrington had shortly 
hdofl' glVl'!1 l'vidl'Il11' to tht· Commttee (see p 180), 
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House, if the Commons could not accept Lords amendments. This could 
comprise seven members nominated by each House and would make proposals for 
resolution, voting as a single body. If the mediated proposals were then accepted 
by the Commons but not the Lords, the Commons should be able to pass them 
into law over the Lords' objections. If they were accepted by the Lords but not 
the Commons (or if no proposals were agreed by the Mediation Commitee), the 
matter could be resolved by the use of the Parliament Act procedure. There 
might be a requirement for a "re-inforced majority" (possibly 60 per cent of the 
membership) in the Commons.52 
This was first discussed in March and again in July. Amongst the points raised 
was whether a distinction should be made between constitutional and other Bills, 
although no finn decision seems to have been reached. Baker initially argued that 
the whole question could not be divorced from that of composition - if there was a 
strong Labour majority in the Commons and a Conservative majority in the Lords, 
the proposed Mediation Committee might get nowhere. Subsequently, he 
proposed a 'Committee of Reconciliation', to meet after amendments had been 
rejected. If agreement could not be reached, then existing arrangements should 
apply for most Bills, but he envisaged a special threshold for constitutional 
measures, certified as such by the Speaker and defined by statute.53 In the event, 
the Committee's Report would suggest a Mediation Committee broadly along the 
lines proposed by Johnson .54 
52 P<; 400/77/4 : Memorandum on methods of resolving disagreement between the two 
Houses of Parliament. 
53 CommIttee Minutes, 31st March 1977, 19th July 1977; PG 400/7720: A Committee of 
Reconciliation (July 1977). Baker suggested the threshold could be either a two-thirds 
majority or 60 per cent of total Commons membership; and that constitutional measures 
could comprise those relating to the powers and existence of the monarchy, the powers 
and existence of the House of Lords, those affecting the sovereignty of Parliament or 
changing the voting system. However, Johnson thought this definition unsatisfactory. 
54 See p 191. 
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During the course of its deliberations, the Committee invited a number of 
prominent individuals to address it. Foremost amongst the supporters of an 
elected chamber was Lord Carrington, who told the Committee in May that "he 
believed that only a wholly elected second chamber could be credible as an 
effective check on government supported by a popularly elected Commons." 
Otherwise the Commons would always have greater legitimacy. The second 
chamber should be elected by a different system, namely PRo Generally, he 
thought existing powers under the 1911 Act would be sufficient, but it should also 
have the power to order a referendum before certain measures affecting 
"constitutional or fundamental human rights." As an elected chamber, it would 
not suffer from the same inhibitions as the present House in challenging the 
Commons.55 
In response to questioning, Carrington thought "there was little to be achieved by 
relatively minor tinkering with the powers or composition". When the possibility 
of a partially elected chamber was raised, he emphasised that, if the principle of 
election was diluted, it would not be able to challenge the Commons. As for the 
possible loss of contribution by distinguished non-partisan figures, he was 
dismissive, suggesting they could have as much effect by writing a letter to The 
Times as by a speech in the Lords.56 
When Hailsham appeared before the Committee in June, he argued that, if the 
Conservatives failed to reform the Lords when they had the power to do so, the 
opportunity of introducing an effective safeguard against "elective dictatorship" 
could be lost for ever. Although he accepted that this could come from the 
extreme right or the left, it was virtually certain that the next Labour government 
would be determined either to abolish the Lords or, more probably, emasculate its 
powers. "In his view, there was only one way in which the upper chamber could 
have sufficient power to curb the House of Commons and thus avoid an elective 
55 Committee Minutes, 3rd May 1977. Carrington sU?,gt'sted here similar areas for spcClal 
PlOtt'ction as would the Labour Party a decade later (see Chapter 6) 
56 Ibid. 
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dictatorship; and this was for members of the upper chamber themselves to be 
elected". A nominated or hereditary chamber would never be strong enough~ and 
the former would also mean that the potential power of government to swamp the 
membership would remain. The chamber should, however, be elected by a 
different system and by different constituencies than the Commons. He did not 
support the idea of a referendum on the issue, but, when asked if he thought the 
Conservative Party could be persuaded on such a radical scheme, he said that "if 
the Party did not adopt it, it would need its head examined".57 
When it was put to Hailsham that Labour might still be able to abolish the Lords, 
he suggested that a Parliament Bill embodying his proposals should provide that 
any change in the composition or powers of the new chamber should require the 
the consent of both Houses.58 This was significant, since a proposed safeguard 
along these lines would feature in the Committee's final report. 
Invited to the same meeting, another Conservative Party grandee, Lord Butler of 
Saffron Walden (who had held many senior posts in earlier governments), took a 
different view, arguing that radical reforms would be more likely to invite total 
abolition than would modest ones. He felt that the problem of extreme 
governments elected on a minority vote would be better dealt with through 
changes in the electoral system; and he argued for a smaller House, with 
representative election from existing peers (both hereditary and life), plus 
additional nominated peers.59 
57 Committee Minutes. 14th June 1977. Several years later, Hailsham's views would be 
quite different (see Chapter 8). At this time, he appears to have shared with Baker the 
view that a Labour government would probably seek to reduce the Lords' powers. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. Interestingly, Home said he was attracted by this concept - even though the 
Committee had previously opposed representative election of hereditary peers (see p 179). 
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Various other papers and evidence were also submitted to the Home Committee 
, 
but were not necessarily discussed. These included some advocating the status 
quo - unsurprisingly, from such as the Conservative MP John Stokes, well known 
as a traditionalist, who argued that "it is vital to retain the hereditary element":60 
but also from the academic Philip Norton, who argued that "composition based on 
the hereditary principle and life peerages is probably the best composition possible 
for the British second chamber". Norton further argued that the question of 
composition was fundamental, while powers and functions were essentially 
secondary. However, he took issue with John Griffith who, as previously noted, 
had argued elsewhere that the House of Lords was not especially effective as a 
revising chamber, asserting that Griffith's own study demonstrated that the Lords 
were more effective in scrutiny than the Commons, and that backbench 
amendments in the Commons had a higher success rate than in the Lords. Thus, 
according to Norton, Griffith was hoist by his own petard.61 
One memorandum which was discussed was that from Lord Denham, who was 
broadly supportive of the status quo. He argued that if the House of Lords were 
to have stronger powers to act as a check on the Commons, it was less likely that 
reform would be accepted, "not only by the Labour Party but by members of the 
House of Commons of all parties".62 When he appeared before the Committee in 
July, he argued that the existing House was able to exercise a revising role "in a 
relatively non-party political way because, and not in spite of, the anomalies of its 
present composition." It exercised forbearance because of its composition; if the 
anomaly was removed, this would not continue. Any conceivable reform would 
make party strengths more equal and alter its character and method of operation. 
60 Submission PG 400/77/3D 
61 Submission PG400/77/7: The Case for the House of Lords' and supplementary note 
PG 400/77/9. Norton was referring to Griffith's Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government 
Bills. (See Chapter 3 for Griffith's role on Labour's Study Group and subsequent views.) 
Then a lecturer at the lJniversity of Hull. Norton later became Professor of Government 
and, from 1998, a Conservative peer. 
62 PG 400/77/3A, March 1977. 
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He felt there was a choice between preseIVing it as a revIsmg chamber, which 
meant leaving it much as it was; or making it a more effective safeguarcL which 
meant complete reform as a wholly elected body, with powers not short of the 
Commons (although, even then, this might not be sufficient safeguard against 
elective dictatorship). Any attempt at compromise would almost certainly lose the 
advantages of the former, without securing the advantages of the latter. 
Constructive revisions, he suggested, were unlikely to be achieved in a more party 
political atmosphere.63 
Denham, by inference, preferred an unelected and to some extent consensual 
chamber, performing a modest revising role; but, as has been seen, this was not 
necessarily the view of other leading ConseIVatives or of all members of the 
Committee, some of whom wanted to see the House taking on a more significant 
role as a constitutional check on government. IndeecL at the very meeting which 
Denham addressed, Home subsequently told his colJeagues that the status quo was 
"probably not a viable option". 64 
At the last meeting of the Committee before the summer recess. when discussing 
the possible format of its report, Home suggested that it should review and 
comment on the various options, without plumping formally for anyone of them. 
Significantly, he obseIVed that, although he thought Mrs Thatcher disliked the 
notion of a wholly elected House, this was an option that could not be ignored.65 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding his observations at the previous meeting, I lome 
also floated the notion of maintaining the status quo, with a self-denying ordinance 
on the number of hereditary peers who could sit and vote, to make it marc 
acceptable. Baker thought this would not work and, indeed, it would seem to have 
been a non-starter. It does suggest, however, that Home himself may have been 
in two minds - perhaps recognising that the Committee was likely to favour fairly 
radical changes but uncertain in his own support for them.66 
63 ('ommittee Minutes, 5tb July 1977. 
6·1 Ibid. 
6) Committee Minutes. 19th July 1977. 
66 Noll' also, his remarks at the first nlt'eting of the COlllmittt,c and his apparent sympathy 
\\Ith Butler's notion of representatiH' electloll~ from existing peers (~l'(, pp 177 and I~~). 
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Home was not present when the Committee next met in November 1977, so it was 
chaired by Mancroft, who drew attention particularly to the Labour Party 
Conference's endorsement of abolition the previous month. "He thus felt that the 
report should make an even stronger case against single chamber government". 
He also "voiced Lord Home's growing apprehension that the option of a wholly 
elected chamber was not, in fact, feasible, as it would prove unpopular with the 
Commons, and asked the Committee to bear this in mind. "67 
The emphasis was now mainly on the mixed option. There was some discussion 
on how the nominated element should be chosen - with Baker favouring lists put 
fOlWard by party leaders before an election and places then allocated according to 
votes; others expressing concern about loss of independence and the presence of 
"party hacks"; and Walker-Smith suggesting nomination on the advice of Privy 
Counsellors. According to Mancroft, the Committee veered in the direction of the 
latter. 68 It was suggested that, if they did go for a mixed option, it should be for 
two-thirds elected and one-third nominated; and Baker followed this up with a 
note suggesting an assembly of 402 members, of whom two-thirds would be 
elected by PR for fixed terms of five years, and one-third would be appointed -
the latter to include bishops and law lords.69 Proposals broadly along these lines 
would be identified as the Committee's preferred option.70 
The Committee met on successIve days in December to discuss the final draft, 
with mostly different people present on each occasion - Home himself was only 
present at the second of these.?l A significant element in the final report was the 
proposal for transitional arrangements in moving towards a new chamber -
including in the nominated element virtually all life peers, together with some 
hereditary peers for their lifetime and possibly also bishops and law lords. This 
aspect was specifically discussed at these meetings. A proposal by Nevil Johnson 
67 Committee Minutes, 10th November 1977. 
08 Ibid. In April there had been little support for a similar notion (see p 179). 
69 Ibid: also note from Baker. 15th November 1977. 
70 Set' pp 192·3 (The proposed tenns to be served would be different.) 
71 Only Mancroft and fallon were at both nlt.'etings. 
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to reduce the number of hereditaries from 50 to 30 and for bishops and law lords 
to be additional to the 402 members was agreed at the first meeting, also with a 
stipulation that - "subject to further research" (sic) - there should be an upper age 
limit of 75 for life peers and that they should be willing to sClVe a full term. 
However, the following day, Home asked the Committee to reconsider, as the 
reduction to 30 hereditaries could make it difficult to sell to the Party; and it was 
duly agreed that "the Committee revert to the number of 50 for reasons of party 
political management" (sic))2 
Shortly before these final meetings, Home had met with the backbench 
ConselVative peers. According to Fallon, Home wanted all along to be able to sell 
any recommendations to them, or at least "to be able to sort of square them")3 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Home reported afterwards that the majority would 
probably like the minimum of change)4 But the emphasis of the report would be 
on rather more than that. 
72 Committee Minutes, 5th and 6th December 1977. The high proportion of nominated 
members involved in the proposed transitional arrangements was specifically pointed 
out by Baker, who said it could be }O years before this group decreased sufficiently 
to allow for new nominations; andby Blake, who said that it would mean initially a 
House of nearly 600, then gradu3Ily decreasing. 
In the event, the final report would leave open whether bishops and law lords should be 
included in the nominated element; and it would not include any firm proposal on an 
upper age limit. 
73 Interview. 
74 PG 400/77/33: Report of meeting, 1st December 1977. He added that they had expressed 
the hope that an element of election by hereditary peers would not be ruled out. It was 
not, but it did not form a major plank of the recommendations. 
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The Committee's Report 
The Committee's report was completed in January 1978 and published in March. 
Most significantly, it concluded that: 
"in our view maintenance of the status quo is not a prudent policy. Indeed 
we are doubtful if it is a policy at all".75 
In what was clearly a response to developments in the Labour Party, the Report's 
discussion of the background observed that: 
"There is every sign that the Labour Party will commit itself in its next 
election manifesto to abolition. And even if it does not, in fact, go this far, 
it may still resort to abolition if opposed by the Lords, or at the minimum, 
bring about the complete emasculation of the powers of the House of 
Lords".76 
The Committee then linked this explicitly with its own work, declaring that 
"obviously the politcal developments just outlined require the Conservative Party 
to think carefully about the role of the House of Lords and its future". Going on 
to consider "the case for reform", it argued that: 
"The thrust of British political development in this century, supported on 
occasions by all parties, has undoubtedly been towards what we call 
'mandated majority government"'.77 
This concept was clearly similar to Hailsham's 'elective dictatorship", but it was 
acknowledged that this had occurred under Conservative as well as Labour 
governments. Affirming that "this trend ought to be halted", the Report turned to 
the powers and role of the second chamber. It argued that the Lords had 
generally been reluctant to use their powers, partly, it was suggested, for fear of 
aholition. It stated explicitly: 
"And under the law as it now stands this is quite possible. The second 
chamber could be abolished or its powers further drastically reduced by the 
('ommons alone The Parliament Act can be altered in this way~ thus the 
Act of 1949 amended the Act of 1911 without the consent of the Lords".78 
75 Committee Report p 35. 
76 Jbid, P 7. In the event, Labour"s 1979 manifesto would contain a commitment to ending 
the Lords' delaying powers and legislative veto (see Chapter 4). 
77 Ibid (NH emphasis original). 
78 Committee Report pp 11-12. 
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This suggests that the Conservative Review Committee did not accept or take on 
board the argument that it might be impossible to use the Parliament Act to effect 
abolition of the House of Lords - a view which the Labour Party went to some 
lengths to address.79 
The Report noted that the existing Parliament Act's provisions excluded legislation 
to extend the life of a Parliament, but suggested this could still be got round by 
passing an amending Act to remove the exclusion. This led on to the conclusion 
that, if a new Parliament Act included provisions allowing the Commons to 
override a Lords veto, it should be clear these would not apply to the Parliament 
Act itself.80 Home sought to emphasise, in his preface, that this was a clear 
recommendation: 
"We feel that at the very least we must act to secure that in future there 
will continue to be two chambers of Parliament. One way to do that is to 
have a new Parliament Act which would make it impossible for the second 
chamber to be abolished without the consent of both Houses. This we 
propose. "81 
The Report also referred briefly to the need to nullify the threat of extra creations 
by limiting the total membership or limiting the number of creations in anyone 
year.82 The threat of "swamping" was thus only briefly addressed, almost in 
passmg. Although the Labour Party Group had discussed potential practical 
difficulties involved in this course of action, their Conservative counterparts were 
clearly not confident that existing procedures would be sufficient to prevent this 
possibility. 
79 
80 
81 
See Chapters 3 and 5. Ac.cording to Michael FalJon, it did take legal advice. He also said 
it was assumed that if legislation was passed, the sovereign would give assent (Interview). 
C...ommittee Report pp 12-13. 
Ibid, P 4. 
Ibid, P 13. 
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When it came to consider the options, the Report rejected the status quo _ "we do 
not believe that leaving things just as they are should be considered a viable 
option for the next Conservative government". It argued that "without doubt, few 
would seriously defend the hereditary principle as a basis for a seat in the 
legislature", but also that "appointment for life inevitably smacks of political 
patronage". It went on to conclude: 
"Thus on balance we feel that to leave the House of Lords unchanged 
would be to leave it with a composition which, should a political attack on 
it be mounted, would be virtually impossible to defend".83 
Pointing to the potential for a future Labour government to take action, the 
Report noted that "both periods of Labour majority government since the war 
have seen a serious attempt at further limiting the powers of the Lords";84 but, 
interestingly, it failed to mention that the 1968 proposals had at least the nominal 
support of the Conservative front bench.85 These, it seems, were no longer 
acceptable. The Committee was "strongly opposed" to any solution involving two 
tiers of voting and non-voting peers. While such a House might be effective as a 
revising chamber, "it could never be strong enough to act as a constitutional 
safeguard". Furthermore, the option to limit voting rights to life peers and peers 
of first creation would "be open to most of the objections raised to the 1968 
proposals".86 
Other variations on the status quo had been considered, but limiting hereditary 
peers to a representative number elected by themselves "would be unlikely to 
make sufficient difference to the party balance in the second chamber to avoid the 
conclusion that it has a built-in Conservative majority"; while including members 
83 Ibid. pp 16-17. The next ConseIVative government would leave things unchanged and 
would actually create a small number of hereditary peers (see Chapter 8). 
84 Ibid. 
Wi See Chapter 1. (An appendix did, however, acknowledge that they owed a good deal to 
discussions in the inter-party conference.) 
86 I bid. pp 17-18. 
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of the European Parliament "would introduce into the Lords people elected for a 
totally different purpose ... and who could moreover have heavy commitments 
outside this country" and this was not thought practical.87 
The pros and cons of a wholly elected chamber were considered - including, on 
the one hand, that it would have a strong moral authority to act as an effective 
constitutional check; and, on the other, the possibility of deadlock between two 
elected chambers, as well as the exclusion of bishops, law lords and other eminent 
individuals. If there were to be an elected chamber, a preference was expressed 
for its members to be elected for fIxed terms and retiring at intervals. The 
assumption was that it would be by "some form of proportional representation", so 
as not to replicate the Commons, although no specifIc method was recommended. 
(It was suggested that, if there were to be a regional list for the "European 
Assembly", then this could be adopted for the second chamber; otherwise the 
Single Transferable Vote might be preferable.)88 
It was in the context of an elected chamber that the possibility of increasing the 
powers of the second chamber - to restore the two-year delaying power it had 
enjoyed up to 1911 - was discussed. An alternative to require a referendum 
before consenting to specifIc measures was also mooted. This might apply to 
measures thought to be "fundamentally opposed to the will of the majority of the 
electorate", or those judged to be of "fundamental constitutional importance" or 
adversely affecting "basic human rights". It concluded that there would be 
potential diffIculties, including the problems of defIning the aforementioned areas 
and of potential conflict with the Commons. The notion of a referendum in this 
context was not pursued.89 Although it had been discussed "quite extensively" In 
the Committee, Fallon thought it had not been a serious runner. 90 
87 Ibid. One meeting of the Committee is recorded as agreeing that this notion "lost its 
attraction as the elections actually approached" (Minutes, 5th December 1977). 
88 Ibid, pp 19-20. The first direct elections in the UK for the European Parliament were 
held in 1979 on a first-past-the-post basis (except in Northern Ireland). 
89 Ibid. pp 20-21. 
YO Intel"iew. February 2000. Baroness Young recalled that peopk wert.' "very nnvous about 
rden.'ndums" (intcl"iew. July 1997). The Party subsequently established a separate 
committc.'c to look more generally at the question of refercndums (sce p 200). 
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In looking at a mixed chamber, part-nominated and part-elected, the Report 
discussed the possibility of indirect election, possibly by local government, but was 
not enthusiastic. It also considered the possibility of the "elected" element 
comprising individuals chosen by their parties in proportion to the respective 
strengths of the votes cast for each in a general election. It noted, though, that 
they would represent no particular area and would still owe their position to 
patronage. Corporate representation of various interests (such as religious bodies, 
trade unions and employers' organisations) was also discussed, but not 
recommended.91 
It is interesting to note that on some options, at least, the Conservative Committee 
came to similar conclusions to Labour's Study Group. For instance, both were 
unenthusiastic about corporate representation and both were against 
representation of MEPs in the second chamber; and for similar reasons. Also the 
possibility of the second chamber having a special role in respect of legislation 
affecting constitutional rights would feature in Labour's proposals some ten years 
later.92 
The Conservative Committee's preferred option was for a House with an upper 
limit of 402, of which 268 (two-thirds) would be directly elected for nine year 
terms (one-third every three years). It suggested election by PR to differentiate 
from the Commons. The 134 nominated members, who would also serve 
renewable nine-year terms, would be selected by the Prime Minister after 
consultation with a committee of Privy Counsellors. Titles would be separated 
from membership of the new House, whose members could be designated "Lords 
of Parliament". However, it then went on to suggest a transitional arrangement. 
91 Ibid, pp 25-27. 
92 Sec Chapters 3 and 6. 
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whereby the nominated group would comprise virtually all life peers and also 50 
hereditary peers for their lifetime. Subsequent vacancies would be filled by 
nomination. Bishops and law lords might also be included. It acknowledged that 
this would mean a higher proportion of "nominated" members in the transitional 
period.93 
A number of 'miscellaneous recommendations' were also put forward. One of 
these was for a Mediation Committee to resolve differences between the two 
chambers, because "the chances of disagreement leading to formal confrontation 
might well be increased in the wake of any substantial reform" and "it would be 
prudent to take steps to reduce this risk". The Report envisaged a committee 
along the lines proposed by Nevil Johnson (i.e. one which might be set up at the 
request of either House, comprising seven members nominated by each). 
However, it did not specify what would happen if the Committee could not itself 
agree or if either House declined to accept its recommendations. Moreover the 
Report acknowledged that the procedure "could not entirely avoid irreconcilable 
disagreements", although it might reduce their incidence.94 Other proposals 
included an upper limit on numbers (either for total membership or for the 
number of creations in anyone year), a possible age limit on membership, changes 
to enable peers to vote in parliamentary elections and minor procedural reforms.95 
93 Committee Report, pp 27-2B. 
94 Ibid, P 32. This suggests uncertainty about how useful this procedure might be. (See p 180 
for earlier discussions.) 
95 Ibid, pp 32-33. No figures were specified in respect of any limit on numbers. A retirement 
age of 75 was suggested, if composition were to be left unaltered. 
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In conclusion, the Report pointed to the ] 968/69 expenence to show that 
"modifications of what is essentially the present framework are open to many 
objections". There remained essentially two options - "a wholly elected second 
chamber or one which is based on some combination of election and 
nomination".96 Whilst suggesting that "careful attention" be given to both, a 
tentative preference was expressed for the latter. Home acknowledged in his 
preface that "the arguments are finely drawn" and "much debate will be needed 
within the party before a final choice can be made". Not all Committee members 
were necessarily committed to every recommendation and arguments, but they 
believed that "when a decision is taken, a Conservative government would receive 
widespread support for two objectives", namely: 
i) "maintenance of an effective revising chamber, capable of supporting the 
work of the House of Commons and of ensuring that controversial 
legislation is not hastily thrust before the public"; 
ii) "to ensure the position of a second chamber within Parliament is put 
on a firm foundation by protecting it against abolition without its 
own consent".97 
The Committee concluded that, whether wholly or partly elected, there was "a 
strong case for reversion to the delaying power of two years"; and that there 
should be provision that change to the powers of the second chamber could only 
be made with its consent.98 
Differing vIews on the Committee were clearly hinted at. Home's preface 
suggested that some members may have wished to look at the issue in the context 
of wider constitutional reform, but this was not within the terms of reference. 99 
96 Ibid, pp 35-36. 
97 Ibid. P 4. 
98 Ibid, P 36. 
99 Ibid, P 4. An earlier draft suggested some thought refonn should probably start with the 
Commons and that the review should include Parliament as a whole (Draft. January 1978). 
Although It started by concentrating on the Lords. Labour's Study Group did have a Wldt.'T 
remit. 
- 193 -
Moreover, there were varyIng degrees of enthusiasm and support for a wholly 
elected or a mixed chamber. Home himself seems to have favoured some reform 
, 
but not a wholly elected chamber. The result was, therefore, according to one of 
its members, a compromise)OO The proposals were, in fact quite radical, but seem 
to have been tentatively expressed, possibly to cover the differences of view on the 
committee. The suggested transitional arrangements would seem to have diluted 
these further and to lay it open to criticism. 
Before publication, the report went to the Leader's Steering Committee in 
February 1978. The discussion there suggested an inclination on the part of the 
leadership to hedge its bets and distance itself to some extent. It agreed that the 
Conservative Party was united in its desire to see a second chamber which could 
be "a significant means of preventing the slide towards a situation similar to that 
which existed in Eastern Europe" (sic). However, the 'introduction' to the report 
(in the form of a letter from Home to Thatcher) should be amended, "so that it 
did not totally rule out continuance of the status quo", since that was preferable to 
single chamber government, and should indicate that, "on balance, the majority of 
the Committee preferred the solution set out in the report, but were well aware 
that wider discussions would bring forward a number of factors meriting further 
consideration".101 The report should be published, but printed in a form of its 
own and not as a Conservative Political Centre document.102 
100 Interview with Baroness Young. 
101 CPA: LSC(78/52nd meeting. Curiously, Home told this meeting that the Review 
Committee had been opposed to a wholly elected second chamber. The minutes 
of the Review Committee do not include any such finn conclusion; and indeed, 
it was presentedin the Report as an option which could be supported. 
102 Ibid. The Conservative Political Centre acted as a Party discussion forum and publishing 
house. 
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There were thus some significant differences between the introduction to the 
document which went to the Steering Committee103 and the Preface of the 
published Report. A statement that "we reject the option of maintaining the 
status quo" was removed, as was a reference to the need for "essential and urgent 
action" (although it still said that "we do not believe the Party can do nothing" and 
the status quo was ruled out elsewhere in the report). References to finely drawn 
arguments and the need for debate on the main options were also added. 
Although the options were still put forward in the Report, this opening 
presentation was certainly more anodyne, again suggesting a degree of hesitancy. 
Responses to the Report 
It may be significant that the Conservative Research Department's contemporary 
notes, Politics Today, gave the Report very little coverage. They ignored it on 
publication and there were just five lines in the issue preceding the 1978 Party 
Conference.104 The following issue, reporting Conference speeches, carried just 
three lines, quoting Francis Pym (then frontbench spokesman on House of 
Commons affairs) as saying: "we want to reinforce and strengthen the second 
chamber.. .. Lord Home and his colleagues have shown us the way".105 This implied 
some support for further action, but Pym may not necessarily have been reflecting 
the views of all of his front bench colleagues. Fallon recalled that "the whole 
thing had a whiff, not of non-adoption, but of second term", but "Margaret didn·t 
want Alec to be snubbed in any way", so the Report was welcome cautiously; while 
according to Carrington, everyone said how interesting, but "nobody intended to 
Jo anything". Denham claimed that the Committee "produced some fairly silly 
recommendations" and that that was the generally held view of the Party.106 
103 PG 400/77/33: Final Revise. 
104 Politics Today (No 17, September 18th 1978). 
105 Ibid (No 18, October 30th 1978). 
106 Interviews, April 1999 - February 2000. 
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Among the public critics was Ferdinand Mount who, writing In The SpectE(or, 
acknowledged that the ConselVatives needed a "defensible alternative" to Labour's 
policy, but concluded that "this is not that alternative". He registered particular 
doubts about the obligation to consult a committee of Privy Counsellors on 
appointments; and about the transitional period, in which life and hereditary peers 
would still be in a majority. He argued the new chamber would be unlikely to 
have enough democratic authority "to act as a bulwark against socialism"; and 
concluded that the Home Committee seemed "motivated less by a serious belief in 
the supremacy of popular election than by a wish to look respectably modern, 
while still managing to sooth sensitivities of life peers and console hereditary 
peers ... " Arguably, none of this mattered too much, since, according to Mount, 
reforming the Lords "must come about 47th on most people's lists of What Needs 
to be Done")07 Nevertheless, Mount's views both on this report and priorities 
may be worth noting since he later became an adviser to Margaret Thatcher.108 
Reporting the document's launch, The Times noted Thatcher's opposition to 
proportional representation for the Commons, but quoted Home as suggesting she 
would not object to having different systems for different chambers, adding that 
he (Home) thought there was a strong case for PR as the method of election to 
the Lords, rather than reproducing the House of Commons. Not surprisingly, the 
President of 'ConselVative Action for Electoral Reform', the former Home 
Secretary, Lord Carr of Hadley, welcomed this, hoping it would be incorporated in 
the next manifesto. However, according to the same report, Home himself had 
said that, because of the big questions raised by his Committee's report, he 
expected only a general pledge to reform the House of Lords.109 
107 The Spectator, 28th March 1978 (Vol 240, P 5). Note his assumption that the second 
chamber would be anti-socialist. 
108 Mount was Head of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit, 1982-83. 
109 George Oark, The Ttmes, 21st March 1978. In the event, the manifesto would not 
include even such a general pledge. 
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Meanwhile, in The Guardian, Simon Hoggart - perhaps cynically, but certainly not 
inaccurately - noted that there was an official Labour plan, a plan from Labour 
peers and now a ConseIVative plan; but "the scheme most likely to win over the 
next few years is the one to do nothing at all". He observed that the previous 
Labour government had found it impossible to get its proposals through, and there 
was "no reason to imagine that any new plan would work any more easily". The 
Home proposals were not yet policy, but Hoggart suggested "the main reason for 
haste for a future Tory government is that a Labour government might make the 
effort to abolish the Lords".1 l0 
The concern with what Labour might do was echoed by a member of the 
Committee itself, Lord O'Hagan, who referred the following day to the prospect 
that "Labour may emasculate us, if it does not abolish us". He said he had been 
"delighted, if surprised when we all agreed that the status quo was no longer a real 
option, but added that "when we turned from diagnosis to prescription, our 
thoughts began to diverge". Although he supported an elected chamber, he 
thought it would take a long time to persuade the Conservative Party to aim for 
such a target.1 11 
The period following the Labour's espousal of outright abolition was actually 
marked by a flurry of interest in Lords' reform in Conservative circles. In 
September 1977, the fonner Attorney-General, Sir Peter Rawlinson, had put 
forward proposals for Parliamentary refonn which, for the Lords, would involve 
each Party nominating voting peers in proportion to its Commons representation 
for the lifetime of a Parliament, with powers limited to approval or rejection on 
second reading. Il2 Shortly afterwards, the Bow Group (a Conservative research 
110 The Guardian, 21st March 1978. 
III 'Girds Refonn: The Next Steps', The Times, 22nd March 1978. 
112 The Times, 13th September 1977. 
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and discussion group) published a memorandum by Jacques Arnold (then a 
banker, later to be a Conservative MP), which argued that reform was inevitable 
and should be carried out by the Conservatives to avoid total abolition by 
Labour. 11 3 Around the same time, 'Conservative Action for Electoral Reform' 
issued a paper proposing a second chamber with significant powers, which should 
be determined by an "acceptably democratic process", but different from the lower 
chamber. Election by a regionally-based system of proportional representation 
would be the most attractive option, but only in the context of wider reforms, 
including the Commons.114 
The following April, the Constitutional Reform Committee of the Society of 
Conservative Lawyers proposed abolition of the existing House and its 
replacement by a senate of 300 members, with one-third elected every two years 
by PRo A varying percentage of this new senate (diminishing during the lifetime 
of a Parliament) would be required to agree before legislation could be referred 
back to the Commons)15 In the same month, the political commentator Wilfred 
Sendall argued in The Spectator for a reformed second chamber. Like some in 
the Labour Party, he concluded that its revising and debating functions "could be 
satisfactorily discharged after some procedural changes by the Commons itself', 
but said it should be able to stop the Commons carrying through "a revolution" on 
a simple majority vote. The present House of Lords, he claimed, lacked authority~ 
and he proposed a House representing various interests in the community - "it 
should not be difficult to devise means by which each could choose 
representatives, either by election or nomination", he asserted, optimistically -
113 Reform of the House of Lords - Practical Proposals for a Strong Second Chamber (1977). 
Arnold's proposals were for rather a hotchpotch of a chamber, including members elected 
by PR, nominated by the C..ommons, MEPs and representatives of various groups 
(including existing peers and "university graduates".) 
114 Elizabeth Lyons and Anthony Wigram: The House of Lords (1977). The same 
organisation had submitted a different paper to the Home Committee (PG400/77/3"1, 
which argued that although electoral reform of the House of Commons would be vastly 
preferable. a proportionally elected Upper House might be more acceptable "to those 
who have the power to reform our constitution". 
115 House of Lords Refoml, 1978. 
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and there could also be a directly elected element on a regional basis. This new 
House should have limited delaying powers generally, but on matters affecting the 
constitution, it should have "an absolute veto".116 
Following publication of the Home Committee's report, a separate Party 
committee recommended legislation providing for a referendum before any 
fundamental change in the constitution, stating that the "primary protection sought 
by such a Bill would be the existence of the second chamber".117 The Shadow 
Cabinet decided early in January 1979 to insert a passage in the manifesto 
indicating that a referendum would be an extremely useful device. 118 Just days 
before the election, Norman St John-Stevas, now Shadow Leader of the 
Commons, publicly suggested a referendum on the House of Lords.1 19 However, 
the actual manifesto would go no further than indicating a general willingness to 
discuss referendums and a Bill of Rights with all parties.120 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Home Committee, the manifesto 
made no specific commitment to Lords' reform. Instead it stated: 
"The public has rightly grown anxious about many constitutional matters in 
the last few years - partly because our opponents have proposed major 
constitutional changes for party political advantage. Now Labour want not 
merely to abolish the House of Lords, but to put nothing in its place. This 
would be a most dangerous step. A strong second chamber is necessary 
not only to revise legislation but also to guarantee our constitution".1 21 
116 'House of Committees', The Spectator, 8th April 1978 (Vol 240, P 15). 
117 Report of ConseIVative Party Committee on the Referendum: LCC(78)141. The 
Committee met between April and July 1978. 
118 CPA:LCC 79/230, 29th January 1979 
119 House of Commons Debates, 26th March 1979 (Col. 965, Vol 25). This may have been 
intended mainly as a challenge to the Labour government. 
120 The Conservative Manifesto 1979 (Dale, op cit, p 276). 
121 Ibid. An earlier draft had warned that the Labour Party wanted to swamp the second 
chamber "to eliminate barriers to the advance of socialism and state control of many 
aspects of our lives" and that, without a second chamber, a socialist majority in the 
C.ommons could vote itse1f into permanent power, without ever holding an election agam. 
The Shadow Cabinet decided to delete these reference~ (Lee 78/219, 4th September 
1978) and the final text was more moderate in its wording. 
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Thus, in place of any specific proposals, the Party's 1979 manifesto presented what 
was, in essence, a generalised reaction to Labour's policies. To some extent, this 
reflected the nature of the debate that had taken place in the Party on the issue in 
the preceding period, although Ian Gilmour, then Defence Spokesman, later 
recalled that Thatcher and the right-wing of the Shadow Cabinet had obstructed 
reform proposals, wishing to protect the House of Lords from the "contagion of 
democracy" .122 Thus, an authoritative committee had come forward with detailed 
proposals for reform which were, in the event, not reflected in the manifesto. It 
would seem that the Shadow Cabinet did not feel the need for a specific position 
on the issue at the time, although it had not yet ruled out the possibility of future 
reform. 123 
The assertion made strongly in the Home report - that the status quo was not an 
option - was very different from the attitude John Major's government would later 
take; and it was different from that of his predecessor who, for all her vaunted 
radicalism would, as we shall see, leave the Lords untouched and even create new 
hereditary peers. In the 1970s, the Conservatives were undoubtedly motivated by 
concern that Labour might actually abolish the Lords; but influential figures were 
forced to acknowledge that the existing chamber was unacceptable. They 
apparently saw the second chamber as a sort of bulwark against "elective 
dictatorship" and, sometimes quite explicitly, as a way of blocking what they 
regarded as extreme or socialist policies - although, in fairness, the Home 
Committee itself did not put it in such partisan terms. Some also appeared to 
assume that a more democratic chamber would be inclined to block measures they 
disliked - an assumption some in the Labour Party would also make a decade 
later, when they took up the notion of the second chamber as a means to 
safeguard particular rights. Concern amongst Conservatives about "elective 
dictatorship" would, of course, diminish when they were in power, as will be seen 
in the following Chapter. 
122 Dancin!! wilh TJo!!1l1a. p 31K (The actual phrase was attributed to Roger Scruton) 
123 Baroness Young confirmed this was the position (Interview). 
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8. THE CONSERVATIVES IN GOVERNMENT 1979 92 
In opposition, the ConseIVatives had been attracted to the notion of the second 
chamber acting as a constitutional longstop, to seIVe as a brake on radical reforms 
being carried through by a government with a majority in the Commons but which 
did not necessarily have majority support in the country. In office, however. this 
perspective would change, as the government of Margaret Thatcher sought to 
carry through radical measures which proved highly controversial and met with 
fierce opposition. Sir Ian Gilmour, a member of her first Cabinet, later turned 
critic, obseIVed how: 
"the views of the public were of little consequence during the legislative 
process. Disliking public inquiry, despising opposition and believing in 
Thatcherite infallibility, the government customarily kept all the 
preliminaries to legislation in its own hand, only listening in private 
to groups and individuals who would give it the advice it wanted. 
As a result, the government, especially in its third term, produced a 
mass of legislation ... strongly opposed by a majority in the country"'! 
In the face of this, the House of Lords would come to be seen as a potential 
obstacle to measures the government was keen to push through, despite the 
ConseIVative strength there. Indeed, it has been suggested that, particularly after 
1983, the Lords were "more effective than the Lower House in obliging the 
government to change its mind on particular questions".2 Of course, unlike its 
Labour predecessor, the ConseIVative government enjoyed comfortable majorities 
in the Commons and, with the benefit of whipping, could normally be confident of 
avoiding defeat, even on measures opposed by some of its own supporters.3 
Dancing with Dogma, p 180. (Gilmour was Lord Privy Seal 1979-81; he entered the 
House of Lords in 1992.) For further illustration of public opposition to Thatcherite 
policies see, for instance, Hugo Young: One of Us (Macmillan, 1989) p 529. 
2 Shell: The House of Lords, p 26. 
3 In two out of the three Parliaments of this period, the Conservatives had a Commons 
majority of over 100. The majority of 43 in 1979 increased to 146 in 1984, but was down 
to 101 in 1987. The share of the total vote. however. was between 42 and 44 per cent 
(Butler & Butler: Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900 - 2000. pp 238-9). 
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However, the position was different in the Lords. While it could use "whipping" 
and other methods of persuasion at crucial times, it could not always be certain of 
carrying the day there, given the uncertainty of turnout, particularly if 
independent/crossbench peers and some Conservative "rebels" joined forces with 
Opposition peers. This was quite possible, since, as Donald Shell observed: 
"the sheer continuity of the Upper House meant the Party there was less 
'Thatcherite' and remained more tempered by the old paternalistic Tory 
tradition".4 
Peter Hennessy noted at the time that the Lords were amending Conservative 
legislation in a progressive or centrist direction; and that Conservative peers were 
said to be rather pleased with themselves.5 In Gilmour's view, the House of Lords 
was "much less Mrs Thatcher's poodle than the House of Commons".6 Baroness 
Young, who was Leader of the House from 1981 to 1983, recalled that Thatcher 
"thought she could run the House of Lords as she ran the House of Commons", 
but "she found she couldn't."? 
It has been claimed that the Lords became "the main focus for opposition to the 
Thatcher government in the 1980s".8 Local authorities, for instance, came to look 
to the House of Lords for support in moderating the impact of government 
legislation. According to Shell, it became evident then that "as far as actually 
getting detailed changes made to Bills was concerned, the House of Lords could 
he at least as useful as the House of Commons" and that interest groups 
responded accordingly.9 Sir John Sainty (Clerk of the Parliaments 1983-90) 
4 Shell (op cit) P 27. 
5 'Medieval ReJic or Mighty Oak?" The Listener, 5th November 1987 (Vol 118, pp 11-12). 
b Gilmour (op cit) p 186. 
7 JnteJ\liew, July 1997. Lord Denham, who was her Chief Whip throughout, remembcrcd 
that Thatcher often said to him: "Look, I don't have defeats in the Commons. why do you 
have defeats there?" (Interview, January 2000). 
8 Ivor Richard and Damien Welfare: l 'nfinished Business - Refonning the House of Lords, 
p 44. (Richard was Leader of the House of Lords, 1997-98.) 
9 Sheil (op cit) pp 150, 173. He records a 1986 survey of 211 organised groups, which 
found that 177 had used the Lords "to make representations or influence policy", most of 
which had found it "useful or very useful". 
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observed that both interest groups and the official opposition "used the House of 
Lords to fOIWard points that they hadn't been able to carry in the House of 
Commons)O 
Between 1979 and 1992, the Conservative governments were defeated in the Lords 
179 times (in 7.9% of divisions»)] Analysis by Shell has shown that 148 out of a 
total of 155 defeats under Thatcher (1979-90) involved legislation; and that in 63 
cases the changes made were accepted by the government~ in 55 cases they were 
rejected (but in a few instances they were accepted after a second defeat); and in 
the remaining 30 a definite compromise was reached. However, amendments 
varied considerably in importance - "some were minor to the point of triviality, 
while a few were very signficant indeed".12 According to Gilmour, while quite 
often defeated on minor matters, the government could use its Commons majority 
to reverse such defeats and, "because of the large Conservative majority amongst 
backwoods peers, the government was never in serious danger on major issues")3 
Legislative Highlights 
Although it is not intended to examine in detail the handling of all legislation by 
the House of Lords over this period, it is worth noting some of the most 
significant and controversial instances, as these would have influenced the way in 
which it was perceived. 
10 Interview, January 2001. Sainty and Denham agreed that the Lords became increasingly 
subject to lobbying in the 1980s. 
11 House of Lords Information Office (1997): Divisions in the House of Lords since 1970-71-
12 Shell (op cit) pp 157-8. (The House of Lords Information Office lists 156 defeats under 
Thatcher.) Shell has further observed that by the late 1980s, around 2,000 am~ndments 
were being made to government Bills each session, but this was "more to do WIth the 
ill-thought-out nature of much legislation when first introduced than with any particular 
skill or diligence by peers" ('The House of Lords: Time for a Change', Parliamentary 
Affairs, October 1994, Vol 47, p 733). 
13 Gilmour (op cit) p 186. 
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The most notable episode in the 1979 Parliament involved the Education (No.2) 
Bill in March 1980, when the government was heavily defeated by 216 votes to 112 
on a clause giving local authorities powers to charge for school transport. The 
main mover against this was the Duke of Norfolk, a Conservative peer, and other 
opponents included Lord Butler of Saffron Walden (who had been responsible for 
the landmark 1944 Education Act).14 Shell notes that "any attempt to reverse such 
a defeat in the Commons would probably have led to further humiliations for the 
government, so instead ministers gave way".15 Ministers had also suffered defeats 
on other legislation the previous month, but this was the first really significant 
reverse forced on them by the Lords.16 The Minister responsible for handling the 
Bill was Baroness Young, who would later become Leader of the House. This 
undoubtedly would have impressed itself on her memory - as she later recalled: ") 
got the biggest defeat for the government it ever had")7 
Such early defeats may have galvanised the government into orgamsmg heavier 
whipping later when key aspects of legislation were at stake. Nevertheless, it 
would not be immune from defeats, both in this and the next Parliament, which in 
some cases, it would be unable to reverse. I8 
14 House of Lords Debates, 13th March 1980 (Vol 406, Cols 1206-1395). 
15 Shell (op cit, p 161) points out that, in the Commons, 13 Conservative MPs had voted 
against the government and 16 abstained. 
16 The other defeats were on the Bees Bill and the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, which he 
suggests were minor affairs (Ibid, p 158/9). 
17 Interview, July 1997. She mentioned it in a debate in the 1980s, when arguing that "the 
House as a revising chamber is effective" (House of Lords Debates, 4th July 1996, 
Vol 573, Cols 1599-1603). According to Denham, he had known the government was 
going to lose the vote, however strong the whip, and he had warned his colleagues of this 
(Interview and subsequent conversation with the author). 
18 Shell (op cit) pp 162-168. There may have been improved organisation of whipping over 
the period. (Sainty, when interviewed, thought this was probably the case.) However, 
another factor might be that, after 1983, the government had a bigger majority in the 
Commons, increasing its confidence and lessening the likelihood of problems with any 
legislation returned by the Lords. 
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The most significant legislation in the 1983 Parliament was probably that affecting 
local government, which carried with it constitutional implications. The 
government was determined to abolish the Greater London Council and the 
metropolitan county councils in other urban conglomerations, but got itself in a 
position whereby the substantive legislation could not be introduced until the 
1984/85 session and so would be unlikely to be passed before council elections due 
in 1985 would have been held. (The proposed abolition would undoubtedly have 
been an issue and the results might have proved embarrassing to the govcrnment.) 
Thus in 1983/84 it introduced what was popularly known as a "paving" Bill _ 
formally the Local Government (Intcrim Provisions) Bill - which would have 
cancelled the scheduled elections and set up bodies nominated by the lower-tier 
local authorities to run the councils in the final year until abolition was effected. 
In London this would probably have meant substituting control by a body with a 
Conservative majority for that by one with a Labour majority, without recourse to 
further election.19 
On the face of it, this would seem to have been the sort of issue on which a 
second chamber which saw itself as a guardian of constitutional rights (or indeed 
as a check on "elective dictatorship") might wish to assert itself. While the actual 
abolition proposals had been included (at the last minute) in the 1983 
Conservative manifesto, they had not hitherto been subject to wide discussion or 
consultation; yet, by abolishing a tier of government, they would fundamentally 
change the way people were governed.2o The "paving" Bill was particularly 
contentious. There had been much criticism in the Commons and although, given 
19 Ibid, pp 168-9. 
20 "Some of the most far-reaching and unresearched proposals for local government for many 
years. thrown into the manifesto at the last minute" (Beyond O.lIT Ken: A _GUide to the 
Battle for I AJndon: Andrew Forrester, Stuart Lansley and RoblD Pauley: Fourth l·.state. 
1985; p 66) "Not the result of informed discussion but of prime ministerial insistence" 
(Gilmour, op cit, p 181). 
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the government's large majority, there was never any danger of defeat, ] 9 
Conservative MPs had voted against Second Reading.2] Arguably, this was a 
situation in which it would be appropriate for the Lords to accord the people and 
Commons "a period for reflection")2 
When the Bill came to the House of Lords in June 1984, there was much activity. 
The then Leader of the GLC, Ken Livingstone, has described how "the calm, 
leisurely pace of life in the Lords began to change with our lobbying". cars were 
provided and rooms supplied with food and drink to keep potential supporters on 
hand.23 Despite this, the government whips were successful in ensuring that it 
passed Second Reading. One Conservative hereditary peer. Viscount 
Mountgarrett, told the House during the debate that "extensive pressure has been 
brought to bear on a number of the governmenfs rather far distant and somewhat 
irregular supporters."24 
However, later in the month, at Committee Stage. the government was defeated 
on a crucial amendment by 191 to 143.25 This amendment - which, although 
moved in the Lords by Lord Elwyn Jones from the Labour benches, tx:came 
known as the "Pym amendment" after the former Conservative minister Francis 
Pym, who had moved a similar amendment unsuccessfully in the Commons - laid 
down that the elections should not be cancelled until the actual legislation 
abolishing the authorities became law (by which time the election would probably 
have been held).26 Livingstone called this "the biggest defeat a Tory government 
suffered in the Lords since the First World War".27 Whilst this was not strictly true 
21 HOllse of COImnons Debates, 11th April 1984 (Vol 59, Co) 1479) . 
22 As suggested by Lord Carrington when in opposition in the 1960s (see p 33). 
23 If Voting Changed Anything They'd Abolish It (Collins 1987, pp 278-9). 
24 House of Lords Debates, lIth June 1984 (Vol 452, Co) 957). The crucial vote was on an 
amendment condemning the BiU as a "dangerous precedent", which was deft.'ated by 237 to 
217, after what The Times' report described as an "intense whipping operation" . with only 
seven Conservatives actually voting against. The hereditary peers were reported to have 
divided 178 to 53 in favour of the government - "it was clear yesterday that the 
govemment had hereditary peers to thank for its majority" (Phillip WehsterHereditary 
pCt.'rs earned victOr)' for amendment on Abolition Bill.' 13th June 1984) . 
. ~5 H(Juse of J.ords Debates. 28th June 1984 (Vol. 452. Col 1069) . 
.?b Shell (op cit. p 1(9) desClibl's it as a "~re('king amendment". (I he substantiw Bill finallv 
lect.'lved Royal Assent III July 1985, two months after the elections would haw heen due.) 
27 I iVIll~stor1t.' (op cit) P ~~3 
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- the margin on the Education Bill in 1980 was larger - the government had, in the 
words of a senior minister, been "humiliated" and, moreover, decided it could not 
risk a Lords / Commons clash by reversing it in the Commons.28 It decided instead 
to offer a compromise by allowing the existing councils to continue in office _ 
without further election - for the final year. This compromise was, in due course. 
accepted by the Lords.29 A banner was erected on County Hall, opposite 
Parliament, which declared: "Peers - Thank you for saving London's democracy".30 
The Times described the episode as "a triumph for the principles of 
constitutionalism and specifically for the principle of a bicameral Parliament".31 
When the actual abolition legislation came to the Lords, after again receivIng a 
comfortable Commons majority, one of the crucial tests came on an amendment 
moved by the independent peer Lord Hayter and supported by Conservative peers 
Baroness Faithfull and Lord Plummer (a former Conservative leader of the GLC). 
This would have replaced the GLC with a new London-wide authority and was 
defeated by just four votes.32 Following this, according to Livingstone, the Lords 
initially passed some amendments, but this spurred Denham, the Chief Whip, "to 
wring out the last few votes of the inbuilt Tory majority"; and "they began to win 
all the really crucial votes, while continuing to lose those they could afford to do 
without". Of 100 amendments passed, there were only two which the government 
could not live with, and these were subsequently reversed in the Commons, 
following which the Lords did not insist on them.33 The legislation thus duly came 
into effect. 
28 Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Year.s (Faber & Faber, 1993) pp 96, 98. 
29 She]) (op cit) p 169. 
30 Baker (op cit) p 98. 
31 Leading article, 30th June 1984 (as noted by Shell, op cit. p 169). 
~2 CA)mmittee Stage, Local Government Bill (House of Lords Debates. 30 April 1985, 
Vol 463, Col 167). The voting was 213 - 209 . 
. B Livingstone (op cit) pp 302-6. The two amendments concerned London-wide waste 
disposal and highway authorities. 
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This episode showed how Labour-controlled authorities saw the House of Lords as 
having the potential to amend legislation in a way favourable to them and lobbied 
there accordingly. It demonstrated too that, although the House of Lords was 
prepared to defeat the Conservative government on an important aspect of its 
legislation, which appeared particularly anti-democratic in nature, this defiance 
had its limits; and that, when sufficiently determined, the Conservatives could, in 
Livingstone's words, "get their act together".34 There may have been a hiccup on 
the way, but ultimately, controversial legislation - abolishing a tier of government _ 
for which there was doubtful public support found its way on to the statute book; 
and the House of Lords was unable or unwilling to prevent it. 
Donald Shell has observed that in the 1987 Parliament, the Thatcher government 
showed "a new determination to overcome resistance in the Upper House" or to 
insist on reversal of Lords amendments in the Commons.35 Viscount Whitelaw, 
who had been Leader of the I-louse since 1983, retired on health grounds at the 
beginning of 1988, to be replaced by Lord Belstead. In his subsequent memoirs, 
Whitelaw obseIVed that the number of defeats the government suffered in the 
Lords while he was Leader "had something to do with the controversial nature of 
the legislation". He also acknowledged (without being specific) that he had tried 
to make use of these defeats to obtain concessions.3b Thus the Leader of the 
IJHds may not always have been unhappy to b{~ defeated. Lord Carrington 
recalled that Whitelaw found it helpful to be able to tell Thatcher that he 
couldn't get things through the Lords - "it did actually play quite an important 
rok". More generally, he acknowledged that there were some in the 
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
34 Ibid. P 303. 
35 Shell (op cit) P 27. 
36 rhe Whitelaw Memoirs, pp 243-4. Sheila Gunn (later to becomea CAJnselVative Party 
official) wrote in ine Times that Whitelaw had been able to convince fellow ministers 
and peers simultaneously that be was fighting on their side. She added: "True, Mar~aret 
Thatcher had contempt for the Upper House and used to stamp her foot whenever It 
challenged yet another of her prized policies. But when convinced the Lords had a 
strong ease, Lord Whitelaw usually managed to wheedle a concession out of her" 
(,Peers lose their Self Confidenc,e', 23rd April 1991). 
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government who saw the Lords as potential allies against possible excesses _ they 
felt the House of Lords was a "more liberal assembly than the cohorts on the 
Conservative benches in the Commons"; and although they couldn't do that much. 
if distinguished people came out, "it would have some effect. "37 
The most controversial measure of the new Parliament was undoubtedly the 
introduction of the poll tax (officially called the "community charge") in the Local 
Government Finance Bill of 1987/88. With its large majority in the Commons, the 
government was able to push through the measure successfully there, although its 
majority fell to 25 on an amendment which would have had the effect of creating 
bands for the tax according to ability to pay.38 When a similar amendment was 
moved in the Lords by Lord Chelwood (the former Conservative MP, Sir Tufton 
Beamish), the government pulJed out all the stops in order to turn out its vote; 
and, in the end, it carried the day by a majority of 317 to 184.39 
The government was certainly well prepared for the vote, but it may, perhaps, 
have overdone things. As Richard Holme noted in the New Statesman, Lord 
Denham, had persuaded 400 Conservatives to take the oath. 40 more than usual, 
but "he drafted in far more non-working peers than he needed and achieved such 
an embarassingly large majority that his ruse became transparent."40 The vote saw 
one of the highest turnouts ever in the House of Lords, bolstered by Conservative 
hereditary peers who had rarely attended before.41 It attracted sharp comment. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
37 Interview, April 1999. Denham, when interviewed, also confirmed that Whitelaw 
wekomed the occasional defeat to strengthen his hand - "very much so". 
38 Shell (op cit) p 172. 
39 Ibid; House olLords Debates, 23rd May 1988 (Vol 497, Col 685). 
40 The Lords: The Not Contents Have It', New Statesman, 3rd June 1988 (Vol 115, P 10). 
Holme was then Chainnan of the Constitutional Reform Centre. He became a Liberal 
Democrat peer in 1990. (The Oath of Allegiance must be taken - or solemn affirmation 
made - by all peers on introduction, in every new Parliament and on the accession of a 
new monarch, before they can sit or vote in the House.) 
-ll According to Shell (op cit. p 172), 550 peers turned out in all. The Independent 
(2-lth May 1988) reported that this was the second highest turnout ever. 
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Amongst the most vociferous was The Sun - at that time usually a strong 
supporter of the Conservative government - which told its readers: 
"When it matters to the Tory Party, the House of Lords is as feudal, as 
reactionary and as undemocratic as it ever was". 
It referred to an assembly dominated by the rich, hereditary aristocracy and "those 
who got their peerage on political hire purchase from a Tory Prime Minister". 
Noting "peers coming out of the backwoods and woodwork", it observed: 
"Some of them hadn't spoken in the House - or been seen there - since 
the Coronation. But they heeded the call and provided the biggest turnout 
of the un elected representatives of privilege that Parliament has witnessed 
this century. Some came because they will do well out of the poll tax .... 
but most came because they heeded the call for loyalty to the Tory cause, 
a loyalty bred in their bones and encased in ermine. As least the House of 
Lords can now be seen again for what it is~ Mrs. Thatcher's poodle. Some 
of their Lordships may live long enough to regret it".42 
Supporters of the status quo had previously sought to deflect or reject criticism 
that the Conservatives could rely on backwoodsmen to get them out of a crisis. 
Now the government had been seen clearly to be doing just that. Gilmour cited 
this as an example to show how they could always ship in some who never 
normally attended or who knew little about the issue "at some public expense in 
transport fees and attendance allowance", adding that in this particular case, "since 
the passage of the amendment would have cost most of them hundreds of pounds, 
their visit to London was undoubtedly .... ~vaut Ie voyage'''.43 According to Shell "the 
whole episode ... discredited the HOUSe".44 
When interviewed, the former Leader of the House, Baroness Young agreed that 
"forcing it through the House was a disaster". She thought "it would have heen 
much better if the House of Lords had just operated and thrown it out", adding: 
''I'm never very happy about bringing in large numbers of backwoodsmen". 
4~ 'House of Poodles', 111e Sun. 25th May 1988. 
H Ciilmour (op cit) p 186. 
44 She II (OP cit) P 17.2 
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However, Lord Denham was quite unrepentant about his role. He described 
Chelwood's amendment as a "wrecking amendment" and argued that, had it been 
passed, it would have breached the Salisbury convention. He argued that it was 
this that "brought in such an enormous number of poeple" on this occasion. He 
further suggested that, if the amendment had been passed, this might have 
prompted the government to support reform of the House of Lords.45 It should 
be noted, however, that neither speaker from the government front bench made 
any specific reference to the Salisbury doctrine.46 Of course, in the event, the 
government did not come close to defeat and no reform materialised (although it 
may have helped to put the issue back on Labour's agenda).47 
That same month in 1988 had also seen the government win another key vote in 
similar fashion, in another very high turnout, enabling it to go ahead with the 
abolition of the Inner London Education Authority.48 As was pointed out in the 
debate, that controversial step had been tacked onto a broader measure at a late 
stage and had not been in the governing party's manifesto. 49 This was the sort of 
situation in which a revising chamber might have been expected to assert itself, but 
it did not.50 
45 InteIViews, July 1997 and January 2000. 
46 The government speakers were Whitelaw and the Earl of Caithness. Conservative 
supporters of the Chelwood amendment denied that it was a wrecking amendment. 
For instance, the former Home Secretary, Lord Carr of Hadley, said: "We are not 
trying to wreck the foundamentals of their scheme, much as we might wish they had 
chosen a different one. It is too late for that now. What we say is that they really 
must go back, think again and produce further ameliorations ... " (House of Lords 
Debates, 23rd May 1988, Vol 497, Cols 648-684). It might have been felt that 
the manifesto conunitment had been less than clear. It spoke of replacing the 
local rates with Ita fairer Community Charge" (The Next Moves FOlWard, 
Conservative Party Manifesto 1987; Dale, op cit, p 344). 
47 See Chapter 6. 
48 This was on an amendment to the Education Reform Bill, to set up a panel of assessors to 
investigate education in London before the ILEA could be abolished, which was defeated 
by 236 votes to 183 (House of Lords Debates, 17th May 1988, Vol 497, Cols 234-7) . 
.t9 Ibid, Co) 186. 
50 Shell (op cit. P 172) notes that "although the government was defeated six times on this 
Bill. the resulting changes were relatively minor". The Times (30th July 1988) was able 
later to report that it emerged virtually unscathed in the end. 
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Later in the same seSSIOn, In July, the Lords defeated the government on the 
Health and Medicines Bill over proposals to introduce charges for eye tests and 
dental checks.51 The Commons subsequently overturned these Lords' amendments 
when the Bill returned in November, but only very narrowly.52 When it came 
back to the Lords, the Government Chief Whip managed to achieve what was 
reported to be the third highest attendance of the 20th century; and secured 
majorities of 50 and 41 respectively on the critical amendments on eye tests and 
dental charges.53 These were much higher than the majorities reached in the 
heavily whipped Commons. Thus, once again, the government got its way in the 
end. It would seem that, at least for crucial votes, it was now able successfully to 
whip its supporters into line in the Lords, and ensure the attendance of sufficient 
"backwoodsmen" . 
Such key votes would seem to contradict the conclusion of Nicholas Baldwin's 
study that, while the attendance of the backwoodsmen is a theoretical possibility, it 
is not one that materialises in practice.54 Lord Denham has also argued that 
"backwoodsmen are a fiction"; but, as noted earlier, Baroness Young herself used 
that very term when discussing the Lords' action on the poll tax.55 Ian Gilmour, 
too, has referred to the role of "backwoods peers" in helping the government on 
major issues; and Viscount Mountgarrett's observations in the debate in the GLC 
legislation also suggested pressure on backwoodsmen, although he did not use that 
actual term.56 The 5th Marquess of Salisbury did, when he complained about the 
51 House of Lords Debates, 19th July 1988 (Vol 499, Col 237, 1247). Amendment to delete 
proposed dental charges carried 118-97; that to delete proposals for eye test charges 
carried 126-94. 
52 The vote to overturn the Lords amendment in respect of dental charges was carried by 16 
votes; that in respect of eye tests was carried by just eight votes (House of C.ommons 
Debates, 1st November 1988, Vol 139, Cols 918, 958). 
53 John Carvel: 'Tories crush Lords revolt on eye tests', The Guardian, 9th November 1988 
He gives the turnout as 467. However, the official record shows the highest figures as 
464 (including tellers). The amendment on eye tests was defeated 257-207; that on dental 
charges defeated 237-196 (House of Lords Debates, 8th November 1988; Vol 501. 
Cols 579. 586). 
54 PhD thesis. University of Exeter (1985), Chapter 5. Baldwin's thesis was, of course. 
submitted befort' the 1988 votes, but not before others. such as those on local government 
legislation. 
55 Illk rviews (for Y ollng, see p 209). 
56 Sl't' pp 202 and 205. 
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role of "backwoodsmen" some thirty years previously; and notwithstanding 
Denham's protestations, they still seem to have been a factor in the House of 
Lords in the 1980s,57 The Conservative dominance in the second chamber could 
normally be made to count where it really mattered, As Donald Shell concl uded, 
"to the Thatcher government of the 1980s, the House was frequently an irritant. 
but never a serious obstacle",58 
There was, however, to be one measure later in the Parliament on which the 
government would not be able to carry the Lords. This was the War Crimes Bill 
1990, enabling the prosecution of former Nazi war criminals in Britain. A debate 
in the Lords on the issue prior to the legislation had indicated "clear and 
overwhelming hostility to such legislation".59 However the Commons was in favour, 
and the Bill passed all its stages there, only to be rejected overwhelmingly when it 
came to Second Reading in the Lords,60 This was highly significant, since it was 
"the first time since 1949 that peers had rejected outright a measure approved by 
MPs and the Cabinet".61 
The government decided to reintroduce the Bill in the foltowing session, using the 
Parliament Act procedures, if necessary, to get it through. The Commons again 
passed it comfortably in March 1991, but the Lords once more rejected it on 
Second Reading, this time by 131 votes to 109.62 The government duly invoked 
the Parliament Act procedures and the Bill went forward for Royal Assent without 
the approval of the House of Lords. This was the first time the procedure had 
been used since the Act was passed in 1949.63 
57 For Salisbury quote, see p 23. For general statistics on at1endance. see Appendix 1. 
58 Parliamentary Affairs, October 1994 (Vol 47, P 733). 
59 Shell: The House of Lords, p 132. This debate took place in a motion to take note of 
the War Crimes Inquiry Report, on which there was no vote (House of Lords Debates. 
4th December 1989, Vol 513, \--Ols 604-677). 
60 Ibid, 4th June 1990 (Vol 519, Cois 1080-1208). An amendment to decline a Second 
Readin~ was carried by 207 votes to 74. 
61 Geor~e Jones, The Daily Telegraph, 8th June 1990. 
()? House of Lords Debates. 30th April 1991 (Vol 528, Col 742). The vote was on an 
aJlH.'ndment to delay Second Readin~ for six months. 
63 Shell (op cit) pp 132-33. 
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Thus the government got its way in the end, despite being unable to obtain the 
support of the House of Lords. It was, however. an unusual measure in that it 
was not one to which party political partisanship applied - it had not been in the 
government's manifesto and the vote had not been whipped.64 Ian Gilmour has 
described the actions of the government in pushing the Bill through as "a clear 
abuse of the Parliament Act", although it is not clear how, unless there was an 
assumption that the powers contained in the Act should never be used.65 There is, 
nevertheless, a certain irony in the fact that the only occasion on which the powers 
of the 1949 Act have been used should have been by a ConselVative government. 
In The Times, Sheila Gunn noted how the Lords' influence had now "crumpled to 
the point where every key decision that conflicts with the elected chamber is 
openly jeered at by members and reversed in the Commons".66 Although Shell 
has suggested that the readiness with which the ConselVative government and the 
Commons "brushed aside the views of the House of Lords" was indicative of a 
changed attitude towards it, he has also argued that Margaret Thatcher - despite, 
when in opposition, having commissioned a committee to advise about the future 
of the House - was, as Prime Minister, "manifestly agnostic": that her government 
showed "little interest in reform" and that, "as the decade went by, the need to 
reform the House lest it fall victim to Labour's abolitionist ambitions diminished. 
The ConselVatives simply ceased to have any policy at all".67 This lack of interest 
would seem to be borne out by the fact that very few of Thatcher's ministers seem 
to have had anything to say on the issue in their subsequent memoirs.68 Neither, 
indeed, did she herself.69 
64 Ibid, P 252. 
65 Gilmour said it had not been mentioned at the 1987 election, that the Lords' expertise was 
"far greater" than the Commons and that it had been annihilated in Lords. "even more in 
argument than in votes" (op cit, p 186). 
66 The limes. 23rd April 1991. 
67 Shell (op cit) pp 167-168, 252. . . 
68 I"he main exceptions to this were Carrington, Hailsham, Gilmour and WhItelaw (OP Cit). 
Nicholas Ridley also mentioned it briefly (see p 214). 
69 In neither The Downing Street Years (Harper C~lIins. 1993), nor The Path to Power 
(Harper Collins, 1995). Nor did Hugo Young mention it in his biography. One of l :s 
(Macmillan. 1989). 
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Strengthening Conservative Ranks 
Nevertheless, Thatcher would have been well aware of the potential for difficulties 
in the Lords. According to Shell, while she took "good care as Prime Minister to 
keep the opposition benches in the Lords starved of new recruits", she continued 
to appoint significant numbers to the already wel1-stocked Conservative benches _ 
"far from evening up the Party balance in the House, she seemed determined to 
ensure an increased majority"; and indeed she was responsible for creating more 
than twice as many Conservative as Labour peers.70 As Gunn noted in The 
Times, "she freely added to her Party's numbers".?1 As a result, by the time John 
Major replaced Thatcher at the end of 1990, Conservatives outnumbered Labour 
peers by three-to-one; and they actually had a majority overall (even taking 
crossbenchers into account).72 
Nicholas Ridley, who was a close ally, acknowledged that Thatcher "created 
honours quite liberally" and that, with just one exception, she bestowed a peerage 
on every one of her Cabinet ministers who left the Commons, anticipating thei r 
support. Thus: 
"When many of these ennobled ex-colleagues were reported to have voted 
against the government she used to be surprised. 'J sent them there to 
support me, they ought to know better,' she would say. So she created 
many other peers who would be more reliable. Even some of them were to 
transgress".73 
70 Shell: The House of Lords, p 275; Paliiamentary Affairs, October 1994 (Vol 47, P 723). 
The f()Jmer (p 36) records 203 creations, of which 101 were Conservative and 45 Labour. 
(These differ from the official statistics listed in Appendix 1, which include resignation/ 
dissolution honours for which her predecessor would have been responsible.) See p 132 
on how Thatcher apparently blocked some proposed Labour creations 
71 'A Handful of Rebels', The Times, 6th June 1990. 
72 See Appendix 1; also The Times. 21st December 1990. 
73 My Style of Govemment: The Thatcher Yea~ (Hutchinson 1991) p .,1 The single 
exception referred to was former Defence Secretary, John Nott, who recclved a 
knighthood. (Ridley was Secretary of State for Transport 1983-86. for Environment 
1988-89 and for Trade and Industry 1989-90.) 
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Margaret Thatcher also revived the creation of hereditary peerages, albeit on a 
very limited scale. None had been awarded since 1964, but she awarded 
hereditary viscountcies to the fonner Speaker of the House of Commons, George 
Thomas (Viscount Tonypandy), and to her Cabinet colleague, William Whitelaw 
(Viscount Whitelaw), in 1983; and also an hereditary earldom to the fonner Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan (Earl of Stockton), in 1984. The two fonner had no 
eligible heirs, but Macmillan did.74 Separately, one royal dukedom was also 
created during this period.75 There were no further hereditary creations; 
nevertheless, it showed that the hereditary peerage could still be added to, if the 
Prime Minister so wished. 
Reform Discussed 
This limited revival of tradition followed the landslide victory in the 1983 election. 
However, when the Conservatives first regained office in 1979, there was still a 
significant degree of interest in reform of the House of Lords. Although the 
party's manifesto had been non-commital, the report of Lord Home's Committee 
was then little more than a year old; and there continued to be concern over 
potential action that Labour might take in future. The DaiJy Telegraph reported 
in October 1979 that: 
"proposals by the Labour left for the abolition of the House of Lords had 
increased the feeling among Conservatives that some reform of the second 
chamber should be made". 
Although the government had "no immediate plans", the report continued, 
"consideration of the future of the House of Lords is expected during the lifetime 
of this Parliament...Many Conservatives believe that it would be better to reform -
and hopefully strengthen - the Lords before the return of a Labour government". 
74 Shell (OP cit) p 33. The Tonypandy and Whitelaw peerages therefore tenninated with the 
holders' deaths. 
75 The Queen's second son, Prince Andrew, was created Duke of York in 1986. 
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It singled out two senior government figures, Lords Carrington and Hailsham, as 
supporters of reform.76 Not long afterwards, Hailsham was reported as telling a 
Conservative backbench committee that "there ought to be constitutional changes", 
but adding, perhaps significantly, that "he did not expect it without backbench 
pressure on Cabinet ministers".77 This would seem to suggest that he thought that 
the Cabinet might be willing to consider the issue, but not necessarily to give it 
priority without some pressure being brought to bear. 
However, there were further reports that ministers were addressing the matter. In 
May 1980, The Sunday Times reported that: 
"a new second House of Parliament is being considered by senior cabinet 
membersin response to the growing Labour Party threat to abolish the 
Lords. The new chamber would be elected on a new constituency pattern". 
In an apparent reference to Jeff Rooker's Ten Minute Rule Bill, the report noted 
that, although it had been easily defeated, there had been "impressive unity on the 
Labour side to end the present upper chamber". The thinking amongst 
Conservatives in "the reform camp" was said to be that an elected chamber would 
present Labour with "a strong democratic challenge" and the initiative rested with 
Hailsham, who was expected to take soundings amongst other parties. Some 
ministers were said to want action before the next election, but others apparently 
thought Labour should be left to do itself electoral harm, as they saw it.78 
76 'Tory feeling grows for reform', The DaiJy Telegraph, 24th October 1979. Carrington and 
Hailsham were now Foreign Secretary and Lord ChanceHor respectively. Possibly one or 
other may have inspired this story. However, when interviewed, Carrington could not 
recaH any discussions at this time, although as Foreign Secretary, he may have been 
pre-occupied with other issues. Neither could Baroness Young recall either of them 
actuaHy raising it in government, although she thought Hailsham might have done. 
(However, she did not join the Cabinet until 1981.) 
77 'Elected Chamber Call by Lord Chancellor', The Times, 24th January 1980. (Official 
papers were not available, but no mention was made of a backbench committee in this 
context by any Conservatives interviewed.) 
78 Michael Jones: 'Ministers plan new elected Lords' ('hamber', The Sunday Times, 
lIth May 1980. The report implied that the proposed new chamber would be elected 
by proportional representation; reformers thought it would reflect public opinion "in a 
way that the first-past-the-post system would not". It would not have financial powers, 
but would be able to reject other legislation. A referendum was mooted as a way of 
ov('rcomin~ Commons' resistance. (For Rooker's Bill, see p 1(9) 
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It would seem that this report did not reflect the views of the whole Cabinet, since 
the following day it was "authentically described" as "premature". According to 
The Times, although Conservative reformers, "with Lord Hailsham in the van", 
believed it would be "better to be safe with an elected second chamber than sorry 
with an abolished or emasculated House of Lords", the Prime Minister was 
"unpersuaded of the need to pre-empt the possible Labour action".79 
Clearly some rival briefing was taking place; and any kite flying was presumably 
not authorised by Downing Street. Hailsham's name, in particular, seems to have 
been identified with supporters of reform; and it may be that he was seeking to 
encourage the pressure on his Cabinet colleagues that he apparently then thought 
was needed. It seems curious that the possibility of talks with other parties should 
have been mooted since, as The Times pointed out, "the prospect of all party talks 
is dim";80 and this would not only have been because of the Prime Minister's views 
- it was surely unlikely that Labour would have joined any such talks at that time, 
given the recent arguments about the watering down of the commitment to 
outright abolition.81 The Sunday Times report had, after all, noted the strength of 
support on the Labour benches for a Ten Minute Rule Bill proposing abolition. It 
is interesting to note that, while the chances of such a Bill reaching the statute 
book may be negligible, this procedure can serve as a demonstration of feeling on 
an important political issue, as in this instance. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
79 The Times, 12th May 1980. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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The commentator, Ronald Butt, once again lent his support to the cause of 
reform, arguing that "failure of the present government" on the issue could lead to 
"fundamental challenge to the whole shape of our society". Notwithstanding 
previous clarifications, he sought to resurrect the suggestion that Labour's 
proposed safeguard with regard to the life of a Parliament actually meant that it 
might be extended. He wanted to see a house of "elders", which would be able to 
ensure "substantial delay on any Bill certified as a constitutional measure".82 
The Prime Minister's lack of enthusiasm for Lords' reform was demonstrated 
when she responded to a Conservative backbencher, who asked about the 
possibility of ¢ a Green Paper on "how to improve our vitally important system of 
dual chamber government". She said: 
"There are many conflicting views on whether the House of Lords should 
be reformed and, if so, precisely how that could be achieved. Some hon 
members who have been in this House a long time remember a number of 
efforts to reform the House of Lords, but they were not successful. There 
is no possibility of the government producing a Green paper in the autumn. 
I think that my hon friend will agree that, for the time being, we have more 
urgent matters on our plate".83 
In referring to unsuccessful efforts at reform, she must have had in mind those of 
the Labour government in 1968/69. It would seem that this unhappy experience 
had helped encourage caution amongst Conservative as well as Labour politicians. 
However, the debate in the Labour Party continued to gIVe impetus to 
Conservative advocates of reform, as events during the 1980 Party Conference 
season showed. Tony Benn's speech at the Labour Conference - proposing that a 
82 'Persuing a perilous path without the Lords'; 'The Making of a New Upper House': 
The Times, 24th and 31st July 1980. It would comprise some elected peers, together 
with former cabinet ministers, judges and other individuals "of great personal distinction" 
or holding particular responsibilities. Ten years previously, be bad proposed a mainly 
elected chamber (See p 165). 
83 Reply to David Madel (House of Commons Debates, 5th June 1980, Vol 985, Col 1673). 
- 219 -
Labour government introduce an "immediate Bill" to abolish the Lords and create 
1,000 peers to carry it through84 - seems to have galvanised the Conservatives, no 
doubt much to the satisfaction of those who had been pushing for reform. 
According to Fred Emery in The Times, it "worked wonders". He noted that, 
despite lobbying from Lord Hailsham, the issue had been a "low priority with Mrs 
Thatcher and her colleagues", spoken of, if at all, as a matter for a second term, 
but that events at the Labour Conference had "compelled the government to 
respond", and at the Conservative Conference the following week, speakers were 
"almost falling over themselves to urge action".85 That Conference passed a 
resolution urging that the House of Lords be strengthened. It stated: 
"In the light of the Socialist commitment to abolish the House of Lords and 
the likelihood that a future left wing government intent on perpetuating 
itself would establish a single chamber Parliament as a step towards the 
creation of a Marxist state, this Conference urges that the composition and 
powers of the Upper House should be strengthened and firmly established 
as a safeguard against arbitrary government". 86 
Two future ministers spoke on opposite sides in the debate, Ann Widdecombe was 
against change, while Douglas Hogg (Lord Hailsham's son) argued that survival of 
the second chamber would be ensured only if its membership was elected, adding 
that "if this Conference persuaded our colleagues in government of the need for 
an elected second chamber, we will have made a real contribution to the survival 
of democracy in Britain. n 87 A former minister, Lord Boyd Carpenter, proposed 
entrenched legislation to limit the number of peerage creations, perhaps to a 
dozen in anyone year. 88 
84 See p 112. 
85 'Tory pledge to guard against end of Lords; Benn speech looms over Conference', 
The Times, 8th October 1980. 
86 lonservative and Labour Party Conference Decisions 1945-1981, P 27. 
87 The Times, 8th October 1980. Widdecombe became Minister of State at the Home Office 
and Hogg Minister of Agriculture in John Major's government (which would take no 
action on Lords' reform). 
88 Ibid. This was a clear repose to Benn's proposition. Boyd CAlrpenter was joint author 
(with Viscount Eccles, Lord Drumalbyn and the Earl of Lau~erdale ) of a p~m.phlet 'The 
Need to retain a Second Chamber', published by the Executtve of the AssociatJon of 
Independent Unionist Peers' around the same time (October 1980). It contained no wry 
clear proposals but claimed, apparently on the basis that many members did not attend 
regularly and on the evidence of one Conservative defeat (on school transport), that their 
"built in majority" had disappeared, and that there was thus no justification for abolition 
on the these grounds. 
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The minister who replied to the debate, Norman St 10hn-Stevas, argued that it 
was important to devise a means "so that the second chamber cannot be swept 
away by an unrepresentative House of Commons, but can stand secure as long as 
it commands the approval and the esteem of the nation". However, while 
supporting the Conference motion, he could not say when the government would 
proceed - "the nostrum of instant abolition is not to be answered by the nostrum 
of instant reform", he said. It was necessary to think "long and carefully", to 
consult with peers and to consider whether to retain the status quo (which would 
actually have been inconsistent with the motion), to have a fully elected chamber 
or a mixed chamber. He favoured retaining an hereditary component. St 
10hn-Stevas was also reported as admitting (in an interview on BBC Newsnight) 
that the Cabinet "had never considered the matter" and that it could not be 
considered by Parliament in the forthcoming 1980-81 Parliamentary session.89 
This suggests that, notwithstanding the previous reports, those in favour of reform 
had made little headway.90 Nevertheless, the events at the Party Conferences 
must have helped their cause.91 According to Michael Fallon, there was then still 
"a feeling that the Lords was vulnerable and we needed to sort of protect it"; and 
that the only way to protect it was to modernise it - "if we didn't do something, a 
future Labour government could just sweep it all away" 92 
89 Ibid. 
90 As Ronald Butt had previously noted, "this is Mrs Thatcher's government, not Lord 
Hailsham's, and the Prime Minister has shown herself little interested in and, in some 
cases, positively hostile to constitutional reform" ( 'A Question of Rights', 'The Times, 
17th July 1980). 
91 It should be noted that the ConselVative Conference did not actually determine Party 
policy. Both Carrington and Denham, when interviewed, ack~owledged that its influence 
over the government would have been limited. Nevertheless, It could prove a useful 
barometer of opinion amongst Party activists. 
92 Interview, February 2000. 
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In an apparent attempt to make this difficult, the former Conservative minister, 
Lord Alport, introduced a Constitutional Referendum Bill in the Lords. This 
provided for a referendum to be held on legislation involving constitutional 
reform, with a requirement that 40 per cent of those entitled to vote should 
support it, otherwise it would be subject to a fIVe year delay. lAcking active 
government support, it made no progress beyond Second Reading. However, the 
reply from the Leader of the House, Lord Soames, was interesting for what it 
revealed about the government's position. He noted that matters of definition 
were "a grey area"; but while the the government would "look carefully" at the 
arguments for legislation to protect the constitutional powers of the House, he was 
"not in a position to give an undertaking that we shall necesssarily come forward 
with our own proposals". He also argued that enacting legislation to protect the 
principle of a second chamber was different from seeking to protect an 
"unreformed second chamber" and that a measure of protection should be looked 
at in the context of wider reform. Having said that legislation would be more 
appropriate to a government Bill, he was surprisingly frank about current thinking 
within the government, adding: 
"Certainly some of my colleagues think there should be radical reform of 
this House. There are others who think there should be some reform and 
yet others who think that at the moment it is probably better as it is .... what 
I am saying is that the government have not yet made up their mind. "93 
Despite his initial lack of success, Alport made a further attempt to introduce 
broadly similar legislation in the following 1981/82 session. By this time, Soames 
had been replaced as Leader of the Lords by Baroness Young, who asserted that 
the House was an "essential safeguard of individual liberty" and, moreover, that it 
was the only constitutional guarantee that a general election must be held at 
intervals of not more than five years". It could be argued that this did not amount 
93 House of Lords Debates, (25th November 1980, Vol 415. Cols 590~35). The 40 per 
cent hurdle was similar to that required for implementation of the previous Labour 
government's devolution legislation. Soames asked AJport to withdraw the BiU, but he 
declined. After Second Reading, it was committed to Committee of the whole House. 
but progressed no further. Its provisions would have applied to a Bill cer1ifie~ by 
either the Speaker or the Lord Chancellor, which in their opinion would abohsh the 
1 louse of Lords or substantially reduce its powers. 
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to a complete guarantee, since the House of Lords could, in theory, support a 
proposal to extend the life of a Parliament. Be that as it may, Young made it 
clear that the government did not propose to pursue "any forms of protection or 
entrenchment by legislation, whether by referendum or otherwise, during the 
present Parliament"; and that the Bill had "virtually no chance of reaching the 
statute book". On the wider question of reform, she suggested that progress could 
be made only through all-party talks and a measure of agreement with other 
parties, of which there was currently little sign.94 
In the debate on Alport's second Bill (which was withdrawn at Committee Stage), 
he and several other speakers continued to refer to a perceived threat from the 
Labour Party.95 However, the 1981 Conservative Party Conference, held shortly 
before, had shown rather less enthusiasm for action than it had done the previous 
year. Once again a motion was on the agenda. This one stated: 
"Conference believes that reform of the House of Lords is an urgent matter 
and steps should be taken in the lifetime of this Parliament to ensure that 
Britain's second chamber retains the experience and integrity of the present 
system, while gaining constitutional authority that would accrue if it were 
wholly or partly elected." 
The mover of the motion (Stephen Mann) warned that the Conservatives had to 
face the threat of an election with the Labour Party committed to abolition, but 
Baroness Young said that reform could not be achieved in the lifetime of the 
current Parliament. All-party talks seemed unlikely, although the government 
would continue to search for a change that would be acceptable to all parties. 
Although it would have been consistent with the still recent report by l.ord 
Home's committee, the motion was defeated.96 
---------------------------------------
-------------------------
-------------------------------------------
94 Second Reading Debate, Constitutional Referendum Bill: House of Lords Debates, 
4th December 1981 (Vol 426, Cols 19-26,34·58). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Conservative and Labour Party Conference Decisions, p 27; The Times, 17th October 
1981. 
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In the following months, Young repeated in the House of Lords what she had told 
the Party Conference; and, similarly, the Leader of the Commons, now Francis 
Pym, when asked about the prospect of a Green Paper, replied that the 
government had no such proposals at present.97 Nevertheless, the possibility of 
future movement had not been ruled out. 
Lord Hailsham, whose earlier support for refonn has already been noted, spoke at 
a Conference of European (Parliamentary) Speakers in June 1982 of the the need, 
ideally, for "a predominantly or completely elective assembly, elected from 
constituencies, geographically different from those in the Lower House". While 
subordinate to the lower house, such a second chamber should have real power to 
make itself felt. 
"It must be in a position to impress its views, particularly in the field of 
legislation designed to be permanent, in such a way that the Lower 
House cannot rush through legislation which flouts the genuine rights of 
minorities, the permanent sense of the inarticulate majority as to what is 
appropriate or right, the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual 
and of groups, or the changing opinions of a minority of the electors".98 
It is not clear how far Hailsham was willing to pursue these arguments inside his 
own government, however. According to Gilmour, he was given no remit as Lord 
Chancellor to carry through constitutional changes of any kind and, while 
disappointed and making some dissenting noises, he chose not to oppose the 
Prime Minister, defending this on the grounds that economic reform took 
priority.99 
IIowever, although not generally known at the time, the government was actually 
giving consideration to a possible measure of reform to the House of Lords. This 
emerged in a BBC radio programme some five years later, which reported that 
97 House of Lords Debates, 24th March 1982, (Vol 428, Cols 960-3); House of Commons 
Debates, 5th April 1982 (Vol 21. Col 221). 
98 Published in The Parliamentarian (issued by the Secretariat of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association), October 1982 (Vol 63, No 4). 
99 Gilmour (op cit) pp 35, 178. 
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Baroness Young had persuaded the Prime Minister to set up a Cabinet 
Commiteee (chaired by Whitelaw) to consider proposals for reform.1°O This was 
subsequently confirmed by Young, who had been a member of the Home 
committee, which she said, had suggested reforms which were possible and which 
sparked her off. Another factor was the inability of the then Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Carrington, to speak to the Commons following the Argentinian invasion of 
the Falkland Islands in 1982, which she thought had handicapped the government. 
She had thought major reforms would not be possible, "as 1968 showed us", and 
moreover "Mrs Thatcher wasn't keen" - indeed she didn't want any reforms of the 
House at all. Young had suggested "relatively small reforms" - for instance, that 
ministers be allowed to to address either House, for joint meetings of both Houses 
and for joint committees. She also suggested some distinction be drawn between 
"honorific" and "working peers" - in other words, doing something about 
backwoodsmen who rarely attended - although it was not clear whether any 
detailed plans were formulated.1 01 
In fact the Cabinet Commmittee only met once. Nothing came of it, as, in Young's 
words, "there was no pressure there". Although Thatcher "disliked" the House of 
Lords and became annoyed with it when it defeated the Commons, this did not 
help Young's modest efforts at reform. Thatcher became displeased with both her 
and the House - "she felt they were all Conservatives sitting there, the least they 
could do was suport her" -but there was "absolutely no pressure from her for 
reforms". If anything, "all these things militated against getting reform done."I02 
100 Analysis - The Other Opposition, BBe Radio 4, 5th November 1987. 
101 Interview, July 1997. She is on record as having told the Home Committee (Minutes, 
12th Meeting, 6th December 1977) that, as its workcontinued, she had become more 
sceptical about wholesale refonn, which suggests a predisposition toward "small reforms". 
102 Ibid. In separate interviews, Carrington recaHed that Thatcher "got ve~ ~gryll over 
defeats in the Lords and that Denham, as Chief Whip, was on the receMng end of her 
displeasure - "he was "black and blue .... she used to beat him over the head". Carrington 
also thought, however, that Thatcher had no intention of doing anythi.ng about It. 
C.arrington's colourful description is clearly not literal, but Denham hImself acknowledged 
that Thatcher berated him over defeats. 
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Baroness Young's successor as Leader of the Lords, Viscount Whitelaw. later 
observed that he felt the time had not then been ripe for change. He added that, 
while he would not have objected to her proposals, he was not sure the Commons 
would have agreed, especially to ministers in the Lords addressing the 
Commons)03 Of course, another way of avoiding the position whereby a senior 
Cabinet Minister was unable to address the Commons, would have been not to 
appoint members of the House of Lords to senior departmental positions. 
However, although Lord Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1982, to be 
replaced by Francis Pym in the House of Commons, Mrs Thatcher would later 
appoint Lord Young of Graffham to the Cabinet post of Secretary of State for 
Employment. 104 
Later in 1982, Baroness Young told the Conservative Party Conference that "Jack 
of agreement within the ConseIVative Party and other parties ..... would be fatal at 
any attempt at reform", although she added that, if major reforms were to be 
rejected III future, "we shall continue to search for smaller internal 
improvements")05 Presumably she had in mind the sort of reforms she put 
-forward in the Cabinet Committee earlier that year. This statement, like that of 
her predecessor Lord Soames in ] 980, suggests that it was lack of agreement in 
the Conservative Party, as much as the lack of any wider agreement, which 
inhibited any significant movement on the issue of Lords' reform. 
103 Interviewed by Peter Hennessy for Analysis: The Other Opposition. In another interview 
for the same programme, Lord Hailsham said that he had not been consulted on Young's 
proposals. 
104 Lord Young (no relation of Baroness Young) was Secretary of State for Employment 
1985-87, then served as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 1987-89. 
105 Reported in ConseIVative Campaign Guide 1983, p 324 (Empbasis a~ded). The. Times. 
(8th October 1982) reported that the Conference rejected overwh~lmingly a .m~~on callmg 
for the election of some members of the Lords; and Young as saYIng that pnontJes over 
the next year or two must be elsewhere. 
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The Conservatives' 1983 election manifesto was non-commital on the Issue. It 
stated: 
"Labour want to abolish the House of Lords. We will ensure that it has a 
secure and effective future. A strong second chamber is a vital safeguard 
for democracy and contributes to good govemment".106 
The Party's Campaign Guide sought to put a more positive gloss on things, 
acknowledging that the "existing state of opinion in the Party and the country does 
not permit further substantial reform at present", but asserting that "it is a well 
established Conservative tradition stretching from the days of the great Lord 
Salisbury to seek constructive reform".107 
Settling for the Status Quo 
By the end of the next Parliament In 1987, however, the Campaign Guide had 
changed its emphasis, arguing in respect of the House of Lords that "further major 
reforms would not necessarily increase its effectiveness''.108 With a Conservative 
majority of 144 in the 1983 Parliament, the prospect of Labour abolishing the 
House of Lords - which had previously exercised the Conservatives - had receded; 
and such interest as there had been in Lords reform seems to have waned. 109 
Whitelaw, the new Leader of the House, was no great enthusiast for reform. In 
November 1983, although only recently elevated to the peerage, he was publicly 
expressing scepticism about the likely success of thorough-going reform, arguing 
that the Commons would not want a second chamber with too much power. 110 
106 The Conservative Manifesto, 1983 (Dale, op cit, p 303). 
107 Conservative Campaign Guide 1983, p 324. 
108 C~nseJVative Campaign Guide 1987, p 410. 
109 One exception was a paper by Nicholas Paget Brown (Unfinished Business: Proposals for 
Reform of the House of Lords: Bow Publications, 1983) in which he argued that, while it 
would be unfortunate if the proposals of "a few unrepresentative socialists" led to 
abolition, it would be equally damaging if the response from the Conservatives was simply 
to do nothing". He argued for phased introduction of elected members to the House. with 
limitations on the voting rights of hereditary peers and those unwilling to attend regularly. 
110 House of Lords Debates, 3rd November 1983 (Vol 444, Cols 655-660). 
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He later told Peter Hennessy that he did not want the House given more powers, 
nor did he want to see composition changed dramatically;111 and he acknowledged 
in his memoirs, "with hindsight.. . .I am convinced that the House of Lords is far 
more valuable as it stands."l12 In Parliamentary replies in this and the next 
Parliament, Whitelaw and his colleagues were mostly content to state simply that 
the government had no present plans for reform. They no longer even hinted at 
willingness to seek wider agreement. l13 
Another minister, Nicholas Ridley, later recalled that when the Lords "became 
quite troublesome before the 1987 general election, Margaret Thatcher 
"considered reforming the powers of the House of Lords but that discretion 
became the better part of valour over this".1 14 However, Baroness Young (who 
was no longer in the Cabinet, but had been moved to become Minister of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office) said that if there was any discussion in the 
Cabinet at the time, she never heard of it. 115 Neither could Lord Denham, who 
was still Chief Whip, recall any such discussion. 116 Certainly there was no specific 
mention of the issue in the Party's 1987 manifesto. Although, after the election, 
The Times reported that the government was considering making greater use of 
secondary legislation as a means of "preventing peers watering down its radical 
programme of reforms this session",117 there is no evidence of any further interest 
111 Interview for Analysis, 1987. 
112 Whitelaw (op cit) pp 66-68. 
113 See, for instance, Written Answers by Whitelaw, 26th January 1984 (House of Lords 
Debates, Vol 447, Col 444); Margaret Thatcher, 20th November 1986 (House of 
Commons Debates, Vol 105, Col 266); and Kenneth Baker, 3rd December 1989 (Ibid, 
Vol 182, Col 10), who, asked if he would bring forward proposals, replied simply "No". 
114 Ridley (op cit) p 33. He added that, in his view, it would have been W?rth the effort. 
Gilmour also notes this in his memoirs (op cit, p 186), but he was not III the government 
then, and gives Ridley as his source. 
115 Interview. She thought she would have heard of any such discussion. 
116 Interview. He thought Mrs. Thatcher may have said to him that it was "about time we 
reformed your House", but he did not think she really seriously thought of doing so. 
117 Sheila Gunn: 'Lords may force move to curb powers', The Times, 5th November 1987. 
Unlike Bills, secondary (or delegated) legislation cannot be amended. Although it has 
the power to do so, the House of Lords has hardly ever voted down secondary legislation. 
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inside the government in pursuing actual Lords reform. According to Ivor Crewe, 
"Mrs Thatcher's preferred way of dealing with obstinate institutions was not to 
reform them, but to abolish or bypass them, unless they were so weak that she 
could ignore them".118 It would seem that the House of Lords must have come 
into the latter category. 
By the time of Thatcher's third term, following the 1987 election, earlier 
protagonists of reform such as Lord Carrington, Lord Hailsham and Baroness 
Young had all left the government. As an individual, Carrington continued to 
favour reform. He stated in his memoirs, published in 1988, that from the time he 
entered the House of Lords in 1945, he had been unhappy with his party's 
dominance there, and argued that "it is extremely flawed". He concluded that "a 
House which, In effect, appealed to the people by blocking the House of 
Commons had to have some sort of demonstrable authority", and added: "I am 
now convinced that what is required is an elected House".119 
Young continued to favour the sort of reforms she had earlier put forward inside 
the government. She felt there was a need to convince her colleagues that it was 
important for the sake of the constitution, but that stage had not been reached. 
Interestingly, when asked what it would take to get Lords reform taken seriously 
again, she replied that it would entail a real threat to abolish the House, backed 
by real thinking about how it would be achieved.12o 
Hailsham, however, subsequently lost interest in reform and was even prepared 
to defend the existing chamber. Writing in 1990 - after eleven years of 
Conservative government - he quoted the 19th century Prime Minister, Lord 
Melbourne, asking "Why not let it alone?" While accepting that "no one could 
have invented the present body and no one outside a lunatic asylum could possihly 
defend its present composition on purely intellectual grounds", 
118 In How Tory (;ol't'mmcIJts Fall (ed Anthony Seldon, Fontana Press 1996, p 397). 
119 Reflcct on ot" Thin!!." Past. pp 81, 204, 214. Carrington ~till took this view when 
intervlcwed in 1999. 
I ~O Interview with Peln Hennessy for Analysis, 1987. 
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Hailsham now argued that "the strength of the present House of Lords lies in its 
very anomalies". Moreover, not only did it offer "a model of civilised, thoughtful 
and well infonned discussion on public affairs", it also provided "a real limitation 
of the party system which, left to the Commons, might well convert 
Parliament .... into a single party, single chamber elective dictatorship on the fonner 
East European model" )21 
Thus he revived his famous Dimbleby Lecture phrase some 14 years on. 
Notwithstanding the contentious legislation put through by the Conservative 
government in the intervening period, he still saw the threat as coming from 
Labour. He noted that the danger of our constitution degenerating into an 
elective dictatorship had led to "a demand that the House should be used as a 
means of curbing more vigorously the authoritarianism inherent in a sovereign 
Parliament, especially under Labour governments more controlled by than 
controlling the executive. "122 The use of the House of Lords as a blocking 
mechanism had often been argued, but not always in such overtly party political 
terms.123 Hailsham no longer supported proposals he himself had previously 
advocated, but consistency would not, seem to have been his hallmark. Only a 
year before his Dimbleby Lecture, he had written that he had "never been a 
supporter of the more grandiose schemes for Lords' reform" and that, moreoever, 
he had "no fundamental objections to an hereditary house of legislature, provided 
it served a useful purpose."124 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
121 A Sparrow's Flight, pp 248-250, 270. Perhaps forgetting similarities between then current 
Labour Party proposals to his own earlier ideas, Hailsham even then suggested Roy 
Hattersley should have asked Melbourne's question on the subject, "before he introduced 
it into current politics". 
122 Ibid (Emphasis added). . 
123 On reQection, both Carrington and Denham acknowledged that there had been electIve 
dictatorship under governments of both parties (Interviews). Moreover, Hailsham himself 
conceded, when giving evidence to the Home Committee in 1977, that elective dictatorship 
could come from the right or the left (see p 180). 
124 The Door Wherein J Went, p 188/9. The "grandiose schemes", which he specifically 
mentioned, he attributed to the late Lord Salisbury ("who was an enthusiast") and those 
supported "more recently under Mr Wilson's first government by Lord Curington and 
Lord Jellicoe". 
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The "why not let it alone" position seemed increasingly to be the position of the 
ConseIVative Party, although there were individual exceptions. For instance. the 
maverick MP, Richard Shepherd, was reported as supporting an elected chamber 
and describing the existing House as: 
"the sunset home at the other end of the building ... .it is a pretty poor body. 
Life support machines are wheeled in and people talk deferentially about 
one another's magnificent contributions".125 
The ConseIVative peer and MEP, Lord O'Hagan, who had been a member of 
Lord Home's committee, wrote in 1990: 
"Now that Labour has abandoned the closed shop, is it not time for the 
ConseIVative Party to think about reforming the House of Lords?"126 
Another ConseIVative peer, Lord Beloff, suggested that ministers in the Commons 
should be able to speak in the Lords on relevant legislation. This would have 
been in line with one of the "small reforms" suggested previously by Baroness 
Young, but it met with an absolutely non-commital response from the then Leader 
of the House, Lord Belstead. Referring to Labour's plans for an elected chamber, 
he said: 
"From these benches, I can certainly say that we do not contemplate a 
comprehensive reform of that kind; but that is not to say that I think 
everything should remain the same".l27 
Outside Parliament, Ferdinand Mount, asked In The Times, In the light of the 
War Crimes Bill, "can we really be happy with a second chamber which is 
overruled with such impertinent contempt by the first chamber?" He argued that 
125 The Independent, 9th August 1989. 
126 Letter to The Times. 11th January 1990. 
127 House of Lords Debates, 24th April 1990 (Vol. 518, Cols. 609-11). Previously, Beloff (a 
fonner Professor of Government at Oxford University) had also suggested. as an 
alternative. having a member of the Lords in every government department CA Lord for 
Every Ministry", The Times. 6th January 1988). 
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there was a need to bolster its constitutional authority, and now commended 
proposals based on those of the Home Committee (which he, himself, had 
criticised at the time »)28 Mount developed the case in a book discussing wider 
constitutional reform. He observed that, as things stood, except in uncontroversial 
matters, Lords' amendments would be reversed and "the government will 
steamroller the Bill back into its original shape .... The Lords now know that the 
Commons will automatically overturn it". While acknowledging that the public did 
not feel strongly on the issue, he suggested that: 
"Lord Carrington and his fellow reformers of the late 1960s were 
entirely right in arguing that, if the House of Lords was to have 
substantial authority restored to it, its composition must be changed."129 
It is interesting that he should have made the link with Carrington, rather than 
with the Labour government, which had actually attempted to bring in legislation 
then.130 
Mount went on to suggest a mixed chamber, which might include some hereditary 
peers, some life peers, some regional/county representatives and representatives of 
the modern "estates of the realm". He concluded, somewhat complacently, that 
"if it is agreed that reform of the constitution of the House of Lords would be a 
profitable exercise, it should not be too difficult to work out a solution which 
satisfies most criteria". Mount also wanted to see other reforms, emphasising that 
the Lords could only become "a serious revising chamber", after the Commons had 
done likewise.131 
128 'Sorting out John Bull', The Times, 14th April 1992 (pubJished immediately after 
the ConselVatives' election victory on 9th April ). 
129 The British Constitution Now (Hutchinson, 1992) pp 162, 188. Mount said that public 
opinion remained "slumbrous and amiable"; but that in decisive confrontations - 1832, 
1911, 1949 - the public had shown "no great desire to come to the rescue of the Lords" 
(Ibid. p 187). It is worth noting that a Public Attitudes SUlVey (for BBC Radio 4) found 
only 30 per cent wanted the second chamber left unreformed, and that while just 8 per 
cent wanted no second chamber, 46 per cent wanted hereditary peers removed (Reported 
in The Times, 10th January 1991). 
130 See Chapter 1. 
131 Ibid, pp 188/89. 
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Advocates of constitutional reform were, however, becoming isolated figures in a 
Conservative Party which increasingly seemed to favour the status quo. Shortlv 
after the 1992 election, Viscount Whitelaw, interviewed for The Times, cautioned 
against change (although he was prepared to concede there could be merit in 
having a ballot of hereditary peers, presumably to elect some from among their 
own number). The former Chief Whip, Lord Denham, in the same article, was 
quoted as warning that, "short of substituting a wholly elected chamber for the 
House of Lords, any tinkering might be dangerous". The author, Sheila Gunn. 
suggested that most MPs also "want to keep the Lords exactly as it is", since, 
despite what they say, "they would love to end their time at Westminster there l1. 
She pointed out that, as the Conservatives had shied away from reform, "the 
hereditary principle dominating the Upper Chamber became one of the few areas 
of public life that Thatcherism did not touch".132 Indeed, some Conservative 
supporters were now even prepared to defend the hereditary principle outright. 
Charles Moore, writing in The Spectator in 1988, claimed somewhat contentiously 
that "the Lords appear, collectively, the only disinterested body in modem public 
life", adding that "the hereditary principle, far from being anachronistic, is natural 
to human beings in a way that democracy is not".133 
132 'Life Times' section, 11th May 1992. Gunn suggested the Conservatives feared that 
"pecking away at the structure" would "expose cracks in the entire political system". 
133 28th May 1988 (Vol 260, P 6). Moore was editor of The Spectator (and later of 
The DaiJy TeJegraph). Here he was writing following a discussion ab?ut the disputed 
Moynihan peerage, in which the contenders were the then ConservatIve MP, 
C,olin Moynihan, and the baby son of a Filipino massage parlour owner and a 
drug dealer. The succession was eventually settled in favour of the former. 
This would hardly seem to have been a good advertisement for the advantages 
of the hereditary principle. 
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As a subsequent study noted, the Conservative Party had "no pressing reason to 
revise the constitution of the House of Lords, given its numerical superiority".l34 It 
went into the 1992 general election with no proposals for any reform of the House 
of Lords (and this would remain the case for the whole of the next Parliament). 
Indeed, as Donald Shell observed, by the 1990s: "The Conservatives had 
apparently ceased to have any policy on the subject of Lords' reform, or indeed 
on virtually any constitutional question whatsoever."13s 
When the Conservatives came to office in 1979, the issue of Lords' reform had 
been a live one in the Party. Although there had been no firm commitment in the 
manifesto, the report of Lord Home's committee was barely a year old, and there 
was some support for reform amongst some senior members of the Cabinet, 
although these did not include the Prime Minister.136 There was still considerable 
concern at the threat of abolition by Labour, as evidenced at the 1980 Conference; 
but this diminished, and Labour eventually moved towards an elected chamber, 
along lines not dissimilar to those favoured earlier by some leading Conservatives. 
There continued to be voices speaking up for reform, but they became increasingly 
isolated. Even Baroness Young's modest suggestions made no headway in the 
absence of Prime Ministerial support. Meanwhile, the House of Lords had shown 
that, although it was prepared to place itself on occasions against a Conservative 
government, when it came to the crunch, the government could usually get its way. 
Moreover, provided the issue was not crucial, the occasional defeat suited some 
Conservatives; and furthennore, it could help strenghen the argument of those 
who would seek to defend the status quO. 137 Thus by the 1990s, the leadership had 
ceased to contemplate any significant reform. 
1.14 Enquiry into Implementation of Constitutional Reform: Reform of the House of Lords 
(The Constitution Unit, 1996) p 34. 
135 The House of Lords at Work (Clarendon Press. 1993) p 348. 
136 Lord Carrington thought she had not the slightest intention of doing anything about the 
House of Lords - her position was "highly negative" (InteTylc .... ). 
U7 ;\~ Young observed. "Lord Denham always makes the point that it's a bad thing if the 
Conservatives win every time" (Interview). 
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9. THIRD PARTIES AND THE SECOND CHAMBER 
Whilst the major parties are most likely to be in a position to implement policies, 
a third party may on occasion have the potential to exercise some influence. 
Although, for much of the post-war period, the Liberal Party's representation in 
the Commons was very small, it had been a little stronger in 1966 and would be 
again in the 1974 Parliaments.! During the course of the latter, in which the 
government had either a very small or no majority. the Liberals formed a pact 
with the Labour government, and in the 1980s, following the formation of the 
SDP and the Alliance with the Liberals, a third party breakthrough was anticipated 
in some quarters, but not realised. This Chapter looks briefly at how these parties 
and then the Liberal Democrats approached the issue of the second chamber. 
As noted earlier, the Liberals had been somewhat inconsistent in their response to 
the Labour government's proposed legislation in 1968/69.2 They put forward no 
proposals of their own and their 1970 election manifesto was silent on the subject. 
However, although the question of Lords reform took a back seat in the new 
Parliament, the Liberals did show some interest in the reform of parliamentary 
institutions. A Working Party on the Machinery of Government, established in 
1971, reported to the Liberal Assembly in September 1973, which itself passed a 
lengthy resolution, 'Power to the People', outlining a commitment to "a revolution 
in the style and structure of British govenlment". This covered a range of areas, 
but its proposals on the House of Lords, which were described as a "longer term 
aim", comprised: 
(i) abolition of the automatic right of hereditary peers to sit in the 
second chamber; 
(ii) a majority of members of a reformed second chamber to be elected 
by new regional assemblies; 
(iii) a proportion of members to be selected on the basis of particular 
experience or expertise; 
Onlv six Liberal MPs were elected in the 1951. 1955 and 1959 elections. In 1964 this rose 
to n-ine and in 1966 to 12. but in 1970 the numbers were down 31?,ain to six. However, 
in the two 1974 elections respectively 14 and then I3 were elected . 
.., See Chapte r I. 
(iv) 
(v) 
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British members of the European Parliament to be included 
, 
ex officio; 
a limited term of office to be fixed, with continuity maintained by 
staggered elections at regular intelVals.3 
The revised final report of the Working Party, published the following year, 
suggested that, although it was likely that its actual powers would be reduced 
further, the second chamber was the best place for the discussion of broad issues; 
and that it should be a means of linking the various systems of government in a 
federal system. It should also take over the functions of bodies such as Royal 
Commissions, and continue to exercise a judicial role. Membership was envisaged 
along the lines of the 1973 Assembly resolution, including representatives from the 
Scottish and Welsh Parliaments and from regional assemblies, plus members of 
the European Parliament. It suggested that, in addition, independent members 
(who might include, for instance, people from voluntary bodies or those who 
might not want to stand for election) could be appointed, possibly by a committee 
of both Houses, for renewable periods.4 
The possibility of linking reform of the second chamber with devolved government 
had recently been rejected by the Royal Commission on the Constitution, but a 
Memorandum of Dissent by two of its members had supported such a 
proposition.5 The Liberal Party Council had welcomed this Memorandum of 
Dissent (although it should be noted that the Liberal peer, Lord Foot, who was a 
member of the Commission, did not dissent from the majority recommendation).6 
3 Liberal Assembly 1973: Resolutions adopted at Southport, 18-22 September. 
4 Power to the People: Report of Liberal Working Party on Machinery of Government 
(Liberal Party Publications, 1974). It was chaired by Desmond Banks (former Party 
President). The other members were Peter Billiness, Alan Butt Philip and William 
Walker (Liberal Parliamentary candidates); Hannah Rose and Michael Steed (academics). 
The Secretary was Adam Pleasance (Research Assistant to Banks). 
5 See p 165. 
6 Liberal Party Council Resolution, Manchester 1973 (recorded in Power to the People, 
p 28). According to Lord Holme of Cheltenham, Foot was not regarded as mainstream 
(Interview, June 1998); but nevertheless Foot would be appointed to the. next Liberal Party 
Committee looking at Lords reform; as also would Alan Peacock, who signed the 
Memorandum of Dissent. 
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Despite the existence of detailed policy proposals on the subject, neither of the 
1974 Liberal manifestos included any reference to the House of Lords. However. 
the elections saw an improvement in Liberal fortunes and, for a brief period after 
the first, there was speculation that the Liberals might join a coalition with the 
Conservatives. There were contacts between the Prime Minister. Edward Heath 
and the Liberal Party Leader, Jeremy Thorpe, but nothing came of them.7 
Minority parties, would, however, be able to exercise greater influence in the new 
Parliament, with the Labour government having at best a precarious majority and, 
for much of the time, none overall. Indeed, the Liberals entered a pact with the 
Labour government during 1977-78, but the second chamber did not feature in 
this, although devolution legislation did.8 
The period from 1974 up to the conclusion of the Lib-Lab pact, saw the 
government run into difficulties with its legislative programme in the House of 
Lords, notably in the case of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill. In the final - and 
crucial - debate in the Lords at the end of the 1975-76 session, the Liberal leader 
there, Lord Byers, had supported the Conservatives in their move to delete 
ship-repairing from the provisions of the Bill, even though this was arguably in 
breach of the Salisbury convention, saying that, if the government chose to use the 
Parliament Act, then that would be their responsibility.9 In the event, the 
legislation went through in an amended form; but as has been noted, the 
experience was a factor in leading the Labour Party to support abolition, which in 
turn helped prompt the Conservatives to set up a committee on the subject. lo 
7 See Campbell: Edward Heath, A Biography, p 617-8. . 
8 Callaghan: Time and Chance. pp 456-7. Although the Liberals had supported a Imk 
between the two, no such proposal was included in the government's legislation. 
9 House of Lords Debates, 22nd November 1976 (Vol 377. Col 1672). 
10 See Chapters 2, 3 and 7. 
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The Liberals did likewise. Shortly before the 1977 Labour Party Conference was 
due to debate the abolition proposal, they announced that, "in view of the present 
interest in the future of the House of Lords", a Liberal Working Group had been 
studying the matter since July that year)l This Group, comprising Liberal peers 
and academics, was chaired by Lord Henley, and began its work in July 1977. 12 
Unfortunately Henley died later the same year, following which there was a hiatus 
in its work until it was revived, under the chairmanship of Lord Airedale. in May 
1978. Its terms of reference were to produce a consultative document "in the 
context of Liberal policy for a constitutional settlement with a federal system of 
government" and reforms which could be effected prior to such a settlement. 
What was termed an "Interim Report" was issued under the title Two Chambers 
or One? in September 1978)3 
In answer to its own question, the report accepted the value of the two chamber 
system and rejected abolition. However, it concluded that the existing House of 
Lords performed a "very limited role in protecting the basic constitutional rules 
against a partisan majority in the House of Commons"; and that its actual revision 
of legislation offered "only limited justification for its existence". While 
acknowledging that that some need for revision could be taken care of by a 
reformed Commons, better preparation of legislation and more open government, 
11 Press Release, 20th September 1977 (Liberal Party Archive 161145). Although the Party 
had last debated the issue fully in 1973, a resolution from a pre-plenary group of delegates 
at the 1976 Liberal Conference made a passing reference to "the eventual replacement of 
the House of Lords by a Senate composed of elected representatives of the federal states 
and the British members of the European Parliament", as part of wider reform in a federal 
system (Michael Steed papers). 
12 The other members were Viscount Thurso, Lord Wade, Lord Foot, Peter Bromhead, Brian 
Keith-Lucas and Alan Peacock. the latter three all bein~ academics. as was the Group's 
Secretary. Michael Steed. Accordin~ to Steed, Peacock was not an active member. 
althou~h he received papers and a~reed to be associated with the report (Interview, 
September 1999). 
13 Interim Report of Liberal Workin~ Group (Liberal Publications Dept. 1978). 
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the report nevertheless argued that, "it is worth including a revising function both 
a present and a revised House". Similarly, private legislation "could be dealt with 
by other means, but it is sensible to include it among the functions of a second 
chamber". Nor did its role in scrutinising European Community legislation justify 
it, "but if a second chamber exists, it can usefully be employed in scrutinising the 
policy and administration of the UK government, of the EEC and quangos", given 
effective committeee systems and enough members able and willing to sit on them. 
Powers should flow from functions; although one chamber should be the "clear 
source of political authority". The present delaying powers were about right.14 
Noting that Labour would "make some play with the undemocratic nature of the 
present House", the report then made the questionable assertion that this was 
"scarcely less democratic" than the voting system for the House of Commons. 
Surprisingly, however, it rejected a chamber wholly or partly elected by 
proportional representation (PR). Since the Liberals supported this for elections 
to the Commons, it was argued that it could either lead to contlict between the 
two Houses or to duplication, if polls were conducted on the same basis. 
However, it suggested that a reformed composition should include: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
a major element elected on a regional basis (although it was not 
specitied how - both direct and indirect elections were discussed); 
members of the European Parliament ex-officio (although there was 
dissent on the Working Group about this); 
others, "especially to man committees" (although it was not clear 
how they would be chosen - probably by interest groups, possibly by 
the Prime Minister, but there was no conclusion on this).15 
---------------------------_._-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Ibid (Paras 5, 11-15, 25). 
15 Ibid (Paras 9, 16, 24-26). 
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In the short term, the report suggested ending the rights of hereditary succession. 
adding members of the European Parliament (although it questioned their right to 
vote, if they were elected under the first-past-the post system). and possibly 
indirect election of members from the Scottish and Welsh assemblies. In the 
longer term, it should form part of a more major constitutional reform. 16 
This report was not dissimilar from Labour's 1977 report, in asserting the limited 
value of many of the Lords' existing functions and that, to some extent, these 
could be dealt with in ways other than through a second chamber. Of course, it 
did not draw the same conclusion. However, despite arguing that powers should 
flow from function, it had no clear view of the role a second chamber should 
perform. Furthermore, the proposals on composition were very tentative, taking 
things little further than the 1973/74 report, Power to the People. Concern with 
electoral reform for the Commons seems to have led the Group into some rather 
curious positions - the argument that the unelected and largely hereditary House 
of Lords was scarcely more democratic than the Commons;17 the conclusion 
against a second chamber elected wholly or partly by PR (presumably because it 
might detract from the campaign for PR for the Commons); and the suggestion 
that election by first-past-the-post might debar members of the European 
Parliament. 
Despite the "interim" designation, no further report was issued. Indeed, little 
more was heard of it, which, given its rather confused conclusions, may not be 
wholly surprising. The timing and the title suggest that it was, in any case, to 
some extent a reaction to Labour's recently published proposals for abolition.l8 
16 Ibid (Para 28). It did not go into what this furthe~ reform ,~hould. comp~s~: . 
17 Lord Holme, when intelViewed, suggested that thiS was a rbetoncal POIDt , mtended as 
"a plug for PR". However, if not meant to be taken literally. this was arguably an 
inappropriate place to make it. .. 
18 Holme agreed that this was probably the case, but argued that the Liberals saw thiS as an 
opportunity rather tban a problem. 
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The question of the second chamber had, however, become a live issue again; and 
the 1979 general election was the first since the Second World War in which all 
three main parties set out their position on the Lords in their respective 
manifestos. In the case of the Liberals, this was the first time they had done so 
since 1950. Now they stated their intention to replace the House of Lords with a 
democratic chambe.r, including representatives of the nations and regions of 
Britain and of members of the European Parliament. 19 
Although Liberal representation in the new Parliament was slightly down,2o the 
years following were to prove highly significant for third party politics, witnessing 
the birth of the Social Democratic Party in 1981, and the Alliance between the 
SDP and the Liberal Party, and their merger to form the Liberal Democrats in 
1988. Early on, there was spe.culation about a fundamental re-alignment of British 
politics, as the Alliance briefly headed the opinion polls. The Conservatives were 
said to have discussed seriously the possibility of an Alliance govenment. 
However, in the 1983 general election, despite securing 25 per cent of the votes, 
they secured no more than 23 seats. During the next Parliament, they again 
enjoyed a short-lived lead in the polls, and there was talk in the Alliance camp of 
the prospect of holding the balance of power and either influencing the legislation 
of a minority government or forming a coalition. This situation did not materialise 
and, following the 1987 election (when together they won just 22 seats), the two 
parties merged.21 Nevertheless, for a while. given that the prospect of the Alliance 
in government or influencing government was taken seriously, then their policies 
for constitutional reform also assumed a greater significance than they might 
otherwise have done. 
19 The Real fIght is for Britain: Liberal Party Election Manifesto 1979 (Dale, op cit, p 190). 
Although not included in previous manifestos, the policy itself was not Dew. 
20 11 Liberal MPs were elected in 1979. 
21 The Alliance, which began soon after the formation of the SDP in 1981, appears never to 
have had a formal title. The newly merged Party in 1988 was fomlally known as tbe Social 
aDd Liberal Democrats, but it would in practice be known as the Liberal Democrats. A 
rump of the SDP continued, but was finally wound up iD 1990. (See Ivor Crewe and 
Anthony King: SDP - The Birth. Life and Death of the Social Democratic Party, Oxford 
University Press 1995, pp 135, 140). See also Butler & Butler. Twentieth Centul}' British 
Political Facts. p 169; and Butler & Kavanagb: British General Election series (1983, 1987 
and 1992). 
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In 1980, the Liberals published a policy paper which argued that the constitution 
was in a mess and that it was "important and urgently necessary to consider how to 
get it right", as the issue was likely to be high on the political agenda. It described 
the Conservative approach to Lords reform as "essentially only a response to the 
Labour Party's initiative", but predicted that they would look to entrenchment of 
the second chanlber and its election by PRo For itself, though, it proposed 
nothing specific on the second chamber.22 Although the predictions about the 
Conservatives would prove wrong, many of them were concerned at that time to 
respond to Labour's "initiative", as indeed Liberals had been.23 
Possib1e means of reforming the second chamber had, meanwhile. been 
considered by the Liberal Party"s Reform of Government Panel. A discussion 
paper considered the pros and cons of various means of determining composition, 
including direct election by PR on a regional basis, indirect election and partial 
appointment. It also looked sympathetically at the notion that peers might be 
chosen by "selection juries picked at random from the electoral roll." These juries, 
it was suggested, could be regionally based, about 100-200 in size, and observe 
guidelines concerning matters such as political balance and the background of 
candidates.24 However, this notion seems to have made no further headway.25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 A New Constitutional Settlement (Liberal Publications Dept, 1980). Generally, it 
advocated a settlement involving a written constitution and also a Speakers' Conference or 
Royal Commission on constitutional refonn. 
23 See Chapter 8 and this Chapter above. 
24 The Second Chamber: A Discussion Paper, July 1980. (Michael Steed papers - Steed was 
the Panel's convenor.) . .. 
25 Steed's papers suggest that there was a diSCUSSIOn at an Assembly fringe meeting, but 
nothing more. 
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The SOP~s initial approach to the second chamber was broadly similar to that of 
the Liberals. Early in its life, one of its founders and future leader, Dr David 
Owen, wrote: 
"Reform of the second chamber, doing away with hereditary peerages and 
bringing in representation from the nations and the regions. are inno\ations 
that are long overdue".26 
An early SDP Green Paper envisaged a second chamber forming part of a wider 
devolution plan. as a "chamber of the regions", comprising regional members and 
government-appointed life members. This chamber would have delaying powers 
of up to two years. 27 
The Liberals and SOP soon began to undertake work together on constitutional 
reform. A joint Commission was set up in November 1981 to examine policies 
which the two parties could present together at the next election. It was chaired 
by Sir Henry Fisher and, although particularly concerned with the issue of 
electoral reform, it did put forward some specific proposals for the reform of the 
second chamber.28 
26 In The RebiJ1h of Blitain, ed Wayland Kennet (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1982) p 2~9. 
27 Decentralising Government, 1982. 
28 Towards a New C-Ollstitutional Settlement - Rep0l1 of Joint Liberal/SDP Alliance 
Commission on Constitutional Reform, 1983. Fisher was President of Wolfson College 
and a former High Court judge. The other members were Alan Beith MP, Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Tom Ellis, Lord Evans of Claughton, Richard Holme, Mari James, Roy 
Jenkins MP. Anthony Lester QC, Robert Maclennan MP, David Marquand, Ray Miche, 
David Owen MP, Lady Stedman. Michael Steed. David Steel MP. Secretary Vernon 
Bogdanor. (Stedman was replaced by l isha Prashar dUling the course of 1982.) Ihis was 
one of two joint commissions established - the other was on the economy. 
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Labour's commitment to abolition was still seen as an important factor. The 
Commission's report specifically mentioned this, arguing that the threat of an 
omnipotent executive, controlled by a single party, legitimised by a single chamber 
legislature was "getting steadily nearer". It rejected abolition in favour of reform, 
stating: 
"We want a second chamber which enlarges its present useful functions by 
bringing a sharper regional dimension into the national legislature". 
It sought a new composition, with "a mixture of elected regional representation 
and meritorious approintment", rather than "the outdated hereditary principle".29 
The Commission's conclusion in favour of a partly elected, partly nominated 
second chamber, was similar to that reached by the Conservatives' committee 
under Lord Home a few years previously, and it specifically acknowledged this. It 
suggested that, in a chamber of some 500 members, half should be elected by PR 
on a regional basis, for a fixed term of more than five years, with a half or a third 
coming up for an election at anyone time. The other half should be selected by a 
standing commission (mainly comprising senior privy counsellors). They would be 
likely to include some existing peers and leading church figures, but they would 
not include the law lords (whose role would be taken by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council). Nominated members should serve for a lengthy period -
say 10 years - and be eligible for re-nomination.30 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Ibid (Para 16). It also sought a more representative House of Commons, with reformed 
procedures and a refonned electoral system. 
30 Ibid (Paras 49-66). 
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The report envisaged that the functions of the new second chamber should be 
those of scrutiny, revision and delay; but, in addition, members representing 
regional interests should have "special responsibilities" in respect of regional affairs 
- where there was no regional government, they should supervise the regional 
activities of central government and other regional bodies, including appointments 
to the latter. Unlike previous Liberal statements, it concluded that members of 
the European Parliament should not actually be members of the second chamber, 
although there should be provision for them to participate in committees on 
European legislation.31 
Although intended to come up with recommendations for the Alliance parties for 
the general election, the Commission's main report was actually published 
afterwards, in August 1983. One of its members, Michael Steed, was subsequently 
highly critical, saying the policy commissions had been "hampered by ambiguity as 
to whom they were responsible and .... hung uneasily between being independent 
investigating commissions and representatives of their parties seeking agreement". 
After a year, that on Constitutional Reform had produced agreement only on the 
issue of the electoral system. Other aspects, including the second chamber, had 
just been agreed and the report was in draft when the election was called; but 
"whether for lack of imagination or simply logistic failure, the report did not get 
published during the election campaign as it should have been". Steed observed 
that the parties had not been working well together; and later suggested that the 
establishment of the Alliance had "set us back several years" in respect of looking 
at constitutional reform, including the House of Lords.32 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------
31 
32 
Ibid. 
Steed: 'The Alliance: A Critical History', New Outlook, Vol 22, No 3, Liberal Assembly 
Issue 1983 (pp 33-4 ): also interview (September 1999) and correspondence with the 
author (May 2004). 
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Nevertheless, the Alliance manifesto did include a commitment to reform the 
powers and the composition of the House of Lords, which it said should include "a 
significant elected element representing the nations and regions of Britain")3 This 
was also listed as one of the "Key Alliance Policies" in the Candidates Handboo~ 
which outlined a policy along the lines contained in the Commission's report.34 A 
draft of the report was probably drawn on by those drafting the joint manifesto)5 
However, by common consent, that appears to have been an unhappy experience, 
with work beginning late and then undertaken in a hurry)6 
Collaboration between the SDP and the Liberals nevertheless continued during 
the 1983-87 Parliament. In July 1986, a new wide ranging joint discussion 
document was published under the title Partnership for Progress. It again linked 
reform of the second chamber with devolution and proposed new elected regional 
assemblies, along with wider parliamentary reform)7 The debate on this at the 
Liberal Assembly at Eastboume in 1986 was overshadowed by a row following the 
defeat of the leadership over defence policy, seen at the time as heralding a 
potential split between the Liberals and the SDP, although that was avoided)8 It 
was relaunched as a joint policy statement in January 1987, under the title The 
Time Has Come)9 This became the slogan used by the Alliance in the 1987 
general election. Its manifesto stated, in respect of the House of Lords, that there 
was no justification for membership based on heredity or patronage. It proposed 
to phase out voting rights for hereditary peers; and linked Lords' reform with 
devolution, to include in a new chamber members elected from the regions and 
nations of Britain.40 
33 Working Together for Britain, Liberal/SDP Alliance Manifesto 1983 (Dale, op cit, p 227). 
34 Alliance Candidates Handbook 1983 - Section 5: Constitutional Reform (pp 52, 59) 
35 According to Steed, it was likely a draft would have been available (Interview). 
36 Ibid. See also New Outlook, Vol 22, No.2, Post Election Issue 1983 - 'Programmed for 
Government' by Leighton Andrews (pp 12, 13); and Crewe and King (op cit) pp 78, 79. 
37 Partnership for Progress: SDP/Liberal Alliance Discussion Paper, July 1986. Lord Holme 
confirmed that the policy was drawn from the 1983 Commission Report (Interview). 
38 Des Wilson: The Battle for Power (Sphere Books, 1987) Chapter 2 (pp 13-69). 
Interestingly, a long resolution on 'People's Government' passed at the same 1986 
Assembly made no reference to the Lords (Liberal Party Archive 8/4). 
39 Ibid, P 130. 
40 Britain United: The Time lias C-eme, SDP/Uberal Manifesto 1987 (Dale, op cit p 241). 
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When the SDP and the Liberal Party merged in 1988, there were still some 
outstanding policy differences.41 Nevertheless, they had worked closely on 
constitutional reform; and the new Party continued to take an interest in this issue. 
A general policy document, published in 1989, stated that the new constitutional 
settlement advocated by Liberal Democrats included "reform of Parliament to 
democratise the House of Lords and give the House of Commons effective powers 
to scutinise and control the executive".42 
The Party's approach to constitutional reform was fleshed out in a Green Paper 
published the following year, We the People: Towards a Written Constitution, 
which included proposals for a fully elected second chamber as part of a wider 
programme of constitutional reform. An elected senate would comprise about 100 
members, directly elected by Single Transferable Vote from the nations and 
regions of Britain (for a six year period, with one-third voting every two years). 
Existing peers would be able to participate in the chamber, but not vote. The new 
House would have the power to delay legislation other than money bills for up to 
two years; and amendments to the constitution would require two-thirds support 
there.43 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
41 However, differences were apparently resolved within a couple of years (The Liberal 
Democrats, ed. Don MacIvor; Prentice Hall / HaIVester Wheatsheaf, 1996, p 86). 
42 Our Different Vision - Values and Themes for Social and Liberal Democrats (Hebden 
Royal Publications 1989) p 11. 
43 Reported in The Times, 6th July 1990. 
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However a resolution was passed at the Liberal Democrats' 1990 Conference, 
which amended the proposals on the second chamber in one very important 
aspect. It stated that it endorsed the Green Paper's key proposals, including: 
"Replacement of the House of Lords by an elected Senate, with powers to 
delay legislation other than money bills, except that the membership of the 
Senate be widened with long term aim of retaining the wealth of expertise 
currently available to the House of Lords".44 
This meant that the second chamber would not necessarily be a wholly elected 
chamber, but could include a nominated element. The leadership was defeated, 
following an appeal by the veteran peeress, Baroness Seear. The amendment to 
"retain the wealth of experience currently available" was carried by 334 votes to 
290. This was said to be a "rebuff' for Robert Maclennan MP, who had chaired 
the relevant working party and who had spoken from the platform in support of a 
fully elected chamber.45 However, another leading Liberal Democrat has 
suggested that the leadership was not particularly unhappy with this 
development.46 
Thus the Liberal Democrats' policy set out in the following election manifesto was 
for a senate "primarily" elected by the citizens and nations of Britain; and with the 
power to delay legislation" (except money bills) for up to two years.47 Essentially, 
the policy of the Liberal Democrats in 1992 was similar to the policy pursued for 
the previous two decades by the old Liberal Party and then the Alliance -
involving a partly but not wholly elected chamber, with close links to the regions. 
44 A copy of this was sent to the author by the Liberal Democrat Infonnation Officer, who 
described it in her letter (3rd August 1998) as "the only policy statement the Lib Dems 
have on this subject up to 1992.". The resolution also endorsed, amongst other proposals, 
use of the Single Tranferable Vote for all elections. 
45 Reported in The Independent, 18th September 1990. Seear was then deputy leader of the 
ljberal Democrat peers (having previously been leader of the uberal peers 1984-88). 
Maclennan was a fonner Labour MP and junior minister, who had subsequently been a 
front bench spokesman for the SDP and the Liberal Democrats. He was briefly leader of 
the SDP 1987-88 and joint leader of the uberal and Social Democrats 1988. lie later 
became President of the Liberal Democrats in 1994-98 and a life peer in 2001. 
46 Lord Holme of Cheltenham (Interview). 
47 Chanl!inl! Britain For Good, uberal Democrat Manifesto 1992 (Dale. op cit, p 316). 
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This proposed link between the second chamber and regional 
government/representation was thus a consistent aspect of these parties' policies 
for much of the period in question. A not dissimilar approach was adopted by the 
Labour Party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The policies of Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats were not identical - there were differences in position on 
delaying powers, although both envisaged a role for the second chamber in 
safeguarding constitutional rights; and the Labour Party was, in 1992, committed to 
a wholly rather than a partially elected chamber, although the former had been 
the preference of the Liberal Democrat leadership too. Nevertheless, there was, 
by then, a considerable degree of common ground between the non-ConselVative 
parties; and had a Labour government been elected then, it could probably have 
counted on Liberal Democrat support to implement its policy on the second 
chamber, had the need arisen.48 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Lords Holme and McNally, when interviewed, indicated that the Liberal Democrats would 
have been likely to support a Labour government in such circumstances. 
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10. POSTSCRIPT - DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1992 
Recent years have seen major developments relating to reform of the House of 
Lords. Although these do not, strictly speaking, fall within the parameters of this 
thesis, they should be noted, if only briefly. 
Since the Conservative Party went into the 1992 general election with no proposals 
at all for reform of the House of Lords, it is hardly surprising that none were 
forthcoming in the following Parliament. If anything, the Conservatives, who were 
returned with a much reduced overall majority of just 21, seemed more content 
than ever to maintain the status quo. A government minister, Lord Fraser of 
Carmyllie, having noted the Lords' functions of deliberation and revision, told the 
House in 1994: 
"The government consider that the powers and composition of your 
lordships' House are broadly apt for the effective discharge of these 
functions. Accordingly we have no plans for far reaching reform. "1 
The Prime Minister, John Major, was determined to "defend our tradition, our 
heritage and guard against any needless change which threatens the institutions 
that make us one nation" and claimed that "the House of Lords has been far more 
effective than many overseas equivalent revising chambers." He even claimed that 
the House of Lords had shown no party political bias over the years.2 In fact, the 
number of defeats suffered by Major's government, although on average slightly 
higher than under Thatcher, still paled into insignificance compared with those 
suffered by Labour in the 1970s.3 
1 House of Lords Debates, 13th April 1994 (Vol 553, Col 1569). Fraser was then Minister 
of State, Scottish Office. 
2 Speech to Centre for Policy Studies, reported in The Times and The Guardian, 27th June 
1996. Major apparently changed his mind after leaving office, describing hereditary peers 
as an anachronism and acknowledging the need for refonn (see Disraeli Lecture, reported 
in The Guardian, 30th October 1998 and John Major: The Autobiography, Harper Collins, 
1999, p 734). He did not take a peerage when he retired from the C,ommons in 2001. 
3 See Chapters 3, 8 and 9. Major's government was defeated 23 times in 12.3 per cent of 
divisions between 1990 and 1992~ and 62 times in 10.6 per cent of divisions between 1992 
and 1997 (Divisions in the House of Lords since 1970-1971: House of Lords Information 
Office, 1997). 
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Major added new life peers to the House at a faster rate than his predecessor. 
During his tenn of office, between 1990 and 1997, 160 were created (excluding law 
lords), of whom 75 were Conservative, 40 Labour and 17 Liberal Democrat. This 
represented an average annual rate of 25, compared with 18 under Margaret 
Thatcher.4 Thus the overwhelming majority of politically affiliated peers were still 
Conservative.5 On occasion, large turnouts of hereditary peers could still be 
mustered on three line whips to help the government win important votes, notably 
to defeat proposals for a referendum on the EU Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and 
plans to privatise military housing in July 1996.6 
The Labour Party, in a statement to the 1993 Party Conference. observed that "the 
sight of hereditary Tory peers wheeled out to vote through controversial 
legislation when entirely immune from electoral account is a constitutional 
outrage," and re-affinned its intention of "replacing the House of Lords with an 
elected chamber." However, it added an important new caveat: 
"As a first step, the hereditary peers should go. We should then begin the 
process of introducing proper democratic elections."? 
4 House of Lords Library Notes: Peerage Creations 1958-1998. These figures include the 
final resignation list drawn up by Thatcher in 1990, but exclude resignation honours 
drawn up by Major in 1997. 
5 As of January 1996, the party strengths were: Conservative 480, Labour Ill, Liberal 
Democrat 55, plus 400 cross bench/non-affiliated. (House of Lords Information Office: 
Information Sheet No 2, March 1996. Figures exclude peers without writ or on Leave 
of Absence.) 
6 Amendment to European Communities (Amendment) Bill defeated by 445 votes to 176 
(House of Lords Debates, 14th July 1993, Vol 547, Col 329); amendment to Housing Bill 
defeated by 256 votes to 176 (House of Lords Debates, 11th July 1996. Vol 574, Col 475). 
The leader of the Labour peers, Lord Richard, was reported as saying: "You see some 
of them and wonder who the hell they are. There were some the clerks didn't even 
recognise" (The Observer. 28th July 1996). One of the clerks confirmed this in private 
conversation with the author. 
7 A New Agenda fOT Democracy: Labour's Programme fOT Constitutional Reform-
Statement to Labour Party Conference 1993. Significantly, Tony Blair (as Shadow Home 
Secretary) was joint convener of the Policy Commission responsible for this statement. 
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No method of election was specified but, in the same year, Labour's Working 
Party on Electoral Systems recommended a regional list system of proportional 
representation for the second chamber.8 A consultation exercise within the Party 
showed a majority of respondents in favour, and a resolution supporting this was 
passed at the Party Conference.9 
The 1993 statement envisaged no significant change in powers, so it appeared that 
the notion of special powers to safeguard constitutional and individual rights had 
now been abandoned. It also became increasingly clear that the commitment to 
an elected chamber was moving on to the back burner. Speaking early in 1996, 
Blair (now Party Leader) stated - inaccurately - that "we have always favoured an 
elected second chamber", but went on to argue: 
"Surely we should first make the House of Lords a genuine body of the 
distinguished and meritorious - with a better, more open and independent 
means of establishing membership - and then debate how we incorporate 
democratic accountability" .10 
A policy statement later that year re-iterated the intention to remove the 
hereditary peers "as a first step towards a more democratic representative 
chamber", but suggested that some places be "reserved by appointment for those 
who have an outstanding contribution to make""l The Shadow Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Irvine of Lairg, confirming that Labour had prepared a draft Bill to remove 
the hereditary peers, said that, for the longer term, "the fundamental question is 
whether the House of Lords can remain an appointed chamber, but it's too early 
to address that".l2 Meanwhile, Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle, two 
8 Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems (Labour Party, 1993). This Working 
Party included several individuals who would subsequently become members of Blair's 
government. 
9 Supporting NEe Statement and Record of Resolutions Passed, Annual Conference 1993. 
10 John Smith Memorial Lecture, Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, February 7th 1996. 
11 The Road to the Manifesto: abridged version, published in The Guardian, 5th July 1996. 
12 Interviewed in New Statesman, 6th December 1996 (Vol 125, pp 18-20). 
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individuals known to have Blair's ear, warned that a reformed Lords would have 
more legitimacy and power to block what the government of the day wanted to do. 
They said that whether Labour should go further than removing the hereditarv 
peers and, if so, how far, was "a difficult judgement."13 Such hesitancy was \'.(IS 
bound to re-inforce scepticism about the prospects for a second stage of reform.l~ 
The Liberal Democrats, having earlier published proposals for a mainly elected 
senate with increased powers, modified them in 1996 with a proposal to phase 
them in over two Parliaments. In the longer term, they envisaged a senate of 300, 
three-quarters elected by Single Transferable Vote and a quarter elected by a 
Joint Committee of both Houses. However, as an interim measure, they proposed 
a chamber of 500 indirectly elected members, 200 by existing peers and 300 by the 
Commons to reflect party strengths at the previous general election. 15 
Thus the Liberal Democrats now, like Labour, appeared to envIsage a two-stage 
process, albeit with somewhat different and more clearly defined proposals. The 
two parties were attempting to collaborate on constitutional reform issues; and a 
Labour / Liberal Democrat Agreement on Constitutional Reform was announced 
in March 1997, which listed amongst the areas of agreement that the right of 
hereditary peers to sit and speak in the House of Lords should be ended. 16 
13 The Blair Revolution: Can Labour Deliver? (Faber & Faber 1996), p 205. Mandelson 
was known to be a confidant and subsequently selVed in Blair's Cabinet. Liddle, a fonner 
member of the SDP, became a Downing Street policy adviser. 
14 See, for instance, The Constitution Unit: Reform of the House of Lords 
(April 1996) P 75. . 
15 Federal White Paper: Here We Stand, 1993; Great Reform Bill, September 1996. 
16 Reported in The Independent, 6th March 1997. 
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Labour's 1997 election manifesto stated that: 
"As an initial, self-contained reform, not dependent on further reform in 
the future, the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of 
Lords will be ended by statute. This will be the first stage in a process of 
reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative." 
Its objective was to ensure that over time party appointees "more accurately reflect 
the proportion of votes cast at the previous election", although it was also 
committed to maintaining an independent cross-bench presence and no party 
should seek a majority in the Lords. A Committee of both Houses would look at 
proposals for further reform)7 Significantly, the removal of hereditary peers was 
now described as a "self-contained reform", rather than part of an ongoIng 
process; and there was no mention specifically of an elected chamber. 
The Liberal Democrats went rather further, stating their intention "over two 
parliaments" to "transform the House of Lords into a predominantly elected 
second chamber capable of representing the nation and regions of the UK and of 
playing a key role in scrutinising European legislation".18 The Conservatives, by 
contrast, had no proposals for reform, emphasising the need to preserve stabilility 
and opposing "change for change's sake".19 
17 New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better, Labour Party Manifesto 1997 (See Dale: 
Labour Manifestos, op cit, p 374). " 
18 Make the Difference, Liberal Democrat Manifesto 1997 (See Dale: Liberal Mamfestos, 
op cit, p 345). .. 
19 You Can Only Be Sure with the Conservatives, ConselVatIve Party Manifesto 1997 (See 
Dale: ConselVative Manifestos, op cit, p 458). 
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Following Labour's election victory in May 1997, with a huge Commons' majority 
of 179, the new Prime Minister set about strengthening the Party's representation 
in the Lords. August 1997 saw the first of several batches of new peers, which 
meant that, by 1st May 2003, Tony Blair had presided over the creation of a 
record number of 254 life peerages in six years, 111 of them Labour, most of 
which were in the first three years.20 Whilst this may have served to help redress 
the political imbalance in the House, it did mean that Blair was responsible for the 
creation of more than 60 new peerages a year, representing the exercise of 
patronage in this area on an unprecedented scale)l 
The new government's first leader in the Lords, Lord Richard, was replaced after 
just a year, and soon after was expressing fears that the second stage of reform 
might be "kicked into touch".22 Nevertheless, Blair still ostensibly favoured an 
elected chamber as longer term objective, assuring sceptics that: 
"there are two stages to reform; one is getting rid of the position of 
hereditary peers; and secondly, there is the longer term reform for a 
more democratically elected chamber. I think it is important we do 
both things".23 
The government, meanwhile, suffered defeats in the as yet unreformed House, in 
a total of 39 divisions in the 1997/98 Session, and in a further 31 in the 1998/99 
Session.24 These included politically significant measures - notably on the 
European Parliamentary Elections Bill, which was lost at the end of the 1997-98 
20 Infonnation supplied by House of Lords Infonnation Office. (The breakdown was Lab Ill, 
Con 48, Ub Oem 38, Cross Bench 53, Other 4. Six law lords created during this period 
are not included, but peers in Major's resignation honours are.) See also House of 
Commons Debates, 20th July 2000 (Vol 354, Col 261W). 
21 See Appendix 1, Table 4 for comparative figures for other Prime Ministers. 
22 Reported in The Times, 30th July 1998. The new Leader of the House was Baroness Jay 
of Paddington. 
23 Interview on Today, BBC Radio 4 (reported in The Times, 31st July 1998). 
24 House of Lords: 1998-99 Sessional Statistics. 
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Session and re-introduced in December 1998, only to be defeated again on Second 
Reading, following which the government invoked the Parliament Act procedure 
to secure passage.25 They also included the controversial issue of the age of 
consent for homosexuals.26 
Legislation to remove the rights of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House 
was heralded in the Queen's Speech at the start of the 1998/99 Parliamentary 
Session.27 However, before publication, behind-the-scenes negotiations took place, 
details of which emerged, perhaps prematurely, when the Conservative Party 
Leader, William Hague, dismissed the Party's Leader in the Lords, Viscount 
Cranborne, for his part in a reported deal to allow a limited number of hereditary 
peers to remain after the first stage of reform, in order to smooth the passage of 
the legislation. This apparently had not been authorised by the Shadow Cabinet.28 
The Conservatives had, meanwhile, set up their own constitutional commission, 
chaired by the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, to examine 
reform of the Lords. Its main report, published in April 1999, proposed two 
options, both involving a senate of between 400 and 550 paid members, with 
similar revising powers to the existing chamber. Under the first option, it would 
be predominantly directly elected, with just a small number of appointed members. 
The second option was for a mixed senate, less than half of which would be 
directly or indirectly elected, with the rest appointed. The Party was not, however, 
officially committed to either of these proposals.29 
25 See The Guardian, 19th, 20th November, 16th December 1998. 
26 House of Lords Debates, 22nd July 1998 (Vol 592, Col 973). The Lords voted by a large 
majority on an amendment to the Crime and Disorder Bill to keep the ag~ of consent at 
eighteen. The government subsequently dropped this measure from the Bill and 
re-introduced it as a separate measure in a later session (see p 257). 
27 House of Lords Debates, 24th November 1998 (Vol 595, Col .t). 
28 Reported in The Guardian, 3rd and 4th December, 1998. 
29 Reported in The Guardian and Financial Times, 16th April 1999. 
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The House of Lords Bill, introduced in the Commons in January 1999, was a short 
measure to remove the rights of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of 
Lords (including those of first creation, although these would be offered life 
peerages); and to remove the disqualification of hereditary peers from voting or 
being elected to the House of Commons. The use of titles would not be affected: 
and the position of life peers, law lords and bishops would remain unchanged. A 
White Paper, issued in conjunction with the Bill, made it clear that in the 
'transitional' House, the government would, through new creations, seek broad 
parity of representation between Labour and Conservative members, while 
retaining a significant cross-bench element. A new Appointments Commission 
would nominate cross-bench peers, operating an "open and transparent system", 
and would itself invite nominations.30 
In the course of the Bill's passage, an amendment to allow 92 hereditary peers to 
remain (in line with the previously mooted compromise), moved by the former 
Speaker of the House of Commons, Lord Weatherill, was passed overwhelmingly 
at Committee stage in the Lords.31 These would comprise 75 elected by hereditary 
peers In their respective political groupings, in proportion to their existing 
strengths (which meant 42 Conservatives, 28 cross-bench and just three Liberal 
Democrats and two Labour); together with 15 hereditary peers who were also 
office holders in the Lords, plus the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great 
Chamberlain.32 Although it became generally known as "the Weatherill 
Amendment", according to an authoritative source it was really a government 
amendment, which had been drafted in the Lord Chancellor's Department and 
agreed with Viscount Cranborne.33 
30 Modernising Parliament: Reforming the House of Lords (em 4183, The Stationery Office, 
January 1999). 
31 House of Lords Debates, 11th May 1999 (Vol 600, Col 1137). A similar amendment had 
been defeated in the Commons (House of Commons Debates, 16th February 1999: 
Vol 325, Col 782). 
32 This detail was not specified in the amendment itself, but would be provided for in 
Stand i ng Orders. 
33 Private Information. 
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Although the Conservatives had earlier opposed Second Reading in the 
Commons, they abstained at Third Reading in the Lords; and the Bill eventuallv 
received Royal Assent on the last day of the Session, 11 th November 1999, with its 
provisions coming into force immediately.34 The hereditary peers who would 
remain had already been elected by their respective political groups and, in the 
case of office holders, by the whole House. Additionally, ten hereditary peers, 
including those of first-creation, were awarded life peerages.35 As one 
commentator observed, the compromise "keeps the hereditary principle afloat _ 
only just - but the aristocracy had always played a long game".36 
If the government was hoping for an easier ride in the newly reformed House, it 
was to be disappointed. In the following Parliamentary Session (1999/2000), it was 
defeated on 36 occasions. These included significant items of legislation, such as 
the Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill, which would have restricted rights to 
trial by jury, and the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill, relating to the age of 
consent for homosexuals, which had been introduced in a second successive 
session and eventually went through using the Parliament Act procedures. The 
government was also defeated on the Greater London Authority (Election 
Expenses) Order, the first occasion since 1968 on which the House of Lords had 
voted down an affirmative order. It would continue subsequently to suffer 
defeats, losing as many as 88 divisions in the 2002/3 Session)7 
34 House of Lords Debates, 26th October 1999 and 11th November 1999 (Vol 606, Cols 292 
and 1649). 
35 House of Lords Infonnation Office; also The Guardian, 3rd November 1999 and 
The Times, 6th November 1999. 
36 Michael White: 'Survivial instinct kept warrior class in power for centuries', The Guardian. 
27th October 1999. 
37 House of Lords Public Bill Sessional Statistics 2002-03; Guide to the House of Lords 2002 
(pp 266, 276). 
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Meanwhile, the government had set up a Royal Commission, chaired by the 
former Conservative Leader of the Commons, Lord Wakeham, to look at longer 
term options for reform, whose tenns of reference included a requirement to have 
regard to "the need to maintain the position of the House of Commons as the 
pre-eminent chamber of Parliament". Its report, published in January 2000, 
recommended a second chamber of approximately 550 members, mainly 
nominated, but partly elected. It put forward three options for the latter - 65, 87 
or 195 elected by proportional representation, either drawn from regional lists 
with the numbers based on votes at the previous general election, or in elections 
held by a regional list system at the same time as those for the European 
Parliament. Non-elected members would be chosen by an Appointments 
Commission, which would take account of party nominations, but also have a duty 
to ensure political balance and representation broadly reflecting society. New 
members should serve for fifteen years, but existing life peers could sit for life, if 
they wished. The remaining hereditary peers would be excluded. Members 
should receive a "modest payment" related to attendance. No change was 
proposed to their main legislative powers, except that it should no longer be 
possible to use the Parliament Act procedures to amend the Parliament Acts 
themselves; and that, for secondary legislation, a vote by the second chamber 
could be overridden by an affirmative vote of the Commons.38 
The report attracted critical comment. For instance, the columnist, Simon Jenkins, 
suggested that Wakeham had got the message that he was to "come up with a 
vaguely plausible fudge so that Downing Street could reclaim the brief and play 
for time"; and that "he had duly offered lifetime protection to his fellow peers".39 
Lord Carrington was even more scathing, calling it a "mish mash".40 Nevertheless, 
in the subsequent Parliamentary debate, the government indicated that it accepted 
the principles underlying its main proposals. The Leader of the Commons, 
Margaret Beckett, confirmed that "we agree that the second chamber should be 
38 A House for the Future: Report of the Royal Conunission on Reform of the 
House of Lords (COl 4534, The Stationery Office, January 2(00). 
39 'Wakeham the weak', The Times, 21st January 2000. 
40 IntclYlew in ine Guardian, 24th April 2000. 
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largely nominated". However, the Conservatives indicated a preference for a 
larger elected element in a reformed House; and the Liberal Democrats, who had 
previously been broadly supportive, were also now critical, describing the 
Commission's recommendations as "weak and unhelpful". Significantly there were 
also critical interventions from several Labour backbenchers. Winding up the 
debate for the government, Paddy Tipping made the curious observation that 
"being democratic does not necessarily mean having elections."41 
A year after its establishment, a first list of fifteen non-affiliated peers appointed 
on the recommendation of the new House of Lords Appointments Commission 
was announced in April 2001. It was widely criticised, since it seemed "the body 
to set up to choose 'peoples' peers' appointed establishment figures instead".42 
This came shortly before the start of the campaign for the 2001 general election. 
In its manifesto, the Labour Party re-iterated its commitment to "completing 
House of Lords reform, including removal of the remaining hereditary peers to 
make it more representative and democratic, while maintaining the House of 
Commons' traditional primacy", stating its support for conclusions of the 
Wakeham Commission, which it would seek to implement "in the most effective 
way possible".43 The Conservatives' manifesto wanted a joint committee of both 
Houses "to seek consensus on lasting reform", but added that "we would like to 
see a stronger House of Lords in future, including a substantial elected element".44 
For their part, the Liberal Democrats' manifesto proposed a smaller directly 
elected senate, with representatives from the nations and regions of the UK, which 
would be given new powers to improve legislation".45 Thus Labour's position now 
appeared to be the least radical of the three main parties. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
41 House of Lords Debates, 7th March 2000 (Vol 610, Cols 910-27): House of C.ommons 
Debates, 19th June 2000 (Vol 352, Cols 48-125). Tipping was then Parliamentary 
Secretary in the Lord President's Office. 
42 Report in The Times, 27th April 2001. It noted they included "seven knights, thr~e 
professors, three charity bosses and a captain of industry", all apparently self-nommated. 
43 Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party Manifesto 2001, p 35 . 
44 Time for Common Sense, Conservative Party Manifesto 2001, p 46 . 
. l5 J·reedom. Justice. Honesty. Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2001. p l.t 
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With the 2001 election result almost a repeat of that in 1997, the Labour 
government could look forward to another very large majority (167) in the House 
of Commons; but since the removal of most hereditary peers, it was no longer 
faced with a House of Lords which was predominantly Conservative.46 The two 
main parties were now much closer to parity there, although this did not 
necessarily ensure that the government would get its way.47 
The government issued a further White Paper in November 2001, which envisaged 
a second chamber of 600, with a predominantly nominated but partly elected 
membership. One-fifth would be elected by a regional list system of proportional 
representation and another fifth would be independent members, nominated by 
the Appointments Commission (placed on statutory basis with a duty to ensure 
balanced representation); but the majority would be nominated political members, 
with proportions based on the distribution of votes between parties at the previous 
general election. It was anticipated that no one party would have an overall 
majority, although the Commission might be required to ensure a lead for the 
governmg party over the official opposition. The rights of the remaining 
hereditary peers to sit would be abolished, but existing life peers would retain 
their rights for life. New members would not necessarily be peers with titles. The 
only change proposed to legislative powers was that the second chamber should be 
able to delay secondary legislation by up to three months.48 
The response in all political parties was less than enthusiastic. Even Lord 
Wakeham, himself, was critical.49 Most significant, however, was the criticism from 
within the Labour Party. The White Paper apparently met with an extremely 
hostile reception at a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party in January 2002, 
46 At the end of the previous session the political breakdown was: Conservative 225, 
Labour 195, Liberal Democrat 61, Cross Bench 162, Other 32 (House of Lords: 
2000-2001 Sessional Statistics). A further 25 peers (13 of them Labour) were 
appointed in June 2001. 
47 See p 257. 
4X Joe House of Lords: CompJetinf! the Refom} (em 5291, The Stationery Office, 
November 2(01). 
,,9 I/(mst' of l.ords Debates. 9th January 2002 (Vol 630, Col 589). 
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when reportedly "MP after MP stood up to denounce the plan"; and an Early Day 
Motion by Fiona Mactaggart MP, calling for a second chamber which was wholly 
or substantially elected, attracted more than 300 signatures.5o The Institute for 
Public Policy Research (normally sympathetic to Labour) greeted "with dismay" 
the proposals for a majority nominated by political parties, which would 
"undermine democracy and exacerbate public cynicism".51 As one commentator 
obseIVed, "rarely, if ever, can a White Paper have received such a drubbing - not 
just from the public but from its own MPs and peers as well".52 A report by the 
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee concluded that the 
proposal for a mainly appointed chamber was "likely to be extremely unpopular 
with MPs of all parties". It was argued that both the White Paper and the Royal 
Commission had been "fundamentally misconceived" and recommended a smaller 
chamber of 350 members, of whom the majority (60 per cent) should be elected. 
Of the remainder, half should be nominated by political parties and half 
independent. 5:3 
Meanwhile the new ConseIVative Party leader, lain Duncan Smith, had set out 
plans for a largely elected second chamber. This would take the form of a senate 
of 300 members, 80 per cent of whom would be elected for single terms of fifteen 
years (one-third of the seats every five years) under a first-past-the-post system, 
using the counties as constituencies, with no allowance for population size. There 
were suggestions that this system could result in a ConseIVative and rural bias; but 
nevertheless, as the commentator, Peter Riddell, observed, it had allowed Duncan 
Smith "to claim the democratic high ground".54 Certainly it represented a major 
shift from the Party's earlier lido nothing" approach, although apparently it did not 
go down well with all ConseIVatives.55 
50 The Guardian, 24th January 2002; The Times, 15th February 2002. 
51 Reported in The Times, 8th November 2001. 
52 Polly Toynbee, The Guardian, 1st February 2002. 
53 The Second Chamber: Continuing the Reform, Fifth Report of the Session 200/-2 
(The Stationery Office, 14th February 2002, He 494-1). 
54 The Guardian. 14th and 24th January 2002: The Times. 24th January 2002. 
55 Sec, for instanct.'. The Guardian. 24th January 2002. 
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Later in the year, a Joint Parliamentary Committee of both Houses was 
established, chaired by the former Labour Cabinet Minister, Jack Cunningham, to 
look at options for further reform, again with terms of reference requiring it to 
have particular regard to "the impact which any proposed changes would have on 
the existing pre-eminence of the House of Commons". Its report, issued in 
December 2002, set out a range of options for composition from fully appointed 
to fully elected, with various combinations in between~ but it did not come down in 
favour of any particular option (although it hinted at attraction to the middle of 
the range). Election should be by a different system and on a different date from 
general elections. No system was specified, although there was a very tentative 
suggestion favouring "some form of indirect election".56 
The Commons held two debates on the Joint Committee's Report. It was clear 
after the first of these that MPs were divided and that, moreoever, differences 
extended to the Cabinet itslef. The then Leader of the Commons, Robin (,.,ook, 
cast doubt on the validity of the largely or wholly ~fIected options, while in contrast 
Lord Irvine, in the parallel debate in the Lords, spoke in favour of a wholly 
appointed House.57 Less than a week before both Houses were due to vote on 
the various options, Tony Blair gave a fairly clear view of his preference, when he 
said he thought a "hybrid" between an elected and an appointed chamber would 
be wrong and would not work. 
"The key question on election is whether we want a revising chamber or a 
rival chamber. My view is that we want a revising chamber.. .. we should be 
cognisant of the need to make sure that we do not have a gridlock".58 
By implication, this endorsed Irvine's call for a wholly appointed House, and 
certainly this was how it was reported.59 
56 Joint Committee on House of Lords Refonn; First Report (HLPaper 17(HC 171. 
The Stationery Office, 2(02). 
57 House of C.ommons Debates, 21st January 2003 (Vol 398, Cols 187·272); House of lAJrds 
Debates, 22nd January 2003 (Vol 643, Cols 831-838). Cook resigned from the government 
a few weeks later over the Iraq war, and Irvine also left it later in the year. 
58 House of Commons Debates, 29th January 2003 (Vol 398, Cols 877-8). 
59 Sl't', for instance The Guardian, 30th January 2003. It would be consistent Wlth l'arlier 
reports that Blair had privately told both Cranborne and Wakeham that he wanted an all 
appmntedinominatcd House (The Guardian. 4th February 2000; The Independent. 
12th April 2(00). 
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When votes were held on 4th February 2003, the House of Commons rejected 
every option that was put, although there was surprisingly strong support for 
outright abolition and the option for 80 per cent elected was only narrowly 
rejected. The House of Lords, itself mostly appointed, voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of the option of an all-appointed House and rejected all other options.60 A 
Labour whip was reported afterwards as saying that "a huge operation had been 
mounted on the Prime Minister's behalf to scupper an elected House .... the 
machine came through for Tony."61 It seemed now that the second stage of 
reform was unlikely to be realised for some time to come; and that what Cook had 
called an "opportunity to bring down the curtain on what has been the longest 
period of political indecision in political history" had been missed.62 
This would mean a continuation of a supposedly interim arrangement, with all the 
anomalies involved. The peculiarities were illustrated by the elections to replace 
hereditary peers who had died. In that held in March 2003 to replace Viscount 
Oxfuird, an office holder, aU peers were eligible to vote and there were 81 
candidates; while in that to replace the Labour peer, Lord Milner, in October 
2003, only the three remaining Labour hereditary peers were eligible to vote, 
although there were eleven candidates.'3 
In June 2003, the government announced plans for the abolition of the post of 
Lord Chancellor and the removal of the law lords from the House of Lords 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
60 House of Commons Debates, 4th February 2003 (Vol 399, Cols 152-242); House of Lords 
Debates (Vol 644, Col 116). In the Commons, the amendment for abolition was defeated 
289-272 and that for 80 per cent elected by 284-281. In the Lords, the all-appointed 
option was supported by 335-110. As Cook had observed in the Commons debate, "most 
of those who were appointed to the second chamber believe that appointment is the 
perfect way in which to maintain it"; although these did not include the then Leader of 
the Lords, Lord Williams of Mostyn, who made clear his support for the whoUy or mainly 
elected options. 
61 The Times, 5th February 2003. Nevertheless, 179 Labour MPs reportedly voted against 
Blair's preferred option of an appointed House, including 21 ministers; and 172 Labour 
MPs supported outright abolition, including five members of the government. 
62 House of Commons Debates, 4th February 2003 (Vol 399, Col 152). Peter Riddell (Tbe 
Times. 5th February 2(03) suggested it meant "the disappearance of any chance of radical 
[('form for at least a decade". 
oJ Information from House of Lords Information Office; also The Times, 28th March and 
28th October 2003. 
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(something which had not been envisaged in the 2001 White Paper);64 and in 
September it issued a consultation paper on further reform, which envisaged a 
chamber whose members would be appointe<L mainly by political parties, the 
number of each having regard to the previous general election result, but with 
about 20 per cent independent. An Appointments Commission would determine 
the number and timing of appointments by each party and also select 
independents in accordance with cetain guidelines. The government should have 
more seats than the main opposition party, but not an overall majority. There 
were no plans to change its role and powers.65 
This blueprint for an appointed chamber was followed in November by the 
Queen's Speech, which contained a commitment to legislate for reform, including 
the removal of the hereditary peers and an independent Appointments 
Commission for non-party members. It generated a hostile response from the 
Conservatives, who were angry at what they regarded as a breach of undertakings 
that the 92 hereditary peers would be retained until there was comprehensive 
reform; and in the Lords' debate on the Queen's Speech, a critical amendment, 
calling on the government to withdraw the proposals, was carried (although this 
would not necessarily have any direct effect).66 
However, by March 2004, the government had already run into difficulties in the 
Lords with the Constitutional Reform Bill (HL), embodying its proposals covering 
the law lords and the office of Lord Chancellor. The government decided not to 
proceed with the proposed legislation on wider Lords' reform during the current 
Parliament, but that a commitment to Lords' reform. including powers, would be 
included in Labour's next manifesto.67 The long running saga could clearly still 
have some way to run. 
64 Reported in The Times, 13th June 2003. Lord Falconer of ThorotoD, for the time being, 
combined the role of Lord Chancellor with the Dew post of Secretary of State for 
C..onstitutioDal Affairs. 
65 C..onstitutional Refonn: Next Steps for the House of Lords (CP 14/03). 
66 House of Lords Debates. 26th November 2003 (Vol 655. Col 3). 
67 See H'POrts in The Indt'fJ<'ndent, 19th March 2004. and Iht' Times. 20th March 2004. 
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CONCLUSION 
Writing in 2004, the United Kingdom still has a second legislative chamber whose 
membership is based on heredity and patronage. The mixture of the two may be 
somewhat different from that pertaining before the changes enacted by the Blair 
government; but still in no way can it be described as democratic, accountable or 
responsible to the electorate. In this respect, it differs from most other modem 
democracies. It is suggested that the events and circumstances outlined in this 
thesis, which preceded the election of the present administration, help throw light 
on why this continues to be the case. It has shown in some detail how and why 
the main political parties developed policies in this area; and how and why, all this 
work notwithstanding, they were never implemented. It has also shown how, 
nevertheless, there were important political ramifications, particularly for the 
Labour Party; and also how wider questions of constitutional propriety and import, 
including the relationships between government, Parliament and the Crown, were 
perceived and dealt with. 
In 1970, at the start of the period in question, a serious attempt at reform by a 
previous Labour government had recently failed, following which, for a time, there 
was little interest or enthusiasm for reform in either of the main parties. This 
failure might have emboldened the House of Lords to make greater use of its 
powers, but the Conservatives, with their strong numerical superiority, were never 
seriously threatened there between 1970 and 1974, with controversial legislation 
going through almost unscathed. 
It was only with the return of a Labour government in 1974, enjoying for a while 
just a very small majority in the Commons and then none at all, that the House of 
Lords, where Labour was very much in a minority, really asserted itself. With such 
a weak position in the Commons, the government was particularly vulnerable. 
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It suffered an enormous number of defeats in the Lords and was forced to 
compromise on important aspects of its legislative programme. The Conservatives 
were accused of acting in breach of the Salisbury doctrine - under which they 
would not use their majority to block legislation which had been in Labour's 
manifesto. Undoubtedly, they sought to use their majority in the Lords to exploit 
the weakness of the Labour government, although this did lead to nervousness on 
the part of some senior figures, who feared it might provoke Labour into action to 
threaten their majority there or even to abolition of the House of Lords 
altogether. 
Their fears were not wholly without foundation. Certainly the Labour government 
was extremely unhappy about the situation and dire threats were made by senior 
ministers. There was apparent support for action amongst Labour backbenchers. 
However, perhaps surprisingly, little thought appears to have been given in 
preceding years as to what Labour might do in such an eventuality; and there is no 
evidence to show that there was any serious discussion of specific measures by 
ministers in government. Admittedly, they were not in a strong position to force 
through any controversial legislation, but they might have been supported by the 
Liberals, with whom Labour, for a period, had a parliamentary pact. Furthermore, 
if comprehensive reform was not contemplated, there was always the possibility of 
a short Bill to tackle the powers of the Lords. Such a Bill had apparently been 
drafted as a possible fall-back measure in 1968 and could presumably have been 
dusted down a decade later; but those involved then seem to have been unaware 
of its existence. 
Although the Labour government may not have discussed any specific action, this 
was not true of the Party's National Executive, which had set up a special group to 
look at policy on this and related issues. After some deliberation, it came forward 
with an extremely radical solution. Having examined various alternatives, it 
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concluded that the most straightforward and practical course would be to abolish 
the House of Lords altogether and dispense with a second chamber. This 
received overwhelming support at the 1977 Party Conference, but some important 
practicalities involved in the implementation of the policy had not been fully 
thought through. These included whether the Parliament Act procedures could be 
used, whether large scale creation of peers was acceptable or feasible and whether 
the Crown might become involved in political controversy. Attention had been 
drawn to these, but the questions had not been resolved - indeed the most senior 
legal figures gave conflicting advice. These questions would be returned to in the 
future, but the policy went forward notwithstanding. An alternative policy, 
involving curbing most of the legislative powers of the Lords, which would have 
avoided some of these practical objections, had been suggested by Party officials, 
but was not accepted at the time. However, it was essentially this policy which 
came to be included in Labour's 1979 manifesto, but only after a major political 
row at the worst possible moment. 
The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, was determined that the commitment to 
abolition be kept out of Labour's manifesto, but when the policy was originally 
going through the Party's policy making machinery, there had been no serious 
attempt to stop it. Indeed ministerial rhetoric might have encouraged expectations 
of radical measures; and some senior ministers certainly supported abolition. 
Once the policy had been adopted overwhelmingly by the Conference, it was 
always going to be difficult to go back on it. At a later stage, when the contents 
of the manifesto itself were being discussed, there was continued support for the 
policy from some senior ministers; and only at the very last minute did Downing 
Street intervene, provoking resentment and a major political row just before a 
general election, even though mechanisms had been set up to avoid that very 
situation. 
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The episode showed how the Prime Minister could be both strong and weak _ 
strong in insisting on a veto over a policy he did not like and thought could be 
damaging to his party; but weak in not having sorted out the problem sooner. 
Moreover, it would have further ramifications for the Labour Party after its 
election defeat, when there were highly acrimonious debates and internal 
constitutional wrangles, followed by the defection of several prominent MPs to a 
new political party. The question of control of the manifesto featured prominently 
in all this, including what had happened to the policy on the House of Lords. 
Events as detailed in this thesis may help explain the background to this and the 
resentments which built up, which proved so damaging to the Party at that time. 
Developments in the Labour Party, and in particular the adoption of a policy of 
abolition, also helped bring about a renewed interest by the Conservative 
opposition in Lords' reform. Certainly there was a strong motivation to come 
forward with proposals which would forestall more radical moves by Labour and to 
establish a second chamber with a greater degree of legitimacy to block what they 
regarded as "extreme" Labour measures. It was in this context that Lord Hailsham 
famously spoke of an "elective dictatorship". 
The Conservatives were forced to acknowledge that the House of Lords as then 
constituted was widely regarded as unacceptable; and indeed a Party committee 
chaired by the former Prime Minister, Lord Home, stated explicitly that the status 
quo was no longer an option and put forward some surprisingly radical proposals 
for a partly or wholly elected second chamber. However, right from the moment 
of publication in 1978, there was a degree of distancing by the Party leadership 
and a sense amongst some of those closely involved that they were unlikely to be 
formally adopted as Party policy, which in the event they were not~ and the 
ensuing manifesto made no specific commitment on the subject. 
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Margaret Thatcher was, to say the least, unenthusiastic about Lords reform; and 
although there were occasional flurries of interest in the ConselVative Party. 
particularly in the early 1980s, when the perceived threat of abolition by Labour 
was still felt, this waned following the 1983 landslide victory, which meant that 
there was little prospect of Labour carrying through any such policy in the 
foreseeable future. Even modest suggestions for minor reforms seemed to find 
little favour. 
During this period, the House of Lords showed itself willing to stand up to the 
ConselVative government on occasion, inflicting on it a number of well publicised 
defeats. Moreover, those opposed to the government's policies sought to use the 
House of Lords much more than previously, although this was probably to a 
substantial degree a reflection of the weak position of the opposition in the 
Commons. Nevertheless, when it came to the crunch, the government usually 
succeeded in getting its way on crucial issues, aided if necessary by its 
"backwoodsmen". It was an irritant rather than an obstacle to the ConselVative 
government; and indeed, in some respects, the occasional defeat on a non-crucial 
issue could potentially be useful to those who sought to defend the House as it 
was. Thus, while Thatcher may have occasionally expressed frustration with the 
House of Lords, there seems never to have been any serious intention of taking 
action. That certainly was also the case under her successor, John Major. The 
status quo had come to suit the Conservatives. 
The events outlined illustrate how political parties have tended to see things from 
different perspectives in government and in opposition. The ConselVative concern 
about "elective dictatorship" largely evaporated in the 1980s and with it most of 
the support in the Party for Lords reform - even though the Thatcher government 
was then in a much stronger position in both Houses than the Wilson or 
Callaghan governments had been in the 1970s (although some Conservative 
politicians were, in retrospect, prepared to acknowledge the existence of "elective 
dictatorship" under Thatcher too). However. since 1997. the ConselVatives have 
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shown a renewed interest in an elected second chamber. Having failed to act 
when previously in office to legitimise the second chamber, they have seen their 
numerical superiority greatly reduced by the removal of most of the hereditary 
peers, and found a new status quo which suits them less well. 
It was not just the Conservatives whose viewpoint changed when in government 
and in opposition. This was also true of Labour. Initially, after its 1979 defeat~ it 
looked back to the policy of abolition. The practicalities of achieving this were 
examined again, but the outstanding questions were never satisfactorily resolved. 
Notwithstanding his own personal support for abolition, the Party Leader, Michael 
Foot, helped narrowly to defeat those who advocated mass creation of peers in an 
attempt to implement the policy and, in the even~ the 1983 manifesto - on this 
aspect of policy, at least - was not dissimilar from that of 1979. However, the 
Party's policy still largely reflected frustration from its time in government and was 
geared mainly towards removing a potential obstacle to a future Labour 
administration. Two further election defeats would change this perspective. 
By the late 1980s, after a decade or so of frustration in opposition, the Labour 
Party came to see the second chamber as a potential means of blocking 
Conservative excesses, an approach similar in many respects to that taken by the 
Conservatives in opposition to the Labour government in the 1970s. It had been 
unable to prevent a Conservative government with a large majority driving through 
major changes, including some with important constitutional implications. Such 
limited successes as there had been had come mostly in the House of Lords. 
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Unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Parliamentary leadership now took much 
more of a leading role in policy development, the influence of the NEC and the 
Party Conference having diminished; and it saw the second chamber as having 
potentially an important role in safeguarding some of the key reforms it was 
working to bring about. Thus, while still advocating abolition of the House of 
Lords as such, it now supported the idea of a democratically based second 
chamber, with enhanced powers to block fundamental changes to constitutional 
and individual rights. As we have seen, similar ideas had been discussed by the 
Conservatives a decade previously, when they were in opposition. 
This was an example of how Labour's much vaunted policy review of the late 
1980s brought about a major change in approach. The policy was, in pa~ bound 
up with the Party's commitment to devolution, particularly in Scotland, and the 
need to be seen to safeguard any settlement there; but certain aspects, including 
whether there could in reality be a formal entrenchment, were never fully worked 
out. The Labour leadership also seems to have assumed rather too readily that a 
new second chamber would share its views in those areas over which it would have 
special powers (an assumption some Tories may also have made in the 1970s). 
This could certainly not be guaranteed; and, had the policy been implemented, a 
future Labour government might have been faced with a second chamber 
equipped with stronger powers and greater legitimacy, attempting to block some 
of its measures. This may be one reason why Tony Blair later came to have 
strong reservations about an elected chamber, and the policy was in due course 
abandoned. Again, it may also illustrate the different perspectives of government 
and opposition. 
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This thesis has concentrated mainly on the development of policy in the two main 
parties. The developments in the Liberal Party and later the SDP and the Liberal 
Democrats have also been noted, but fairly briefly since, although they took an 
interest in this area, they were, for the most part, unlikely to be in a position to 
implement their policies. For a short period in the 1980s the opinion polls may 
have suggested otherwise, but this did not last. Although they might have had the 
potential to exercise influence in a hung Parliament, the issue did not feature in 
the Lib-Lab pact of the 1970s. Later there would be a good deal of common 
ground between Labour and Liberal Democrats on the issue, when they both 
supported an elected second chamber. Had Labour been narrowly elected, say in 
1992, it could probably have counted on Liberal Democrat support to carry 
through any reform of the second chamber. When Labour was eventually elected 
in 1997, it did initially seek collaboration with the Liberal Democrats on issues of 
constitutional reform, but in the end, the Blair government, enjoying a huge 
Commons majority, acted on its own initiative to reform the House of Lords. 
The Labour government has now, to some extent at least, succeeded in what was 
an objective over much of the post-war period, in creating a second chamber 
which is no longer dominated by its political opponents and which may be - in the 
same way as it was to its Conservative predecessors - an irritant but not a serious 
obstacle to its programme. By contrast, the Conservatives, having shown an 
interest in heading off what they regarded as unacceptable reforms by Labour 
when in opposition, failed to act when they were in office. Thus we now have a 
situation in the early years of the 21st century in which, having carried through a 
modest but undemocratic reform which ended Conservative dominance of the 
second chamber, a Labour government appears reluctant to pursue any reform 
which might result in a body with greater legitimacy to obstruct its programme. 
-----------
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It is probably true to say that the present situation IS widely regarded as 
unsatisfactory, having resulted in a sort of half-way House that is neither 
accountable nor democratic and which still lacks legitimacy. This might suggest 
that there was some merit in the argument that abolition could be the most 
straightforward course of action. Certainly there is a strong case for arguing that 
there might have been a more satisfactory outcome if one or other of the previous 
schemes, which this thesis has examined in detail, had been implemented. These 
have ranged from outright abolition to a fully elected chamber, both of which were 
advocated at various times by the Labour Party. They have also included the 
elected or part-elected, part-nominated chamber proposed by the Conservatives' 
committee under Lord Home in the 1970s; and the variants on these proposed at 
various times by the Liberals and the Liberal Democrats. Each of them had 
various advantages and also disadvantages, which have been discussed here; but 
each of them would have had some coherence and would, arguably, have been 
preferable to the present position. As it was, a good deal of time and effort was 
expended and political controversy engendered, but the House of Lords survived; 
and despite recent changes, the challenge of establishing a more representative, 
accountable and viable second chamber remains to be addressed by politicians in 
the 21st century. 
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APPENDIX 1 
HOUSE OF LORDS: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
Table 1 Composition of the House of Lords 
Type of Peer 1970/71 1980/81 1991/92 
Hereditary by Succession 764 769 758 
Hereditary - First Creation 86 35 19 
Life Peers (1958 Act) 184 330 373 
Life Peers (Law Lords, 1876 Act) 18 19 20 
Lords Spiritual 26 26 26 
TOTAL 1078 1179 1185 
Of the above: 
Without Writ 101 87 80 
On Leave of Absence 171 160 133 
Sources: JAG Griffith and M Ryle, with M A J Wheeler Booth: 
Parliament - Functions, Practice and Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell, 1989); 
House of Lords Information Office 
Note: Peers on Leave of Absence or without writ were ineligible to attend. 
Table 2 Party Strengths in the House of Lords 1988-89 
Hereditary Life Law Lords Total 
Conservative 328 105 433 
Labour 12 101 113 
LiblLib Dem 29 27 56 
SDP 9 14 23 
Cross Bench 134 86 20 240 
Source: D Shell & D Beamish: The House of Lords at Work: A Study based 
on the 1988-89 Session (Clarendon Press, 1993). 
Note: (i) "Hereditary' includes those of first creation. 
(ii) Bishops and other peers without any registered affiliation not included. 
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Table 3 Changes in Party Strengths in the House of Lords 
1975 1991 
Conservative 292 458 
Labour 149 115 
Lib / Lib Oem 30 68 
Cross Bench 281 259 
Sources: D Butler and G Butler: Twentieth Century British Political 
Facts 1900-2000 (Macmillan, 2000);-1-
Dods Parliamentary Companion (1992 edition). 
Note: (i) Peers without any registered affiliation not included: 
(ii) Figures quoted for 1968 (Cmnd 3999, p 5) show Conservative 351, 
Labour 116, Liberal 41, Other 554 (including those without registered 
affiliation ). 
Table 4 Peerage Creations by Prime Ministers 
(i) By Category of Peerage 
Hereditary Life Law Lords Total Annual 
(1958 Act) Average 
Heath 1970-74 45 3 48 12 
Wilson 1974-76 80 3 83 38 
Callaghan 1976-79 58 2 60 19 
Thatcher 1979-90 4 201 11 216 18 
Major 1990-97 160 11 171 25 
(ii) By party affiliation 
Con Lab Lib/Lib Dem! Crossbencb/ Total 
SDP Other 
Heath 1970-74 8 9 2 26 45 
Wilson 1974-76 22 39 6 13 80 
Callaghan 1976-79 5 29 1 23 58 
Thatcher 1979-90 98 56 10 41 205 
Major 1990-97 75 40 17 28 160 
Source: Peerage Creations 1958-1998 (House of Lords LibraI)' Notes). 
Note: (i) The above figures are listed under the Prime Minister at the time 
of announcement. Resignation/dissolution honours which were 
the responsibility of an outgoing Prime Minister are included under 
his/her successor, if announced later. Available information suggests 
that under Heath there were 8 thus attributable to Wilson, under Thatcher 
11 attributable to Callaghan, and under Major 7 attributable to Thatcher. 
(ii) Of Major's total of 160, 35 preceded the 1992 general election (and 
there were a further 21 dissolution honours). 
(iii) List by party affiliation does not include Law Lords. 
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Table 5 House of Lords Attendance 1989-90 
Conservative 
Labour 
Lib/SDP 
Crossbench/Other 
Bishops 
Law Lords 
All Created Peers 
% Attending over 
one-third of sittings 
20.1 
25.7 
27.8 
5.7 
0.0 
10.5 
21.0 
All Peers by Succession 10.6 
Total 14.3 
% Not attending 
at aJJ 
11.6 
7.1 
9.7 
56.1 
7.7 
31.6 
9.9 
41.7 
30.4 
Source: D. Shell: House of Lords (2nd Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992). 
Note: The above figures include those without writ or on leave of absence. 
[If these are excluded, the figure for Crossbench / Other attending 
one-third of sittings is 10.2%; and for those not attending at alJ is 
21.2%. The total figures are then respectively 1Z7% and 14.0%.J 
Table 6 House of Lords Business 
Session Sittings Ave length Average Public Amendments Divisions 
of Sitting Attendance Bills Made 
1971-72 141 5hr 46min 249 89 974 171 
1990-91 137 6hr 28min 324 63 635 104 
Sources: Butler & Butler (op cit); House of Lords Information Office. 
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Table 7 Government Defeats in the House of Lords 
(i) By Periods of Government 
Defeats Divisions % 
1970 - 74 (Can) 26 459 5.7 
1974 - 79 (Lab) * * * 
1979 - 83 (Can) 45 723 6.2 
1983 - 87 (Can) 62 700 8.9 
1987 - 92 (Can) 72 841 8.6 
Source: Divisions in the House of Lords since 1970-71 (House of Lords 
Information Office, 1996). 
Note: Figures for Labour government 1974-79 are incomplete. However they are 
available for 1975 - 79 and show 240 defeats in 308 divisions (77%). 
According to Shell (The House of Lords, op cit, p 25), over the whole 
period the Labour government was defeated more than 350 times in over 
80% of divisions. Another reference source, Parliament in the 1980s 
(ed Philip Norton; Basil Blackwell, 1985; p 14), lists 362 defeats in those 
two Parliaments. 
(ii) Individual Sessions 
Defeats Divisions % 
1971 - 72 5 171 3 
1975 - 76 126 146 86 
1980 - 81 18 184 10 
1984 - 85 17 142 12 
1988 - 89 12 189 6 
Source: As for 7(i) above. 
Note: These statistics cover the first normal length session of each Parliament. 
Table 8 Life Peerage Creations 
Total Number of Peerages created under 1958 
Life Peerages Act since its inception: 
as at June 1970 188 
as at June 1992 621 
Source: Ilouse of Lords Information Office. 
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APPENDIX 2 
LABOUR PARTY MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT STUDY GROUP 
Membership: 1976 
National Executive Committee: 
Eric Heffer MP (Chairman), Tony Benn MP, Michael Foot MP, John Forrester, 
Bryan Stanley, Shirley Williams MP 
Co-opted Members: 
Tony Banks*, Norman Buchan MP*, Ken Coates*, Bernard Crick, 
Lord Crowther Hunt, Norman Ellis, John Garrett MP, Bryan Gould MP, 
John Griffith * , Adrian Ham*, Cledwyn Hughes MP, Sydney Irving MP, 
Bill Kendall * , Neil Kinnock MP*, David Lea, Alex Lyon MP*, John Lyttle, 
John Mackintosh MP, Michael Meacher MP*, Frances Morrell, Robert Neild, 
Arthur Palmer MP, Derek Robinson, Brian Sedgemore MP*, Robert Sheldon MP, 
Lord Shepherd, Dennis Skinner MP*, John Torode*, Bill Wedderburn* 
Secretary: Tim Lamport 
Note (i) The co-opted membership was first agreed in April 1976. Those 
additional members whom it was agred to co-opt in June 1976 are 
indicated by *. 
(ii) Some co-opted members were initially described as "correspondent 
members", but this distinction made little difference in practice. 
(iii) As of February 1977, the membership had been amended as follows: 
Deletions: Michael Foot MP (NEC); Bernard Crick, Norman Ellis, 
Lord Shepherd (co-opted members) 
Additions: Judith Hart MP (NEC); Lord Balogh, Michael English MP 
(co-opted members) 
Membership: 1981 
National Executive Committee: 
Eric Heffer MP (Chairman), Tony Benn MP, Judith Hart MP, 
Dennis Skinner MP 
Co-opted Members: 
Lord Balogh, Tony Banks, Norman Buchan MP, Bill Callaghan, Ann Carlton, 
Campbell Christie, Lord Crowther Hunt, Colin Crouch, Michael English MP, 
John Garrett MP, Bryan Gould, John Griffith, Adrian Ham, Roy Hattersley MP, 
Stanley Henig MP, Patricia Hewitt, Lord lIving, Joe Jacob, Alex Lyon MP, 
Michael Meacher MP, Frances Morrell, Charles Morris MP, Brian Sedgemore, 
Robert Sheldon MP, John Silkin MP, John Torode, Alan Williams MP 
Secretary: Tim Lamport 
Note: In addition to the above, Rober Neild and Lord Wedderburn 
were designated 'Consultative members'. 
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